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In this study I investigate some of the reasons behind Turkey’s inability to resolve its Kurdish issue despite 
the enormous human, political and economic cost of the conflict between the state and the PKK. The 
answer is explored in continued importance of Turkish nationalist discourses and the shortcomings of 
the public discourse on the Kurdish issue. To be precise, this work examines: 1) how Kurds and their 
demands for cultural and political rights were represented in the Turkish-language mainstream press 
(1999–2005), and 2) the debates over proposals to change the conceptualizations of the citizenship of 
Turkey within attempts for a resolution to Turkey’s Kurdish issue (in 2005 and 2009).
To achieve this, news and columns published in the Milliyet, Zaman, Yeni Şafak, Cumhuriyet 
and Sabah national dailies were examined through five case studies. How the press: 1) represented the 
pro-Kurdish political actors in the context of the elections of 1999; 2) approached the demands for 
multilingual Turkey in the context of the Kurdish language education petition campaigns of 2001–2002; 
3) assessed the disruption of formal democratic procedures and the banning of the pro-Kurdish HADEP 
(People’s Democracy Party) in 2003; and 4) evaluated the first tentative attempt of the AKP (Justice 
and Development Party) Prime Minister Erdoğan to change the official definition of the issue in 2005. 
Through these cases I follow the gradually increasing visibility of Kurds and the category “Kurdish” in the 
public space and the widening acknowledgement of a de-facto cultural/linguistic diversity in Turkey. The 
fifth case study is a comparison of reporting on two instances of debate on citizenship and the Kurdish 
issue from 2005 and 2009 in the Milliyet, Zaman and Cumhuriyet dailies. Here the focus is shifted to 
explicit debates on national identity and citizenship, and on representations and normative arguments. 
The analysis is based on selected tools and approaches of critical discourse analysis, influenced by 
frame analysis. Two main sets of textural features are analyzed: 1) naming of participants, locations and 
processes, and 2) quotation patterns. Attention is also paid on how various speakers frame and legitimize 
their stances, as well as skewed causal structures and absences/silences. 
To understand the debates in the print press, it is necessary to look at how the Turkish nation 
was created, and Turkish citizenship formulated, within the Kemalist nation-building and state-building 
projects (1920s-1930s), and to follow how these formulations and related minority policies changed 
from the 1940s to late 1970s. An important point of reformulation of Turkish (official) nationalism was 
in the aftermath of the 1980 military coup d’etat, and the process of discursive change analyzed in this 
work begun in the 1990s with the challenge of the imagined and enforced homogeneity of the nation by 
claims for ethnic, religious and sectarian identities.
From these analyzes I derived three interconnected main arguments. First, until 2003 there were 
no concrete groups, or even individuals labeled as Kurds in the news reports, but rather roundabout 
labels were used. Because Kurdishness remained an abstract category, we are led to approach claims of a 
“recognition of a Kurdish reality” in Turkey in the 1990s with caution. Our investigation shows, rather, 
that it was only in the early 2000s that a more sustained discursive transformation took place. Second, 
the successful utilization of state-centric and security-oriented conservative nationalist discourse by the 
main opposition party, the CHP (Republican People’s Party) to counter the ruling AKP’s Democratic 
Opening in 2009 points towards the continuing power of various stands of nationalist discourse in 
Turkey. Conservative (Kemalist) nationalism was used as a powerful instrument in a situation of political 
polarization. Third, while the multicultural state of affairs may have become increasingly acknowledged, 
even by 2009 there was almost no support for group rights and only limited support for affirmative 
4action. Demands for minority rights continued to be discussed within a framework of security rather 
than as issues of justice, and the idea of minority right was still presented as an existential threat to the 
state.
The main contribution of my dissertation aims to make is to the literature on Turkish nationalism 
and citizenship by a systematic analysis of some relatively recent every-day manifestations of nationalism 
in an important sector of the public non-state discourse.
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ChaPter 1: introDUCtion
You will not believe there is a problem; you will believe there is no problem. If you believe there is a 
problem, there is a problem. If you believe there is no problem; it will disappear. We say, for us there 
is no such problem. (AKP’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on the Kurdish issue, quoted 
in Hürriyet 25.12.2002)
The Kurdish issue is Turkey’s issue (Prime Minister Erdoğan quoted in Sabah 12.8.2005)
There is no Kurdish issue, there is a problem of terrorism. (President Erdoğan quoted in Radikal 
6.1.2016)1
Turkish nationalism has traditionally imagined the Turkish nation as a culturally homogeneous unified whole. 
The most visible and serious challenges of the unitary ideal offered by the official state nationalism have been 
both the violent campaigns of the PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, The Kurdistan Workers Party) from 
1984 onwards, and the activities of a series of legal pro-Kurdish political parties from 1990 onwards. 
The war against the PKK has not only cost Turkey immensely in human, economic and political 
terms, it has also strained Turkey’s relations with its neighbors. Turkey’s inability to come to terms with the 
demands of its Kurdish population has also tarnished Turkey’s international reputation, especially from the 
early 1990s onwards, when the status and treatment of minorities became seen as matters of international 
concern. In the 1980s and 1990s, the rigid stance of the state hindered open public debate on non-military 
or non-security approaches towards solving the issue, but after 1999, the abatement of the separatist threat 
to state security and Turkey’s gradual democratization as a part of its integration with the EU opened a 
possibility of publicly discussing the Kurdish issue—including mentions of an ethnic or national Kurdish 
identity—with perspectives that surpassed those of “terrorism” and security. Some scholars had anticipated 
this change in mainstream attitudes. In 1997 the well-known researchers, Gareth Winrow and Kemal 
Kirişçi, wrote in their important work, The Kurdish Question and Turkey. An Example of a Trans-State Ethnic 
Conflict: “The political system in Turkey is going through a slow and painful transformation which may 
eventually allow for expressions of Kurdish identity” (Winrow & Kirişçi 1997, 114); and in 2004 Murat 
Somer concluded his quantitative analysis on Kurds in the Turkish media by stating that the 1990s had 
witnessed a “growing visibility of Kurdish identity” (Somer 2004, 246-248). 
Yet, it was only in the summer of 2009 that the AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, the Justice and 
Development Party) government of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan launched its “Democratic 
Initiative,” a plan that aimed to resolve the long-enduring Kurdish issue by initiating a serious and 
credible non-military attempt to end the conflict and address the claims made by the Kurdish-speaking 
minority. A vital part of the initiative labeled “the Democratic Initiative” and soon dubbed “the Kurdish 
Opening” was the argument for a need to redefine Turkish citizenship. While the AKP’s initiative was 
applauded by many among the Turkish intelligentsia as the most serious attempt thus seen to resolve the 
Kurdish issue, it also engendered resistance among both political opponents and many ordinary citizens 
for—among other things—challenging the notion of “Turkishness.” 
1 The translations are mine.
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The 2009 opening failed, for it did not manage to engender a general consensus, or enact significant, 
concrete reforms. On the contrary, it ended in disappointment, strained relationships between different 
actors, and a nationalist backlash. The pro-Kurdish2 party of the time, the DTP (Demokratik Toplum 
Partisi, Democratic Society Party), was closed at the end of the year; several pro-Kurdish mayors and 
politicians were incarcerated, and the PKK again intensified its violent campaign against the Turkish 
state. In addition, the ensuing public-political debates were accompanied in various locations by instances 
of violent inter-ethnic clashes and ethnically motivated lynch mobs, acts that up to then had been rare 
in Turkey. It was only in 2013 that another attempt at rapprochement was tried, but this too did not 
advance as hoped for, and the war started once again in 2015.
The important question, of course, is why? Why were there no serious attempts at non-military 
solutions prior to 2009 and why did the 2009 initiative fail? Why was the progress from 2009 onwards 
both slow and problematic? In this work the answer is explored by investigating the shortcomings of the 
(non-state) public discourse on the Kurdish issue, a discourse that attests to the rigidity and continued 
strength of nationalist discourses. This discourse has, for the most part, served to support the illegitimacy 
of demands voiced by sub-national groups for cultural and political rights, made open public debates on 
the issue difficult, and hindered the finding of a resolution.
In the empiric part of this dissertation I investigate: 1) how Kurds and Kurdish demands for cultural 
and political rights were portrayed in the Turkish-language mainstream press (1999–2005); and 2) how 
the debates over proposals to change the way traditional conceptualizations of citizenship of Turkey 
were conceptualized within efforts to resolve Turkey’s Kurdish issue (in 2005 and 2009). Through the 
analysis of media texts I investigate one phase of the slow, difficult, and contested process of discursive 
transformation that has been ongoing since the late 1980s or at least by the early 1990s with the gradual 
and partial acknowledgment of the irreversible diversity of Turkish society, and the deep cultural 
divisions within the Turkish nation. Until the 1990s, the nation had been conceptualized as a unified 
and harmonious whole, one without significant cultural and linguistic cleavages. 
However, the scope of this study as a whole is much wider. It begins with an examination of the 
formation of the Turkish nation-state, and how the citizenship of Turkey and membership in the Turkish 
nation were formulated during the early republican period (1920s and 1930s). It continues with the 
tracing of these formulations and related minority policies vis-à-vis the Kurdish speaking population over 
time, and follows the development of Kurdish nationalism from the 1960s onwards, and pro-Kurdish 
political activities from 1990 onward. In addition, there is a lengthy section on the development of 
the Turkish-language press. These lengthy chapters rely on a wide range of relevant social and political 
research on Turkey. They are integral parts of the work, and vital (especially for a non-Turkish reader) for 
contextualizing the media debates analyzed in the empiric part.
1.1 ReseaRch details
A variety of primary and secondary sources are used in this study. The majority of the sources can be 
grouped under the following categories: 1) literature on theories of nationalism and on nationalism in 
2 The term pro-Kurdish connotes a political stance rather than an ethnic identity (Watts 1999, 651, fn 6).
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Turkey; 2) literature on theories of citizenship and citizenship in Turkey, both with emphasis on issues of 
managing diversity and multiculturalism; 3) literature on media studies, especially studies of representation, 
ethnicity, nationalism and minorities in media; and 3) literature on the history of society and politics in 
Turkey. In addition, a number of primary sources such as law texts and newspaper articles are used.
The empiric part of the study is comprised of a series of five case studies. The material analyzed 
consists of news articles and columns published in the national Turkish dailies Milliyet, Zaman, Yeni 
Şafak, Cumhuriyet and Sabah on issues related to Turkey’s Kurdish speaking population, their claims 
for specific rights, their representation, and public debates on how to solve the Kurdish issue. The 
first four cases look at how the press: 1) presented pro-Kurdish political actors within normal, routine 
democratic settings investigated via the reporting on pro-Kurdish HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, 
People’s Democracy Party) in the elections of 1999; 2) approached the issue of language and demands 
for multilingual Turkey investigated via reporting on the Kurdish language education petition campaigns 
of 2001–2002; 3) interpreted the disruption of formal democratic procedures with juridical pressure on 
pro-Kurdish activism investigated via reporting on the closure of HADEP by the Constitutional Court 
in 2003; and finally 4) evaluated the first tentative attempt by the AKP Prime Minister Erdoğan to 
change the official definition of the issue in 2005. Through these different spheres or topics I follow the 
gradually increasing visibility of Kurds and the category “Kurdish” in the mainstream public space and 
the widening acknowledgement of a de-facto cultural/linguistic diversity in Turkey.
The fifth case study is comprised of a comparison of reporting on two instances of debate on the 
Kurdish issue and Turkish citizenship from November 2005 and July-August 2009 (the beginning of the 
so-called Kurdish opening) in the dailies Milliyet, Zaman, and Cumhuriyet. In this last case the center 
of attention is shifted to explicit debates on national identity and citizenship, with focus on both the 
kind of reality constructed i.e. how things are (re)presented, as well as on normative arguments over how 
things ought to be.
The analysis of the media texts centers on two main sets of textual features: 1) naming of 
participants, locations, and processes, and 2) quotation patterns. Attention is also paid to how various 
speakers frame or legitimize their stances in the texts, as well as to skewed causal structures and absences/
silences. Both the method of analysis used and the approach towards the texts are significantly influenced 
by critical discourse analysis, with some ideas offered by framing analysis, which has been used to analyze 
how individual speakers and writers framed their statements and opinions. As this textual analysis 
is qualitative, it limits the number of texts that can be analyzed, which necessitates a limited sample 
consisting of clearly specified snapshots rather than reporting over longer time periods. 
1.2 aRguments
I make three interconnected main arguments in this work. First, my analyses of the news reporting on 
the elections of 1999, the Kurdish language campaigns of 2002, and the closure of the pro-Kurdish 
party HADEP in 2003 led me to discover that no concrete groups of people, let alone actual individuals, 
were actually labeled as Kurds; on the contrary, roundabout labels such as the people, voters of the South-
East, HADEP voters, citizens, inhabitants of the region, people of the South-East, persons, students, teachers, 
mothers, guardians, women and children were used. Kurdishness remained only an abstract category; thus, 
one should be cautious about how one interprets the claims of “recognition of a Kurdish reality” in 
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Turkey in the 1990s (among others: Pope 1991; Kirisci & Winrow 1997; Gürbey 1996; Yavuz 2001). 
On the basis of my findings, it is argued that it was only in the early 2000s that a more comprehensive 
and sustained discursive transformation occurred.
Second, the successful utilization of state-centric and security-oriented conservative nationalist 
discourse by the main opposition party, the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People’s Party), 
to counter the AKP’s Democratic Opening in 2009 points towards the continuing power and availability 
of various stands of the nationalist discourse in Turkey. The social-democratic (and Kemalist-nationalist) 
CHP headed by Deniz Baykal vehemently opposed the opening, despite his party also having introduced 
similar initiatives in the 1990s. According to Fuat E. Keyman, in response to its loss of expectation of 
electoral success, the CHP adopted a political strategy that shifted the focus of political competition 
from politics and political competition to polity, i.e. the constitutional and institutional norms, values, 
and decision-making procedures that frame the competition among political parties, and to thus present 
itself as the defender of the existing polity (Keyman 2010). As non-securitization and democratization 
were not in the interests of the CHP,3 it successfully utilized to its purposes the long-dominant Kemalist-
nationalist discourse with its emphasis on cultural homogeneity as a guarantee of national security.4 
While conservative nationalism5 was most likely not the root cause of CHP’s opposition, it now became 
useful as a powerful instrument in the climate of political polarization caused by the strained relations 
between the largest parties and the majoritarian defects of Turkish democracy.
The third argument concerns the possible means of resolution of the Kurdish issue, and minority 
or group rights. While the multicultural state of affairs may have become increasingly visible, accepted, 
and acknowledged, at that time in 2009 the sample analyzed in this work indicated almost no support 
for multicultural policies of group-rights, and only limited support for (economic) affirmative action. 
In this regard Turkey differs significantly from the Western European countries, where internal self-
determination (i.e. territorial autonomy) and official bilingualism has become the norm for sizable, 
territorially-concentrated national minorities with nationalist aspirations (Kymlicka 2004). From the 
1970s onwards, demands for minority rights in the West have become addressed as issues of justice, 
whereas it was obvious from the sample that in Turkey demands for minority rights continued to be 
discussed within a framework of security, very much like in the post-communist countries of Eastern 
Europe. The comments of representatives of both the MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, the Nationalist 
Movement Party) and CHP reflect the idea of minority rights as an existential threat to the state, and 
the interpretation of minority rights as an issue of social justice was almost absent from the debate. 
While this makes the resolution of the Kurdish issue more difficult, it does not necessarily mean that the 
cultural and linguistic rights of Kurds cannot be improved, as long as conceptualized within individual 
citizens’ rights rather than as any form of communal rights.
3 It is not unusual for national elites to securitize minority issues as they can be used to trump both normal democratic 
processes of debate and negotiation as well as issues of justice (Kymlicka 2004).
4 There were several other reasons for the failure of the opening, one of which was a popular reaction against visible displays of 
Kurdish nationalism in the course of the Opening.
5 For definition, see chapter seven.
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1.3 impoRtance and contRibution
My dissertation has several aims. The most important aim is to contribute to the by-now considerable 
literature on Turkish nationalism and citizenship through a systematic analysis of some relatively recent 
every-day manifestations of nationalism in an important sector of the public non-state discourse. 
Systematic analyses of Turkishness and Kurds in the media have so far been rare (for examples, see 
Somer 2005a; Sezgin & Wall 2005; Erdem 2014). This particular study aims to investigate the process 
of discursive transformation and to evaluate the role the print media played in it: how the discourse 
changed and in what ways the media’s reporting on the demands for Kurdish rights and recognition 
of Kurdish ethnicity or nation as distinct from the Turkish one within Turkey promoted or hindered 
the creation of a multicultural Turkey and constitutional reconstitution of Turkish citizenships in a 
form tolerant of cultural diversity, as has been called for by influential scholars of Turkey (most notably 
Keyman & İçduygu 2005; Keyman & Öniş 2007). Through a case study of concrete material the work 
hopes to illuminate both the advances in, and the still continuing problems of, accommodating cultural 
and linguistic diversity in Turkey. The interest is on both the kind of reality constructed i.e. how things 
are (re)presented as well as on normative arguments over how things ought to be. At the center of 
the debates is the question of how Turkey, with its increasingly obvious cultural, linguistic and ethnic 
diversity, could be governed. And if this governing process could not be achieved in a totally democratic 
and fair way, could it at least be carried out in a way that could achieve peace? What kind of relationship 
could be established between national identity and citizenship, and should the nation be retained as the 
source of social solidarity upon which the state is based? In addition to this main contribution, my work 
aims to present a succinct account in English (for a non-Turkish reader) of the creation of the Turkish 
nation, its policies on minority groups, and the evolving relations between the Turkish nation-state and 
the Kurdish-speaking minority from the 1920s until the 2000s. In a limited way my study also addresses 
the situation of Turkey’s Kurdish minority, which remains a seriously understudied topic despite recent 
advances (such as Gunes & Zeydanlıoğlu 2014). In addition, it also aims to make a contribution to the 
currently extremely limited body of works on the Turkish print media in English. Thus, the section on 
the fascinating history of the Turkish print press is quite a bit longer than necessary as a means of fully 
contextualizing the main issue investigated in this work. 
In the following paragraphs of this introductory chapter I will situate my research question within the 
context of theoretic discussions on nationalism, citizenship, and management of diversity in modern 
nation-states as well as Turkey and Turkey’s Kurdish issue. Since this is a case study rather than a 
theoretic work, it does not include a separate chapter on theory. The central concepts of the study such 
as nationalism, nation-state, nation, ethnicity, minority and citizenship are first introduced here and these 
will be revisited in the following chapters and discussed at more length in relation to the concrete case at 
hand.
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1.4 nationalism studies
Nationalism and the Nation-state
Turkey is far from alone in its struggles with ethnically or nationally motivated violence, claims for 
recognition for various linguistic, ethnic, cultural or national minority identities, and rising nationalist 
right-wing currents. Because virtually all nation-states struggle with ethno-politic issues, Turkey is 
neither alone nor unique because of its Kurdish problem (Yeğen 2006). The 1990s witnessed a highly 
visible resurgence of nationalism around the globe, among which we can cite the creation of a host of 
new independent nation-states (such as Estonia, Lithuania, Latvia, Kirghizistan, Uzbekistan, Georgia, 
Armenia and Azerbaijan) and the ethnically motivated violence and wars in different corners of the world 
(such as former Yugoslavia and Rwanda). When this picture was completed with the problems related to 
immigration and cultural diversity in the established nation-states of the West, as well as the rise of right-
wing populist and nationalist movements in Europe, it looked like nationalism was very much on the 
rise again. As Craig Calhoun rightly pointed out in 1997, “In the 1990s, nationalism became front page 
news again.” (Calhoun 1997, 1). 
In line with the increasing visibility of nationalism in the 1990s, nationalism studies became 
established as a distinct interdisciplinary field, to which contributions have been made by scholars from 
various backgrounds ranging from area studies to sociology and anthropology. The process was facilitated 
by the appearance of new approaches towards nationalism introduced in a few seminal works in the 
1980s. Ernst Gellner’s Nations and Nationalism was published in 1983, Benedict Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities came out the same year, and Anthony D. Smith’s The Ethnic Origins of Nations appeared 
in 1986. The ideas of the theorists were taken up by academics at large when the continuing power of 
nationalism became evident after the end of the Cold War. The birth of nationalism studies as a distinct 
field is also attested by the appearance of several periodicals that concentrate on nationalism: both Nations 
and Nationalism (edited by Anthony D. Smith) and Nationalism and Ethnic Politics began publication in 
1995, and National Identities has been published since 2000.
Scholars engaged in nationalism studies have emphasized the pervasive influence of nationalism 
with its multiple and varied forms in shaping the modern world as we know it (for example Calhoun 
1997). Partly, however, due to the plurality and scope of nationalism, the scholarship of nationalism 
has not produced a general theory of nationalism that is valid for all cases in all times. It has even 
been argued that since the terms nationalism and nation are used to designate a whole range of widely 
diverse discourses and entities, a general theory applying to all is simply not possible (Özkırımlı 2000, 
10). Just as there is no general theory, there is also no single, generally agreed upon and encompassing 
definition of the term nationalism. It can be associated with war and ethnic cleansing as well as with 
democracy, citizenship, and political legitimacy. Depending on the context and case, nationalism can, 
at the least, be understood as: an idea or ideology, a form of behavior, a political or social movement, a 
political principle, or a discursive formation (for more details see: Özkırımlı 2000, 58-9; Pakkasvirta & 
Saukkonen 2005, 40).
Theories of nationalism have been categorized under two loose labels: modernist and primordialist/
essentialist. According to modernist theorizing, the nation-state is a specifically modern way to organize 
political community, one naturalized by nationalist discourse that developed into the dominant way 
of thinking about the world during the 19th and early 20th centuries (among others Gellner 1983, 
Anderson 1991, Calhoun 1997). Scholars classified under the broad category modernist (for example 
by Özkırımlı 2000, Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2005) have connected the spread of nationalism and the 
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institution of nation-states to: the needs of the developing capitalist economy and industrialization (for 
example Tom Nairn 1975), political transformation associated with modernization and the need to 
legitimate centralization of power (for example Hobsbawm 1990), and such cultural transformations as 
urbanization and the emergence of mass society with widespread literacy and mass media (for example: 
Gellner 1983; Anderson 1991). Competing theories of nationalism labeled alternatively as primordialist, 
perennialist, or essentialist (Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2005, 23-25; Özkırımlı 2000) tend to place their 
emphasis on the antiquity of nations. In a sort of middle-ground is Anthony D. Smith’s (1986) ethno-
symbolism, an approach that emphasizes the pre-national cultural commonalities that underlie modern 
nations.6 In this current work I follow in the footsteps of the modernists.
In nationalist and conventional everyday thinking, nation-states were expected to be economically 
and politically independent, sovereign, bounded entities. They were to have clear borders corresponding 
to the boundaries of the nation with uniformity within and a measure of difference when compared to 
the outside. Ideally, every nation was to have its own state. By the time of the founding of the Republic 
of Turkey in 1923, the nation-state had become the dominant model of political organization of the 
modern era, and the Turkish case shares its general features with various other modernist and nationalist 
state-building and nation-building projects, which worked to create the ideal homogenous bounded 
unit. Like the other nation-states, the new Turkish state was also expected to be a centralized polity 
with flattened traditional regional, cultural, linguistic, ethnic, and religious differences, achieved by 
compulsory education, citizen armies, and improved networks of communication and transport, etc. 
The rhetoric of national homogeneity used in nationalist nation-building projects worked to hide the 
differences within nations or nation-states on one hand, and the similarities between the populations of 
different nation-states on the other. Thus the Turkish nation was constructed as a separate entity that was 
essentially different from, for example, the Greek nation. 
In the world of nation-states, every state is expected to have a nation, and even inter-state relationships 
are routinely referred to by the term international i.e. taking place between nations rather than states 
(Özkırımlı 2000, 58). Beginning with the French revolution, ”sovereignty has belonged to the people,” 
with this people most often imagined as a nation. Michael Billig (1995) has also noted in his study Banal 
Nationalism how the nationalist discursive and structural bias extends to research as well, as contemporary 
social sciences tend to research societies, which are defined along national lines: the Finnish society, the 
Turkish society, etc. An indication of the strength of the naturalization of nationalist ways of dividing the 
world into neat compartments, i.e. nation-states, is the difficulty of avoiding them as units of analysis. Billig 
himself ended up analyzing the British national press, just as I analyze the Turkish national press.
The Turkish Nation and the Kurdish Ethnicity?
In modernist scholarship the objective, structural criteria of nation such as a shared language and history 
has been complemented with or even replaced by subjective criteria (Özkırımlı 2000, 58). Accordingly, 
“nation” can be defined as a community of people who believe they share crucial characteristics 
such as descent, history, culture, language, or future, commonalities that give them the right to self-
determination (following Suny 2001). Nation is seen as one form of social solidarity implying a measure 
of integration and a collective identity, that is, recognition of the whole by its members, a sense of 
6 For more detailed classifications, see: Özkırımlı 2000; Calhoun 1997, 20-23; Pakkasvirta & Saukkonen 2005, 23-35.
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individual that includes membership in the whole (Calhoun 1997, 4). Conventionally, membership 
in a nation should also be equal and unique: each member is directly a member of the nation with 
equal status of membership, and at the same time each individual is a member of one and only one 
nation (Calhoun 1997, 18). Other criteria such as name, possession of a state or a homeland or at least 
a claim to a historic homeland, or belonging to a common economic sphere are sometimes added to the 
characteristic features of nations.7 The lack of exact criteria does not constitute a problem, as nation is 
a potent and emotion evoking symbol, one that works because it is often ambiguous (Verdery 1993). 
People who belong to a certain nation can still dispute who they are, and can argue about boundaries and 
about what is “authentic” (Suny 2001). 
The premise in this study is that nations, like nationalism and nation-states, are modern creations, 
even when they have older roots in previously existing cultural commonalities. The shared commonalities 
of a nation are not taken to be necessarily historically true, but to refer to an idealized homogeneity 
produced within the general discursive formation of nationalism and the specific nation-state formations. 
Accordingly, the Turkish nation does not have a history of thousands of years, but is one, rather, that came 
into being with the Kemalist modernizing project from the early 1920s onwards. The Turkish nation-state 
invested considerable effort into building a Turkish nation, and as a state it had the necessary resources 
and tools to ensure the success of this nation-building. It is important to note that the perception of 
nations as historical social constructions, rather than essential or primordial formations, does not render 
them any less real or less important for both members of the nations and in the international arena. The 
fact that I acknowledge the constructed nature of the Finnish nation as a part of the Finnish nationalist 
project during the 19th century does not make me any less Finnish; nor does the argument of the Turkish 
nation as a creation of the Kemalist modernizing project render Turkish nationality any less important as 
a source of identity for individual Turks.
Contemporaneously with the Turkish nation-building project, the new nation-state worked to 
suppress the development of alternative nationalisms, such as Kurdish nationalism and the creation of 
a Kurdish national identity as distinct from the Turkish national. To this end, the state adopted policies 
of forced and voluntary assimilation into the Turkish nation. As will be discussed later in this work, the 
Turkish state was, or at least seemed to be fairly successful in these efforts. The first Kurdish nationalist 
individuals and organizations were already active during the early 20th century (White 2000, 66-70), 
but Kurdish nationalism as a mass movement emerged only in the late 1960s and 1970s (White 2000, 
132-4; McDowall 2004 chapter 19), and the idea of a Kurdish national identity as distinct from and in 
competition with the Turkish national one probably gained wide-spread popularity only in the 1980s 
among Turkey’s Kurdish population. It is thus problematic to talk about a Kurdish nation (in Turkey) 
prior to that. This poses some terminological challenges for discussing Kurds and Kurdish history within 
Turkey. What and who do I exactly refer to with the words “Kurds” and “Kurdish”?
As being successful as a nation is often seen to require the existence of a state, the majority groups 
of nation-states are more generally considered as nations, whereas other groups of people are easily 
labeled as ethnic groups (Valtonen 2005, 112). Those in the majority often do not see themselves as 
“ethnic” at all, for the word “ethnic” has come to denote anything perceived as culturally distinct from 
the mainstream, such as ethnic food or ethnic music (Singh 2004, 95). In line with this, Kurds could 
be classified as an ethnic group, an ethnie. However, according to modernist and constructionist ideas 
7 See Calhoun 1997, 4-5 for a list of claims commonly made in describing nations.
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regarding collective identifications, ethnic groups or ethnicities—like nations—should not be defined 
as natural and objective entities, for they also rely on the subjective understanding of the members of 
an ethnicity or an ethnic group. Thus, an ethnie can be defined as a community of people who believe 
they share crucial characteristics such as descent, history, culture, language, or future. It is a form of 
social solidarity, one that implies a measure of integration and a collective identity; that is, recognition 
of the whole by its members, a sense of individual that includes membership in the whole. So, how 
does an ethnie differ from a nation? The main difference seems to be the existence of a nation-state. So, 
from the modernist and constructionist (of which more is provided below) perspectives, it is somewhat 
problematic to talk about Kurds as a self-conscious “ethnic group” during the early republican period, or 
about ”Kurdish ethnicity” or ”Kurdish ethnic origins” to denote a preexisting, primordial commonality, 
as most Kurdish speaking individuals did not, in all likelihood, see themselves in these terms. 
In his book Ethnicity without Groups, Rogers Brubaker argues against “groupism” in the study of 
ethnicity, race, and nationhood. He points out how there is a general tendency to treat ethnic groups and 
nations as substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed. A researcher should be very 
careful with language, otherwise the social and cultural world becomes presented as a multichrome mosaic 
of monochrome blocks (Brubaker 2004, 8) of the type: “Turkey’s Kurds demand cultural rights.” Several 
theoretic and analytic trends have questioned the nature of bounded groups, but they are still often used 
in study of ethnicity and nationalism. Even much of constructivist academic writing routinely frames 
accounts of ethnic, racial, and national conflict in groupist terms as the struggles of ethnic groups (Brubaker 
2004, 8-9). Brubaker reminds us that, as researchers, we should work to explain the phenomenon of seeing 
the world as divided into separate distinct groups, not use it to explain things with. It should be a part 
of our empiric data, not of our analytical toolkit. Commonsense social and ethnic categories tend to be 
essentializing and naturalizing. We should not replicate that in our scholarly analyses (Ibid.).
In Turkey the matter of ethnic and national labeling is complicated by the fact that throughout the 
history of the Republic, there has been an awareness of differences between different kinds of citizens. 
These were most often expressed in terms of language and culture,8 i.e. some citizens did not speak 
Turkish and so were not seen to belong to the Turkish culture. They were not considered as true “Turks,” 
and at times faced differentiated treatment or outright discrimination. Many of these “different” citizens 
spoke some dialect of Kurdish as their mother tongue and hailed from the Eastern and Southeastern 
provinces. What would be the most appropriate term to refer to these perceived differences? In a context 
of assimilationist policies the differences cannot be expressed solely in terms of language. I will return to 
this question in the course of this work, but for the time being and for the lack of better terms, I have 
chosen to summarize this perception of differences under the term of ethnicity, or to be more specific, 
Kurdish ethnicity. 
1.5 the tuRkish nation-state and the kuRds
Turkish nationalism has a history of more than one hundred years, and as the central ideology of the 
Turkish nation-state since the 1920s it has been contested, adopted, and reinterpreted by various political 
8 Or at times also in terms of race (ırk), blood or tribe (kavim).
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and cultural actors and groups. In his introduction to the hefty 1000-page volume on nationalism, Tanıl 
Bora (2002a) divided the history of Turkish nationalism into six periods, during which it has had different 
emphasis and gained different features. These are: the proto-nationalism of the War of Independence and 
the founding of the Republic (1919–1923); the early nationalism of the one-party period (1923–1945), 
which is particularly important and much studied and debated since it forms the core of all later strands; 
the Democratic Party period (1950–1960), during which nationalism as such was not emphasized but 
nevertheless gained anti-communist features; nationalism as an autonomous political ideology during the 
period of political polarization (1960–1980), when Kemalist (the official ideology named after Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk) nationalism lost its hegemonic position at the core of all Turkish political movements; 
restoration of the official nationalism during the 1980s; and the increased popularity of various strands 
of nationalism since the early 1990s, which Bora has labeled “nationalist hubbub” (Bora 2002a and 
2003b) and Hugh Poulton as “nationalist schizophrenia” (Poulton 1997, 315).9 
Influenced both by the world-wide scholarly interest in issues of nationalism as well as the domestic 
claims for recognition of various sub-national groups, a host of critical studies that concentrate on various 
aspects, periods, and strands of Turkish nationalism and conceptualization of the Turkish nation and 
citizenship of Turkey began to appear, especially from the second half of the 1990s onwards. These works 
have investigated the issue within different contexts and with a variety of methods.10 Drawing on this 
considerable body of secondary sources, I trace the development of Turkish nationalism from the period 
of late Ottoman Empire in the era of nationalism (early 19th century onwards) and the Turkish War of 
Independence (1919–1922) until the end of the 1990s in Chapters two to four of this work. Within the 
narrative, attention is also paid to the policies adopted vis-à-vis the Kurdish population, and a cursory 
outline of the development of Kurdish nationalism during the republican period is given.
The Turkish nation was conceptualized and Turkish citizenship formulated within the intertwined 
modernist Kemalist nation-building and state-building projects of the early republican era (1920–30s). 
These early formulations are investigated in considerable details as they form the basis for the later ones. 
The sociologist Mesut Yeğen has argued that there were already different degrees of “Turkishness” in 
the 1920s. According to early republican terminology, everybody in Turkey, including its non-Muslim 
citizens, could be referred to as ”citizens of the Republic of Turkey,” meaning that legal citizenship was 
open to non-Muslims, even though they were considered to be citizens only in a formal sense. The label 
”Turkish citizen” was used for all Muslim citizens (including the Kurds), while the word ”Turk” was 
used as an ethnonym for citizens of Turkish ethnic origin (Yeğen 2004 and 2006, 97-101). The political 
scientist Soner Çagaptay has referred to this categorization as three concentric zones of Turkishness: an 
outer territorial one, a middle religious one, and an inner ethnic one. The farther away one was from the 
center, the more unaccommodating was the state towards one (Çagaptay 2006b).
In a short summary, according to the Kemalist ideals, a good member of the Turkish nation and 
9 This periodization is a rough simplification. For example, Ahmet Yıldız divides the founding era nationalism into three 
periods: nationalism based on religion (1919–1923), secular nationalism (1924–1929) and ethno-cultural nationalism (1929 
onwards) (Yıldız 2001a).
10 The almost 1000-page volume on nationalism, Milliyetçilik, edited by Tanıl Bora and Murat Gültekingil (2002) as a 
part of the ambitious Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce series (Political Thought in Modern Turkey) exemplifies the scope of 
research on nationalism. The book has more than 70 contributors, who investigate nationalism in various periods, as a part 
of various ideologies and through influential political actors and thinkers. A more recent example is the volume Symbiotic 
Antagonisms—Competing Nationalisms in Turkey (2011) edited by Ayşe Kadıoğlu and E. Fuat Keyman. 
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a good citizen was expected: 1) to be a Sunni Muslim (of the Hanefi school), 2) to be a secularized 
individual, 3) to emphasize Turkishness over other possible linguistic, ethnic, or cultural commonalities 
and 4) to prioritize the interests of the state over one’s own. In addition, the Turkish nation was imagined 
along corporatist harmonious lines: it was to be a single, organic unit with one mind and one heart.11 
Individuals and groups that actively resisted these ideals were easily branded as enemies of the patria, and 
their actions were seen as reactionary or separatist.
The Kemalist one-party state used brutal force to suppress several rebellions and uprisings (1925–
38) against its centralizing and nationalizing policies. It both encouraged voluntary assimilation into 
the “Turkish culture” and used repressive measures of forced assimilation vis-à-vis non-Turkish speaking 
Muslims in the early years of the republic (Yeğen 2006, 9-10). After the difficult start and despite a 
degree of de-facto linguistic, cultural, and religious diversity within the country, the creation of a unique 
Turkish nation should be considered successful. According to many accounts, by the 1950s the Turkish 
nation was a fait accompli. A widely shared feeling of belonging to a special, unique national group 
with shared history, culture, and state had been fostered. Even the Kurdish population, which had been 
the hardest to integrate, seemed to have been successfully integrated into the Turkish nation (Kirişçi & 
Winrow 1997, 105). In the process, citizenship became “nationalized” as religious, ethnic and language-
related differences were erased from the public sphere and the Republic evolved into a Republic of Turks 
(Kadıoğlu 2007). In the public sphere the Turkish nation appeared as a homogenous entity, and various 
social, linguistic, cultural or ethnic differences or cleavages were denied political salience.
In the period from the late 1940s until the eve of the military coup of 1980 Turkey underwent 
sweeping socio-economic transformations (such as urbanization, improved levels of education and 
increasing social mobility) and witnessed political pluralization. In the 1950s the strict understanding 
of secularism of the single-party period was relaxed and the existence of various social “groups” with 
different economic interests was acknowledged; in the 1960s a genuine left-right axis formed in politics, 
and the first Islamist and ultra-right wing parties were founded; a Kurdish nationalist movement emerged 
from the radical leftist movement in the 1970s, which were characterized by political polarization and 
social unrest, violence, and reoccurring economic crises.
The military coup d’état of September the 12th in 1980 has been considered an important watershed 
in the history of modern Turkey (for example: Öktem 2011). The military used brutal measures to 
reinstitute law and order (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 125-127; Zürcher 1993, 292-295), and set out to provide 
long-lasting solutions for the political, economic, and social problems that had plagued Turkey in the 
1970s. Before returning the power to civilian governments, the military junta instituted a centralized 
and authoritarian political system outlined by the restrictive Constitution of 1982, other restrictive 
legislation, and the securitization of an array of political issues. This coup both positioned the military 
into the heart of political decision-making (Bayramoğlu 2004), and also worked to strengthen social 
solidarity and unity with a new articulation of state-promoted and authoritarian Kemalist nationalism 
(usually referred to as Atatürkism, Atatürkçülük), this time combined with Islam.
In the 1980s and 1990s new political movements and claims for recognition of various ethnic 
(Kurdish), religious (Sunni Muslim), or sectarian (Alevi) based identifications emerged as unexpected 
11 This is also a rough simplification as Kemalist nationalism of the early republican period was not a fully codified, internally 
harmonious discourse, but evolved over time, for early Turkish nationalism was ambiguous, with different competing and 
mutually complementing strands.
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consequences of the restructuring of the Turkish political and ideological institutions undertaken by 
the military junta. It has been argued that these movements and claims made apparent the deep-seated 
cleavages and brought under question the image of the Turkish nation as a harmonious single unit. 
They have been interpreted as a part of questioning of the Kemalist modernizing project or end of 
Kemalist certainty (Kasaba 1997), the crisis of Kemalist hegemony and emergence of new sources of 
identity (Çelik 1996), the crisis of Kemalist nationalism (Keyman 2000), or that of Turkish modernity 
(Keyman & İçduygu 2005). Despite the often used label “crisis,” the process has mostly been perceived 
in a somewhat positive light by scholars as a manner of maturation of Turkish society into a level of 
modernity inclusive of political rights fit for liberal democracy, and an opportunity for a more inclusive 
redefinition of the Turkish nation and a more pluralistic reformulation of Turkish citizenship, tolerant of 
ethnic, cultural and religious diversity (Ibid.).
The most vocal demands were those voiced by Turkey’s Kurdish population. The separatist PKK 
started its violent campaign against the Turkish state in 1984, while in 1990 the official ideology of 
Turkish nationalism began facing challenges from within the democratic parliamentary system by a series 
of legal political parties that centered on promoting the claim for wider cultural and political rights for 
Turkey’s Kurdish-speaking population.
The war against the PKK has cost Turkey immensely in human, economic, and political terms. 
There have been more than 40,000 casualties, with thousands of villages emptied and destroyed, all 
events that have led to wide-spread displacement and rapid internal rural-urban migration. Throughout 
the 1990s the direct financial burden of maintaining the massive security apparatus served to hinder 
Turkey’s development, while the indirect costs of the war in damages to infrastructure and stagnant 
regional economy hampered Turkey’s overall economic and social development. During that same decade, 
the extended emergency rule contributed to continued human rights violations and impeded Turkey’s 
democratization, earning Turkey constant criticism in the international arena. (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997; 
Kirişçi 2010; Ergil 2000; Ünalan & al. 2007.)
Meanwhile, the Turkish state, the PKK, and various political and civil society organizations were 
engaged in a meta-conflict over the nature of the conflict, i.e. the interpretative frames of the conflict were 
contested. The PKK and other Kurdish ethno-political entrepreneurs (term from Brubaker 2004) worked 
to frame the conflict as an ethnic or national one, whereas the Turkish state worked to frame the conflict 
exclusively as one of terrorism and national security. Accordingly, the Turkish state systematically denied the 
identity aspects or ethnicity, i.e. the Kurdishness of the conflict. This is not a new reaction, for even in the 
early days of the Republic the response to the series of uprisings in the predominantly Kurdish inhabited 
areas were referred to as issues of political reactionarism, tribal resistance, or regional backwardness, but 
never as ethno-political problems. Officially, the resistance against the state was not defined or acknowledged 
as Kurdish with ethno-political causes, but the actors behind the insurrections were claimed to be various 
tribes, bandits, sheikhs—all evils of Turkey’s pre-modern past. (Yeğen 1999, 555).
Since the 1980s and the start of the fight against the PKK, the state has worked systematically to 
frame the issue as a problem of terrorism, one that is being supported by Turkey’s external enemies. There 
has also been some framing to the effect that the issue might also have such internal causes as economic 
inequality and the backwardness of a tribal society. The meta-conflict over the nature of the conflict did 
not simply shadow the conflict from the outside, but was an integral part of it. This is actually typical for 
conflicts: attaching labels and frames to events is a constitutive and consequential act of social definition. 
A great deal is at stake in struggles over the interpretive framing and narrative encoding of conflict. 
(Brubaker 2004, 16-17.) In the 1990s, the rigid stance of the state hindered open discussion on the issue. 
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However, also opportunity to address the issue brought about by the abatement of the separatist threat 
to state security and Turkey’s gradual democratization as a part of its integration with the EU after 1999 
was not seized. 
A serious and credible attempt to end the conflict and address the claims made by the Kurdish-
speaking minority was not made before the Democratic Opening of 2009, and the window of 
opportunity provided by the PKK’s unilateral ceasefire from 1999 to 2004 was wasted. The important 
question of course is why this was the case. In this work the answer is explored by focusing on the 
shortcomings of the (non-state) public discourse on the Kurdish issue, which attested the rigidity and 
continued strength of nationalist discourse. As will be discussed in Chapter Six, minority nationalism 
and other-than Turkish identities were still not deemed acceptable within mainstream public discourse. 
In addition, as will be discussed in chapter seven, there was still heavy emphasis on national unity, within 
which minority rights continued to be approached from the perspective of national security rather than 
that of social justice. However, as will be summarized in chapters six through nine, several positive steps 
towards improving minority rights were taken, despite the problematic way the issues were represented 
and assessed in the public discourse.
1.6 managing diveRsity: minoRity Rights oR equal citizenship?
At its most basic level, citizenship is a legal and political relationship between the state and the individual 
or groups of individuals. Citizenship establishes both a set of rights and duties of an individual towards 
the state and other citizens, and conditions of membership based on equality of status in a political 
community. However, in the modern era citizenship has been based upon the nation, i.e. a process of 
nationalization of citizenship has taken place such that citizenship became synonymous with nationality 
(Isın & Turner 2007, 11), both in everyday usage and within nationalist projects: in the age of the 
nation-state, citizenship is understood as belonging to a nation-state, i.e. nationhood. Hannah Arendt 
(1951, 275, quoted in Isın & Turner 2007, 11) described this as the conquest of the state by the nation. 
A political community does not need to be a nation-state, and nationalism is only one way to imagine 
a community, one way of thinking about social solidarity and collective belonging (Calhoun 1997, 
4). However, historically, belonging to the nation has been an indivisible part of the modern idea of 
citizenship (İçduygu & Kaygusuz 2004, 34). In the modern nation-state, the elements of nationality 
(membership in nation, cultural belonging) and citizenship (political membership) have been fused 
together, and an idealized national homogeneity is discursively constructed through “politics of national 
citizenship” (İçduygu & Kaygusuz 2004, 34).
In the wake of globalization (with large scale immigration and refugee movements) and the 
emergence of competing forms of national and sub-national religious, ethnic, regional, and cultural 
identifications, notions of the cultural homogeneity of a people born and living within the territorial 
borders of a nation have become increasingly difficult to sustain. Cultural diversity has become a central 
aspect of most modern societies (İnce 2012, 3). Since the 1980s various theorists have claimed a move 
from modernity to a post-modern era, and it has been argued that the nation-state belongs to the modern 
age and is being superseded in the postmodern globalized world (for a critical summary see: Billig 1995, 
132-134). The argument goes along the lines that the idea of a sovereign, independent, bounded, and 
internally homogeneous nation-state has been eroded from above by economic and cultural globalization, 
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transnational information networks, and cross-border flows (immigration), and from below by claims for 
recognition and demands for cultural and political rights by sub-national groups (Billig 1995, CH6; 
Calhoun 1997). Growing domestic heterogeneity and identity politics reduce the nation-state from 
within so that they are less able to manage collective affairs. In short, the struggle of various sub-national 
collective identities for recognition can be interpreted to reflect, or partially cause, a (postmodern) crisis 
of the modern nation-state and liberal democracy.
The rise of the discourse on minorities has made apparent the idea that in nation-states only people of 
the same national origin could enjoy the full protection of legal institutions, and that persons of different 
nationality needed some laws of exception unless they were completely assimilated (Isın & Turner 2007). 
The heterogeneity of populations in the contemporary nation-states and claims for recognition and 
demands for group-specific rights have made pluralism and management of cultural diversity within 
modern nation-states and liberal democracies key issues of citizenship studies today (for example: Turner 
1990 and 2006; Isın & Turner 2007; Habermas 1998a; Kymlicka 1995; Kadıoğlu 2007; Keyman & 
İçduygu 2005), and the concept of citizenship has once again become a center of attention in political 
philosophy (see Kymlicka and Norman 1994). One clear indication of the importance attributed to 
questions of citizenship was the 1997 launching of the new journal Citizenship Studies, which announced 
its intention to “focus on debates that move beyond conventional notions of citizenship, and treat 
citizenship as a strategic concept that is central in the analysis of identity, participation, empowerment, 
human rights, and the public interest” (quoted in Nyers 2007, 1). All in all, an important question in 
these discussions on citizenship since the early 1990s has been that of how increasingly multi-cultural 
societies can be governed in a democratic and fair way.
The importance of the notion of citizenship as a tool for managing diversity has also been pointed 
out in the Turkish context. During the past twenty some years Turkish national identity and citizenship 
in general have become important topics of study and the focus of lively scholarly debates (for example: 
İçduygu et al. 1999; Keyman & İçduygu 2005; Yeğen 2004 and 2009; Yıldız 2001a and 2001b; Üstel 
2005; Altınay 2004; Aydın 2005; Caymaz 2007; Kadıoğlu 2005, 2007, 2008; Aktar & al. 2010; İnce 
2012). The arguments and conclusions of these previous works on the Turkish case will be discussed in 
more detail in subsequent chapters. 
The various stances in the Turkish “citizenship debates” taking place on the pages of the print press 
will be analyzed vis-à-vis some of the different strands in the contemporary international citizenship 
discourses (Shafir 1998, 2). Namely these are the (normative) ideals of conservative nationalism 
(represented by Roger Scruton), liberal nationalism (of David Miller), multiculturalism (á la Will 
Kymlicka), and constitutional citizenship (modeled in the vein of Jürgen Habermas). 
In conservative nationalism the nation is the ultimate ontological unit of political life. Individuals 
are constituted and nurtured by their nation. Individuals are first members of their nation and only 
derivatively of the state. Their nationality precedes and gives meaning and moral energy to their 
citizenship (Parekh 1999a, 296 on Roger Scruton). Because of the importance of the nation, the beliefs 
and practices that compose the nation need to be protected against the corrosive acids of criticism, 
and the state should ensure that national myths are preserved. The result and aim is a closely tied 
national community based on relations of authority and tradition, closed, bounded, intolerant, and 
vigilant against outsiders. (Miller 1995, 125.) Various strands of Turkish nationalism closely resemble 
the conservative nationalism, and as will be discussed in chapter seven, and in 2005 it remained the 
dominant way used to approach the possibility of reconstituting Turkish citizenship, but by 2009 it 
had lost some of its power.
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Theorists classified as liberal nationalists, such as David Miller (1995) and Yael Tamir (1993), have 
argued for the continued need for social solidarity provided by nations and nationalism, and propose a 
liberal reconstitution of nationalist thinking in a form more tolerant to difference. For them the bond of 
national identity remains the essential unifying factor, the basis of trust and good will between citizens 
(Miller 1995, 140), but the principle of nationalism is defined in a way consistent with liberal political 
ideas (Miller 1995, 130). The meaning of common membership in nation changes over time, ideally in 
a collective conversation in which many voices can join (Miller 1995, 127). For the liberal nationalist, 
institutionalizing freedom of expression for ethnic-linguistic particularities can be a way to strengthen 
national unity (Somer 2005b, 77). Many of the arguments in support of Prime Minister Erdoğan’s 
initiative to change the understanding of Turkish citizenship in 2005 can be interpreted as falling into 
the category of liberal nationalism.
The main problem with the liberal nationalist position is the culturally diverse state of affairs in 
any given nation-state: Just like Turkey, every national territory, however small, includes among its 
inhabitants members of other nations. Most countries have more than one territorially concentrated 
culture that is based on shared language, and which provides their members with meaningful ways of 
life across the full range of human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and 
economic life, encompassing both public and private life. The Canadian political philosopher Will 
Kymlicka refers to these as national minorities (i.e. not immigrants) and argues for specific minority 
(group) rights (Kymlicka 1995). On the basis of my analysis I argue that even though the multicultural 
state of affairs had become increasingly accepted in Turkey by 2009, support for multicultural policies, 
including group rights, remained very limited. 
The German philosopher Jürben Habermas (for example, 1998a) has argued for the reconstitution 
of true liberalism, and envisions constitutional citizenship within the format of the nation-state. He has 
also argued that an individualist theory of rights can deal with struggles for recognition by collective 
identities, but it needs the consistent actualization of the system of rights, and the kind of politics of 
recognition that protects the integrity of individual in the life contexts in which identity is formed (Ibid. 
206-208). The aim and meaning of cultural rights within constitutional citizenship is that an individual 
has the right to his/her culture, whereas the survival of the culture itself does not have the right to be 
protected. 
It was President Süleyman Demirel who, in the 1990s, first introduced in the political sphere the 
notion of constitutional citizenship or constitutional patriotism as a possibility for Turkey. It was then 
enthusiastically taken up by a number of scholars, who have discussed it in the Turkish context (for 
example İçduygu & al. 1999). AKP Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also proposed constitutional 
citizenship both in 2005 and 2009 (instances of debate analyzed in this study). In both instances the 
proposal sparked intensive debates on the issue. The content of this kind of constitutional citizenship, 
which may have actually more resembled liberal nationalism, was not clarified in the media texts I 
analyzed. In any case, on the basis of the debates sparked by the 2009 initiative, I argue that the full 
realization of liberal citizenship rights is the most realistic way to improve linguistic and cultural rights 
of members of minorities of Turkey in the short run. Then again, it is questionable whether even full 
cultural rights envisioned within individual rights would satisfy the Kurds, who have aimed for self-
government or, at the very least a decentralized system led by strong local governing bodies.
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1.7 Why analyze media texts?
As should be obvious from the discussions on nations and nationalism above, this research project 
is grounded in social constructionist epistemology. According to ideas and theories labeled social 
constructionist, humans cannot reach and observe reality directly “as it is”, for all knowledge of it is socially 
constructed. The constructionist epistemological challenge to positivism in the study of humans and 
their cultural products dates back to Peter L. Berger’s and Thomas Luckman’s influential book The Social 
Construction of Reality (originally published in 1966). It has been deeply influenced by Michel Foucault’s 
work, Foucauldian discourse analysis, and it has been connected with the emergence of postmodernism 
and the textual (or linguistic or cultural) turn that took place in social sciences in the 1980s. 
Within constructionist thought, all knowledge is seen as historically and culturally specific, created 
and reproduced in social processes, especially through the use of language. Language is not seen as a 
neutral instrument that reflects reality—as something through which reality can be reached—but is 
rather viewed as a practice, an instrument that (re)produces reality.12 Our ways of understanding the 
world do not come from the objective reality itself but from other people through language. Concepts 
and categories are acquired by each person as they develop the use of language and are reproduced every 
day by everyone who shares a culture and a language. The categories with which we apprehend the world 
do not necessarily refer to real divisions. As Rogers Brubaker, an American sociologist who has written 
extensively on issues of nationalism and ethnicity, states: 
Ethnicity, race, and nationhood are fundamentally ways of perceiving, interpreting, and representing 
the social world. They are not things in the world, but perspectives on the world. These include ethnicized 
ways of seeing (and ignoring), of construing (and misconstruing), of inferring (and misinferring), of 
remembering (and forgetting). They include ethnically oriented frames, schemas, and narratives, and 
the situational cues—not least those provided by the media—that activate them. They include systems 
of classification, categorization, and identification, formal and informal. And they include the tacit, 
taken-for-granted background knowledge, embodied in persons and embedded in institutionalized 
routines and practices, through which people recognize and experience objects, places, persons, actions, 
or situations as ethnically, racially, or nationally marked or meaningful. (Brubaker 2004, 17.) 
Thus the central entities of this study such as ethnicity, nation or nationhood are not things in the world 
but perspectives on the world. There are no clear boundaries in the reality outside of language separating 
bushes from trees (Lehtonen 1996), nations from ethnicities (Valtonen 2005), and classic music from 
pop (Burr 2003). 
By the 2000s, perspectives classified under social constructionism13 have become the standard 
mainstream practice, “the epitome of academic respectability, even orthodoxy”14 (Brubaker 2004, 3) in 
12 For a clear and concise presentation of social constructionism, see Burr 2003, Chapter 1. Burr’s presentation is from the 
perspective of psychology and social psychology, but her work is widely cited in other fields as well.
13 The term social constructionism is consistently used instead of social constructivism to indicate focus on cultural processes 
and products rather than the individual level.
14 Brubaker actually criticizes constructionism: “Social construction has been a fertile metaphor in recent decades, inspiring a 
large body of work that has enriched and transformed our understanding of ethnicity (and of many other phenomena). Yet by 
virtue of its very success, the constructivist idiom has grown “weary, stale, flat, and unprofitable.” (Brubaker 2004, 3.)
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various fields of human and social sciences. The focus in studies made within constructionist framework 
is not the relationship or correspondence between knowledge and reality, since we cannot compare 
reality as it is in itself, naked and undescribed, with our descriptions of it. Thus, in this study I will not 
attempt to find some “real Turkish nation,” and then compare how the representations in the media 
texts correspond to it. Instead, the content of knowledge and the processes with which it is sustained 
become the focus of research. What is considered as true and real in the society? What kind of reality 
is being produced? Why? By whom? Whose interests does it serve? How is this reality and knowledge 
sustained? As language is defined as a precondition for thought and the main tool for (re)producing 
shared, social reality, the topic of this investigation is approached by analysis of language and textual 
practices, in this case the textual practices of constructing the Turkish nation and citizen in media texts. 
Prompted by social constructionist orientation, I work to maintain a critical stance towards taken-for-
granted knowledge, the conventional ”common sense,” to unravel the textual processes of producing 
reality as well as the particular kind of reality produced.
It is perhaps in order to clarify that my constructionist stance is not radical: Even if entities such 
as nations, states, and citizenship are not born in ”objective” reality outside of human interaction 
and language, even if they are not inevitable, but socially constructed within language practices, they 
should be considered as real (realist social ontology). These social constructs include material aspects 
and consequences. A state may be a social construct, but it still has physical borders, currencies, check-
points, passports, benefits given for nationals, etc. Social constructionist approach does not (necessarily) 
entail the denial of the importance of studying structure. My study of nationhood in media products is 
intended to complete and complement analysis of the related structures, not to replace them or to deny 
their importance. 
Our use of language can also be seen of as a form of action (performative role of language) (Burr 
2003, 6-9). When people talk to each other, the world gets constructed. Shared reality is seen as an 
ongoing, dynamic process; reality is reproduced by people acting on their interpretations and their 
knowledge of it. There are numerous possible social constructions of the world, and each brings with 
it, or invites, a different kind of action from human beings. Because of the close connection between 
knowledge and social action (influenced by critical theory, Foucault and Gramsci) individual studies 
often unite the constructionist approach with theories of power, analysis of unequal power relations and 
emancipatory aims (see for example Pietikäinen 2003, Sezgin & Wall 2005). It is more effective and 
efficient for a system to control our behavior by controlling our perception of reality than it is to control 
us by force (such as the police, prisons and the military) (Wareing 2004, 11). The idea in emancipatory 
research projects is that once it has been made clear that the present state of affairs is not inevitable, it can 
be transformed. I subscribe to the emancipatory project to a degree: analyzing the constructions is not 
adequate in itself; their social consequences must also be addressed. Yet, changing well-established social 
practices and conventions is never easy. For example, a state does not cease to exist once we realize it is 
”only” a social construct and a convention (see Navaro-Yashin 2002), and even researchers critical of all 
kinds of nationalism can be moved by national sentiments at times.
In the contemporary world the role of mass media in the construction of shared social reality has 
become emphasized: we have no direct connection to most of the world we “know,” but instead our 
knowledge of it is to a large extent based on the products of the mass media. Because they are narratives 
of newsworthy events, of real occurrences, news articles occupy a special place among media texts. News 
texts are expected to be objective and give an impartial account of significant real-life occurrences. “The 
language used by the media to represent particular social and political groups, and to describe newsworthy 
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events, tends to provide the dominant ways available for the rest of us to talk about those groups and events.” 
(Thornborrow 2004, 56).
Scholars of nationalism have convincingly argued that the connection between print media and 
nationalism is a close one. Benedict Anderson (1991, 1st edition in 1983) connected the spread of 
print capitalism with the birth of the European nation-states, and says that while media is not the only 
site where the nation and nationhood are (re)produced, its role is crucial in the daily reproduction of 
nationhood (Billig 1995). Billig stretched the meaning of the word nationalism to cover “the ideological 
means by which nation-states are reproduced” in daily practices (Billig 1995, 6), while Calhoun described 
nationalism as a fundamental way of talking and thinking and seeing the world (Calhoun 1997, 1), rather 
than just a political ideology or movement. The modern world is a world made up at one basic level 
of nations and their international relations (Ibid.). Nationalism is not something that emerges during 
situations of crisis, but as something, rather, that conditions our daily speech and behavior (Özkırımlı 
2000, 4), something that not only belongs to “them,” but that also forms an important part of “our” 
understanding of the world. At a very basic level, nationalism can be seen as the use of common rhetoric, 
a kind of language that enables or disables certain other ways of speaking or acting (Calhoun 1997, 3-4, 
12; Billig 1995). Both Calhoun and Billig have pointed out that nationalism is not only significant in 
crisis situations (Calhoun 1997, Billig 1995), but it is also basic to collective identity in the modern era. 
It is not only about politics, but of culture and personal identity, and it is powerful partly because “it 
helps to make us who we are” (Calhoun 1997, 3). 
In line with the ideas presented by Craig Calhoun and especially Michael Billig, it is worthwhile to 
investigate in detail the role the Turkish print media have played in the gradual and still ongoing move 
away from the state-centric understanding of the nation and citizenship. Turkish sociologist Arus Yumul 
and researcher and theorist of nationalism Umut Özkırımlı followed the ideas put forth by Billig and 
investigated the Turkish case. Based on an analysis of Turkish national dailies on one randomly selected 
day, they concluded that the Turkish press is permeated by nationalist discourse, which they expect to 
be true for any national media. (Yumul & Özkırımlı 2000.) In my study, the role of the media as an 
important instrument in the creation of the nation is taken for granted; here, the focus is on determining 
the kind of nationhood that is being produced in the media texts.
Besides playing a role in the construction and daily reproduction of the nation, the media is also 
important for (re)constructing (other) ethnicities and other collective identities. In general, media and 
mediated discourses are considered essential in the production of identities in contemporary societies (see 
for example Kivikuru 2000, 39-45). The public representations of both ethnic and national identities 
influence our understanding of ourselves (See Pantti on Hall 2004, 248 and Hall 1999b), and the way 
we are shown to ourselves and others; that is, the way we are represented is an important part of the 
process of identity forming, the process of becoming someone (Hall 1999b, 250). 
The well-known Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor has explained the urgency of the demand 
for recognition by various minority or “subaltern” groups with the supposed link between recognition 
and identity. His thesis is that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by the 
mis-recognition of others. A person or a group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the 
people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning picture of themselves. 
Non-recognition or mis-recognition can inflict real harm; it can be a form of oppression, imprisoning 
someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being. (Taylor 1994, 25.) Mis-recognition not only 
evidences a lack of due respect, it can also inflict a grievous wound and self-hatred. Due recognition 
is not just a matter of courtesy; it is a vital human need. Democracy has ushered in a politics of equal 
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recognition (Taylor 1994, 26).
As media is considered such a crucial site for constructing social reality, including national and other 
identities, studies of race and ethnicity, along with gender, in the media are a fairly established sub-genre 
within communication research (see for example: Cottle 2000; Raittila & Kutilainen 2000; EUMC 
2002; Pietikäinen 2000; Sezgin & Wall 2005). The collective findings of this research effort generally 
make for depressing reading: structural inequalities tend to be ignored and news reporting offers negative 
and problem oriented portrayal of ethnic minorities, who seldom have a voice in the mainstream media 
(Cottle 2000, EUMC 2002).
1.8 limitations
Before finishing the introductory chapter, I must also point out what this work is not. It has several 
limitations. First, it relies heavily on theoretical debates on nationalism and citizenship, but contributes 
to them only in the form of providing a limited case study. Second, it does not address the claims for 
recognition made by other sub-national groups in Turkey (such as Alevis). Third, it does not aim to 
provide a history of Kurdish nationalism, and the international developments that have had great impact 
on both the Kurdish issue and on the debates over it in Turkey are only very cursorily summarized. 
The fourth and probably most important limitation concerns the size and content of the sample 
analyzed: within a qualitative study it is possible to analyze only a limited number of articles; thus, the 
interpretations and generalizations made on the basis of such as limited sample can only be treated as 
tentative, even when supplemented by other material.
1.9 on the contents of this study
The work starts by investigating in chapters two and three the way the citizenship of Turkey, Turkish 
citizenship, and membership in the Turkish nation were formulated during the early republican period 
and how these formulations and related practices changed from the 1940s to the late 1970s. An 
important point of reformulation of Turkish nationalism was the military coup d’etat of 1980, followed 
by an emerging challenge for the imagined and enforced homogeneity of the nation by claims for 
ethnic, religious, and sectarian identities in the 1990s, which are discussed in chapter four. Chapter five 
contextualizes the media texts analyzed by presenting the fascinating history of the Turkish-language press 
with emphasis on the more recent period from 1980 onwards. The five qualitative case studies, which 
analyze the reporting on six different news events, are presented chapters six and seven. The analysis in 
the first four cases, which is presented in chapter six, investigates the increasing visibility of Kurds in 
the print media, and the widening acceptance of the de-facto linguistic and cultural diversity in Turkey 
from 1999 to 2005. The questions looked at include what kinds or representations of Kurdishness, 
Turkishness, and Turkish citizenship the media produced, how these changed over time, and what kinds 
of relationships were constructed between them? The dailies included are Milliyet, Sabah, Cumhuriyet, 
Zaman and Yeni Şafak. The final case study presented in chapter seven focuses on explicit debates in the 
press in 2005 and 2009 (in Milliyet, Cumhuriyet and Zaman) on redefining the relationship between 
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Turkish citizenship, Turkish nationality, and Turkish ethnicity as a part of the attempt to resolve the 
Kurdish issue. These debates in the Turkish press are presented and discussed vis-à-vis some of the most 
relevant theoretic and normative scholarly debates on management of diversity in contemporary nation-
states. The concluding chapter eight summarizes the main findings and posits them vis-à-vis the findings 
of some other students of Turkey. Chapter nine is a sort of an epilogue that summarizes some of the main 
developments in Kurdish rights since 2009. 
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ChaPter 2: imagining the tUrkish nation  
anD the Citizen
As subsequent Kemalist nationalism would be very difficult to understand without any reference to 
preceding developments, the presentation is begun with a cursory outline of the main developments 
regarding the ideals of socio-politic order, legitimation of power, and sources of loyalty and 
solidarity in the late Ottoman Empire in the era of nationalism (early 19th century onwards) and 
the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1922). The narrative highlights the development and 
changes of ideas and ideals rather than political events. Only developments and features most 
salient for understanding the specificities of the subsequent Turkish nationalism are discussed. The 
presentation is openly historicist, and the Ottoman period15 is not investigated for itself, but merely 
as a background for later events.
2.1 the ottoman empiRe enteRs the age of nationalism
According to the conventional history of Turkey, colored by nationalist discourse, the Turkish nation 
entered the stage of history in prehistoric times in Central Asia, founded great khanates for hundreds of 
years, and recorded its history for the first time in Old Turkic runes in the so-called Orkhon inscriptions of 
eight century A.D. When the Turkish tribes were converted to Islam, the Turkish national consciousness 
submerged into Islam, in honor of which the Turks founded some of the greatest Islamic empires in 
history. The long slumbering Turkish nation finally re-emerged from the sea of Islam, awakened at last at 
the end of the Ottoman Empire to fight for the independence of the Turkish nation in the Turkish War 
of Independence.16
In Europe it was commonplace to talk about “Turkey” by as early as the 12th century, and the 
Ottomans were often referred to as “Turks.” This was a distortion in the sense that there was no 
Turkish nation prior to the founding of the Republic of Turkey in 1923, nor was the Ottoman Empire 
based on an idea of a shared Turkish ethnicity even if the Ottoman dynasty initially came from a 
Turkish/Turkic background. The Ottoman Empire was a multi-ethnic and multi-religious empire that 
relied on inclusion for its success (Quataert 2005, 2). Thus many of the Ottomans the Europeans 
15 For a thorough presentation of the Ottoman Empire, see H. İnalcık & D. Quataert (eds.), An Economic and Social History 
of the Ottoman Empire (1300–1914) from 1994. For a more concise and very clear account of the political, economic and 
social history of the late Ottoman Empire see Quataert’s The Ottoman Empire 1700–1922 (2005) and for an analysis of 
the late Ottoman Empire and the new Republic of Turkey, see Zürcher’s excellent Turkey, Modern History (1993 with new 
editions in 1998 and 2004).
16 This sort of presentation can often be seen in popular(ized) articles on “the history of the Turks” or earlier Kemalist and/or 
nationalist accounts of Turkish history (for example: Karal 1981). The strength or naturalization of the nationalist discourse is 
evident also when well-known scholars sometimes talk simply about the Turks in Central Asia, the Turkish identity submerged 
into Islam, the Turkish nation in the 1870s, or of the national revival of the Ottoman minorities (for example, see Mango 
2004, 15–24; Akçam 2002, 54). These useful and conventional simplifications use essentializing categories for peoples of the 
past that in all probability did not define themselves along ethnic and most certainly not along national lines.
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met were not of Turkish origins, nor spoke Turkish as their mother tongue.17 The Ottoman Empire 
(1299/1300–1922) was not a nation-state, but a pre-modern empire (ancien régime), where neither 
legitimacy of the state nor solidarity within the population were based on the idea of an Ottoman 
nation, let alone a Turkish nation/ethnicity.18 The Ottoman Turkish language19 used in government 
was not directly understandable for the Turkish-speaking population, which in any case formed only 
a part of the total population of the empire, and was not in the majority prior to the Balkan wars 
(1911–1913) (Zürcher n.d.).
In the Ottoman Empire, the ideals of socio-politic order, legitimation of power, and sources of 
loyalty and solidarity were quite different from those of modern nation-states. Uniformity among the 
population and equality before law (or otherwise) were not, even in theory, important for the Ottoman 
organization of society and state. Instead the socio-political order was based on two important axes of 
differentiation. First of all, in the ideal Ottoman model, the society and polity were organized around 
a hierarchical division into the ruling class (âskeri, lit. of the military) and the ruled (reâya or raya, lit. 
the flock). The ruling class did not form an aristocracy with autonomous sources of power, but derived 
its power from the absolute power of the sultan (Zürcher 1993, 13-15).20 The second crucial division 
was the division of the population into a single community of Muslims and a plurality of non-Muslim 
communities defined on the basis of religious affiliation and referred to as millets.21 Despite the visible 
existence of a great degree of regional and local diversity, in theory the Muslim community was imaged as 
a single entity, and sectarian, linguistic, ethnic or regional divisions were not given political significance 
(Yıldız 2001a, 47-49; Mardin 1981, 199). As Quataert has emphasized: “Difference is a marker 
distinguishing individuals and groups but it need not be negative, a source of conflict, simply because 
difference exists. Indeed, in most societies most of the time, differences are merely that.” (Quataert 2005, 
143).22 The prominent Turkish sociologist and political scientist Şerif Mardin has compared the Ottoman 
system of classification as an immense checkerboard of positions that were aimed at a static function 
17 An often cited example to emphasize this point is the influential 16th century Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmet Pasha, who 
came from a Bosnian background (for example by Karpat 2002[1985], 717). The word Turk was also often used for non-Arab 
Muslims in general among the Ottoman Christians (Quataert 2005, 175). 
18 The idea of the Ottoman Empire as having an essentially ‘Turkish core’ was propagated by some Turkish nationalist 
historians such as Mehmet Fuat Köprülü (Kafadar 1995, 10).
19 The official language of the Ottoman empire was a form of Turkish written with Arabic script with extensive borrowings 
from Arabic and Persian.
20 In the ideal Ottoman model, political opposition and autonomous nodes of power emerged only at times when the power 
of the sultan or the central government was weak. They were not easily tolerated as they implied the weakness of the ruler.
21 There has been some contention over the duration and importance of the millet-system. Many have considered it as 
essential as a mechanism of inter-ethnic peace in the Ottoman Empire from the 15th until the mid 19th century (for example 
Kurtoğlu Eskişar 2009, but citing curiously old research). Others have pointed out that the system underwent significant 
changes and that in the 19th century the traditional three millets of Jews and Orthodox and Armenian Christian were replaced 
by a greater number of millets defined along religious and ethnic lines (Karpat 2002 [1985]). Donald Quataert has pointed 
out that until Mahmud the II (r. 1808–1839) the term millet was actually used to refer to either Ottoman Muslims or 
Christians outside the empire, not Christian groups inside it (Quataert 2005, 175-6). In any case, an illuminating example 
of the Ottoman classification system based on religion is the Christian Gagauz, a Turkic speaking people in the Balkans. We 
do not know when or how the Gagauz settled in the Balkans since in the Ottoman system they were grouped under the label 
“Rum” (=Roman/Greek) on the basis of their religion (A lecture by Astrid Menz, Istanbul: OI, 4.11.2009).
22 As in many pre-modern empires, there were also clothing laws in the Ottoman Empire. Their very purpose was to mark 
differences among individuals of different rank and different kinds of groups.
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of preservation (Mardin 2011, 4). The Muslim ruling elite, membership in which was by no means 
limited only to Turkish speakers, distanced itself from both the rest of the Muslim and the non-Muslim 
population (Karpat 1988 quoted in White 1999, 77).23
In the classic Ottoman system of governance the Ottoman subjects were not considered as citizens 
with citizen rights in the modern sense, but were somewhat protected from the excesses of arbitrary rule 
by the Ottoman ideals24 of justice (adalet), Islamic law (shariah) and a just social order (nizam-i alem).25 
The highest goal was to keep everyone in their rightful place, to maintain the different rights and duties 
of various groups and to ensure the balance, the status quo, of the system (Yıldız 2001a, 48-49). The 
main sources of solidarity that bound the people to the ruler and to one another were perceived to be 
Islam for the Muslim population and loyalty to the Ottoman dynasty for all subjects (Yıldız 2001a, 49). 
If asked who they were, Ottoman Muslim subjects would not have described themselves along 
national and most likely not along ethnic lines. The ruling elite and a large share of the urban population 
of the empire in all probability considered themselves as both Muslim and Ottoman (osmanlı, men of 
Osman), referring to the allegiance to the Ottoman dynasty. It is difficult to assert how the majority of 
the population, i.e. illiterate peasants would have described themselves, but most likely they would have 
emphasized regional, local, tribal or even professional affiliations. Counter to the often presented claim 
of Islam as the basis of solidarity for the Ottoman population, Şerif Mardin has argued that even in the 
late 19th century millions of Ottoman subjects lacked a conception of a unit transcending the village 
or the hamlet (Mardin 1981, 201–2). Since a great majority of the rural population was illiterate and 
never traveled far, it is questionable how aware they were of belonging to the international community 
of Muslims (umma).26 Taking a somewhat different view, Kemal Karpat has argued that ethnicity was an 
important source of identity for both the Christian and Muslim Ottoman population on the local level, 
but it was not given political significance (Karpat 2002[1985]).
This way of perceiving and organizing social and political life of the empire underwent some changes 
in the 18th century, and changed dramatically during the 19th and early 20th centuries. The 19th century 
was chiefly defined by the growing influence of Europe, the gradual disintegration of the empire, and the 
reactions these brought about. The European influence was exerted in the economic sphere, where the 
Ottoman pre-capitalist economy was incorporated into the capitalist world system; the political/military 
sphere, where Europe dominated the Ottoman Empire; and the ideological sphere, where European 
ideologies such as secularism, nationalism, and liberalism started to have impact among the elite and 
certain groups among the population (Zürcher 1993). The loss of Ottoman power vis-à-vis the Christian 
West encouraged the spread of nationalist ideas and emergence of nationalist movements among the 
23 Significant regional differences as well as cultural distance between the ruling class and rest of the population are considered 
as typical for pre-modern societies, where the ruling class uses culture to differentiate itself from the large majority of peasants. 
The idea was presented by Gellner (Özkırımlı 2000, 130; Gellner 1983, 9-12).
24 The Ottoman ideals of good governance and the state structure itself were greatly influenced by Turco-Islamic statecraft as 
well as the Byzantine traditions (see for example Quataert 2005[2000], 4-5 & chapter 2).
25 For more details on these ideals and their application in practice, see Stremmelaar 2007, 121-144.
26 Şerif Mardin (1981, 201–2) cites the experiences of a young Ottoman officer with his Anatolian peasant recruits during 
the First World War. The officer is thoroughly vexed with them since they cannot answer even his most simple questions 
related to religion. Instead of refering to themselves as Muslims they also labeled themselves as being of “the religion of the 
Great Imam” or “followers of the Prophet Ali,”listed the Ottoman War Minister Enver Pasha among prophets and could not 
tell whether Prophet Muhammad was still alive or not.
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Christian minorities within the empire (Yıldız 2001a, 53). One by one the Christian provinces rebelled 
against Ottoman rule, and managed to eventually gain their independence with the support of the 
Western Christian powers. Most Balkan national movements aimed for a homogenous national entities 
based mainly on religion (a continuation of the Ottoman millet-system), and accordingly Balkan Muslims 
were excluded from the new nations. Following the founding of the independent states of Greece, Serbia 
and Bulgaria, many Ottoman Muslims, Greeks, Serbs, Macedonians, Bosnians, Bulgarians (Pomak), 
Albanians and Roma, in addition to Turks, were faced either with extermination or with being expelled 
to the shrinking Ottoman lands (Çagaptay 2004, 5).
The impact of this development on Ottoman reform, as well as on later Turkish nationalism, and 
the approach towards both internal minorities and Europe should not be underestimated. The Christian 
millets had been conceived as integral and loyal components of the Ottoman population, but now they 
had turned against the sultan and rebelled. This was seen as treason, made even worse by the pronounced 
support and encouragement of the old enemies, the powerful states of the Christian West. In the course 
of the 19th century the remaining religious minorities became to be seen as potential traitors working 
with hostile external forces (see Yıldız 2001a). Western demands for improved rights for first religious 
and later ethnic minorities became to be seen as insincere and aimed mainly at weakening the Ottoman 
Empire and later the Republic of Turkey. Also, with the influx of Muslim refugees, Ottoman Anatolia 
turned increasingly Muslim (Çagaptay 2004, 5-6).
The Ottoman reaction to the growing influence of the West and the gradual disintegration of the 
empire manifested itself in the form of reform movements, disputes over the direction of the reforms, 
and reactions to them. In general, the reforms were inspired by the Western experience, initiated by 
the leading elite of the empire rather than popular demand, were aimed at strengthening the state 
both militarily and financially and at ending the gradual partitioning of the Ottoman ruled areas. The 
Ottoman elite were pragmatic: if Western institutions could rejuvenate the state, they would be adopted, 
but the aim was not westernization as such (Mardin 1981, 197). This has been a fairly typical approach 
of various modernizing programs from the Arab countries to China.
The Ottoman reformist elite were painfully aware that strengthening the state apparatus was 
insufficient of itself and that there was a serious need to find a new source of loyalty and solidarity to 
bind the population of the disintegrating empire together. The models suggested have conventionally 
been divided into Ottomanism, (Pan)Islamism and (Pan)Turkism (Zürcher 1993, 132).27 The 
Ottomanist ideals were formulated during the period of reform known as the Tanzimat (1839–
1876). Ottomanism was, in its essence, territorial Ottoman patriotism that was opposed to religious 
and nationalist separatism, the ideal of which was a union of the different communities gathered 
around the Ottoman dynasty. A step towards the Ottomanist ideal was taken when, also prompted 
by the West, all Ottoman subjects were proclaimed equal before law, and granted a set of formal 
legal rights vis-à-vis the ruler and the state (Çelik 1996; Keyman 2005; Ayyıldız 2007; Yıldız 2001a, 
54-55). On the official level, Ottomanism was retained as the official state policy until the end of the 
Ottoman Empire. The main idea of (Pan)Islamism was to regenerate the empire on the basis of Islamic 
practices and solidarity within the Islamic community (umma). (Pan)Islamism was promoted by the 
authoritarian Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876–1909) and gained increasing support towards the end of the 
27 This is a very rough generalization of debates spanning from the era of Tanzimat reforms until the War of Independence, 
but suffices for the purpose of this work.
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19th century as the Ottomanist policies failed to stem the growth of (Christian) minority nationalisms. 
In some ways the (Pan)Islamist ideas were in contradiction to Ottomanism, but in practice they were 
often used to support the official policy of Ottomanism. The last to develop at the turn of the century 
was ethnic Turkish nationalism, which sought the union of the Turkic peoples under the Ottoman 
flag. “Turkism” was first systematically pronounced by the Young Turk Yusuf Akçura in 1904 in his 
treatise Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset.
In conclusion, the gradual shifts away from the traditional Ottoman social and political imperial 
model towards formulations closer to the modern ideas of citizenship and nation were important 
elements of the Ottoman process of reform as they prepared the ground for the subsequent Kemalist 
modernizing project of the 1920s and 1930s. In several works the transition from the Ottoman 
Empire to the Turkish nation-state is seen to have required a the shift in the notion of authority 
from personal rule to the rule of law; a shift in understanding the universe from religious to positivist 
rationalism; a shift in the notion of community from a community founded upon the differentiation 
between the ruling elite and the ruled population to the people as sovereign; and a transition in the 
understanding of the bases of the community from religion to nation (Keyman 2005; Çelik 1996; 
İçduygu & Kaygusuz 2004). However, it should be emphasized that at this stage the aim was not a 
Turkish nation-state.
2.2 the young tuRk peRiod and the WaR of independence
The historical and political events and debates during the tumultuous Second Constitutional Period, also 
known as the Young Turk Period (1908–1918), and the War of Independence (1919–1922) were very 
important for the subsequent formation of the principles of Kemalist nationalism. 
The beginning of this turbulent Second Constitutional Period, after the proclamation of the 
constitution in 1908, passed in an atmosphere of freedom of thought, expression, and association, one 
which witnessed a revival of the public debates on politics and social issues that had been silenced during 
the long reign of the authoritarian Abdülhamit II, and an explosion in the number of publications (Emin 
1914, 88; Zürcher 1993, 132). One of the main topics of public discussion was reform of the state. It 
had become painfully obvious that the state and society had to be reformed, and the direction of this 
reform should take became a topic of public debate. The point of view in the debates was once again 
quite state-centered, and the state was seen as the main instrument of change. These heated debates are 
often presented as arguments between the three strands of thought explained above: various strands of 
Ottomanism, (pan-)Islamism and (pan-)Turkism, or Turkish nationalism. The central questions of the 
debates were those the renowned 19th century Ottoman intellectual Namık Kemal had already tried to 
answer: How to build a synthesis of European and Ottoman civilizations? How to become modern while 
staying oneself? (Zürcher 1993, 132.) 
The Young Turk period also witnessed the last phases of the gradual disintegration of the Empire. 
The Empire lost virtually all of its remaining European possessions in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913), 
and to add insult to the injury, this war was lost against former Ottoman minority millets. The loss of 
the wealthy and developed Balkan provinces that had been in the core of the empire for over 400 years 
was traumatic, and acted as a further proof of the military weakness of the empire. One important 
consequence of the area losses was that for the first time in its history, Turkish-speakers now formed the 
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majority of the population of the empire (Zürcher n.d.).28
 Following the Balkan Wars, the Ottomanist policies of the increasingly authoritarian Young Turk 
regime turned increasingly (Turkish) nationalist, and tentative steps towards compulsory Turkification 
of the Anatolian population were taken (Yıldız 2001a, 81-86). These included forced migrations 
of non-Turkish speaking groups29 and the introduction of Ottoman Turkish as compulsory language 
in schools.30 With this, the Young Turk regime resolved the earlier debates on the possible source of 
solidarity. According to Erol Ülker, Ottomanism and Turkish nationalism did not stand as two different 
alternatives to the Young Turks. Rather, Ottomanism was reformulated by the ruling Committee for 
Union and Progress (CUP, İttihat-ı Terakki Cemiyeti, İTC) under the influence of Turkish nationalism; 
therefore the Anatolian Turkish-speaking population became positioned as the heart of the Empire, with 
the Turkish-speaking population as its core, the leading millet of the multi-ethnic and multi-religious 
empire (Ülker 2005). 
The seriously weakened Ottoman Empire entered the First World War (1914–1918) on the side 
of the Central powers. During the war the Empire lost the symbolically important Arab provinces, as 
well as some of its remaining core areas. By the end of the war, the Ottoman state was on a brink of 
collapse. In the treaty of Sèvres (1920), the victorious Entente states envisioned the partition of the 
remaining Ottoman areas into several independent states. However, by the time the treaty was signed 
two years after the armistice, most of Anatolia was in the hands of a unified resistance movement headed 
by Mustafa Kemal Pasha (Atatürk since 1934), and a war ensued between the movement and Greece, 
which attempted to enforce the treaty on behalf of the already demilitarized Entente. The war lasted until 
1922 and ended in the victory of the resistance movement. 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha proceeded to proclaim the Turkish Republic in 1923. Earlier the same year 
the country’s continued independence had been acknowledged internationally by the Treaty of Lausanne, 
in which the new borders of the country were ratified. During the War of Independence, the leaders of 
the resistance movement moved further away from the above described imperial, dynastic social vision, 
and conception of territory and membership towards a modern understanding of national citizenship 
(İçduygu & Kaygusuz 2004). Yet, contrary to the popular myth, even the War of Independence was 
initially fought in the name of the Ottoman sultan and Islam rather than any form of Turkish nationalism 
28 There were quite big differences in population densities in the Ottoman Empire: the Balkan provinces had the highest 
densities while Syria, Iraq, and the Arabian Peninsula were sparsely populated. In 1914 the combined population of the 
remaining Rumelian provinces, Istanbul, and Anatolia was approximately 15 million, and that of Syria and Iraq combined 
slightly over 5 million. (Quataert 1994, 778-784.) The Ottoman population statistics are not entirely reliable, but give 
indication of the populations densities in different parts of the empire.
29 The first large-scale voluntary and forced migrations took place immediately after the Balkan Wars in 1914, but gained 
momentum during the First World War. More than four hundred thousand Muslims immigrated into Anatolia from the 
lands the Ottoman Empire had lost. The policy of the imperial center was to expel non-Muslims from Anatolia and Turkify 
the (non-Turkish speaking) Muslim population of Anatolia. The Young Turks endeavored to homogenize Kurds, Arabs, Lazs, 
Circassians and other non-Turkish Muslim communities residing in or entering as immigrants to the lands that became 
regarded as the core of the Turkish nationality. Nevertheless, Turkification was in the making only within this region, not in 
the rest of the empire. (Ülker 2005, 629.) 
30 Erol Ülker argues that compulsory Turkish language education should be interpreted as part of the centralizing Ottomanist 
policies, rather than an expression of increasing Turkish nationalism. Promotion of a commonly shared official language was 
seen as promoting a sense of belonging to the Ottoman community as well as administrative efficiency. The main language of 
education in the non-Turkish-speaking regions was not Turkish but local languages were used. Kurdish-language schools were 
also established during the Young Turk rule. (Ülker 2005.) 
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(see for example Zürcher 1993, 158-9; Parla & Davison 2004, 45-46; Aydın 2005, 28-29).31 
2.3 the tuRkish Republic and the kemalist pRoject
...Mustafa Kemal took up a non-existent, hypothetical entity, the Turkish nation, and breathed life 
into it. It is this ability to work for something which did not exist as if it existed, and to make it 
exist, which gives us the true dimensions of the project on which he had set out and which brings 
out the utopian quality of his thinking. Neither the Turkish nation as the fountainhead of a ‘general 
will’ nor the Turkish nation as a source for national identity existed at the time he set out on this 
task. (Şerif Mardin 1981, 208-9.)
In 1923, when Mustafa Kemal declared the Republic, the country was in ruins. After a decade of almost 
continuous warfare, it was depopulated and impoverished. An estimated 20% of the Anatolian population 
had lost their lives and another 10% had emigrated from the area (Zürcher 1993, 170-171). The (often 
forced) emigrations of the Christian minorities and immigration of Muslims from the lost territories 
had also changed Anatolia culturally into 98% Muslim. Forming a Turkish nation-state would have 
been more difficult without the forced migration and genocide of the Armenian population of Eastern 
Anatolia during the First World War, which removed most of a numerous, territorially concentrated 
Christian and nationalist minority from Anatolia. However, it is questionable to which degree these 
actions were undertaken in order to further Turkish nationalist aims.32 After these processes, only two 
large linguistic groups were left: the Turks and the Kurds (Ibid. 172). 
In 1922 the 600 year-old Ottoman Sultanate was abolished and in 1923 the Republic of Turkey 
was proclaimed. After the founding of the Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal gradually concentrated all 
power in the single party CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People’s Party) government and, 
together with the progressive elite of the country, embarked on an ambitious program of reform. In 
1924 the Islamic Caliphate was abolished, all religious institutions were taken under the control of the 
state’s Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı, Diyanet in short), and a new constitution 
for the republic was adopted. In 1925 all Islamic brotherhoods and Sufi orders were forbidden; the old 
headgear was replaced by the western-style hat; and the Gregorian calendar was adopted. In 1926 a new 
Penal Code was adopted from Italy and a new Civil Code modeled after the Swiss was drafted. 1928 saw 
the transition from the Arabic script to the Latin, and in 1934 Turkish women were given the right to 
vote, and western-style surnames were adopted.
31 According to the popular Kemalist myth, Atatürk had envisioned the creation of a Turkish nation long before the creation 
of the republic, but only revealed his plans later, when the time was ripe. However it may be, detailed analysis of the rhetoric of 
the Independence Movement has shown that even though there were Turkish nationalist elements in the rhetoric of Atatürk’s 
speeches from 1919 onwards (Parla & Davison 2004, 69), the war was initially fought in the name of Islam and the Sultan. 
The rhetoric underwent significant changes during the war years and transformed towards a more nationalist line (İçduygu & 
Kaygusuz 2004).
32 For a very short evaluation of the Armenian Genocide see Zürcher 1993; for an evaluation of the debate on the genocide 
see Suny 2002, and for a more detailed description and evaluation see Taner Akçam’s A Shameful Act. The Armenian Genocide 
and the Question of Turkish Responsibility published originally in Turkish in 1999 with a title avoiding the word Genocide, and 
in English translation in 2006. 
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The Kemalist Westernist and modernist program was conditioned by the traumatic experience of 
the gradual disintegration of the empire, especially in the aftermath of the First World War, when the 
Ottoman state became close to collapse, as well as the century old state-centric tradition of Ottoman 
reform summarized in the previous section. The set of principles underlying the reformist program of 
the new Republic of Turkey, undertaken by the governing party CHP during the single-party period 
(1923–1945) became known as Kemalism (Kemalizm).33 Kemalism formed the core of the official state 
ideology, according to which the state and the nation were formulated. As the official ideology, it was 
propagated through the education system, the press, and the compulsory military service. Its declared 
basic principles, the so-called six arrows, were laid down in the CHP party programs of 1931 and 1935, 
and incorporated into the Turkish constitution in 1937. The six arrows of Kemalism were: republicanism 
(cumhuriyetçilik), secularism or laicism (laiklik), nationalism (milliyetçilik/millicilik/ulusçuluk), 
populism (halkçılık),34 etatism/statism/state-centrism (devletçilik) and reformism/revolutionism 
(inkılâbçılık/devrimçilik). There is a considerable body of scholarly work on Kemalism, including a 
variety of interpretations of what should be considered as the core ideas of Kemalism.35 A comprehensive 
overview of the ideology36 is not attempted here, but only those aspects of Kemalism directly relevant for 
the form and content of the Turkish nation and citizenship are outlined.
2.4 defining the tuRkish nation and the tuRkish citizen
The Turkish nation and a new kind of Turkish citizen were envisioned during the early republican 
period (1920s and 1930s). Understanding the content of these is complicated by the fact that Kemalist 
33 For a detailed discussions on and analyses of the development and ideological content of Kemalism and the one-party 
period, see: Mete Tunçay’s Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nde Tek Parti Yönetimi’nin Kurulması (1923–1931) from 1981, Taha Parla’s 
Kemalist Tek-Parti İdeolojisi ve CHP’nin Altı Ok’u from 1992, and Levent Köker’s Modernleşme, Kemalizm ve Demokrasi from 
1990. Important English language works include: Ergun Özbudun’s and Ali Kazancıgıl’s interesting, even if somewhat uneven, 
collection of articles under the title Atatürk. Founder of a Modern State in 1981, the excellent collection of articles edited by 
Jacob M. Landau under the title Atatürk and the Modernization of Turkey in 1984 and a more recent highly critical view by 
Taha Parla & Andrew Davison Corporatist Ideology in Kemalist Turkey in 2004. The almost 700-page volume on Kemalism 
edited by Ahmet İnsel (2001) as a part of the ambitious Modern Türkiye’de Siyasî Düşünce -series (Political Thought in Modern 
Turkey) bears witness to the scope and depth of contemporary academic discussion on Kemalism. The book features articles 
from more than 60 writers on a multitude of topics related to Kemalism throughout the history of the republic.
34 In the usage of the 1920s the term populism referred to rule by the people, popular sovereign ty.
35 For example, Fuat E. Keyman (2000) defines the project of modernity as the core of Kemalism; Taha Parla and Andrew 
Davison (2004) explicitly argue against the view of Kemalism as modernist emphasizing its corporatist character; Ahmet İnsel 
posits state-centrism into the core of Kemalism (2001), whereas Levent Köker (1995) and Nur-Betül Çelik (1996) define the 
principle of populism as its key concept.
36 One of the topics debated in relation to Kemalism is whether it even should be considered an ideology. Most researchers 
present the founders of the Turkish republic as pragmatists (Zürcher 1993; İlter 2002; Akural 1984, 142; Steinbach 1984), whose 
program was, without doubt, informed by certain principles, but never developed into a “coherent, all-embracing ideology, but 
can best be described as a set of attitudes and opinions, which were never defined in any detail.” (Zürcher 1993, 189.) All do not 
agree. For example, Dumont considers Kemalism as an ideology: even if the leaders of the Turkish republic did not create a great 
doctrine, the reforms were guided by a set of principles that were gradually codified, albeit in loose and at times awkward manner 
(Dumont 1984, 25). Kemalists themselves emphasize that Atatürk did not intend to create a dogma that should be dutifully 
followed (Kili 2003, Kışlalı 1994). Critics in turn note that since Kemalist reforms were not based on careful study of the Turkish 
socio-political and economic conditions, they were predetermined by ideological considerations (Parla & Davison 2004).
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nationalism was not a fully codified, internally harmonious discourse, and also evolved over time. 
Turkish nationalism was—as nationalism often tends to be—ambiguous, with different competing and 
mutually complementing strands. As there were leftist Kemalists, statist Kemalists, and liberal Kemalists,37 
so were there also different formulations of the Turkish nation, including modernist and traditionalist 
nationalisms (Şerif Mardin in Levent Köker 1997, 70). In an influential and often cited book on the 
creation of the Turkish nation, Turkish researcher and author Ahmet Yıldız divides the founding era 
nationalism into three periods: nationalism based on religion (1919—1923), secular nationalism 
(1924—1929) and ethno-cultural nationalism (1929 onwards) (Yıldız 2001a). Thus there is no clear 
consensus on the exact content of Kemalist nationalism. 
As will be explained in more detail below, according to the Kemalist ideals, a good member of 
the Turkish nation and a proper citizen was expected: 1) to be a Sunni Muslim (of the Hanefi/Hanafi 
school); 2) to emphasize Turkishness over other possible linguistic, ethnic, or cultural commonalities; 
3) to be a secularized individual behaving in a modern and civilized (i.e. western) manner; and 4) to 
prioritize the interests of the state over one’s own. In addition, the Turkish nation was imagined along 
corporatist harmonious lines: it was to be a single, organic unit with one mind and one heart. 
2.4.1 inclusion and exclusion: diffeRing degRees of tuRkishness
Any individual within the Republic of Turkey, whatever his faith, who speaks Turkish, grows up 
with Turkish culture and adopts the Turkish ideal, is a Turk. (Definition of a Turk from the CHP 
1931 party program, from Zürcher 2000.)
…the master of this country is the Turk. Those who are not genuine Turks can have only one right 
in the Turkish fatherland, and that is to be a servant [hizmetçi] to be a slave [köle]. (the former 
Minister of Justice Mahmut Ezat Bozkurt quoted in Parla & Davison 2004, 77)
The physical borders of the new republic were more or less those borders the Ottoman army had been able 
to defend in World War I and were not drawn on the bases of an idea of shared nationality or other vision 
of shared origins, but became associated with the Muslim Ottoman population of Anatolia during the War 
of Independence, and with the Turkish nation during the early republican period (İçduygu & Kaygusuz 
2004).38 These borders gradually became internalized as the natural and inalienable borders of the Turkish 
37 In his article on the ideas of Turkish conservative modernists, Nazim İrem points out that by the 1930s, there were hard-
line statist republicans devoted to a positivist-humanist civilizing project led by the General Secretary of the CHP Recep 
Peker; the pro-business liberal faction led by the future president Celal Bayar; the moderate statist-bureaucratic elite supported 
by Prime Minister and later President İsmet Inönü; the socialism-oriented Kadro movement; and the republican conservative 
groups, who all saw themselves as Kemalists (İrem 2002, 104).
38 Erol Ülker notes that the idea of Anatolia as the Turkish heartland of the Ottoman Empire was initially formed during the 
Young Turk period, in the aftermath of the Balkan Wars. There was, however, confusion over where the borders of Anatolia 
should or could be drawn (Ülker 2005, 629).
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nation and the Turkish state.39 As was pointed out in the introductory chapter, in the modern world of 
nation-states, citizenship is often equated with nationality and understood as belonging to a nation-state, 
belonging to a nation (for example: Isın & Turner 2007, 11). To a great degree this has been true in Turkey 
as well: nationality and citizenship have been fused together (Üstel 2005, İçduygu & Kaygusuz 2004). To 
receive full citizenship rights, to be considered a real member of the state and a member of the political 
community, one was expected to be a member of cultural community of the Turkish nation as well. 
Directly after the conclusion of the War of Independence, Turkey and Greece agreed on an exchange 
of populations (Mübadele). It is important to remember that the exchange was based on religion rather 
than language: most Greek Orthodox communities moved from the area of Turkey to Greece, and most 
Muslims from Greece to Turkey.40 After the exchange, Turkish citizenship was granted to all those residing 
within the new borders of the country regardless of their linguistic, cultural, or religious affiliations. 
Turkish Nationalism as Ethnic or Civic Nationalism?
The canonical typology of different kinds of nationalisms or nationalist phenomena is a division into 
two different variants: civic versus ethnic (for example Smith 2001). The division has been cast through 
many different terms such as Western versus Eastern, French type versus German type, voluntarist 
versus organic, political versus cultural, inclusive and assimilationist versus exclusive, territorial versus 
genealogical, rational versus romantic, good versus bad (Özkırımlı 2000, 41-42, 61-62; Akman 2004, 
24; Brubaker 2004, 132-133). According to this typology, there are two distinct ways to understand 
nationhood: the first is based on common citizenship and the second on common ethnicity. Since 
residents of the new Republic of Turkey were granted citizenship regardless of their linguistic, cultural, 
or religious affiliations or identifications, Turkish citizenship policies and even Turkish nationalism has 
often been grouped into the civic, French type variant, based on inclusive political-territorial criteria (for 
example: Karal 1981; Ürer 2009). From that it follows that Turkishness can be seen as a political category, 
a legal-political status assigned to citizens of the Republic of Turkey, who may have been of both Turkish 
and non-Turkish ethnic origins as well as Muslims or non-Muslims (Yeğen 2004, 55). However, as will 
be detailed below, researchers of early Turkish nationalism have also pointed out its cultural, ethnic, or 
even ethnicist/racist tendencies (among others: Çagaptay 2004; Zürcher 2000), and thus there are also 
good bases for classifying Turkish nationalism as an ethnic variant in the typology. 
Rogers Brubaker has pointed out that this kind of result, i.e. the conflicting classification of 
a single nationalism as both civic and ethnic is hardly surprising, and stems directly from the serious 
analytic ambiguity of the civic-ethnic dichotomy (Brubaker 2004, 132-146). If the understanding of the 
nation is defined to be based on ethnicity, what exactly is ethnicity?41 If ethnicity is defined narrowly as 
common descent, almost no contemporary nationalism belongs to the ethnic type, since most nations 
do not invoke an actual common ancestor. However, if ethnicity is seen to include common, shared 
culture, then virtually all nationalisms would fall into the ethnic category; even the French or American 
39 I have discussed the topic with a number of individuals in Turkey, and it seems that the idea of Turkey’s borders as “natural” 
has also been internalized even by those who are critical of most expressions of Turkish nationalism.
40 For example, small numbers of Turkish-speaking Christians were moved to Greece. 
41 Brubaker states elsewhere that ethnicity, as well as race or nation, should not be conceptualized as substances or things or 
entities or collective individuals, but rather in terms of practical categories, situated actions, cultural idioms, discursive frames 
or political projects (Brubaker 2004, 11).
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nationalisms, generally classified as epitomes of civic nationalism, include certain cultural aspects. If civic 
is interpreted as involving an a-cultural, a-historical, universalist, rationalist understanding of nationhood 
and nation-membership is understood as chosen not given, it is questionable whether there exist any 
civic nationalisms. When civic nationalism is defined more broadly to include culture, it bears a strong 
resemblance to the broadly defined ethnic variant. In other words, when both are defined narrowly, 
there are only a few cases that belong to either, with most cases in the middle ground. When they are 
both defined broadly, there are many cases that could be classified as either, and then the civic-ethnic 
distinction cannot be considered as mutually exclusive. (Brubaker 2004, 132-146.) The contradictions 
involved in classifying the Turkish case further validate Brubaker’s criticism. 
In more recent years, the division of nationalisms into either ethnic or civic has been replaced by 
an investigation of the various civic and ethnic tendencies of various cases. This has become a kind of 
theoretical “common sense” (Brubaker 2004, 136). From this perspective, Turkish nationalism would 
be described as a combination of ethnic-exclusive and civic-political-inclusive elements (for example 
by Aydıngün & Aydıngün 2004) and Turkish citizenship policies as a combination of the French and 
German models (for example by Soyarık-Şentürk 2005). However, due to the ambiguity of ”civic” and 
”ethnic” as terms, analyzing different, competing or opposing civic or ethnic elements of a particular case 
is far from simple. It can be as hard to classify a single element as it is to classify an entire case (Brubaker 
2004, 138-139). For example, policies to promote a particular language, such as Turkish, can be seen as 
distinctively civic, as necessary or even essential for republican citizenship. Or, on the other hand, they 
can be considered as prime examples of ethno-cultural nationalism.42
The deep analytic ambiguity is combined with normative problems. The conventional description 
of civic and ethnic understandings of nationhood as voluntarist and ascriptive respectively is greatly 
overdrawn. Civic nationalism is generally glossed as liberal, voluntarist, universalist, and inclusive; ethnic 
nationalism as illiberal, ascriptive, particularist and exclusive (Ibid., 140). Who could defend ethnic 
nationalism within this normatively loaded, one-sided characterization? The result of the normative 
imbalance has been the tendency to see “our” nationalism as civic, as a normal and useful everyday 
phenomenon, a source of social solidarity and commonality often labeled as patriotism. In comparison, 
“their” nationalism is depicted as ethnic, fanatic, and disruptive (compare with Billig’s Banal Nationalism 
from 1995). Due to the normative inequality in the civic-ethnic dichotomy, the aim to present the 
Turkish case as a civic one rather than the ugly ethnic variant is not hard to understand. 
Stephen Shulman, who is one of the critics of the ethnic-civic classification, has proposed three variants 
of national identity: civic, cultural, and ethnic. He lists five main components of the civic identity, from 
which national unity and membership in the nation are derived: 1) attachment to a common territory, 2) 
citizenship, 3) belief in the same political principles or ideology, 4) respect for political institutions and 
enjoyment of equal political rights, 5) and the will to be a part of the nation. Cultural identity is based 
on nonpolitical cultural traits, the central ones of which are language, religion, and traditions. For ethnic 
national identity, shared ancestry and race are the dominant criteria by which membership in the nation is 
defined. (Shulman 2002, 559.) These three variants of national identity differ in their levels of inclusiveness. 
It is very difficult for “outsiders” to meet the ethnic criteria because one cannot choose one’s ancestors, 
42 The promotion of Turkish-language education during the Young Turk period is a good example of this difficulty in 
classifying: it can be presented as a civic, albeit centralizing policy aimed at efficiency (as argued by Ülker 2005) or as an 
attempt at Turkification of the non-Turkish speaking population. 
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but it is possible to adopt cultural traits and thereby enter the nation. Some of the civic criteria are indeed 
relatively easy to meet, such as will and consent, but citizenship is also dependent on the state (Ibid.) The 
variants also have different expectations vis-à-vis assimilation: in the civic example assimilation is not 
expected; in the cultural it is encouraged as membership in the nation is based on shared culture; and in the 
ethnic it is not deemed worthwhile as one cannot adopt new ancestry. (Shulman 2002: 560-561.) When 
one looks at Turkish nationalism through the prism of official formulations and state policies, it is clear that 
it includes both civic and cultural traits: attachment to a territory, citizenship, and shared language, history 
and religion. Turkey’s policies of voluntary and forced assimilation point towards cultural rather than ethnic 
understanding of the nation, certain formulations of the 1930 notwithstanding.43
Brubaker argues that “in fact all understandings of nationhood and all forms of nationalism are 
simultaneously inclusive and exclusive. What varies is not the fact or even the degree of inclusiveness or 
exclusiveness, but the basis or criteria of inclusion and exclusion” (Brubaker 2004, 141). Thus it is more 
meaningful to investigate the bases of inclusion and exclusion in the various cases. Territorial-political 
understanding of the civic nation is inclusive since it includes all citizens of the territory of a certain state, 
regardless of their particular (race, color, creed, ethnicity) traits. Yet, citizenship itself is, by its very nature, 
an exclusive as well as an inclusive status, and access to citizenship is universally limited: one cannot simply 
decide to become a citizen of Turkey or Canada, for example. The understanding of nationhood in civic 
nationalism is not entirely voluntary; the nation is given, as well as chosen. One is granted citizenship based 
on the citizenship of one’s parents. On the other hand, in many cases classified as ethnic or ethno-cultural, 
there is space for choice; one can choose to belong to a certain culture rather than another.
Brubaker tentatively suggests a division into state-framed and counter-state nationalisms as a 
replacement or improvement from the civic-ethnic distinction (Ibid., 144-146). In this division, the 
Turkish case is easy to classify, for, since most (though not all) strands of the Turkish nationalist discourse 
have been state-centric, it falls squarely into the state-framed category. As my current aim is not to classify 
different cases of nationalism or even various Turkish discourses of nationalism, but rather to understand 
who were/are considered to be proper, good members of the Turkish nation and proper citizens, and 
what the differences between these two categories constitute, I follow Brubaker’s suggestions only to 
a point: I will investigate the bases of inclusion and exclusion in the Turkish case without resorting to 
the ethnic-civic classification.44 In chapter seven, I do however, resort to evaluating various competing 
discourses as conservative or liberal nationalism, but more about this division later.
43 In his empiric study, Shulman investigated and evaluated how members of majority groups in Western, Central European 
and Eastern European countries valued the various civic or cultural criteria of membership, such as attachment to a territory, 
citizenship, shared language or religion. He found out that the differences between countries of the three groups were rather 
small and did not support theorizing on civic West and ethnic/cultural East. In both groups importance was attached to both 
civic and cultural components of belonging. (Shulman 2002.)
44 By the early 2000s, the ethnic-civic division of nationalism had become the target of much criticism, and several other 
variants had been suggested. For example, Ayhan Akman suggested a third, modernist variant of nationalism, in which 
he describes modernist nationalism as a project of modernity that demands ”civilizational conversion” to western culture, 
highlights cultural commonality, is state-imposed and stresses the future rather than the common past in the legitimation of 
the nationalist project (Akman 2004, 26). Turkish nationalism is classified as a modernist variant of nationalism. In another 
interesting critique of the ethnic-civic division, Tim Nieguth has proposed four organizing principles of national boundary 
construction (i.e. basis of inclusion and exclusion), namely ancestry, race, culture and territory. Ancestral notions include 
and exclude individuals on the basis of assumed common ancestry and kinship. Racial conceptions base their distribution of 
membership on race. Cultural view expects cultural assimilation as a precondition for admission to membership. Territorial 
conceptions grant membership to all who reside within the state in question. (Nieguth 1999, mostly 169.)
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Basis of Inclusion and Exclusion: I Religion
Religion was obviously an important basis for inclusion into, and exclusion from, the Turkish nation, as 
is also further illuminated by the Turkish word Mustafa Kemal and his followers chose for nation: millet.45 
The term had been used in plural for the non-Muslim religious communities of the Ottoman Empire, 
and in singular for the Muslim community, but had gained more nationalist connotations by the time of 
the War of Independence, when it became widely used by the new elite: the ambiguousness of the term 
that could be understood to refer both to the community of believers and the nation evidently benefited 
the early nationalists.
Both the terms citizen (vatandaş) and Turkish (Türk) could be understood in different ways 
depending on the context. As his starting point, sociologist Mesut Yeğen (2004 and 2006) took the 
definition of citizenship as written in Article 88 of the constitution of 1924, which states: “The people 
of Turkey regardless of their religion and race would, in terms of citizenship, be considered Turkish.” 
This formulation has often been interpreted as a proof of the inclusive official formulation of Turkish 
nationalism even in works highly critical of Kemalist nationalism (such as Parla & Davison 2004, 71). 
Yeğen argues against this interpretation and proposes that the formulation together with other texts and 
practices of the early republican period actually suggest that there were different degrees of Turkishness. 
In the early republican terminology, everybody in Turkey, including the non-Muslim citizens, could 
be referred to as ”citizen of the Republic of Turkey,” meaning that legal citizenship was open to non-
Muslims, yet the non-Muslim citizens were mere “citizens-in-law” (term from İçduygu & Kaygusuz 
2004, 40); they were considered to be citizens only in a formal sense. The label ”Turkish citizen” was 
used for all Muslim citizens, including the Kurds, and the word ”Turk” was used as an ethnonym for 
citizens of Turkish ethnic origin. (Yeğen 2004 and 2006, 97-101.) So, there was a difference between the 
“constitutional Turks” and “Turks as such” (see also İnce 2012, chapter 3).
There was a considerable gap between the categories of citizenship and membership in the nation, 
and Turkishness may not have been achievable by some Turkish citizens (Yeğen 2004, 56-57). Thus, 
there have always been citizens who are not “Turks.” This means that differences between the definitions 
of citizenship and nationality exist; that is, the requirements of Turkish citizenship, and the way the 
membership in, or “community inside” (İçduygu & Kaygusuz 2004) was drawn in terms of citizenship 
differed from the requirements of membership in the Turkish nation. Yeğen has argued that the 
differentiation existed both in the founding texts of citizenship as well as in state practices related to 
citizens’ rights. For example, career as a state civil servant was open for Turkish citizens, but not for non-
Muslim citizens of Turkey prior to the 1960s, and career in the military was reserved for members of the 
Turkish race, meaning ethnic Turks only (Yeğen 2004).46 
The Treaty of Lausanne (1923) guaranteed some minority rights for some of the non-Muslim 
religious groups, namely Greek Orthodox, Armenians and Jews, later labeled as “national minorities” 
(milli azınlık), “official minorities,” or “Lausanne minorities.”47 In the nationalist imagination, these non-
Muslim groups, officially citizens of the Republic, were constructed as a threat to the national security, 
45 Interestingly enough the Arabic origin term “millet” was purged from Turkish language during the most radical phase of 
the language reform and replaced with the purist “ulus.” Later the term millet was reintroduced by Atatürk himself (Çolak 
2004, 84)
46 Some of the differential practices will be describe in the next chapter, but for more details, see Yıldız 2001a, Yeğen 2004 
and Çagaptay 2006a.
47 Note the correspondence with the traditional Ottoman Christian millets.
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as agents of foreign powers within Turkey (İçduygu & Kaygusuz 2004, 36). The historical roots of this 
perception were of course in the 19th century series of minority rebellions supported by the Western 
powers, which thus interfered in Ottoman affairs with the excuse of protecting the minorities. The 
process culminated in the treaty of Sèvres (1920) that envisioned the partition of the Empire. 
According to İçduygu & Kaygusuz, the peace treaties of Sèvres (1920) and Lausanne (1923) profoundly 
influenced the way the Turkish nation was envisioned in the 1920s and 1930s (İçduygu & Kaygusuz 2004). 
First of all, the treaty of Sèvres introduced the element of ethnicity to the emerging idea of “community inside” 
by recognizing territorial autonomy for the first time for a Muslim community of non-Turkish origins (i.e. 
Kurds). Secondly, there was an excessive concern with minority rights, which enforced the Ottoman/Turkish 
view of minority rights not as demands of democracy, but as disruptive of social cohesion, political integrity 
and leading towards separatist projects.48 This led the Turkish side to emphasize a unitary model of citizenship 
with equal rights and duties for all citizens. Furthermore, equal rights and duties were seen more as guarantees 
of political integrity than democratic ends in themselves (İçduygu & Kaygusuz 2004, 44-45). 
Until the present time, official Turkey has refused to use the word “minority” for any other group 
than those explicitly spelled out in the Lausanne treaty. The official argument is that all citizens of Turkey 
are equal as citizens and should not be denigrated to the status of minority. The idea of the non-Muslim 
minorities as a danger to the Turkish state has been kept alive by nationalist discursive practices. They 
have at times, even in official degrees, been referred to as “citizens of foreign origins” and subjected to 
differential treatment (for examples, see Oran 2004). 
Basis of Inclusion and Exclusion: II Ethnicity and Culture
In addition to religion, ethnicity played an important role in defining the basis of inclusion into and 
exclusion from Turkishness, and the basis on which individuals were considered as “proper, good citizens,” or 
not. Ethnicities, ethnic groups, and identifications are generally viewed as something older, more primordial 
than nations and national feelings. It has been argued that nations are not only products of modernization 
and elite projects, but have their basis in earlier cultural bonds, which are often presented as ethnic.49 But, 
if one takes the modernist and constructionist ideas regarding collective identifications seriously, ethnic 
groups and ethnicities should not be defined as natural and objective entities any more than nations. Also, 
they rely on the subjective understanding of the members of an ethnicity or an ethnic group. Ethnic groups 
should not be seen as primordial entities but as (socially constructed) groups of individuals who feel they 
48 In his work on the history of the protection of minorities in Europe Antony Alcock classifies both peace treaties as two 
instruments out of a total of 19 set up to protect minorities in Europe through international treaties and declarations, to 
be put under the control of the League of Nations. However, this inter-war system of minority protection failed. It was 
limited in scope and applied only to a few states, and it was political rather than legal or humanitarian. (Alcock 2000, 46-55, 
81-83.) As a result, the states that were ordered to protect minorities on the basis of these instruments perceived it as a breach 
of state sovereignty. In addition, the system for enforcing the protection of minorities was inadequate, and there was no 
unanimous stance on whether the ultimate aim was to protect the continued existence of minority cultures or to facilitate 
their assimilation. Also, the treaties emphasized individual rights and religious freedom, but were weak on collective rights, 
including linguistic rights. (Alcock 2000, 83-87.) All in all, Turkey was not alone in its resentment of “outside meddling,” and 
it was not the only state that failed to fulfill its obligations vis-à-vis its minority communities.
49 The best known of the theorists who have argued for the old or even ancient ethnic identities as the basis of modern 
nations is Anthony D. Smith (Smith 1986; Remy 2004). In the Turkish case this approach sometimes ends with a result that 
a scholar may explicitly deny the millennia long existence of the Turkish nation, but present the early phase of the Ottoman 
Empire as based on Turkish ethnicity (for example see the otherwise excellent work of Yıldız 2001a, 65-70).
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share some important, defining characteristics (for example: Valtonen 2005) that bind them together so 
that they form a group. These shared characteristics may have been a source of communal identification for 
people since before modernization and nationalism, but this may not always be the case! 
It is quite problematic to talk about the Turks as a self-conscious “ethnic group” before the founding 
of the Turkish republic, or about “Turkish ethnicity” or “Turkish ethnic origins” to denote a preexisting, 
primordial commonality the Turkish nationalists could count on when constructing the new nation. 
If one looks at Turks as an ethnic group, the subjective criterion of a self-consciousness group was 
probably not even met during the War of Independence. As was discussed previously, the majority of the 
Turkish speaking population of Anatolia still saw themselves either more universally as Muslims, or had 
more local or regional sources of identification than shared Turkish ethnicity. Up until the end of the 
19th century, the term ”Turk” had been used to refer to nomads, and would have been considered as a 
derogatory label by urban dwellers. The first time the word ”Turk” (Türk) was used by the Ottomans to 
mean something akin to a Turkish nation, rather than certain backward nomadic tribal elements of the 
Ottoman population, dates only to 1897 (for more details, see Yıldız 2001a, 67). Since the term ”Turkish” 
came to mean the whole Turkish speaking population of Anatolia gradually, and only after the turn of 
the century, Turkish ethnicity as an important source of self-identification for the general population 
cannot really be considered as a primordial phenomenon the Turkish nation was constructed upon, at 
least without falling back to the idea of a ”forgotten” identification typical for nationalist discourses. 
Yet, even if Turks as a bounded self-conscious ethnic group did not exist according to the 
contemporary understanding of ethnic groups that emphasizes the subjective understanding of their 
members, Turks as an ethnic category did. Ethnicity is not only a subjective feeling of belonging to a 
certain community, but often includes objective criteria such as language, as well as outside recognition 
for validity of the particular identification. One cannot simply decide that one is ethnically Finnish or 
Turkish to be accepted by others as such. Ethnic category is a term that is used to denote a label attached 
to a group of people that are seen to share certain characteristics by outsiders. In the Turkish case, the 
westerners had long referred to the Ottomans as Turks, and by the time the Republic of Turkey was 
founded, an influential share of the leading Kemalist elite thought of the Turkish-speaking population of 
Anatolia as Turks, i.e. as a bounded group with common features. Thus it can be argued that by the time 
of the founding of the Republic, Turkishness as an ethnic category/categorization did exist.
Research on the formation of the Turkish nation has mainly been research of legal definition, official 
discourse(s) and state policies, many of which were based on the Kemalist belief in the existence of Turks 
as a bounded unit with crucial shared characteristics. The Kemalist nationalist elite did not use the term 
ethnic/ethnicity, as the term became commonly used only after the Second World War (Valtonen 2005, 
107), but the ways they used the terms soy (origin), hars (culture), kavim (tribe/race/later also ethnicity) 
and ırk (race, later also ethnicity) come at times very close to what is currently referred to with ethnicity 
(see for example: Parla & Davison 2004, 71-80; Çagaptay 2004).50 
Jan Erik Zürcher has analyzed the meaning of the term culture (hars) in the CHP definition of a Turk 
from 1931: “Any individual within the Republic of Turkey, whatever his faith, who speaks Turkish, grows 
50 In the Kemalist-nationalist daily Cumhuriyet the word ırk (race) is at times still used as a synonym for ethnicity. For an 
analysis of the interaction between Turkish nationalism and the concept of race in the 1930s, see Soner Çagaptay’s (2004) 
article “Race, Assimilation and Kemalism: Turkish Nationalism and the Minorities in the 1930s”. 
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up with Turkish culture and adopts the Turkish ideal, is a Turk” (Zürcher 2000, emphasis mine). 51 First, 
unity of language, culture and ideal is defined to constitute the nation. Then culture, which is different from 
civilization (=Western civilization),52 is defined as something inherited from one’s background, as something 
that is intrinsically impossible to adopt, making it as exclusive category as ethnicity. Hence, asking Kurds, 
Arabs, or Circassians to adopt Turkish culture is an impossible demand; and it can thus only mean asking 
them to acquiesce to the cultural monopoly of the Turks and to suppress their own culture. At the same 
time, this served as a prerequisite for being a member of the Turkish nation. In its attempt to constitute a 
national identity, the new regime denied the existence of different ethnicities within the country (Ibid.).
It has been convincingly argued that the role of Turkish culture (or race/ethnicity) became more 
pronounced in the definition of the Turkish nation during the course of the 1920s and that by the 
1930s the official nationalist rhetoric was decidedly ethnicist bordering on racist (Yıldız 2001a; Parla 
& Davison 2004, 71-80). For example, the word Kurd(ish) that was used by Atatürk in his speeches 
during the War of Independence was dropped from the official state discourse later, after the founding of 
the Republic (Yeğen 1999).53 Perhaps the most infamous quote that illuminates the racialist or ethnicist 
discourse of the 1930s is from the former Minister of Justice Mahmut Ezat Bozkurt, who stated in 1930 
that “…the master of this country is the Turk. Those who are not genuine Turks can have only one right 
in the Turkish fatherland and that is to be a servant [hizmetçi], to be a slave [köle]. We are in the most 
free country of the world. They call this Turkey.” (quoted in Parla & Davison 2004, 77). The ethnicist/
racialist discourse was very much influenced by the contemporaneous nationalist and racist discourses in 
Europe and were in part a response to the negative Western image of the Turks as an inferior race (Parla 
& Davison 2004, 73; Akçam 2002, 55).
An important step in the construction of the Turkish nation, a proud nation with a glorious 
history, as opposed to the European negative image of the inferiority of Turks, was the construction and 
propagation of the Turkish History Thesis and Sun Language Theory. These were developed in the early 
1930s in a series of official conferences and publications (Çagaptay 2004, 86; Çagaptay 2006a, 48-56). 
These theories defined the Turkish race as the founder of all great civilizations of the world, and made 
it possible for Turkey to claim the Anatolian cultural heritage as their own. The Sumerian and Hittite 
civilizations were claimed as part of the Turkish cultural heritage.54 At the same time, terms such as 
“Turkish race” or “Turkish blood” were used in the Kemalist nationalist rhetoric of the 1930s and at 
times used to refer to Turks as a biological community (see Parla & Davison 2004, 71-80). 
Assimilationist Policies
Despite the ethnicist biological rhetoric and a measure of differential treatment based on culture (hars), 
the logic of voluntary and compulsory assimilation played a more constitutive role in the definition of 
51 As the only allowed party the CHP was partially merged with the state, and by the 1930s its party programs very much 
defined the official policies of the state.
52 The theorizing of Ziya Gökalp greatly influenced the Kemalist notions of civilization, culture, and nation (for a short 
summary, see Mardin 1981, 207).
53 Research of non-state public discourses and private discourses might yield very different results. An example from a much 
later period, i.e. Murat Somer’s (2004) analysis of Kurds in the Turkish daily Hürriyet in the 1980s shows that official denial 
of the existence of Kurds in Turkey notwithstanding, even the pro-state Hürriyet occasionally used “the known yet suppressed 
category of Kurd” (Somer 2005).
54 The Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory were quietly forgotten after the 1930s.
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Turkishness and the practices of the early republican era, at least vis-à-vis the Muslim population. Both 
the “Citizen, speak Turkish” campaigns of the 1930s55 and the settlement law of 1934 were based on 
assimilationist logic suggesting that Turkishness was generally believed to be something achievable by the 
non-Turkish-speaking Muslims (Yeğen 2004, 57), Turkey’s Jews, and even some Christians (Çagaptay 
2004). However, the cultural, assimilationist logic (see Shulman 2002) also bears some traces of ethnicist 
thinking, especially when one considers that the Turkish state aimed to regulate and mold also the private 
life of the individual, not only the public one.56
Soner Çapagtay, who has studied the Turkish nationalism of the 1930s, argues that although 
Kemalism increasingly favored ethnicity as a marker of Turkishness in the 1930s, it never closed the gates 
to Turkification. Inasmuch as Kemalist ideology focused on the Turkish race, it would appear that what 
the Kemalists saw in “race” was closer to the word’s nineteenth century connotations than to its twentieth 
century meaning. Race referred not to a biological community, but to a national one, defined through 
language rather than genetic factors. Çagaptay concludes: “Thus, it appears that under the rubric of 
Turkish race, Kemalism was willing to accept not only the Anatolian Muslims and Jews, but, thinking 
wishfully, even the Armenians into the body of the Turkish nation. Consequently as the example of the 
“Speak Turkish” campaign reveals, ethnicity-through-language emerged as one of the primary planks of 
Turkishness in the 1930s.” (Çagaptay 2004, 96-97). Ankara kept the avenues of assimilation open to 
those who were not ethnically Turkish, especially the Jews and non-Turkish Muslims. True, assimilation 
was enforced; yet it was inclusive. This created certain dilemmas for the minorities who did not wish to 
assimilate by adopting Turkish (Çagaptay 2004, 96-98).
The Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory were utilized to legitimize assimilationist 
policies: since Armenians and Turks were of common origins, it was not thought to be problematic for 
the Armenians to assimilate and to be accepted as Turks (Çagaptay 2004, 88-89). In the Sun Language 
Theory Turkish language was defined as the transmitter of the ancient culture, character, and intellect 
of the Turkish nation (or race), and thus it was of utmost importance to be able to speak Turkish if one 
desired to be seen as belonging to the Turkish nation (Çagaptay 2004; Aydıngün & Aydıngün 2004). It 
was due to this academic background and general nationalist fervor of the 1930s that the “Citizen Speak 
Turkish” campaigns spread across Turkey. 
At this juncture, it is worthwhile to consider the radicalism of the Kemalist language reform. While 
the Turkish language was defined as the determining factor of Turkishness, the transmitter of the ancient 
culture, it was also conceived as a cultural artifact produced within the Kemalist nation-building project, 
rather than simply an independent basis of “national consciousnesses” or “the constitutive aspect of 
culture” (Çolak 2004, 84-85). 
The state followed assimilationist policies until the 1980s, and individuals with a good command 
of Turkish were readily accepted as Turks as long as they kept their ethnicity a private matter (Kirişçi & 
Winrow 1997, 113). One’s non-Turkish background did not necessarily need to be a hindrance for a 
career in politics or business. After the brutal suppression of a series of insurgencies (1925–1938), often 
casually termed ”Kurdish rebellions”57 in the South-East, the state gained control of the entire country, 
55 Interestingly enough, some prominent members of Turkey’s Jewish community, who wished to show their loyalty to the 
republican regime, were some of the most ardent supporters or even initiators of these campaigns (see Çagaptay 2004).
56 See below.
57 See next chapter.
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and a feeling of shared Turkish nationality gradually became part of the world-view of the Anatolian 
masses. 
The creation of the Turkish nation is easy to interpret from the modernist perspective of nationalism. 
The nationalist elite invested in national education; and the resultant increased literacy, accompanied by 
a national press and obligatory military service in the citizen army spread the nationalist ideals from 
the elite to the people in a top-down project of national modernization. The process offers a powerful 
legitimizing force for the elite in power. The assimilationist policies were largely successful, and by the 
1950s even many citizens of ethnic Kurdish origins, the most difficult group to assimilate, considered 
themselves foremost as Turks (van Bruinessen 2000, 93).
The Forgotten “Others” of the Turkish Nation
Another way of looking at the basis for and policies of exclusion and inclusion into membership of the 
nation during the construction of the Turkish nation is via the “others” of the nation. This approach starts 
from the premise that an “other,” which is essentially different from oneself, is needed for the construction 
of the self or a group identity. In regards to Turkey, perhaps the most wide-spread categorization is into 
three sets of internal others: the non-Muslims in Turkey (or the late Ottoman Empire), the non-Turkish 
population, and as perhaps the most important, the backward representation of the Islamic Ottoman past 
(Kadıoğlu 2007). The external “others,” among which Europe is probably the most important, are not 
considered to have been of primary importance. According to this interpretation, the modern Turkish 
nation was constructed vis-à-vis the internal “others” who were either excluded from, or subordinated 
to, the Turkish nation. The process is seen to have started already before Turkish nation-building, when 
the non-Muslim population was gradually distanced from the common Ottoman experience. As was 
discussed above, this development started with the Tanzimat reforms and minority nationalist uprisings of 
the 19th century, gained momentum during the Balkan wars, and culminated in the forced deportations, 
massacres, and population exchanges that took place between 1914 and 1923. A policy of assimilation 
was directed towards the non-Turkish Muslim population. “The third internal other,” the Ottoman past, 
was presented as backward, superstitious, and a hindrance to reform and progress. The republican elite 
advocated a radical cultural break with the Ottoman past. (loosely following Kadıoğlu 2007.)
In a very interesting commentary on the idea of the “others” of the Turkish nation, based on analysis 
of the civics education material used in Turkey, Füsun Üstel points out that even if the Turkish citizen was 
expected to be militant in his devotion to his country, up until the 1980 military coup the unity and totality 
of the Republic were shown as a victory realized, as a fait accompli. Thus, an internal threat or enemy was 
not usually encountered in the early books. Initially, a return to the Islamic Ottoman past was shown as 
a danger, (as an “other” in the above described sense), but later the few examples of exclusionary practices 
include such categories as: eşkiya (brigands), 58 fena adamlar (bad men), milletin en büyük düşmanları: 
kaçakçılar (the greatest enemies of the nation: smugglers). (Üstel 2005, 209-214.) These can hardly be 
considered to fall within the categories of the “other” of the nation as defined by Ayşe Kadıoğlu (2007). 
After the normalization of relations with Greece in the early 1930s, the outside threat also became more 
potential than actual, with no named actors appearing in the textbooks (Üstel 2005, 214).
58 Eşkiya can be seen as a roundabout, non-politicized reference to Kurds and those taking part in the uprisings in the 1920s 
and 1930s (Üstel 2005, 209, drawing on the work of Yeğen 2003).
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The conclusions of Üstel’s analysis point towards another possible interpretation, namely the creation 
of a state of amnesia, also pointed out by the political scientist Ayşe Kadıoğlu (2007). The Republic 
of Turks ignored the presence of other religious and ethnic groups to the point of “forgetting” them 
(Kadıoğlu 2007). A state of amnesia was created in the newly founded Turkish republic with the help of 
the cultural reforms: the adoption of the Latin script to replace the Arabic one and the radical language 
reform. According to Çolak (2004, 73), the leading elite actually welcomed the general amnesia caused 
by this radical cultural break. The new generations were cut off from their Ottoman past, and made 
ignorant of the multi-religious, multicultural, and multi-ethnic history of Anatolia (Kadıoğlu 2007, 
289). As a part of this general amnesia, an official policy of denial of the atrocities committed against 
these other inhabitants of Anatolia was adopted. “The new Turks” of the land of oblivion have become 
ignorant about the extent of the impoverishment brought upon them on the road to a homogenous 
nation-state.” (Kadıoğlu 2007, 289.) Analysis of the content of history textbooks used in Turkish schools 
points partly to the same direction: the Armenians of Anatolia were mentioned only rarely and Kurds 
never, but the strong influence of European history-writing ensured the ancient Greeks a lengthy section 
in the early textbooks (Copeaux 2006 [1997]).
2.4.2 muslim yet modeRn and seculaR
The aim of the reforms we have already carried out and are continuing to carry out is to form 
Turkish society into a modern society in every aspect. (A quote from Atatürk in Karal 1981, 15)
For everything in the world, for civilization, for life, for success, the most important factor is science, 
and True enlightenment in life is science. (Quotes from Atatürk, Karal 1981, 15, 23)
In this section I look at the Kemalist elite expectations for the nation and the citizen and how the citizen 
of the new republic was expected to behave. In short, a citizen and a member of the Turkish nation 
was to be modern and civilized (in personal life as well as public) as prescribed by the state; he was to 
accord primacy to the interests of the state; and the whole nation of Turkey was seen to form a one single 
harmonious entity, a unified mass. 
Fuat E. Keyman has defined Kemalism as a project of modernity, the central idea of which was ”a 
will to civilization”59 within the framework of Western modernity (Keyman 2000). Keyman interprets 
all the other elements of Kemalism as means to reach the goal of modernity. The level of contemporary 
civilization (muasır medeniyet), by which Western civilization was meant, was seen to be reached by 
creating its requirements: an independent sovereign nation-state (political modernization), developed 
industry (economic modernization) and secularized national identity (identity creation) (Keyman 2005). 
“...the Kemalist will to civilization was based upon an articulation of modernity (reason) and capitalism 
(capital) into Turkish society through the construction of a modern nation-state” (Keyman 2005, 275). 
The cultural aspect of the Kemalist project of modernity was very important: the creation of the Turkish 
59 ‘Will to civilization’ (Fuat Keyman 2000, 71: C. de Ferro 1995, “The will to civilization and its encounter with laissez-
faire,” Alternatives 27, 89-103).
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nation and the modern Turkish citizen were considered to be an essential part of becoming modern. 
Many of the Kemalist reforms, such as the adoption of the Western type hat, calendar, and legislation and 
Latin script witness this modernist drive. Also school primers refer to civilization and promote behavior 
in a good, “civilized manner,” meaning, in essence, the adoption of Western type of behavior and 
clothing (for example Üstel 2005: 176-179). Yılmaz Çolak points out also the modernist justifications of 
the Kemalist language reform: the transition from Arabic to Latin alphabet was presented as a demand 
of modernity that would lead the way to the conversion from traditional to “civilized” life. It would 
correct the deficiencies of the oriental mentality and end the backward position of Turks. The explicit, 
pronounced aim of the purge of old Arabic and Persian loan words was to make Turkish a language fit for 
modern life and civilization (Çolak 2004).
Thus, Kemalists did not look for the Turkish nation in the past, in tradition, but a modernist nation 
with new, manufactured symbols was invented, and the state assumed the task of molding the people to 
fit this modernist image (İçduygu et al. 1999, 197). Because of this strong modernist bent, Ayhan Akman 
has labeled Turkish nationalism as ”modernist nationalism” (Akman 2002 and 2004). In addition to the 
adoption of Western legislation and cultural styles and symbols from calendar and music to architecture, 
the state attempted to prescribe how citizens should speak, dress, and behave in public and even in their 
private lives. Because of these regime-enforced policies, many commentators have argued that Turkish 
citizenship was seen as a cultural status more than a social or political one (İçduygu et al. 1999, 197), 
which makes the connection between citizenship and nationality a very close one indeed. 
In a postmodern and post-colonial critique of Kemalist modernity, Tuğrul İlter (2002) describes 
the republican understanding of modernity as singular; there is only one measure of modernity and 
civilization, and that measure is universal. This universal History is a Western Tale, assumes that the telos 
of history is the West, and, consequently, modernization is equivalent to Westernization: His story. There 
is only one civilized world, the Western world. Thus oriental concepts of civilization with its archaic 
otherworldly concerns is an impediment on the way to “real” civilization. The modern man is guided by 
reason, logic, and intelligence. (İlter 2002.)60 
Secularism was part and parcel of the Kemalist understanding of enlightened modernit. This brings 
us to the seemingly paradoxical relationship constructed between religion and secularism in the Kemalist 
Republic: religion was at the same time the most important requirement for membership in the Turkish 
nation, but at the same time a good Kemalist citizen was expected to be a secularized individual guided 
by rational thinking and science rather than by his religion, which he was to delegate to the private 
sphere.
Contrary to the often heard simplification, the Ottoman Empire was not a theocracy.61 In theory 
it was an Islamic empire and Islam was the official religion of the state. In practice, politics and religion, 
temporal and sacred rule were separated to a large extent (Zürcher 1993, Mardin 1981). Yet, the Ottoman 
60 The perception of Kemalism as truly modern/modernist is not wholly unanimous. Based on an analysis of some of the 
founding documents of Kemalism, Taha Parla & Andrew Davison argue that Kemalism should not be considered a project of 
modernity or a modernizing project. They understand Kemalism in terms of corporatism. Corporatism defines occupational 
groups (not individuals or social classes) as the basis of society and promotes ordered progress with harmonious relations 
between codependent social groups. They argue that since corporatism (and thus Kemalism) opposes the central categories 
of liberal model of society (liberal individualism is viewed as overly atomistic and disruptive of social equilibrium) as well 
as Marxist categorization based on social classes, it should not be considered within the boundaries of modernity (Parla & 
Davison 2004, 26-32).
61 A simplification heard often from researchers of modern Turkey, not Ottomanists.
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Empire cannot be considered to have been exactly secular either. On the symbolic level Islam was the raison 
d’être of the Ottoman state and thus important in legitimating the Ottoman rule: the sultan ruled because 
God had granted him the power. The Sultan-Caliph was the defender of the (orthodox Sunni) faith, the 
ruler of all Sunni Muslims. Sunni Islam was promoted by the state and continued as an important source 
of solidarity for the Muslim population until the very end of the empire (Gülalp 2005, 358). The Ottoman 
state imposed orthodox Sunni Islam upon the Muslim population envisioned as a single homogeneous 
block despite considerable religious heterodoxy outside the urban centers (Mardin 1981). 
In addition to the symbolic role played by religion legitimating the state power, Islam was also 
incorporated into the state structure. Members of the religious hierarchy had the status of civil servants, 
which gave the state a measure of control over the ulema (the religious scholars), and the ulema acted 
as agents of the state in the control of social life through their control of education, judiciary, and 
administrative networks (for example Mardin 1981, 194). There was a symbiosis of religion and state, 
and religious movements were proclaimed heretical mainly if they were seen to endanger the state. 
During the 19th century the influence of the ulema decreased as the administration, legislation, and 
education were further secularized (Mardin 1981).
From the Ottoman point of view, there were hypothetically two alternative modes of legitimizing 
modernization—Islamic and secular—both of which were used during the 19th century. For example, Sultan 
Abdülhamit II (1876–1909) believed in modern science and its practical applications, and continued the 
institutional reform, i.e. the rationalization and modernization of the state apparatus begun during the 
previous period of reform known as Tanzimat (1839–1876), and yet, he also strongly propagated Islam as 
the source of solidarity for his Ottoman subjects (Mardin 1981, 200-201). The two modes of legitimation, 
i.e. secular and Islamic, did not need to be mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, the Kemalist reformers chose 
the secularist path to modernization because they shared the widely held Eurocentric belief, according to 
which Islam and modernization are incompatible (Gülalp 2005, 359). Modernization was equated with 
westernization, and Islam was seen to represent a set of traditions, values, legal rules, and norms that were 
intrinsically non-western, and thus non-modern in character (Gülalp 2005, 361).62 
After the founding of the Republic, the Kemalist elite moved to remove Islam from the public 
sphere, to suppress it political role, and to build a secularized nation-state in which they attempted to 
replace Islam with Kemalism and secular nationalism in public ceremonies and as the source of shared 
identity. Islam, which was seen as superstitious and backward, the enemy of Enlightenment and progress, 
was shut out from the political sphere. Secularizing steps included abolishing the caliphate, the religious 
education system (medrese), and the religious courts (1924); banning the religious orders (tarikat) 
(1925); adopting a civil code modeled after the Swiss one (1926), and deleting reference to Islam from 
the constitution (1928). Because of the previous symbiotic relationship between the state and religion, 
62 Şerif Mardin explains the radicality of the Kemalist stance towards Islam with the divided educational system of the late 
Ottoman Empire. The post-Tanzimat education system was divided into two, the old religiously oriented one and the new, 
secular and positivist schooling, which produced a radicalized elite with utopian mentality. Each school was a self-contained 
universe in which students were segregated from Ottoman everyday life. They were studying principles and laws which 
were abstractions from reality, and had artificial internal consistency. As students members of the new elite were constantly 
reminded that the fate of the Empire depended on their contributions to its salvation. The new elite beganto look down on 
the traditionally schooled elite (the ulema) and saw them as ignorant charlatans and obstructers of progress, rather than as 
carriers of traditional knowledge. (Mardin 1981, 204-205.) Besides this, the failures of Sultan Abdülhamit II and the Young 
Turks to create a new feeling of solidarity with Islam discredited Islam as a source of unity and belonging for the nation in the 
eyes of the new elite.
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Şerif Mardin compares the new policy of laicism with tearing a limb out of the body of the Turkish state 
(Mardin 1981, 191).
In a more recent work, however, Andrew Davison has argued that Turkish modernization removed 
religion from politics, but did not sever the link between religion and the state (Davison 2003, 337). The 
Turkish state removed Islam from the public/political sphere, but did not grant autonomy to religion 
or the religious establishment. It created its own modern, moderate and rational version of Islam: the 
official state religion under the control of the newly founded Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) 
that was to oversee all matters related to communal worship and religious education (Davison 2003, 
337).63 The Diyanet still oversees all mosques and their personnel in Turkey and the imams are state 
employees. This state control over religion through the state paid religious hierarchy can be seen as a 
continuation of the Ottoman model. As in the Ottoman Empire, the state formalized and promoted 
a Sunni religious set of beliefs and values that were to be enforced on all citizens to provide a basis for 
solidarity among citizens (Koçan & Öncü 2004, 471). Despite this continuity in state-enforcement of 
official Sunni Islam, many of the non-Sunni groups such as Alevis64 became enthusiastic supporters of 
the secularist republic. Because religion was decreed to belong to the private sphere of the individual, it 
was a great improvement from the Ottoman Empire from the perspective of the non-Sunni population.
The laicization of high Islam did not face opposition, but the suppression of the ”unenlightened,” 
“superstitious,” and ”backward” practices of popular Islam raised resistance among the population. The 
series of revolts in South-Eastern Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s were motivated by a mixture of resistance 
to Turkish nationalist policies and centralization of power, and, very importantly, constituted a reaction to 
the secularist drive of the regime (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997, 104). The banned religious organizations went 
underground, and popular Islam became the “other” Islam, ”the dark face of Islam” behind the Diyanet’s 
official Islam, something to be feared (Öncü 1995). Thus, the relationship between the state and religion 
was complex and multi-layered: on one hand, the state insisted on the exclusion of religion from politics, 
while on other hand it officially promoted a particular religious identity for the nation (Ibid.). Political 
Islam was made “the internal other” of the modern Turkish nation, and any resistance to Kemalist regime 
was presented as Islamist reaction (irtica). Kemalism created a Cartesian duality between the Kemalist 
progressivism versus Islamist reactionarism. This divide continued to function as within/outside the 
legitimate system divide in the Turkish Republic (Dursun 2006) up until the AKP rule in the 2000s. 
Since private beliefs were now the concern of the state, the fusion of Islam and nationalism and 
state control over religion actually worked against the aim of privatization of religion. Thus, despite the 
removal of Islam from areas of symbolic legitimation and governance, religion was not made entirely 
separate and thus a private matter. A real, a proper citizen, and a good Turk was expected not only to be 
Muslim, but also to be a Sunni Muslim, and was to practice his or her religion in the manner the state 
prescribed, i.e. secular, modern, moderate and rational. Yet, Muslimhood was expected not to wield 
influence over the individual’s political activities. 
Another consequence of the attempt to fill the place of Islam in the public sphere with Turkish 
nationalism was the infusion of religious features into Kemalism and Turkish nationalism. For an 
63 Davison also argues for the use of more exact term “laicism” for Kemalist secularism, a term also used by the Kemalists 
themselves. The other option seems to be expressions such as “the Kemalist mode of secularism” (see Davison 2003).
64 Alevi is an umbrella term that is used to refer to a number of heterodox religious groups. For more on Alevi, see Andrews 
1989 and Erdemir 2005.
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important share of the population, Islam had offered answers to the questions of social solidarity and 
belonging. When Islam was pushed to the background, and the consciousness of the new Turk was 
to be based on rational science (Mardin 1981, 211), nationalism was promoted as an answer to these 
important questions. Nationalism in general has been described as having replaced religion in the post 
Enlightenment era and can be seen as the civic religion of modern nation-states (Pakkasvirta 2005, 72 
on Benedict Anderson). These quasi-religious features have been quite pronounced in Kemalism with 
its unquestionable truths, prophet (Atatürk), sacred symbols (the flag, the anthem), and texts (Atatürk’s 
speeches) (among many others Navaro-Yashin 2002, chapter 6).
2.4.3 nation and citizen in the seRvice of the state
Everything within the state, nothing against the state, nothing outside the state. Here is today’s 
formula of etatism. (A quote from Ali Fuat Başgil, an important ideologue of the CHP, cited in 
Parla & Davison 2004, 257) 
If (secular) modernity was the main aim of Kemalist reforms, the main agent behind the modernist project 
was seen to be the state: the Turkish nation was to become civilized in a manner defined by the state. 
Autonomous nodes of power were not allowed65 and even autonomous westernization was discouraged 
as possibly disruptive. In Kemalist political thinking the state is defined as an autonomous entity with 
its own interests and needs, and the whole nation—as well as the individual citizen—subordinate to the 
state. The nation became a property of the state to be remolded according to the needs of the state (social 
engineering) and the loyal citizen was expected to willingly adopt the life-style prescribed by the state 
and to wholeheartedly support the modernist vision of the society. (İnsel 2001.)
The authoritative definition of a Turk in the 1931 party program of the Kemalist party CHP has 
been considered to form the basis of the so called republican citizenship, which emphasizes citizens’ 
duties rather than rights (Ahmet Yıldız 2001a, 16). According to the program: ”Any individual within 
the Republic of Turkey, whatever his faith, who speaks Turkish, grows up with Turkish culture and adopts 
the Turkish ideal, is a Turk” (from Zürcher 2000, emphasis mine). According to Jan Erik Zürcher, whose 
analysis of the term culture (hars) was presented above, the term ideal (mefkûre/ülkü) came gradually to 
mean the radical modernization and westernization of Turkish society: to be considered a good citizen, 
any individual had to unconditionally support the radical modernization and westernization program. 
Because unquestioned support for the Turkish ideal was an essential requirement of being Turkish, the 
opponents of the Kemalist program of modernization could be branded as supporters of irtica (religious 
reaction), as traitors to the nation. Thus, subscribing to the secularist modernist vision of Atatürk was 
very much a part of the definition of Turkishness (see also: İnsel 1998, 22; Çelik 1996, 159). Adoption 
of the mefkûre/ülkü of Kemalist secularist modernization was part of one’s nationhood and citizenship, 
making its antithesis irtica equivalent to high treason. 
For some observers, such as Ayhan Akman (2002 and 2004) and Ahmet İnsel (2001), state-centrism 
is the single most important principle of Kemalism, more important than modernization. In the very first 
65 This is a clear continuation of Ottoman political thought.
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lines of his introduction to the massive volume of articles on Kemalism, Ahmet İnsel names nationalism 
and a will to civilization as the core ideas of early Kemalism (İnsel 2001, 17), but sees the need to safeguard 
and protect the state as the motive behind these. In a somewhat unorthodox interpretation, İnsel claims the 
Kemalist principle of statism as, not merely the chosen developmental economic policy of the regime, but 
a manifestation of the more important political state-centrism in the economic sphere.66 Other researchers 
have also pointed out the state-centric nature of Kemalism, but do not consider it to fall under the principle 
of statism. For example, Levent Köker connects it with the principle of republicanism (another one of 
the six arrows of Kemalism): “Kemalist republicanism assigned to the state a dominant role not only 
in the economy, but also in the field of identity formation, best summarized by the idea that the state 
will regulate the ideas (fikrî nâzımlık yapmak) of the people to secure the formation of a new national 
consciousness obedient to, and in the service of, the new state (Köker 1997, 68).67 Ayhan Akman succinctly 
summarizes the hierarchy of concerns of the Kemalist modernist elite: ”Nationalism was a means to achieve 
modernization; modernization was a means to save the state” (Akman 2004, 39).
As for the reasons for this state-centrism, İnsel points out that the Turkish Republic inherited both 
a centralized system of government and strong state tradition from the Ottoman Empire, along with 
an elite traumatized by its dissolution (İnsel 2001). Many of the leaders of the new Republic originated 
from the lost areas of the empire. Also, the period leading up to the Second World War saw the collapse 
and disappearance of a myriad of states, which was something feared by the elite (İnsel 2001). Another 
interpretation is offered by Koçan & Öncü (2004, 466), who argue that in the absence of the population’s 
sense of identification with the Turkish nation-state, the nation-state’s formation and its permanence had 
to rest on the coercive force of the state. Undoubtedly Kemalist state-centrism was also influenced and 
strengthened by the prevailing authoritarian trends of inter-war Europe. Whatever the reason behind 
the state-centrism of Kemalism, the resulting definition of the new nation subjected it to the state, and 
the definition of the new citizen did not embrace a notion of individual autonomy, rights, and liberties 
against the state but rather regarded rights as dependent on the state-centered definitions of the social, 
economic, and political obligations of the citizens. 
2.4.4 tuRkish citizenship fRom a compaRative peRspective
The Turkish nation-state was not created within a vacuum, but was very much influenced by the 
ideologies and practices of the contemporaneous Western Europe. Thus, it is useful to look at the Turkish 
formulations within a wider comparative framework. A classic study on the evolution of citizenship is 
British sociologist Thomas H. Marshall’s investigation of the evolution of British citizenship (Marshall 
1992 [originally from 1949] and 1963).68 British citizenship evolved gradually from the acquisition of 
civil rights (such as the rights to free speech, worship, property and justice) in the 18th century, to 
those of political rights (right to vote and stand for office) in the 19th century, and social rights (access 
66 In general, statism has been interpreted as a short-lived economic policy, as perhaps the least important of the six arrows. 
For a concise and clear presentation of statism as an economic policy in 1930—1938, see Dumont 1984.
67 Köker (1995) himself defines populism as the key principle of Kemalism.
68 Marshall’s study remains one of the most influential works in contemporary theorizing on citizenship.
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to health care and other welfare state structures) in the 20th century (Marshall 1992). T.H. Marshall’s 
work has been criticized (among some other problems) for his attempt to universalize a specific historical 
case, for in actuality citizenship has evolved differently in different countries and historical contexts (for 
a short evaluation of the work of T.H. Marshall, see Turner 1990). This much is true for Turkey: the 
development of Turkish citizenship is pronouncedly different from the British case as told by Marshall; 
the origins of the development of Turkish citizenship are in the Ottoman era, and certain civil rights 
were granted to the Ottoman subjects/citizens in the 19th century, but limited political and social rights 
were granted only in the 1920s, and by initiative of the reformist state elite rather than as a gradual 
development resulting from social negotiation. 
Following loosely in Marshall’s footsteps, British-Australian sociologist Bryan S. Turner has worked to 
develop a model to analyze the different historical trajectories that have led to the variations in the modern 
understanding of citizenship. He has proposed a classification of modern citizenship based on the two axes 
of 1) active versus passive and 2) the extent of association of citizenship practices with the public or private 
realm (Turner 1990, Kadıoğlu 2005). If citizenship rights were granted as a consequence of a popular 
struggle, citizenship tends to be active (France, U.S.), whereas granting of citizenship rights from above has 
tended to lead to a more passive understanding of citizenship (U.K., Germany). If citizenship evolved within 
the public arena (France, U.K.), the formal aspects of democracy become highlighted and the private world 
of the individual is treated with suspicion; if citizenship evolved in the private arena (U.S.), the rights of the 
individual are constantly emphasized and the protection of private life from state interference is considered 
essential (Turner 1990, Kadıoğlu 2005). Once again, the model’s direct application onto the Turkish case 
is problematic. Since Turkish citizenship rights were granted from above, the public arena was emphasized 
and the state also instituted serious attempts to regulate the private sphere, it falls into Turner’s category of 
“passive democracy” (from above and emphasis on public sphere). This category is shared with 17th century 
English citizenship in Turner’s classification (Turner 1990). However, Ayşe Kadıoğlu finds comparisons 
with Turner’s other example cases more illuminating. She believes Turkish citizenship more akin to the 
German (from above & emphasis on private sphere) understanding in regards the manner the citizenship 
rights were granted from above, without a popular struggle or even a gradual intra-elite negotiation process 
(which was the case in Britain), and also the way the public sphere was rather undeveloped. She also notes 
the resemblance to the French experience (from below and emphasis on the public sphere) with its strong 
suspicion of the private arena and attempts to control it (Kadıoğlu 2005, 115). Even if the final classification 
suggested by Turner might not help us understand the Turkish case, his two axes reveal some of the crucial 
features of Turkish citizenship, as Ayşe Kadıoğlu concludes: “Turkish citizenship is defined from above 
(passive) within an exaggerated public space which smothers the individual and invades the private space of 
the family and religion.” (Ibid.).
Some of the debates within the field of political theory, labeled by the Israeli-American sociologist 
Gershon Shafir (1998) as “the citizenship debates,” can perhaps be more useful for understanding/
discussing Turkish citizenship than those sociological studies based quite exclusively on the Western 
European historical experience. Shafir talks about the competing ways used to conceptualize contemporary 
citizenship or different strands in contemporary citizenship discourses (Shafir 1998, 2). The most 
common way to understand citizenship in modernity has been the liberal understanding. Within the 
liberal approach, citizenship denotes membership in a political community. Liberal citizenship is based 
on an individualistic theory of rights, and accents personal liberty and private property. The emphasis 
is on negative rights, i.e. protection from the interference by the state or other citizens. In return for 
protection, individuals undertake certain minimal civic-political obligations (obey the law, pay taxes, 
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vote, and serve in the military). Here the individual citizen is seen as an autonomous being not beholden 
to the community, and no definition of the good life is raised above any other. Thus, the liberal view 
of citizenship is supposed to have an inherent ability to be tolerant of religious, cultural, and political 
diversity and to allow for multiple conceptions of the good life. Liberal discourse of citizenship is also 
openly normative (for example in the writings of John Rawls or Jürgen Habermas). It describes the ideal 
of citizenship rather than the actual state of affairs. 
The liberal discourse of citizenship has been challenged on several fronts. Shafir (1998) 
classifies these challenges as communitarian/modern civic republican, social democratic, nationalist, 
multiculturalist, and feminist. What concerns us here is the communitarian/civic republican approach, 
which addresses the “cultural” dimension of modern citizenship that has to do with identity, sense of 
belonging, membership, social cohesion and solidarity. The critiques classified by Shafir under nationalist 
will be discussed below and the multiculturalist approaches are discussed later in this work, whereas 
the social democratic and feminist ones do not fall within the scope of this study. The communitarian 
intervention, which has its roots in the model of direct democracy of the Greek city states, criticizes the 
liberal view for a lack of attention to the communal aspects of social life. For the communitarian or civic 
republican, the community in question is still the political community of the liberals, but its importance 
for the individual is emphasized. Citizenship should not be only a status, but an activity or a practice 
of involvement in the community with which the citizens can identify (Shafir 1998, 10-11). The civic 
republican understanding of citizenship is expressed in terms of citizenship duties and/or obligations to 
the community (from Kadıoğlu 2005, 113, who in turn follows Adrian Oldfield 1990). The emphasis 
is on citizenship duties rather than rights, and the community is the morally superior entity. Civic 
republicanism demands that citizens put their country above their personal interests. 
Communitarian approaches have reasserted the need for community as a response to the increasing 
number of individuals in Western democracies who have used their (liberal) freedoms and rights not to 
engage in their wider society and politics, a development that is seen as problematic for maintaining an 
effective representative democracy. The liberal retort against the communitarian challenge is fearful of the 
communitarian pursuit of a single conception of the good life, which they fear will lead to authoritarian 
government. Because the civic-republican conceptualization of citizenship was developed in the Greek 
city states and assumed a small, relatively homogeneous and close knit community, its utilization in the 
modern large, multicultural, and ideologically diverse societies poses certain difficulties, among them the 
issue of the creating of responsibility and some sense of a public good without requiring consensus on all 
values and beliefs, a single conception of the good life.69
The division into liberal and civic-republican approaches as the basis for analysis has proved useful 
and fruitful in evaluating the Turkish case. For example, in her analysis of the legal and constitutional 
foundations of Turkish citizenship, Nalan Soyarık-Şentürk comes to the conclusion that initially the 
constitutional formulation of Turkish citizenship followed the liberal approach centered on individual 
rights, even if this was not followed in practice (Soyarık-Şentürk 2005). However, there seems to be a 
consensus that Turkish citizenship is more akin to the civic republican ideal of citizenship than the liberal 
one. As was detailed above, the citizen’s duties towards the state and the community are very much 
emphasized (Üstel 2005; Kadıoğlu 2005, 113; Keyman & İçduygu 2005; İçduygu & al. 1999) and the 
citizen is expected to prioritize the interests of the community over his own.
69 For more details on liberal responses, see Parekh 2000.
57
As Kadıoğlu so well concludes in her article on Turkish citizenship: 
In Turkey, the civil and legal, political and social rights associated with citizenship were given from 
above. They were not acquired as a result of struggles from below. The notion of Turkish citizenship 
evolved within the civic-republican tradition by emphasizing practices that were viewed as duties. 
In the early years of the Republic, Turkish citizens were geared toward embracing the fundamental 
tenets of the Turkish revolution… [this] paved the way to its definition by disregarding a distinction 
between the public and the private realm. The republican elite defined not only the public duties of 
the citizens but also their private roles, dress codes and their recreational activities…. In sum, it is 
possible to argue that in the founding years of the Turkish Republic, Turkish citizenship was defined 
from above by state elite within the civic-republican tradition, by emphasizing duties over rights and 
by disregarding the privacy of the individual. (Kadıoğlu 2005, 117) 
The citizen was expected to obey, to follow, and not to reason his own path of the good life. This duty-
based conception was also accompanied by the innate state-centrism of Kemalism, so that actually the 
citizen was expected to prioritize state interests over his own. 
2.4.5 unified and haRmonious nation
Sovereignty belongs unconditionally to the nation. 
(A motto attributed to Atatürk.)
I see you before me as a single conscience and a single heart. (A quote from Atatürk cited in Parla 
& Davison 2004, 154)
Gentlemen, the nation in its totality, like a moral person and in the form of a unified mass, 
manifested itself, and by maintaining the lofty unity, it eliminated those who were its enemies. (A 
quote from Atatürk cited in Parla & Davison 2004, 157)
The nationalist tradition of citizenship emphasizes the importance of communal aspects within the definition 
of citizenship. The nationalist sees the cultural community of the nation as the relevant community of 
citizenship. Rogers Brubaker (1998) argues that modern citizenship has been equated with nationhood. In 
his opinion, in the age of the nation-state, citizenship is about belonging to a nation-state, i.e. nationhood.70 
As was pointed out in the introduction, a political community does not need to be a nation-state, but 
historically belonging to the nation has been an indivisible part of the modern idea of citizenship (İçduygu 
& Kaygusuz 2004, 34). In this understanding, the elements of nationality (membership in nation, 
cultural belonging) and citizenship (political membership) have been fused together. Thus, citizenship as a 
membership of a state has become conventionally understood as membership in a nation-state. This kind 
of creation of the political community of citizens went hand in hand with the creation of the cultural 
70 Rogers Brubaker is not a nationalist and this is not a normative statement but a descriptive one.
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community of the nation in most modern nation-states, not only in Turkey.71
In addition to the pervasive influence nationalism has had in defining modern citizenship, nationalist 
thinking of the state and citizenship has gained new popularity during the past twenty years or so. In 
Bhikhu Parekh’s words:
Having been dismissed for decades as logically incoherent and politically pernicious, the idea of nation 
has undergone a major revival in contemporary Western political theory. Writers of conservative, 
liberal, and even socialist persuasions contend that nationalism is a force for good and that a state 
lacks legitimacy and is unlikely to be democratic, and just, unless it is embedded in and constantly 
nurtured by a shared sense of nationhood. (Parekh 1999a, 295). 
For conservative nationalist thinkers, the nation is the most important unit of political life. In line 
with communitarian ideas, they argue that individuals are not asocial abstractions of the classical 
liberal imagination but embedded in, and constituted by, their cultural community, i.e. the nation. 
The individual’s specific identity is derived from, and inextricably links them to, other members of the 
national community. The state is not seen as an artificial and conscious human creation, but as an organic 
expression of the nation, and retains its stability only so long as it stays true to the nation. All individuals 
are seen primarily as members of their nation. Their nationality precedes, grounds, and gives meaning 
and moral energy to their citizenship. (Parekh 1999a, 296.) Conservative nationalist thinking promotes 
a homogeneous cultural environment, a homogenous nation. According to Parekh, the nationalist is 
profoundly disoriented by difference, which she finds threatening (Parekh 1999a, 318).
Perhaps not surprisingly, and very much in line with conservative nationalist thinking, an important 
feature of the Kemalist nationalist project was the substantial emphasis placed on unity and harmony 
(İlter 2002; Çelik 1996; Köker 1997; Keyman 2005; Parla & Davison 2004; Zürcher 2000). The 
requirement of unity and harmony worked on several levels, shaping both the nation and the political 
sphere. According to Levent Köker, ”Kemalism was a project aimed at the re-establishment of a state 
with a new legitimation formula, i.e. that of the unity of nation and state” (Köker 1997, 68). Unity of 
the state and the nation was emphasized in contrast to the formation of a state-civil society distinction 
to create checks and balances for power. All disagreements and conflicts were viewed as threats to the 
state, and the possibility of conflict had to be minimized. Because negative meaning had been attributed 
to politics as the locus of conflict, antagonism, and confrontation,72 politics was now redefined as 
constituting informed, rational, and harmonious discussions that were of the best interest to the whole. 
The political rights of the citizens were limited to participation on the formal level, i.e. voting in the 
elections. The state, the single party, and the people were merged together into an organic whole and this 
left no room for conflictual politics. 
Emphasis on unity and harmony as the essential requirements or even characteristics of the Turkish 
nation was also used as a powerful tool in the struggle for power. Mustafa Kemal presented himself as the 
interpreter of the will of the nation and the privileged bearer of the national secret. When there exists but 
71 For a cogent presentation of the European nation-state, its development, main achievements and the inherent tensions 
between nationalism and republicanism, see Habermas 1998b.
72 In addition to contemporaneous nationalist thinking, this was also very much derived from the Ottoman understanding 
of centralized power structure.
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one will and one reality, the mono-party state was not seen as problematic (Parla & Davison 2004; Çelik 
1996), and any opposition was framed as counter to the national will, as hostile to the Turkish nation. 
Nationalism can be used to as a handy tool for authoritarian government: first sovereignty is defined 
as belonging to the people; then the people are equated with the nation, which in turn is described as 
unified and harmonious with a singular will (of the nation) that needs only one representative. 
The terms researchers commonly use for the Kemalist ideal nation are: unified, static, unchanging, 
organic, and monolithic (yekpare) (for example: İnsel 2001; İçduygu et al. 1999, 197). The Great 
Turkish nation was perceived as a monolithic unified block, where different groups work seamlessly 
and harmoniously together for the benefit of all. Ethnic, sectarian, or other differences were not given 
political salience and were either ignored or suppressed. The nation was perceived as a singular entity 
with a single (general or high) will and one objective common interest. Mustafa Kemal himself described 
the collectivity of Turks as a ”mass”. The nation appears ”like a moral person and in the form of a unified 
mass with ”a single conscience and a single heart” (quotations from Parla & Davison 2004, 160). 
2.4.6 educating the citizen
Füsun Üstel (2005) has investigated the notion of “the good, the proper citizen” in Turkey by analyzing how 
the desired conduct of the good citizen was presented in the civic education course books in the Turkish 
republic and in the late Ottoman Empire. Her well-written study is one of the most detailed and thorough 
analysis of original material and has been cited again and again in other works on Turkish citizenship, 
including this current work. According to Üstel, the notion of citizen during the 2nd constitutional period 
(1908—1918) was more liberal than in the subsequent Turkish Republic. Citizen rights and equality of 
respect were emphasized, and the idea of citizenship could best be described as Ottoman constitutional 
patriotism. With the traumatic Balkan Wars and the collapse of the empire, Ottoman patriotism turned 
into late-comer nationalism and “crisis situation patriotism.” An idea of an organic Turkish nation had, 
therefore, begun to replace that of the patriotic Ottoman nation even before the founding of the republic.
Üstel also notes the duty-based model of Turkish citizenship as well as its tendency to invade the 
private sphere: in the early Republican period school books—even personal hygiene—were shown to be 
the kinds of national duties a citizen owes to his nation rather than as a personal duty owed to oneself 
(Üstel 2005, 192). Üstel also points out the nationalist-communitarian definitions of Turkish citizenship 
as given in the textbooks. The basic actors in the civics textbooks are not citizens, but comprise the 
nation itself, and thus the community of citizens becomes equated with the Turkish nation. In those 
textbooks Turkish citizenship was understood along communal lines, and the citizen was seen mainly as 
a member of the cultural community of descent rather than the political project of the republic without 
a particular cultural identity. Social relations between citizens relied on a shared view of ”the good life” 
and a shared understanding of the common good (as defined by the state). This state-centric citizenship 
is apolitical and in harmony with state nationalism, just like the public sphere is apolitical, neutral, 
and harmonious. The participatory aspect of citizenship is lacking; political participation is reduced to 
voting in the elections, which is also presented as a duty towards the state rather than as a right. (Ibid., 
326-7.) Participation is understood as social solidarity since one’s own good is supposed to be the same 
as the common good. The actor is not an autonomous free citizen, but one that arranges his social role 
according to the common good. 
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The student is expected to feel emotional attachment to the Turkish nation on three different levels: 
local, i.e. attachment to one’s own local environment; territorial, i.e. the borders of Turkey (Misak-ı 
Milli, National Pact borders); and linguistic/historical/ethnic, i.e. “history of the Turks” from Central 
Asia onwards (Ibid., 162). These three different levels or conflicting definitions of Turkishness are used 
to support one another. The Turkish nation is presented as homogenous and organic. The multi-cultural 
and multi-religious reality of Anatolia is flattened into a one-dimensional representation: the entire 
country is reflected in one kind of village, one kind of town, one kind of city, and one kind of life-style. 
This construction goes hand in hand with the cultural assimilation policies.
2.5 conclusion: tuRkish citizen and nation
If a man thinks of himself rather than [of ] the happiness of his country and nation, his value is of a 
secondary grade. (A quote from Atatürk cited in Parla & Davison 2004, 156)
In conclusion, all those residing within the borders of the new Republic of Turkey could become citizens 
of the republic. Non-Muslim citizens were considered only “citizens-in-law,” and referred to as “citizens 
of Turkey.” At times they were constituted as a threat to national security rather than true members of 
the political community. To be considered a proper member of the political community and a member 
of the cultural community of the nation, one was expected to be a Muslim, and a Sunni Muslim at 
that. The Directorate of Religious Affairs promoted a moderate, rational Turkish Islam compatible with 
modernity as a basis for common morale and source of social solidarity for the nation. 
At times, the Muslim members of the political community could be divided into two categories 
based on ethnicity. Those of “non-Turkish descent” were labeled as “Turkish citizens,” an expression 
that can also be understood to denote membership in the political community. Unlike non-Muslims, 
“Turkish citizens” were not generally framed as a threat. Those considered to be of Turkish descent were 
labeled as “Turks,” i.e. the true members of the Turkish nation. In some state practices and policies these 
two categories received differential treatment and, in most instances, especially later in the republican 
history these two categories were fused together. Thus, on the official level, all Muslim residents of the 
country regardless of their ethnicity were accepted as real citizens and proper members of the Turkish 
nation as long as they prioritized Turkish identity. Accordingly, individuals who were willing to claim 
Turkish nationality at the expense of possible other ethnic/linguistic/cultural attachments, and who had 
good command of the Turkish language were readily accepted as members of the nation. Throughout the 
republican history there have been many members of the elite who were not of Turkish ethnic origins. 
Besides (Sunni) Islam and the willingness to wholeheartedly embrace the common Turkish culture, 
a good citizen, as well as a good member of the nation, was expected to be subordinate to the state. An 
individual was expected to prioritize the interests of the state and integrate himself into the modern(ist), 
harmonious nation. In the name of modernity, the state, and unity, deviation from, and resistance to, the 
Kemalist reformist project was often constructed as treason. Political activities opposed to the Kemalist 
mode of reform, as well as the rebellions in the South-East against the centralization of state power, 
were easily presented as traditionalist, reactionary, and pre-modern (Yeğen 1999). The label of traitor or 
enemy of the nation (vatan haini) has been an easy one to attach for those who have not embraced the 
interests of the state and Turkish nationalism. 
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  This chapter offered a fairly straight-forward presentation of the complex questions of the conditions 
of “proper” nationality and citizenship in early Kemalist nationalism. The issue is a complicated one 
because the Kemalist nationalism of the early republican period was not a fully codified, internally 
harmonious discourse, but one that evolved over time. Turkish nationalism was also ambiguous, with 
different competing and mutually complementing strands. There were leftist Kemalists, statist Kemalists, 
and liberal Kemalists, with different formulations of the Turkish nation, some of which emphasized 
science, rational thinking and progress and others religion and customs. The multitude of “dialects of the 
nationalist language” (Bora 2003b) and the internal contradictions of the discourse should not be seen as 
a handicap, but the different nationalist discourses should be seen as mutually enforcing.
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ChaPter 3: management of Diversity:  
the tUrkish nation-state anD kUrDs
The chapter begins with a look at the demographic diversity of Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s, and then 
outlines the various tactics used by the state to manage diversity. The assimilationist logic of early Kemalist 
nationalism referred to in the previous chapter will be illuminated through examples of concrete state 
practices. Rather than attempting a comprehensive overview, the focus is on the combination of suppression 
and assimilationist policies utilized towards the non-Turkish-speaking Muslims, especially the Kurdish 
population. Only cursory attention will be paid to state policies towards other ethnic, linguistic, or religious 
groups. As will be explained below, the Kurds have been a special case in many ways. The approach and 
policies of the state were tempered by a series of “Kurdish revolts” (1925–1938).
The chapter continues by looking at the profound changes that took place in Turkey during the 
late 1940s and the 1950s after the transition to a multi-party system. The Kemalist project of modernity 
did not end with the adoption of multi-party democracy, and the six arrows of Kemalism remained 
constitutional principles. According to some accounts, the state actually extended its influence in rural 
areas through relaxation of strict secularism and managed to connect the people to the state more firmly 
than before. This can be interpreted as an attempt to complete the nationalization process initiated by 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk by integration of local popular cultures into the secular political state (Çelik 
1996 & 2001). The 1950s also witnessed the beginning of a rapid socio-economic change brought 
about by deeper integration into global markets, mechanization of agriculture, urbanization, improved 
communication networks, and increasing social mobility. 
The fourth section continues the narrative to the 1960s. A more liberal understanding of democracy 
and citizenship was adopted in the Constitution of 1961. Rapid socio-economic change combined with 
liberal legislation brought about political pluralism and polarization, radicalism, and violence. Despite 
the continued hegemony of strictly upheld Kemalist nationalism in the official public-political discourse, 
the first cracks in the imaginary unity of the nation had become apparent by the 1960s. Part of that 
development was the emergence of “an Eastern question” on the public agenda. The final section of 
the chapter discusses the developments leading to the military coup d’état of 1980, one of which was 
the emergence of a militant and explicitly Kurdish-nationalist movement. Once again, throughout the 
chapter the focus is on the changing general attitudes, and official formulations or public discussion, 
rather than political events as such.
3.1 demogRaphic diveRsity
As opposed to the official rhetoric of a homogeneous Turkish nation, the population of the newly 
founded Republic was characterized by significant diversity. The majority was Turkish-speakers, but all 
in all, the Turkish nation was probably harmonious and fully united in its will only in the dreams of 
the Kemalists (Çagaptay 2004). In the census of 1935, inhabitants of Turkey were categorized into the 
following religious and linguistic categories: 
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Religious:
Total  16,157,450 
Muslim (including Alevi) 15,838,673 
Greek Orthodox  125,046
Jews 78,730
Gregorian Armenian 44,526 
Catholics 32,155 
Protestants 8,486 
other Christians 4,725
others 12,965
Linguistic groups:
Turkish 13,899,073
Kurdish 1,480,246
Arabic 153,687
Greek 108,725
Circassian 91,972
Laz 63,253
Armenian 57,599
Georgian 57,325
Judeo-Spanish (Ladino)  42,607
Pomak 32,661 
Bosnian (including Serbian & Croatian)  29,065 
Albanian 22,754
Bulgarian 18,245
(Crimean) Tatar 15,615
Spanish 12,424
Abkhaz 10,099
Romani 7,855
French 5,381
(from Cagaptay 2004, 93.)
A degree of ethnic and religious diversity was hardly exceptional for Turkey, as most modern nation-
states include diverse population groups with other than national sources for primary identification 
that compete with the national one. This is also something to be expected as the borders of the 
Republic were not defined according to any real or imagined ethnic or national cleavages. As in other 
emerging nation-states, a variety of policies to manage the diversity of the population was utilized. 
These included deportation and massacre (Armenians) during the Ottoman period,73 population 
exchanges (Greek Orthodox),74 separation (Arabs) at the time of the creation of the Republic, and 
finally discrimination and group rights (the so-called Lausanne minorities), and both voluntary and 
forced assimilation (non-Turkish speaking Muslims) in the early years of the republic (Yeğen 2006, 
9-10). 
The different concrete policies directed at managing the diversity of the population during the 
73 In 1915, i.e. before the founding of the Republic of Turkey.
74 The low numbers of Christians are due to the expulsion and genocide of the Armenians from Eastern Anatolia and the 
population exchange with Greece. 
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first decades of the republic illuminate the conceptualizations discussed in the previous chapter. In line 
with the conceptualization of Islam as an integral part of belonging to the Turkish nation, immigration 
to Turkey of Balkan Muslims from the areas that had been an integral part of the Ottoman Empire was 
encouraged.75 The precondition for immigration was that the immigrants shared the Turkish culture 
(hars). At the same time, the non-Turkishness of the Balkan Muslims was taken into account when 
they were resettled in Anatolia, as the plans for resettlement included stipulations on who could be 
settled where. The aim was to prevent de-Turkification, and to encourage Turkification. The state also 
made sure that no group of immigrants could form a demographic base in any one area. (Çagaptay 
2004, 82-85). All non-Turkish Muslims were expected to assimilate to Turkishness. With the exception 
of Kurds, for most non-Turkish Muslims the assimilation did not face serious resistance. Acccording 
to Suavi Aydın,76 the large-scale Muslim migration to Ottoman Anatolia and the new Turkish republic 
influenced the formation of the state and national identity. Islam as the common denominator became 
emphasized as there were different groups of migrants from different regions. The immigrants had 
been forced to leave their homes and had no other place to go. They had faced violence and lost much 
of their possessions. Now Turkey became their new homeland, and they supported a strong state that 
would give them the protection they had previously lacked. (Aydin 2005, 30.) They wanted to be seen 
as founding elements of the state, as part of the majority, the mainstream, instead of being a minority; 
thus, there was a willingness to assimilate and unwillingness to ask for cultural rights. (Ibid.)
 Yet, according to Soner Çagaptay, the Kemalist state also watched many of the smaller Muslim 
groups such as Arabs, Albanians Circassians, Abkhazes, Lazes, Georgians, and Chechens with caution 
and monitored any nationalist activities. Publications in Muslim minority languages were banned and 
individuals were expected to learn Turkish. In addition, the state monitored individuals and groups 
suspected of nationalist activities (Cagaptay 2004: 113-123).
The policies of the state vis-à-vis the Christians and Jews were complex and quite discriminatory. 
There was a widespread antipathy towards Christians, and Christian minorities were marginalized, 
neither being invited nor forced to assimilate. Turkey also did not respect the stipulations of the Treaty 
of Lausanne concerning the rights of minorities. The Jews had been loyal to the Ottoman state, and had 
supported the Independence Movement so that one could have expected them to be treated well in the 
new Republic; however, their economic affluence and lack of knowledge of Turkish language caused 
resentment among Turkish nationalists, and there were sporadic campaigns in the late 1920s and in the 
1930s for linguistic assimilation. (Cagaptay 2004, 124-139) 
3.2 fRom ottoman subjects to “futuRe tuRks”
On the one hand when we say we are “Turks” we are told “no, you are not Turks, you are Kurds.” 
Yet, when we, the people of Dersim, say were are Kurds, they hit us hard and say that “no you are 
75 It has been estimated that close to 800,000 people immigrated to Turkey in the 1920s and 1930s. The Balkan Muslims 
had been a part of the Ottoman Muslim millet, and the impoverished and underpopulated new Republic needed the human 
capital of these relatively well educated and prosperous newcomers (Çagaptay 2004, 84).
76 The main part of Suavi Aydın’s research based on a series of in-depth interviews with citizens of Turkey actually concerns a 
later period (Aydın 2005). 
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not Kurds, there are no Kurds”. (A quote from Dr Nuri Dersimi’s complaint to the governor of 
Tunceli (Dersim)77 quoted in Kirişci & Winrow 1997, 105)
In this section on the history of the treatment of Kurds in the Republic of Turkey, I use the term 
“Kurd”/”Kurdish” as a catch-all term for a whole range of heterodox linguistic, religious, tribal or other 
sub-minorities, identities, and groupings. There has been some contention both within these groups 
themselves and among researchers as to whether all can accurately be described as “Kurdish” (for example, 
see Watts 2000, 6 and for more details van Bruinessen 1989). 
There are several dialects/separate languages classified under the term Kurdish. McDowall classifies 
the main dialects (or groups of dialects) into Kurmanji (or Kurmanci), Surani (or Sorani), Zaza and 
Gurani (McDowall 2004, 9-10). According to him, Kurmanji (spoken mainly in Turkey) and Surani 
(spoken mainly in Iraq) are quite close to one another. Grammatically, they differ from each other as 
much as English and German, but are much closer in vocabulary. The languages/dialects of Zaza (Turkey) 
and Gurani (Iran) are close to each other, and closer to Persian than Kurmanji and Surani (Ibid.).78 It has 
been debated whether they are actually dialects of a single Kurdish language or related Kurdish languages. 
This kind of debate is hardly specific for Kurdish, as division into separate languages (for example Turkish 
vs. Azeri) as opposed to dialects of the same language (for example Arabic) is often more political than 
linguistic in nature. There exists no common literary language as the Kurdish-speaking population has 
been divided into several different nation-states, and thus there has been no central authority to develop a 
standardized literary language. According to my knowledge, the two primary Kurdish dialects/languages 
spoken in Turkey, i.e. Kurmanci79 and Zaza are not mutually understandable. Some Zaza-speakers do not 
consider themselves Kurdish, while others do. 
Besides linguistic diversity, there is also a degree of religious diversity among Kurds. About 75 
percent of all Kurds are Sunni (mostly Shafi mezhep i.e. denomination; Turks are mostly Hanefi) and 
there are considerable numbers of Alevi80 among Turkey’s Kurds. There also used to be Yezidis (originally 
77 The old local Kurdish place name Dersim was changed into Tunceli by the state.
78 Van Bruinessen divides the groups into: 1) the northern and northwestern dialects (Kurmanji), 2) the southern dialects of 
which Sorani is one, and 3) the southeastern dialects (Sine’i, Kermanshah and Leki). He is hesitant to group Zaza and Gurani 
as Kurdish (van Bruinessen 1992, 21-22).
79 I follow the Turkish spelling Kurmanci.
80 Alevi is an umbrella term that is used to refer to a number of heterodox religious groups. These include Bektaşı (nominally 
a Sunni Tarikat and an urban organization), and the rural Alevi (also sometimes refered to as Kızılbaş), which can be divided 
by religious, linguistic, ethnic or tribal affiliations into the subgroups of Abdal, Ocakzade, Çelebi, Tahtacı (Türkmen Alevi), or 
Çepni (Türkmen Alevi). There are Turkish-speking, Kurmacı-speaking, Zaza-speaking and Albanian-speaking Alevis in Turkey. 
Sometimes even the Arabic speaking Nusayri (Alawite) are counted among the Alevi. (Erdemir 2005, 938; Andrews 1989, 57-8, 
65-73, 116-118, 123-125, 151-154.) Alevis are variously described as non-Sunni Muslim (Erdemir 2005, 938), as ghulat (i.e. 
exaggerating, which refers to – from the Sunni perspective – exaggerated veneration of Ali or other religious leader), an extremist 
split from Shi’a Islam (White 2000, 41) or as representing a version of popular Islam comprised of a blend of orthodox Sunni 
Islam with Shiite Islamic, Christian and other local religious and cultural elements (Grigoriadis 2006, 458). Sunni Muslims 
have also classified Alevis as infidels (gâvur) and they were persecuted under the official Sunni Islam of the Ottoman Empire. In 
general, Alevis do not acknowledge the Sunni caliphs but follow the twelve Imams beginning with ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib, and the 
Bektaşı patron saint Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli (Erdemir 2005, 938). Most Alevis do not observe the five pillars of Sunni Islam: they do 
not fast, pray five times a day or go to the pilgrimage. In addition, there is little or no gender segregation in Alevi communities 
and congregational ceremonies (cem) that include music and religious dance (semah) (Erdemir 2005, 938).
Because of reoccurring periods of severe persecution, the Alevi remained marginal and peripheral for centuries, while 
increasingly turning to the secrecy of esoteric teachings (Erdemir 2005; Andrews 1989, 57).
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a Sunni sect, not considered Islamic and severely persecuted)81 among both Iraqi and Turkish Kurds, 
as well as groups of Ahl-i Haqq (i.e. People of the Truth, a heterodox sect of Islam). There are very few 
Yezidis left in Turkey, while a community of some hundreds of thousands remains in northern Iraq. Most 
Iranian Kurds are Shi’a (of Twelver Shi’ism). In earlier times there were also some Christian Kurdish-
speaking tribes. (McDowall 2004, 10-13.) Some Kurdish-speaking Alevis do not consider themselves 
Kurdish, while others do.82 There are also Turkish speaking Alevis in Turkey, some of whom prioritize 
their Alevi identity over the linguistic one.
3.2.1 the ethnicity of “the kuRdish issue”?
At this point it is in order to take up some theoretical-terminological clarifications. In his book 
Ethnicity without Groups, Rogers Brubaker argues against “groupism” in the study of ethnicity, race, 
and nationhood. He points out how there is a general tendency to treat ethnic groups and nations as 
substantial entities to which interests and agency can be attributed. As researchers we should work to 
explain the phenomenon of seeing the world as divided into separate distinct groups, not to use it to 
explain things with. Commonsense social and ethnic categories tend to be essentializing and naturalizing. 
We should not replicate that in our scholarly analyses. (Brubaker 2004, 8-9) 
Brubaker warns against essentializing ethnic identities. Within post-modernity, the fragmented 
and situational nature of identity, or identity as process, has become highlighted: it has become widely 
acknowledged that an individual has multiple identities, emphasized differently in different situations. 
Individuals do not form coherent narratives and stay the same across different contexts, but can have 
different gender, national, ethnic, class, religious, linguistic etc. identities. Yet, the idea that one has to 
have an ethnic identity, an ethnic origin that is somehow one of the most important possible sources 
of identity has become pervasive during the modern era. This is despite the considerable difficulties 
involved in defining objective criteria to what actually constitutes the core of this shared ethnicity and 
the obvious overlap with nationality (Brubaker 2004). 
Yet, it is admittedly difficult to discuss the history and current situation of Turkey’s Kurdish speaking 
population, the demands for wider cultural rights for the Kurds as well as the various, conflicting 
sources of identity available for those of Kurdish-Zaza-Turkish or Sunni-Alevi origins without resorting 
to essentializing both ethnicity and identity and using the kinds of ethnicist language and “groupism” 
that Brubaker warns against. I use a few examples from the well-known work of David McDowall to 
highlight the difficulties involved. McDowall writes in his introductory chapter to A Modern History of 
81 For more information on Yezidis, see Andrews 1989, 118.
82 The issue of defining “who the Kurds are?,” or “who are the Kurds?” has been a politicized and contested one in Turkey. The 
apparent linguistic and religious diversity has been used by Turkish nationalist scholars to prove that there exist no separate 
people that should be labeled as Kurdish. Also more impartial works have engaged in this (essentialist) debate over “the origins 
of the Kurds.” For a summary of the (nationalist) Turkish scholarship on the Turkic origins and language of the Kurds, see 
Laciner & Bal 2004, 477-479. Laciner and Bal themselves seem to come to the conclusion that “…the people of this area do 
appear to be of mixed origin,” then continue to the subjective criteria and state: “However, what cannot be disputed is that the 
people of this area of Asia today call themselves “Kurd” and identify with the particular area now called Kurdistan. Also, if a 
people feel themselves to be of a different race, nation, or language group, one cannot claim that the cause of this group is not 
valid. In other words, the self-identification of the Kurdish peoples should be respected.” (Laciner & Bal 2004, 479.)
67
the Kurds: “There is no doubt that a Kurdish people had existed as an identifiable group for possibly more 
than two thousand years, but it was only in the early years of the twentieth century that they acquired a 
sense of community as Kurds.” (McDowall 2004, 2-3, emphasis mine). In this excerpt Kurds are labeled 
as “a group,” even though it is noted they did not share a sense of community as such prior to the 20th 
century. The same book also gives the following descriptions: “…Ziya Gokalp, a man born and bred in 
Diyarbakir, a man who considered himself Turkish because it was in his view both his mother tongue 
and his culture, but who was arguably of Kurdish ethnicity.” (McDowall 2004, 2) and “…some of those 
willing to deny their ethnicity or at least to subordinate to the dictates of the state…” (McDowall 2004, 
88).83 In the first example the individual’s subjective definition of himself as Turkish is denied and he is 
categorized by the author on the basis of his ethnicity, which is seen as a more primordial identity. In the 
second, ethnicity is essentialized in the sense that one has to deny or suppress it to be able to claim some 
other, not quite as primordial identity. 
Some more innocent statements quoted from other works, such as, “In the late nineteenth century 
within the Ottoman Empire, the typical Arab, Albanian or Turk was not aware of his separate ethnic 
identity” (Winrow & Kirisci 1997, 78) can also be seen as essentialist in the sense that the implication is 
that even when one is not aware of that identity, it is there waiting to be revealed. The fact that the Kurds 
have not been able to found a state of their own accentuates the problems involved. In a case of a nation-
state, one can at least resort to the history of Turkey, or even Turkish history, defined as the history of 
those living in Turkey. Of course, the same problems apply to “Turkish history” prior to the founding of 
the nation-state. I do not claim to have resolved the problem of resorting to groupist terminology, but do 
my best to avoid essentializing, nationalist or ethnicist labeling in this work.
3.2.2 “the easteRn question”
Until the end of the First World War, the majority of the people currently labeled as Kurds lived as 
subjects of the Ottoman Empire in the provinces of Bitlis, Dersim (later Tunceli), Amed (Diyarbakır), 
Hakkari, Mosul, Mamuretulaziz (Elazığ) and Van. Persia also had a sizeable Kurdish population. The 
roots of Kurdish nationalism have been traced to the Sheikh Ubaydallah revolts of 1879-1881 (for an 
evaluation see White 2000, 57-60, for more details see McDowall 2004, chapter four). Yet, despite the 
emergence of Kurdish nationalist ideals and some attempts at nationalist organization among the elite 
during the Young Turk period (1908–1918),84 the lack of widely shared national identification, as well 
as tribal rivalry, prevented the mobilization of the population at large on an ethno-nationalist basis to 
secure a formation of a Kurdish nation-state in the region. Up until the first years of the 20th century, 
being a “Kurd” was to be a rural bumpkin, a labelling that was also true for those identified as “Turks” 
(McDowall 2004, 87). Many of the Ottoman and Young Turk reformists may have been of Kurdish 
ethnic origins, but did not choose to organize politically around this ethnicity. For them it was natural to 
83 The quotes are taken on purpose from the widely known, excellent study by David McDowall to emphasize the difficulty of 
avoiding essentializing ethnicist language. In this work, originally written in 1996, McDowall seems to combine a primordial/
objective idea of ethnicity with a subjective one. For him, ethnic identity is mainly something we inherit, but under certain 
circumstances it can also be adopted. (See for example McDowall 2004, 4)
84 For details of early Kurdish nationalist organizations, see White 2000, 65-68. 
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work to reform the Empire as Ottoman citizens, in the name of Islam and the Ottoman dynasty. Despite 
the emerging idea of Kurdishness as one possible, separate source of identity, loyalty, and belonging, the 
resistance movement in Anatolia was also composed of both Turks and Kurds, whose aim was to ensure 
“the continued existence of a stable Ottoman sultanate and society” (Kirişci & Winrow 1997, 77). 
In line with President Wilson’s ideals of national self-determination, the treaty of Sèvres in 1920 
promised the formation of an autonomous Kurdish region that would have the right to elect for complete 
independence one year later under certain conditions (McDowall 2004, 137). The treaty was never 
ratified by the signatories and was replaced with the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which did not recognize 
specific rights for Turkey’s Kurdish population. According to Kirişci & Winrow, this was made possible 
by both the failure of the Kurdish nationalists to form a unified national movement, and by the lack of 
ethnic self-awareness among Kurds (Kirişci & Winrow 1997, 78-9). The Kurdish leaders were divided 
into loyal Ottomanists, nationalist secessionists, and tribal chiefs, who aimed for their own kingdoms. In 
addition, the population was divided along family, tribal, linguistic and sectarian lines as well as urban-
rural and sedentary peasant-nomad divisions. Yet, it is worth noting that the idea of Kurds as essentially 
different from Turks was quite widespread both among the Ottoman elite and internationally. So, by the 
time the Republic of Turkey was founded, there already existed a small Kurdish-nationalist elite and a 
wide-spread other-definition/ethnic-national category of Kurdish.
It is also worth noting that although the idea of Kurds as a group separate from Turks was widespread 
among the Kurdish elite by the time of the War of Independence, it was not something on which most 
members of the elite chose to base their political activities. Instead, the Kurdish tribal leaders who took 
part in the resistance movement declared that Turks and Kurds were “brothers in terms of race (soy) 
and religion” (U. Mumcu quoted in Kirişci & Winrow 1997, 79) and opposed any efforts to create an 
independent Kurdish state.85 Thus, for them, the main source of loyalty was towards the Ottoman state 
and Islam. When the map of the Middle East was redrawn and a modern state system was formed after 
the war, most Kurds came to live in the Republic of Turkey, British Iraq, French Syria, and Iran.86 
During the initial, more pluralist phase, i.e. the War of Independence and in its immediate 
aftermath, the Kurds were seen as one of the “founding elements” of the Republic.87 Then, when the 
Republic became a Republic of Turks, where no other legitimate elements were acknowledged, the legal-
political significance of the differentiation into Turks and Kurds was denied. The non-Turkish speaking 
Muslims, Kurds among them, were considered to fall within the boundaries of Turkishness and the logic 
of assimilationist citizenship policies towards them was followed. The Kurds were viewed by the state 
as “future Turks” (term from Yeğen 2006) and invited to become Turks and thus first class citizens. In 
principle, they were not to be discriminated against; however, the idea of them as future Turks made 
them “not quite Turks,” and exposed them to discriminative practices as well (Yeğen 2006, 47-8).
According to Soner Çagaptay, Kurds differed from other (non-Turkish) Muslim groups in several 
important ways. Unlike other Muslim groups, Kurdish speakers formed a significant portion of the 
population. They inhabited a large, contiguous territory in southeastern Turkey, where they were an 
85 According to Kirişci and Winrow, out of the 23 rebellions against the Ankara Government (i.e. the resistance movement) 
between 1919 and 1921, only three involved Kurdish tribes and clans (Kirişci & Winrow 1997, 80). 
86 For a comprehensive history of the Kurds, see David McDowall 2004.
87 An acknowledgement as an equal “founding element of the republic,” with equal status to the Turks became one of the 
demands of Kurdish nationalists in later periods.
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overwhelming majority. Nearly 90% of Turkey’s Kurds lived in fourteen adjoining provinces. They lacked 
a deep identification with the Turkish-Muslim millet of the Ottoman empire because they had lived in 
Kurdistan, a rugged, autonomous area at the fringe of the Ottoman Empire. Because they had not 
seen themselves as Ottoman, they faced problems in the passage from Ottoman-Muslim identity into 
Turkishness. (Çagaptay 2004, 19-20.) Yet, the state expected them—just like everyone else—to assimilate.
The state’s stance towards its Kurdish population was hardened by a series of 18 revolts during the 
first 15 years of the republic, out of which 16 involved Kurdish tribes.88 These rebellions have often 
been categorized in both academic and non-academic works as Kurdish nationalist rebellions against the 
increasingly ethno-nationalist Turkish state; however, a number of scholars have convincingly argued 
that there was a multitude of reasons behind the different rebellions, of which the spreading of Kurdish 
nationalist ideas among the Kurdish population, while important, was not the only one (Kirişci & 
Winrow 1997, 103).89 Paul White also argues against the nationalist history-writing on these revolts: 
“The first wave of Kurdish (or putatively Kurdish) rebels in Anatolia was extremely ‘primitive.’ Led by 
local religious authorities, these movements were really nationalistic only at their head; their rank and file 
was basically motivated by religion. These rebellions were thus unable to rally pan-Kurdish support and 
were all defeated by the late 1930s.” (White 2000, 206). Despite the later nationalist reading, and the 
nationalist rhetoric and aims of some of the leaders of these revolts, an ethnic or national Kurdish identity 
was not widely shared (or at least given great political significance) at that time, and the uprisings failed 
to bring one about. Opposition to the centralizing and secularizing reforms imposed by the state, along 
with the power struggles of local notables, also played important roles in the instigation of the revolts. 
In the final evaluation, the uprisings were sporadic and uncoordinated. The revolts remained local and 
failed to overcome sectarian, linguistic, and tribal divisions among the Kurdish population. 
Nicole Watts has analyzed the Dersim uprising (1937 and 1938), and argues that it was distinctly 
different from both previous and later types of “Kurdish resistance.” The Sheikh Said rebellion (1925) 
was led by a Nakshibendi90 sheikh and supported by Sunni Kurdish tribes. Dersim, on the other hand, 
involved Kurds of the heterodox Alevi minority. In both cases the one refused to help the other or even 
aided the government against the other. Both the Sheikh Said and the Mount Ararat (Ağrı Dağ, 1930) 
revolts broke out in the vital frontier zones, while Dersim was well within the borders of Turkey and 
involved no real danger of loss of territory. (Watts 2000, 7). Watts suggests that Dersim occurred as a 
particular response to a new phase of intense “statification” that profoundly threatened the livelihood 
and independence of the local tribal and religious leadership (Ibid.)
The rebellions were brutally suppressed by the state with immense human and considerable material 
cost, with the result that Kurdish nation-building was to take place only much later. In the state discourse 
the perpetrators were not defined as Kurds, but as reactionaries, sheiks, tribes, collaborators, brigands, 
or just general backward individuals (among others, Yeğen 1999 and 2006, 53-54). Within the Kemalist 
nationalist and modernist discourse, all expressions of Kurdish ethno-political identity became associated 
with vestiges of the past and resistance to modernity, or meddling of outside powers, or perhaps resistance 
towards the emerging national market caused by the underdevelopment of the region. Thus, the revolts 
against the Kemalist state did not change the basic evaluation of Kurds as future Turks, and the (mostly 
88 For a concise description of the revolts and their brutal suppression, see McDowall 2004, chapter 9.
89 For a concise summary of the arguments of different scholars, see Winrow & Kirişci (1997, 104-105).
90 A major Sunni Sufi order.
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forced) assimilationist policies continued. During the 1930s, even the physical existence of the Kurds 
became denied as a part of the increasingly ethnicist official Turkish nationalism.
3.2.3 a pRoblem of demogRaphy?
Administrators of the new Republic were naturally concerned with the unrest in the southeastern provinces, 
and over 20 different confidential administrative reports were written on “the Eastern Question,” between 
1925 and mid 1940s (Akçura 2008, 29).91 As Mesut Yeğen has noted: “…despite its denial of the existence 
of the Kurds, the Turkish state still had to speak about the Kurdish question, for this question did not 
disappear as soon as the Turkish state denied the existence of the Kurds.” (Yeğen 1999, 560.) These reports 
offer a good look at the mentality and practices of the early republican administrators. Several of the reports 
note the fact that in the eastern-most provinces the majority of the population was non-Turkish-speaking. 
One of the more important or at least interesting reports is the Avnı Doğan report of 1943 (from Yeğen 
2006), which gives the demographic figures for the eastern provinces as follows (for 1935): 
Total population  1.222.113
Turkish-speakers  322.267 (26.4%)
Kurmanci-speakers  700.303 (57.3%)
Zaza-speakers   47.880 (3.9%) 
Arabic-speakers   107.624 (8.8%) 
Süryani     23.143 (1.9%) 
This demographic situation was considered as highly problematic in the reports, and the suggested 
solution was a combination of assimilationist practices and demographic engineering. The proposals 
included: forced emigration to Western Turkey of certain segments of the population, a more general 
encouragement for emigration to the West, as well as immigration of Turkish-speakers to the East, 
encouragement of intermarriage, abolition of tribes, prohibitions on speaking Kurdish, improved 
education including boarding schools, as well as the development of better transportation and 
communication networks, population census, and military service in other parts of the country than 
that of one’s origin (Yeğen 2006, 57-59). Most of the measures were never widely implemented, even 
though the process of nation-building did include extreme violence (suppression of the revolts 1925–
1938), periodic mass deportations (after the Sheikh Said revolt and the Settlement law of 1934) and 
air bombing of villages,92 as well as more successful and peaceful means such as abolishment of the old 
91 The reports, which range from a few pages to long and detailed texts, were published in the 1990s. Besides regional 
authorities, the authors include such important personalities as several times Prime Minister and later President İsmet İnönü, 
Prime Minister and later President Celal Bayar, and Chief of Staff Fevzi Çakmak. For more details on these reports, see 
Devletin Kürt Filmi by the journalist Belma Akçura (2008).  
92 British commentators considered the brutality of the treatment of the Kurdish population comparable with that of the Armenians 
in 1915 (McDowall 2004, 199, 209). In 2011, there was a heated debate in the press on what actually happened in Dersim in 1937–
8. There were claims that the state had used poison gas on its own citizens (Radikal, Dersim’de gaz kullanıldı, 21.11.2011), evaluation 
whether it was a rebellion or a massacre perpetrated by the state, and speculation over whether (by this time sick) President Atatürk 
knew about the extent of the violence. The debate was sparked by a CHP deputy who accused the party and the state. Within this 
historical debate, even the mainstream usage reverted back to using the old name Dersim rather than the republican Tunceli.
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medrese-type educational system and the introduction of compulsory general education (in Turkish), 
general military conscription and state-controlled radio and press. Effective also were the establishment 
of boarding schools93 and the prohibition on publishing or educating in languages other than Turkish. 
The ban on writing in the Kurdish language was especially seen as a powerful tool in the nationalizing 
of the Kurdish-speaking population (van Bruinessen 2000, 92). The repressive measures also included 
the demand to adopt Turkish surnames in 1934 and the change of traditional Kurdish place names to 
Turkish (for example Dersim > Tunceli). 
David McDowall describes in his Modern History of the Kurds how the leader of the rebellious Dersim 
tribes justified the resistance in 1937: “The government had tried to assimilate the Kurdish people for 
years, oppressing them, banning publications in Kurdish, persecuting those who spoke Kurdish, forcibly 
deporting people from fertile parts of Kurdistan for uncultivated areas of Anatolia where many had 
perished. The prisons were full of non-combatants, intellectuals were shot, hanged or exiled to remote 
places.” (McDowall 2004, 208).94 The revolts ended after 1938.
3.3 1950s: islam, votes, and tRactoRs
After the Second World War, Turkey joined the Western camp in the bi-polar global system.95 In 1945 
Turkey adopted a multi-party political system; the first multi-party elections were held in 1946, and the 
first free elections in 1950. The transition to multi-party democracy was a consequence of both Turkey’s 
international alignment within the Western camp—the champion of capitalism and democracy—and 
the acknowledgement of the leading elite of the severe internal discontent. The population of Turkey 
had grown tired of the authoritarian policies of the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, Republican People’s 
Party) during the single-party era, especially during the war; and the economic hardships of the war years 
(see Ahmad 2003; Atasoy 2005, Kalaycıoğlu 2005). 
The first opposition party, the Demokrat Parti, DP (The Democrat Party), was founded in 1945 
by four discontented CHP members. The new party won the first democratic elections of 1950 with a 
landslide, and then ruled with single party governments throughout the 1950s. The DP’s program of 
economic and political liberalization meant the liberalization of the political system and civil society and 
greater civic rights and freedoms. To counter the DP’s growing popularity, the CHP had also adopted a 
liberalizing program in the 1940s.
The transition to a multi-party system has been considered a water-shed in the history of modern 
Turkey (for example: Zürcher 1993, 232). Democracy and democratization became central themes for 
93 YİBO, Yatılı Bölge (İlköğretim) Okulları, Primary Boarding Schools of the Region. The practice continues even today; 
according to statistics, out of the total 299 boarding schools, 155 are in the Kurdish inhabited regions (Yeğen 2006, 68-9).
94 The use of term “Kurdish” to label the Dersim Alevi uprising has been estimated to stem from the fact that Kurds were an 
internationally acknowledged and known people, unlike the Alevi (Watts 2000).
95 It became the founding member of the UN in 1945, it received Marshall Aid from 1947 onwards, and it joined the 
Council of Europe in 1949, and joined NATO in 1952; it applied for EEC membership in 1959; and became a founding 
member of the OECD in 1960. Most of the international context of the developments in Turkey are not touched upon here. 
For a comprehensive account of Turkey in the international context, see William Hale’s (2000) impressive Turkish Foreign 
Policy 1774-2000.
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political discourse, and the DP rule can be viewed as a shift from Kemalist populism and social engineering 
into right-wing populism. DP’s victory brought with it far-reaching changes in the political and social 
balance of power and enabled the emergence of new political forces (Steinbach 1984, 79). The members 
of this new elite were generally younger, came from provincial backgrounds, and had made their careers in 
private sectors. Bureaucratic dominance was reduced in both political and economic spheres.
The introduction of multi-party politics coincided with great social changes in Turkey. The 
modernization began by the Kemalist reformers had gained momentum slowly, and the increased 
investments to the countryside and agriculture under the DP rule contributed to a profound socio-
economic transformation (Jung & Piccoli 2001, 91).96 The combination of fast population growth, 
mechanization of agricultural production, and improved communication and road networks resulted 
in large scale immigration from the countryside to the urban centers. This migration caused cultural 
fragmentation and conflict in the urban areas as the urban and rural worlds came into more contact with 
each other, and began to discover how different they were from another. The so-called gecekondu shanty 
towns developed and grew (according to Jung and Piccoli writing in 2001, more than 50 percent of 
residents in Turkish cities live in gecekondus), and with the growth of the gecekondu population, the urban 
poor became a formidable political power not to be ignored by political parties.
Transition to multi-party regime also heralded a slightly more inclusive understanding of Turkish 
citizenship: inspired by the Western liberal conceptualization of individual rights and freedoms, 
“individual rights” entered the Turkish political discourse (Atasoy 2005, 68; Çelik 1996). The important 
question was how to determine the normative grounds for expressing these rights and freedoms. Another 
important question concerned how to facilitate the expression of different types of political belonging. 
Existence of various social “groups” in society, with different economic interests, was acknowledged, 
even if the word “class” was not used. This was an important step away from the ideal of a harmonious, 
homogeneous, and organic nation.
Under DP rule, the strict understanding of Kemalist secularism was relaxed and a stronger sense of 
belonging to a national culture was promoted: elective courses on religion were added to the primary school 
curriculum; religious imam-hatip courses were established to train religious personnel for the state-run 
mosques; a Faculty of Theology was opened at the Ankara University; pilgrimage was made easier; reciting 
the prayer call in Arabic was allowed, as was the recitation of the Koran over the state radio; more funds 
were allocated for building and restoring mosques; and the official meaning of secularism was amended to 
include respect for religion. (For more details, see Atasoy 2005, Ahmad 2003, Kalaycıoğlu 2005.)
The Demokrat Parti worked to unify and mobilize the different groups of the “periphery” against the 
“center”.97 During the single-party era the masses had been excluded from the political process, because the 
ruling elite believed they had not acquired the norms and practices required for the Kemalist secularization 
and westernization program. Their “backward” cultures were thought to be a source of reactionary political 
activity. The DP kept the Kemalist aim of westernization, but combined it with a concept of justice that 
included the experiences of the previously marginalized groups. The DP believed that the secular basis 
of Turkish nationalism would not be undermined by participation of the masses into politics, i.e. more 
96 For an interesting contemporaneous evaluation of the social, economic and cultural changes in the villages of Izmir, see the 
report of Kenneth A. Byrns from 1963 (in Balı 2010, 39-53).
97 Şerif Mardın’s (1973) interpretation of Turkish politics as a struggle taking place between “a center” and “a periphery” has 
had a profound influence in research of Turkish politics and most scholarly accounts refer to this dichotomy. 
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inclusive political citizenship practices. The masses were seen responsible enough to enjoy their democratic 
rights and freedoms without engaging in reactionary movements and rejecting the ideological foundation 
of the state (Atasoy 2005, 70-71). For the DP, Islam was an important element of the peripheral folk culture 
and capable of sustaining the sentiment of belonging to a national society, which the bureaucratic secularized 
high culture had failed to do. It has been estimated that the new sensitivity towards Islam actually helped 
to promote feelings of cultural belonging and this strengthened the national consciousness of the younger 
generation more efficiently than the oppressive state actions of the previous era (Atasoy 2005, 72). 
3.3.1 tRansfoRmations in the easteRn pRovinces
Turkey’s Kurdish-populated provinces were also greatly influenced by the transition to democracy, 
ideological changes, and the growing visibility and legitimacy of religion, as well as the socio-economic 
changes. The policy of forced relocations of population had already been given up in the 1940s during 
the process of democratization, and most of those moved returned home in 1947 (Yeğen 2006, 65-68). 
Abandoning this part of demographic engineering was no great draw-back for the state authorities, as 
by the early 1950s the “Eastern question” had ceased to be an important problem for the state. The 
Kurdish population had been the most difficult to assimilate, mainly because it was both indigenous and 
geographically concentrated, and lived in an area where the state’s penetration was weak (mountainous 
terrain, far from the administrative center).98 Yet, by the 1950s, a large share of the Kurds seemed 
to have been assimilated, and the tribal leaders co-opted into the Turkish political system (Kirişçi & 
Winrow 1997, 105). Or, when one takes into account the state’s lack of penetration in the Kurdish 
inhabited regions, McDowall’s statement probably describes the situation more aptly: “Kurdistan seemed 
thoroughly cowed. The Kurds had, it seemed, accepted their lot.” (McDowall 2004, 210). However, 
according to McDowall, the Kemalist leadership still remained extremely sensitive towards any expressions 
of Kurdish ethnicity in the 1940s, and the existence of Kurds in Turkey was once again explicitly denied 
in a statement as late as 1946 (McDowall 2004, 397). In the 1950s, a large scale voluntary emigration 
and a deeper integration of the Kurdish populated areas with the rest of the country took place with the 
development of the capitalist economic system.
Interestingly, the position of the traditional ruling class of Turkey’s Kurdistan, the local notables 
(ağa) and sheikhs was strengthened at this time by several developments.99 First of all, they had been 
98 Suavi Aydın has argued that it was especially those non-Turkish speaking Muslims who had migrated to Turkey during the 
final days of the shrinking Ottoman Empire who were willing to integrate into a national Turkish culture and to prioritize 
their national Turkish identity over other linguistic or ethnic identities. The immigrants had been forced to leave their places 
of residence and knew they had no other place to go. They had faced violence and lost many of their possessions. For them, 
Turkey became the new homeland. Because of the past traumas they supported a strong state that would belong to them 
and protect them. As Muslims they were invited to participate in the War of Independence and could all see themselves as 
founding elements of the Turkish state. In the light of the unequal treatment of the official minorities, membership in the 
mainstream was much preferable to that of a minority (Aydın 2005, 30-1).
99 For an evaluation of the various relationships between the state and the local notables during the earlier periods, see 
van Bruinessen 1992 [/1979], CH3. van Bruinessen argues against the idea of unchanging traditional tribal power relations 
among the Kurdish population that the advent of the modern state would have disrupted. Instead, at times the local notables 
have been able to strengthen their “traditional” power position via interaction with the state. (van Bruinessen 1992.) 
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co-opted into the political power system. In exchange for power and material benefits, the ruling families 
delivered the votes of their tribes or villages as a block to one of the competing parties. This practice had 
already begun to a certain extent during the period of single-party rule. The CHP had managed to co-opt 
many local notables and in some cases this relationship continued even after the transition to multi-party 
politics. For example, in Hakkâri, the CHP even received 100 percent of the vote in the first free multi-
party elections of 1950. (Kirişci & Winrow 1997, 107, based on Özbudun). The DP gained the support 
of an increasing number of Kurds after the policy of forced assimilation was ended, but according to 
Kirişci & Winrow, this party continued to receive comparatively fewer votes in the Kurdish-dominated 
provinces than that of the country average (Kirişci & Winrow 1997, 107).100 
The revitalization of traditional Islamic values in the public-political sphere also contributed to the 
revival of the importance of religious networks, especially in the Kurdish areas, which became once again 
a stronghold of traditional Islam (McDowall 2004, 399). This further contributed to the influence of the 
former ruling class, which played a leading role in these religious networks. In addition, the influence 
of the mechanization of agriculture was deeply felt in southeastern parts of the country, where the local 
notables had large-scale holdings.101 As the number of tractors in Turkey grew from 1,750 in 1948 to 
40,000 in 1954, hundreds of thousands of small and tenant farmers lost both their land and their work 
and had to migrate to cities such as Diyarbakır, Elazig, Istanbul, Ankara and Adana. The socio-economic 
situation of those who remained grew gradually worse. (McDowall 2004, 398-403.) All of these 
developments, i.e. the co-optation of the traditional local elite into the political system, the increasing 
economic inequality in southeastern Turkey, as well as the large-scale emigration from the Kurdish 
villages to urban centers were to contribute to the emergence of secular ethnic Kurdish nationalism in 
the 1960s, this time secular and led by well-educated young cadres instead of the traditional elite.
3.3.2 evaluation of the dp peRiod
Despite the momentous changes, several researchers have also pointed out significant ideological 
continuities from the previous era. The Kemalist aim of “unity in politics” was retained, even under 
multiparty regimes, (Atasoy 2005, 69) and Kemalism was advocated as the only legitimate ideology 
while the extreme left and extreme right were seen as especially dangerous ideologies (Uzer 2002, 123).
Class-based and contentious cultural claims were neutralized with a populist understanding of 
a general national interest or will (Atasoy 2005, 68-9). And, counter to the often repeated claims of 
Kemalists (for example: Kili 2003 [/1981] and Kışlalı 1994), the steps taken by the DP towards the 
redefinition of the role of Islam in the state-society relations should not be considered an Islamist reaction 
to the secularist foundations of the state, let alone counter-revolution against the Kemalist. The DP rule 
did not spell the end of the Kemalist project of modernity, at least as far as modernization, economic 
development, nationalism, and secularism were concerned. The DP merely attempted to bridge the gap 
100 According to Romano, by 1954 the Democrat party was much more popular in Turkey’s Kurdistan than the CHP 
(Romano 2006, 40). I do not know the reason for this conflicting information. 
101 Despite the importance placed on modernity by the Kemalists, they had not seriously attempted to break the traditional 
feudal structures in the South-East. Redistribution of land was only half-heartedly attempted in 1945. 
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between traditional Turkish political culture, society, and religion with a move closer to the rural masses 
(Steinbach 1984, 81). The six arrows were still constitutional principles, albeit offered more flexibility of 
interpretation, and most of the DP leaders considered themselves devoted Kemalists. 
The state actually extended its influence in rural areas through Islam: religious institutions remained 
within the state structure; the content of religious education was under strict state control; the Diyanet 
still oversaw all religious institutions and all the personnel in the mosques remained state employees. 
The DP’s attempt to generate intense feelings of cultural belonging in the population and the intention 
to connect the people to the state more firmly than ever can be interpreted as an attempt to complete 
the nationalization process initiated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The DP merely aimed to integrate local 
popular cultures into the secular political state, to vulgarize politics (Çelik 1996 & 2001). As a result 
public politics became more inclusive, and a range of ideological positions became possible, one of which 
was Islamic. Gavin D. Brockett has argued that the political elite of the single-party period had not been 
able to impose a transformation on the periphery; it could not turn a “backward” people into a cohesive, 
modern nation by fiat. According to him, popular identification with the nation emerged only after 
the introduction of multi-party politics, relaxation of the strict secularism, and the rapid emergence of 
national print media from 1945 onwards. Between 1945 and 1954, the Turkish national identity came 
to be incorporated with a preexisting repertoire of popular identities, the most important of which were 
those associated with Islam. (Brockett 2011)102 
After the promising start, it soon became obvious that the DP was mainly concerned with economic 
liberalization and development. The party was not committed to political liberalization in the long run, 
but opted for restrictive policies after the first liberalizing years. A series of restrictive legal amendments 
were made from 1953 onwards. Around the middle of the decade the intelligentsia started to turn against 
the DP. One reason behind this was the heavy inflation, which had hit salaried people hard: the cost 
of living rose by 150 percent from 1953 to 1958. It became obvious that the DP could not keep its 
promises of economic affluence, and with mounting criticism being voiced in the press, neither was it 
willing to keep its promises of political liberalization (for more details, see Zürcher 1993, Jung & Piccoli 
2001, 87).
It was also obvious that explicitly Kurdish activism was not to be allowed under the DP. During 
the 1950s, a number of young intellectuals such as Musa Anter had adopted a sense of Kurdish identity 
during their studies in western Turkey. In a way, it was from their fellow Turkish students that they had 
learned they were Kurdish rather than Turkish. These youths began a campaign to develop the neglected 
Kurdish provinces, without referring to Kurds or Kurdistan, and in the late 1950s published a short-lived 
journal Ileri Yurt (Forward/Progressive Homeland)(McDowall 2004, 404-6). In 1959, a demonstration 
carried out by a group of Kurdish students who were protesting Turkish nationalist comments by a 
Turkish member of the parliament led to the arrest of 49 Kurdish intellectuals (the so-called incident of 
the 49). According to McDowall, the DP leadership wanted them hanged but refrained from doing so 
mainly due to the likelihood of adverse international reaction. (McDowall 2004, 405.)
102 Part of the process was a partial re-evaluation of the Ottoman Empire as a part of Turkish history, which now became 
accepted as an honorable period of Turkish history (Brockett 2011, chapter 6).
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Citizenship in Civics Education
According to Füsun Üstel (2005, 327), the definition for the concept of “citizen’ called for modification 
after the move to the multi-party democratic system. According to her research of civics education 
materials, a slow but clear transformation in the discourse from an ethno-cultural definition of the citizen 
towards political citizenship within the borders of the Turkish republic (i.e. the borders of the National 
Pact, Misak-ı Milli) began in the early 1950s. The obligatory ties between citizenship and nation were 
somewhat loosened. Nevertheless, the understanding of citizenship was still not truly participatory: the 
citizen was expected to vote, pay taxes, perform military service, and participate in a formal way during 
certain times/episodes. Üstel describes this kind of understanding of citizenship as sterile, since it did not 
even bear the excessive ethno-cultural load of the previous period (Üstel 2005). 
In her final estimation, she sees the changes in civics education during the multi-party democratic 
period of the 1950s and the free atmosphere of the 1960s103 as somewhat superficial. The democratic 
transformations brought about by the Democrat Party period seem somewhat overestimated in this 
sense. The republic entered the multi-party democracy with old-style school programs, in which one 
stated aim of schools was to take the first step in raising citizens who were committed to republicanism, 
nationalism, populism, secularism and revolutionism (Üstel 2005, 242). Until 1968, one of the stated 
aims of the education program was ”millileşme” (nationalization), i.e. spreading and promoting 
nationalist ideas and ideals. This aim was also openly stated in the instructions for the teachers of civics 
classes, thus continuing the holistic-propagandist line of the single-party period. The communal (as 
opposed to individual) view of citizen prevailed with continued emphasis on shared ideals and duties 
(Üstel 2005, 246-7). Even sections concerned with democracy emphasized respect to one another (an 
aspect of communal relations), corporatist division of labor and political participation.
“Hot” Nationalism in the 1950s
An interesting and highly visible episode of “hot” Turkish nationalism in the 1950s were the so-called 
September 6–7th riots of 1955. They are summarized here briefly as they illuminate both the emotional 
commitment and capacity for mass mobilization of Turkish nationalism, as well as its continued 
connection with Islam. The riots targeted the non-Muslim population, especially the Rum (i.e. Turkey’s 
Greek-speaking, usually Greek Orthodox) population, and took place in the atmosphere of international 
dispute over the Cyprus issue and widespread rumors of massacres against Turkish Cypriots. On the 
evening of September the 6th, violent rioting erupted in Istanbul after the pro-government newspaper 
Istanbul Ekspress had written that Atatürk’s house in Thessalonica, Greece had been bombed. A mob of 
thousands started attacking non-Muslim property and persons. Thousands of shops and houses were 
seriously damaged, more than seventy churches burned, several persons killed and hundreds injured. 
(Kuyucu 2005.) As a result, 20,000 Rum citizens emigrated from Turkey between 1955 and 1960. 
The interesting question is how so many people could be mobilized within hours against their fellow 
non-Muslim citizens. The background to this reaction was the way the Turkish nation was defined by 
excluding the non-Muslim citizens, by “othering” them (see previous chapter). Another condition was 
the transformations of the DP period that gave birth to a “populist nationalism,” one that proved to be 
more powerful than the “official nationalism” of the CHP (Kuyucu 2005, 377). Created by the DP, this 
103 See below.
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“popular nationalism” with its strong religious tone proved to be extremely successful in mobilizing the 
discontented masses, especially the ever-increasing gecekondu (=shantytown) dwellers in the big cities. 
According to Kuyucu, the “others” and “enemies” of this popular and religious mobilization were the 
old Kemalist elite (urban rich, the bureaucracy, the intelligentsia), the communists, and the non-Muslim 
minorities. (Kuyucu 2005, 372). Kuyucu also connects the profound political, social and economic 
changes of the 1950s to the riots and concludes: 
Similar to ethno-national riots in other contexts, structural factors such as rapid urbanization, widening 
urban inequality, growing unemployment and poverty and the transition to a competitive/democratic 
political system all played highly significant roles in paving the way for the eruption of violence 
against non-Muslims in Istanbul. But most importantly, it was the conscious manipulation of people’s 
sentiments by ethnic entrepreneurs, state provocateurs and the press and the successful organisational 
work by ‘riot specialists’ that made these catastrophic events possible. (Kuyucu 2005, 377). 
It is thus evident that by the middle of the 1950s a rather radical version of Turkish nationalism had 
become internalized, at least by the urban masses, and had become a force to be taken into account and 
utilized.
3.4 1960s: toWaRds a libeRal undeRstanding of the citizen
On May the 27th of 1960 a group of younger Kemalist officers of the army led a coup d’état, one that was 
applauded and approved by the intelligentsia and the students. The stated aim of the coup was to remove 
the increasingly authoritarian DP from the helm, and to reinstitute the Kemalist model of development. 
In their book on the Kurdish issue Kirişci and Winrow argued that concern over increasing awareness of 
Kurdish national consciousness was one motivation for the coup (Kirişci & Winrow 1997, 107). In the 
course of the action, the military arrested and deported to western Turkey 55 Kurdish notables, mostly 
members of the DP. McDowall also highlights the protests taking place at that period in the Kurdish 
provinces, but attributes the concern of the military to the Kurdish defiance in Iraq rather than any 
internal disturbances (see McDowall 2004, 406). Other motivations often listed for the coup include: 
the attempt of the old statist elite, the center, to stem the rising power of the newly emerging social 
groups; and the loss of the privileged position of the military (social, economic and political) under the 
DP rule (Jung & Piccoli 2001, 88-90).
The Kemalist rhetoric notwithstanding, the content of the new Kemalism reconfigured after the 
coup differed from that of the single-party era with its liberal character and emphasis on democracy and 
human rights. A new liberal constitution was drafted by a group of university professors under the rule of 
the military junta. The new constitution of 1961 was radically different from the previous constitution of 
1924. It created a system of checks and balances with a bicameral parliament and a constitutional court,104 
104 The role of the constitutional court has been very controversial. Among other things, the court has closed Islamic and 
pro-Kurdish parties. The 1961 constitution also created the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Kurumu), which 
granted the armed forces institutional position in the political sphere.
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and granted autonomy to universities and the state-owned broadcasting company. One of the aims of the 
new constitution was to explicitly guarantee freedom of expression.105 The restrictive legislation adopted 
under the DP was annulled, and the limitations on the freedom of expression were lifted. 
In the liberal constitution of 1961, the definition of citizenship shifted from the republican, duty-
based citizenship model towards a more liberal understanding. The Republic was defined as a state 
based on human rights, and the state was assigned the duty of protecting the rights of the citizens 
(Kabasakal Arat 2007, 5), which included guarantees of freedom of thought, expression, association, 
and publication. The emphasis was on the rights of an individual instead of his duties towards the state 
(Soyarık-Şentürk 2005, 131-133), and the role of the citizen vis-à-vis the state was envisioned as one 
of active participation. As Soyarık-Şentürk notes: “The Constitution limited the interference of the 
state into the affairs of the individual and defined the duties of the state toward the individual, which 
was a significant departure from the primacy of the obligations of the citizen toward the state in the 
early republican period.” (Soyarık-Şentürk 2005, 132). It has been argued that the constitution even 
envisioned limited social citizenship rights (Ahmad 2003, 122-3).106
As was noted in the previous chapter, the terminology used to define citizenship in the 1924 
Constitution was somewhat problematic in regards to ethnicity. In the most crucial formulations of the 
new constitution the uncertainty seemed to have been resolved in favor or political/civic understanding 
of Turkishness (Article54). Yet, some of the uncertainty in the conceptualization of citizenship/
Turkishness was still visible in the terminological inconsistencies. The terms “the state of Turkey” and 
“Republic of Turkey” (Türkiye Devleti, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti) were used interchangeably with “Turkish 
state” (Türk Devleti); in most instances the word used for the population was “everyone” (herkes) or 
“citizens” (vatandaşlar), but in some instances the term “each Turk” (her Türk) was used instead. (Yeğen 
2006, 104). Another continuation from the previous era was in the official discourse, within which the 
Turkish nation was still imagined as an indivisible whole; and at the practical level it was possible to strip 
a person of his citizenship for conducting activities not in line with loyalty to the state (Soyarık-Şentürk 
2005, 134).
In the liberal atmosphere provided by the Constitution, the arena of politics grew wider, and the 
institutions of civil society began to gain relative independence from the state. There were heated political 
debates and the number of political parties and groups greatly increased. This heralded a transformation 
of the Turkish political system: a program-based and functionally determined party system began to take 
form and to take the place of the center-periphery cleavage-based one.107 For the first time, a genuine 
left-right axis formed in politics, at least within the elite. The ruling AP (Adalet Partisi, the Justice Party, 
continuation of the banned DP) became a center-right party and during the second half of the decade 
the old Kemalist CHP was transformed into a center-left (ortanın solu) party. Even radical leftist groups 
were admitted a degree of legitimacy and tolerated, and a Kurdish movement began within the leftist 
105 Because of this the 1960 coup is interpreted in a very positive fashion in histories of the press/media. For a more critical 
or negative evaluation, see for example Heper 1985.
106 Some researchers have been eager to use the concept of social citizenship rights (originally of T. H. Marshall 1949) in 
connection to the étatist and clientilist policies of the Turkish state (see for example White 1999). I consider this somewhat 
problematic in the absence of the structures of a welfare state.
107 It can be argued that in the 1960s, the ideological supremacy of Turkish nationalism was challenged by political demands 
for pluralist democratization (Watts 1999, 635).
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groups.108 A few short-lived Turkish/Kurdish journals appeared in 1962-1963, and a public debate of 
modest scale on “the Eastern question” also began. 
3.4.1 easteRn meetings and a kuRdish people
The emergence of a mass movement in the left can be attributed to a coalition of intellectuals and Kurdish 
activists (Yeğen 2006); in 1964 the communist Workers Party of Turkey (TİP, Türkiye İşçi Partisi) was the 
first legal party in Turkey to acknowledge the existence of a Kurdish issue as an ethno-political problem. 
In 1967 the party organized a series of highly publicized Doğu Mitingleri (Eastern Meetings), where the 
issue was addressed. In the proclamations and programs of the party the issue was conceptualized as a 
problem of citizen’s rights and discrimination on the basis of mother-tongue (within a unitary state), but 
by 1970, the party had also acknowledged the existence of a separate “Kurdish people” (Kürt halkı). This 
was one of the reasons cited as the grounds for the closure of the party by the Constitutional court in 
1971. (Yeğen 2006, 164-166.) It is important, however, that before the closure of the party, the political, 
cultural and economic grievances of the Kurdish inhabitants of the country had become topics to be 
publicly discussed and debated. There was a long debate on the nature of the Kurdish issue among the 
various radical leftist splinter groups. Many of them saw the Kurds as a separate nation that had the right 
for self-determination according to the principles of Leninism (for a more detailed account, see Yeğen 
2006, 160-7). Yet, as interesting as these debates are, they remained largely out of mainstream public 
discourse (Watts 1999, 651).
The new leftist-Kurdish activists were mostly young, urban, relatively well-educated, secular, and 
deeply conscious of the social and economic inequality in the Kurdish areas. They were products of 
the modernized educational system, and had come to give political salience to their Kurdish ethnicity 
during their residence in the urban centers of western Turkey, partly due to the discrimination they 
faced there. The shift in political mobilization away from the local notables and semi-tribal peasantry 
towards urban students and young professionals was a highly significant one (McDowall 2004, 410), and 
cleared the way for the subsequent emergence of an explicitly ethnic nationalism. In 1969, the network 
of Revolutionary Eastern Cultural Hearths (Devrimci Doğu Kültür Ocakları, DDKO) was founded. The 
DDKO demanded civil liberties and social reforms, including political and economic rights for peasants 
and women. The state was not willing to tolerate DDKO’s activities (and implicit Kurdish nationalism 
mixed with its leftist ideology) and arrested and imprisoned the leaders as separatists. The suppression of 
the movement involved also brutal commando crackdown in the countryside. (McDowall 2004, 411-2).
It is correct to conclude that the idea of Kurdish ethnicity or even Kurdish nationality as a politically 
significant factor emerged in the 1960s within the leftist movement. Yet, it is difficult to estimate how 
wide the support for Kurdish nationalism at this stage may have been among the Kurdish-speaking 
population, or how wide was the awareness of “a Kurdish issue” among the population at large. In a 
confidential report from 1965, Robert S. Dillon, an American diplomat, describes the southeastern part 
108 The first ideas and initiatives labeled as Eastism (doğuculuk) had emerged already in late 1950s. Eastism did not refer to 
Kurds as such, but aimed to improve the socio-economic conditions of the eastern provinces. There had also been protests for 
acknowledgement of the existence of Kurds in 1961, but these had been brutally suppressed (see McDowall 2004, 405-407).
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of the country as Turkey’s “foreign” provinces and the administration as a colonial one over an essentially 
Kurdish region: “A small group of western Turks in the major cities and towns rule a vast hinterland, 
inhabited for the most part by people who do not speak Turkish and who do not feel Turkish.” (Dillon, 
in Balı 2010, 227). Another American report from 1971 also noted a clear dislike between Turks and 
Kurds (i.e. the administrators and the local people) in the area, but found no convincing indication 
that Turkish-Kurdish relations had deteriorated over the recent past, quite to the contrary. The writer 
attributed this to government spending in the region, tacit government support for the traditional power 
structure, and a strong military presence. He saw no apparent justification for the anxiety of the military 
and political elite over the Kurdish-inhabited regions (Newberry, in Balı 2010, 237-239).
One source of further proof for an increasing value given to Kurdish ethnicity (or nationality) during 
the 1950s and 1960s has been looked for in the voting patterns in the Kurdish-inhabited provinces. 
Notable are the popularity of independent candidates and the popularity of the local right-wing New 
Turkey Party (Yeni Türkiye Partisi, YTP) and the leftist Turkish Workers’ Party, TİP, in the 1960s. (Kirişci 
& Winrow 1997, 107-108). McDowall also notes that 75% of the thousands arrested in the Eastern 
provinces after the military coup of 1971 (see below) were from the countryside, which indicates the 
effectiveness of the DDKO and the TİP in also mobilizing the rural population to their cause (McDowall 
2004, 412).
In addition to leftist activism, the 1960s also witnessed the founding of the first Islamic party (MNP, 
Millî Nizam Partisi, National Order Party), which gained considerable popularity in the predominantly 
conservative and traditionalist South-Eastern provinces of the country. Also an ultra-right wing party 
(MHP, Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, National Action Party) was founded in the 1960s. The MHP ushered 
in the emergence of more radical populist Turkish nationalism as a contender for the official Kemalist 
nationalism. As opposed to the left, the attitude of the radical right-wing was hostile towards Kurds. In 
1967 the most famous radical Turkish nationalist ideologue of the time, Nihal Atsız, caused an uproar 
among nationalist and/or leftist Kurds with his proposal that those not happy with being Turks should 
leave the country and with his hints of a fate similar to that of the Armenians for the Kurds.109 
3.4.2 evaluation of the libeRal 1960s
In conclusion, the result of wider civil liberties and political pluralization was a decade of lively public and 
political debate combined with an eruption of social unrest and violence. Yet, even within the context of 
ideological differentiation, Kemalism (and Kemalist nationalism) still retained the central position in the 
political discourse due to its status as the official ideology of the state. All major parties had to still claim 
allegiance to the (Kemalist) official ideology. The old Kemalist party, the CHP, stood for a Kemalism that 
sought to change society through reforms imposed from above and carried out by a ruling elite strictly 
bound to Atatürk’s principles. The party was still comprised mainly of the bureaucratic elite (Steinbach 
1984, 82). The ruling party of the 1960s, the center-right AP, was more indifferent towards Kemalism, 
but had to tread carefully since it was at odds with the Kemalist military. There were also still considerable 
109 For his exact words, see White’s (2000, 132-3) somewhat confused account of the events.
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restrictions on the freedom of expression. The Kurdish journals as well as those Turkish ones bringing forth 
the Kurdish issue were closed down, and in 1967 publishing in Kurdish language, as well as distributing 
material published in Kurdish, was explicitly forbidden (McDowall 2004, 410). The new radical religious 
and Marxist groups can be seen as independent from and opposed to Kemalism and the Kemalist model of 
reforms, even if both currents were also influenced by Kemalism (Steinbach 1984, 82).
Once again I return to the civics education material as a testimony of the way citizenship was 
envisioned in the 1960s, and what kind of citizenship was promoted. According to Üstel there were 
important developments: the textbooks of the 1960s constructed a differentiation between private and 
public spheres. There was a gradual and slow transition towards more liberal and participatory discourse. 
At the end of the 1960s, new national curriculums were adopted for both primary and middle school 
levels. In the textbooks of the revised program, the definition of the citizen now straddled the two models: 
the liberal and the nationalist-republican. The books continued to promote a duty-based and communal 
understanding of the nation, where the benefit of the community was prioritized above that of the 
individual, and the books included such statements as “the indivisible unity of the state with its country 
and nation” (devletin ülkesi ve milletiyle bölünmez bir bütün). At the same time, with this communal 
understanding, emphasis was put on universal, individual-based human rights as inalienable rights of 
an individual! Citizenship as rights was discussed and democracy in every-day-life was promoted (even 
if often reduced to an explanation of respect and duties within hierarchical structures such as family 
or school). Writing in 2005, Füsun Üstel estimates that the education program of 1968 was the most 
democratic to date (Üstel 2005, 263). It promoted citizen activity, was universal, lacked the “organic” 
nation aspect and “threat perception.” There seemed to be an awareness of some social and political 
variety in the students’ backgrounds, even when the aim was to inoculate them with common ideals. 
Less emphasis was given to the notion of threats and more space was devoted to international solidarity, 
universal rights, and cooperation. Yet, at the same time the students were still expected to internalize and 
protect the principles of Kemalism. (Üstel 2005.)
The liberal political system created in 1961 and the above-described half-liberal understanding of 
citizenship did not last long. The social life of the 1960’s was characterized by rapid change, increased 
social mobility, political mobilization, and urbanization. Combined with the politicization of society, 
this led to escalating social tensions, growing social unrest, an emergence of extremist radical political 
groups, and political violence. In a report submitted to Senator Robert Kennedy in 1967, one anonymous 
American commentator predicted that “…there is no doubt in my mind that expectations in Turkey 
are outstripping accomplishments to such a degree that radical social turmoil is inevitable within the 
next two decades…” (in Balı 2010, 130). The anonymous author proved to be right, and by the end 
of sixties the climate in Turkey was one of economic instability, high inflation, and growing inequality. 
Turkey’s version of the worldwide student unrest was one that was particularly violent, with the ultra 
right wing youth organization, the Grey Wolves (Bozkurtlar), engaging in violent fights with leftist youth 
organizations, leftists, and Kurdish activists.
3.5 1970s: cRacks in the imaginaRy unity
On 12 March, 1971, the high commanders of the army stepped into the fray with the so-called “coup by 
memorandum.” The separatist activities in the East was touted as one of the three reasons for this coup 
82
(McDowall 2004, 412). The commanders gave an ultimatum that demanded the restoration of order 
and the continuation of the Kemalist reforms. Because the government was not able to stop the violence 
on the streets, a state of emergency was declared in twelve provinces, including Istanbul, some other 
larger cities, and some of the provinces with a high percentage of Kurds. The army used the situation 
to crush the leftist movement; leftist organizations were shut down and their members, including many 
journalists, were arrested or imprisoned. There were widespread rumors of torture. The radical nationalist 
groups were deemed more legitimate and largely left alone. The freedoms guaranteed by the ”too 
liberal” constitution of 1961 were annulled: the universities and television and radio networks lost their 
independent status and the freedom of the press was restricted, among other things, to “the protection 
of the unified state and people,” “social order,” and “national security” (Girgin 2001, 135; Zürcher 1993, 
273). Several publications, including the prestigious daily Cumhuriyet that had followed the CHP in its 
move towards the left were temporarily closed. New legislation demanded the educational system once 
again promote Kemalism and nationalism. Any activity counter to Turkish nationalism as protected by 
the constitution was explicitly forbidden (Üstel 2005, 265).
Because neither the 1971 ultimatum nor the consequent restrictive measures chose to tackle and/or 
solve the reasons behind the political and social unrest there was a quick resumption in political turmoil (Jung 
& Piccoli 2001, 93). The radical leftist organizations of the 1960s fragmented into myriad new Marxist-
Leninist and Maoist groups, all of which turned their attentions towards the recruitment of the discontented 
urban youth who lacked prospects for education, employment and upward social mobility.110 It was also 
at this time that Kurdish nationalism began to dislodge itself from Turkish leftism, with the disappointed 
Kurdish leftists now forming their own and separate Kurdish leftist organizations. Not all discontented youth 
became leftist; others joined such far right groups as the conservative Islamist National Salvation Party or 
the National Movement Party, while some joined the fight of the so-called Grey Wolves against both the 
communists and Kurds, whom they did not consider Turkish (McDowall 2004, 413). The political field was 
extremely polarized and street violence between ultra right groups and ultra left groups claimed almost five 
thousand victims during the last years of the decade. According to McDowall, the left-right clash served to 
camouflage many of the other contests and cleavages: “Turk versus Kurd, Sunni versus Alevi, Sunni versus 
secularist, artisan/trader class versus rural migrant and urban proletariat” (McDowall 2004, 414).111 
In addition to radicalization and violence, by the end of the decade the parliamentary politics found 
themselves in a deadlock with political problems aggravated by the deteriorating economic situation of 
the country. The oil-crisis of 1974 and the subsequent European recession highlighted the problems 
of the Turkish economic policy of import substituting industrialization (ISI) followed from 1963 to 
1978 (for details of Turkey’s economic history, see Keyder 1987). In the winter of 1979 the economic 
instability led to daily power cuts, shortages of available consumer goods, and break downs of transport 
(Jung & Piccoli 2001, 93).
Thus, the developments leading to the third military intervention of 1980 were manifold, with 
mounting problems of law and order, Kurdish activism, a polarized political system in a seemingly 
110 McDowall gives the following figures as examples: in 1977 there were only 60,000 places at the universities for the 
360,000 applicants. Of those who entered the job market each year, only 40% could find employment (McDowall 2004, 
413).
111 McDowall also interprets the massacre of Maraş in 1978, which left 109 dead and 176 seriously wounded, on several 
different levels as an attack by rightists (the Grey Wolves) on leftists, Turks on Kurds, Sunnis (probably Kurdish as well as 
Turkish) on Alevis, and city-dwellers on economic migrants (McDowall 2004, 415).
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unsolvable deadlock, an economic crisis, and a fear of Islamic fundamentalism fueled by the Iranian 
revolution (Zürcher 1993, 282). The military coup of 12 September, 1980 both put an end to the 
turmoil and ushered in a new era. 
Despite all the turbulence, throughout the period prior to the coup of 1980, Kemalism, the official 
ideology of the state with its hefty dose of Turkish nationalism, continued to fix the checks and balances of 
the political game, define the frames of the political community, determine the conditions of the relations 
between the state and citizen, and serve as the source of public policies. During the 1970s, the Turkish 
Republic remained Kemalist from top to bottom. Besides acting as the state’s official ideology, Kemalism 
also functioned on another level; it became a tool in the struggle for recognition of different ideologies. 
Practically all groups claimed real Kemalism, real Atatürkism, or at least the real Atatürk. In part, the 
claims for Kemalism were a rhetoric strategy to gain legitimacy. Among the various political groups from 
radical nationalists and leftists to Islamists some had truly internalized parts of the modernist ideas of 
Kemalism, even when the particular group violently argued against the particular model of modernity 
chosen.112 The immense importance of the person of Atatürk is also clear. Even the very radical anti-
regime and anti-state groups have managed to lay claim for a real Atatürk. (Çelik 1996.)113
Thus, despite the rapid socio-economic changes, heated ideological debates, and political 
polarization, the dominant position of Kemalist nationalism was not significantly questioned nor 
criticized, mainly because until the 1980s the 
Intellectuals have regarded themselves as the vanguards of the modernization project and have been 
the voluntary carriers of the official and the founding ideology of the regime, that of Kemalism. 
They have occupied a prominent place within the Republican project as the missionaries of the 
transformation of the society. In this regard, their thoughts and ideas have been shaped under the 
dominance of the official ideology. Even the opposing ideological stances, either from the left or right 
of the political spectrum, have retained the imprint of Kemalism. (Akdeniz 2004) 
The intelligentsia, in the main, refrained from problematizing the state and clung to the traditional 
paradigm of “saving the state” (Ibid.).114 In the new republic, the function of the new university system 
112 Nur Betül Çelik argues that by 1980 Kemalism had become “an empty signifier” (Celik 1996), devoid of any real content. 
113 The leftists had found a positive reference in Kemalism, with which they shared such notions as anti-imperialism, anti-
capitalism, modernization, national sovereignty, independence, secularism, an understanding of religion as a dark force, and 
populism based on a fear of traditional masses. The left saw themselves as the interpreters of true Kemalism, a revolutionary 
progressive ideology. The radical nationalist movement found positive points of reference in Kemalism as well. They too 
wanted to save the state in crises, they too opposed the communists, they too wanted to modernize Turkey and thus raise 
it to the peak of civilization, and they too emphasized the glorious history, civilizations, and heroes of the Turkish nation, 
which had also been central for the Kemalist creation of the Turkish nation. The nationalist youth identified with the great 
Turkish heroes and Atatürk’s idea of the youth as the vanguard of the nation. The nationalist movement viewed itself as a 
continuation of the nationalist and passionate intelligentsia with the mission to save the state (Çelik 1996, 239-241). Even 
though radical nationalism was in its essence an anti-system militant ideology, the ideology avoided direct conflict with the 
state and claimed Mustafa Kemal as a hero of Turkish nationalism. Even the discourse of the Islamist alternative of Milli Görüş 
(National Outlook) was characterized by a strong attachment to nationalist ideals. The war of independence and the Kemalist 
nationalism were merely emphasized as Islamic. Many Islamists presented Atatürk as a hero, and Islamic hero, whose greatness 
stemmed from his faith.
114 For a more detailed evaluation of the role of the intelligentsia as didactics and protectors of the state in the Ottoman-
Turkish modernization process, see Argın 2009.
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was to play a role in social and economic development and to provide the maintenance of the Kemalist-
secularist regime (Mızıkacı 2005). The views of some individual scholars differed radically from the 
official historiography and officially approved line, but their attempts were not powerful enough to give 
impetus for a wider public discussion on the topic.115 
In conclusion, despite liberalization of the economic and political systems, the more visible role 
of Islam in the public sphere, the highly significant socio-economic changes and the emergence of left-
right cleavage in politics, many of the Kemalist ideals of the previous era, especially those concerning 
citizenship and membership in the nation were kept, even if within a somewhat more liberal and 
participatory understanding. Despite some claims for other identifications (in this case ethnic Kurdish), 
on the official-public level the ideal of a culturally homogenous Turkish nation was retained.
115 For an example, see Martin van Bruinessen’s account of the case of İsmail Beşikçi, a Turkish sociologist and a kurdologist 
(van Bruinessen 2003-4[2005]) discussed also in chapter six of this work.
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ChaPter 4: inCreasingly voCal Claims for DifferenCe
Chapter four investigates the socio-political context of the media texts analyzed in chapters six and seven, 
i.e. the increasingly vocal demands for recognition for a separate Kurdish identity in the 1980s and 
1990s, and the official and popular responses to them. These debates were begun within a public sphere 
shaped by the military after the coup d’état of 1980 and in an atmosphere colored by a new articulation 
of Kemalist nationalism (usually referred to as Atatürkism, Atatürkçülük), the violent struggle of the 
ethno-nationalist PKK (Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan, Kurdistan’s Workers Party) against the Turkish 
state, and a gradual process of democratization. 
Time-wise, the focus of this current chapter is from 1980 to 1999. The military coup of 1980 has 
been considered an important watershed in the history of modern Turkey (for example: Öktem 2011), 
the consequences of which were to be felt until well into the 2000s. The year 1999 can be seen as an 
important point, especially in the discussion on the Kurdish issue in Turkey. There are several reasons 
for this: Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK was captured and brought to trial, the PKK violence 
practically ceased (until 2004), and Turkey was granted the status of an EU-candidate country. For 
these reasons my own empiric analysis (chapter 6) begins from 1999.
The chapter is divided into two sections. The first part of the chapter looks at the military 
coup of September the 12th and its aftermath. The focus is on the ideological and legal-political 
restructuring of the Turkish polity undertaken by the military junta. The second section of the 
chapter focuses on the Kurdish issue in the 1980s and 1990s. The presentation emphasizes political 
activities and events within Turkey and does not cover in detail other factors important for 
popularizing a separate Kurdish identity, with the exception of the war between the PKK and the 
Turkish state.
4.1. the militaRy junta ReconfiguRes politics and the nation
4.1.1 the Coup d’état of septembeR the 12th
The Turkish army’s coup d’état of 12 September, 1980 led it to assume control over all spheres of 
government: a state of emergency was declared, the parliament was dissolved, the cabinet was deposed, 
all political parties and a number of other organizations were first suspended and later abolished, all 
mayors and municipal councils were dismissed, and the party leaders and a high number of other 
politically active individuals were arrested. All power was concentrated in the hands of a military 
junta named Milli Güvenlik Konseyi (MGKo, National Security Council), which consisted of the 
military members of the previous National Security Council (NSC, MGK, Milli Güvenlik Kurulu).116 
The MGKo established an ex-military/technocratic cabinet to execute its decisions. Initially, the 
116 The NSC/MGK was mentioned in the 1961 Constitution and established by law in 1962. Thus, the liberal constitution 
of 1961 gave the military a constitutional role in politics, even if initially in advisory capability. The council consisted of the 
top echelons of the executive branch of the government and the military, and had its own secretariat. For more information 
on the MGK, see Bayramoğlu 2004, Kardaş 2004 and Bılgıç 2009.
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military government was primarily concerned with establishing law and order. It used draconian 
measures legitimized with the need to curb the political terrorism and to save the country from 
the imminent economic crises. All dissent, including political violence, was brutally suppressed. A 
state of law and order was successfully reinstated within a year of the coup (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 125). 
This pacification was achieved with a very high cost. More than 120,000 people had been arrested 
(Zürcher 1993, 294)117 and human rights abuses including torture became common practice during 
the rule of the military junta. (Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 125-127; Zürcher 1993, 292-295; Öktem 2011, 
60.)
Next, the military set out to provide long-lasting solutions for the political, economic and social 
problems that had plagued Turkey in the 1970s. In the political sphere, the military Junta aimed for 
stability and harmony, and instituted a centralized and authoritarian political system. In the economic 
sphere the Junta aimed to ensure the transition from the previous state-centric economic policy of 
import-substituting-industrialization (ISI) and from populist public spending to export-oriented, 
austere economic program.118 In the social sphere the generals tried to strengthen the social solidarity 
and unity with state-promoted Turkish nationalism bolstered with a dose of Islam. To achieve all this, 
the military forced the making of significant changes to the legislation and the political system before 
returning the power to the civilians (Zürcher 1993, 292-3).
In 1983, after two and a half years at the helm, the generals deemed they had done enough, and 
handed the power back to a civilian government limited by the 1982 Constitution and under the 
watchful eye of the new President (General) Kenan Evren.
4.1.2 national secuRity and limited spheRe of politics
The 1982 Constitution, to which I will refer to as the September 12 regime, aimed to impose on 
the society an authoritarian and conservative statist conception of politics. The September 12 regime 
made the concept of the state sacred. It placed a radical statism at the center of the principle of 
republicanism, and it took care to have this principle hang over politics like Demokles’s sword. It 
systematized the authoritarianism that was one of the innate characteristics of the Turkish Republic, 
and institutionalized the transfer of the administrative center of this authoritarianism from the civil 
117 The figures given in different sources vary significantly. Andrew Mango cites Ali Birand and gives the following numbers 
to illustrate the scope of both social unrest and repressive measures: 7000 illegal machine guns, 48,000 rifles, 640,000 hand 
guns and 26 rocket launchers were confiscated, nearly 180,000 people were detained, 42,000 were sentenced to imprisonment, 
and 25 were hanged (Mango 2004, 81). McDowall says that the official figure of arrests for the period of military rule was 
only 60,000, out of which 54 percent were reported to be leftist, 14 percent rightist and only 7 percent Kurdish separatists 
(McDowall 2004, 416). McDowall argues that the military wanted to downplay the mass appeal of Kurdish nationalism and 
cites the figure given by the International League of Human Rights, i.e. 81,000 arrests within the first two years of military 
rule (Ibid.). Kerem Öktem cites much higher figures for the three years of military rule: 650,000 person detained and a total 
of 210,000 court cases (Öktem 2011, 59).
118 To raise the country from the deep economic crisis the Junta strictly enforced the IMF (International Monetary Fund) 
backed liberalizing program that had already been launched prior to the coup. This meant a change from the ISI-policy to 
export-oriented liberalism, which opened Turkey to the outside world and effects of globalization. For a short description of 
the economic transformation, see chapter five on media. For a more detailed evaluation of the transformation, see Keyder 
1987 and a critical later evaluation Eder 2004.
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to the military bureaucracy, to achieve a politically and socially stable but economically dynamic 
new regime. (İnsel 2003, 293)119 
The Turkish Constitution of 1982 is special by nature. The Turkish military took over the function of 
the legislative branch of the government, became the highest authority in the land, and set the limits 
for the society for the foreseeable future (Bayramoğlu 2004, 82-84). The 1982 Constitution reflected 
the authoritarian and statist values of its military founders: because the military wanted a strong state 
and an indivisible national unity, the new constitution was induced with a spirit of authoritarianism, 
emphasis on harmony and unity, and a fear of politics. This new constitution eliminated many of the 
liberal freedoms and rights granted in the previous 1961 Constitution, and evidenced a return to a more 
republican and duty-based understanding of citizenship (Soyarık-Şentürk 2004, 135).120 Its primary aim 
was to restore the authority of the state and to maintain public order.
The scholar and columnist Ali Bayramoğlu (2004, 82-4) describes the constitution as an ugly 
document, which purposefully distorted the meaning of those international agreements on human 
rights to which it referred. According to Bayramoğlu (Ibid.), it could be described as the opposite of a 
conventional constitution in the sense that its aim was not to protect the basic rights and freedoms of an 
individual vis-à-vis the state, but to limit them. The underlying philosophy was to protect the state from 
the actions of its citizens, rather than to protect the fundamental rights commonly found in democratic 
constitutions (Özbudun 2007, 179). Thus, it explicitly restricted the basic rights and freedoms of 
individuals, but not the rights of the state (Bayramoğlu 2004, 82). The usual rights and liberties were 
spelled out in the constitution, but it was stipulated that they could be limited on the grounds of national 
interest or national security, among other concerns. The constitution sanctified the state and legitimized 
authoritarian leadership. It aimed to encode the mentality, cultural, and political operations of both 
individual and the society. Among other things it also legitimized the notion of ”crimes of thought,” 
and underlined the military authority over the individual, the society, and politics (Bayramoğlu 2004, 
82-84).
The 1982 constitution has often been contrasted with the liberal constitution of 1961, also a 
product of the military. These two constitutions have been seen in a paradoxical relationship, the military 
undoing its own handiwork. Despite this, both constitutions had essentially the same aim: to carve a 
space for an autonomous state removed from the arena of politics. The 1961 constitution aimed to do 
this by a separation of powers and autonomous state institutions, while the 1982 constitution aimed to 
do this by de-politicization of society and the regulation of politics. It narrowed the arena controlled by 
the judiciary and limited the power of the executive (Bayramoğlu 2004, 82). It increased the power of 
the president and the National Security Council.121
According to Kirişçi & Winrow, the constitution effectively criminalized demands for a separate, 
Kurdish ethnic identity within the country by defining the safeguarding of “the independence and 
integrity of the Turkish Nation, the indivisibility of the country, the Republic” (Article 5) as a fundamental 
119 İnsel also argues that the Constitution reflected the long-enduring conception that perceived the state at the center and 
the society at the periphery (İnsel 2003, 294-5). For center-periphery cleavage in Turkey, see Mardin 1973.
120 The effects of the constitution on the freedom of expression and media will be returned to in the next chapter.
121 The constitution became the subject of controversy from its inception. Following the restoration of democracy it was 
amended in 1987, 1993, 1995, and twice in 1999, sometimes quite radically (Özbudun 2007: 180).
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task of the state (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997, 111). The use of Kurdish language in public-official situations 
was prohibited122 by a combination of Article 26 of the constitution, which noted that: “No language 
prohibited by the State shall be used in the expression and dissemination of thought” together with Law 
Number 2932 (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997, 111).123 Until the Constitution of 1982, no language had been 
officially banned at the national level; thus, contrary to the often heard generalization that Kurdish was 
illegal in Turkey until 1991, it actually was banned “only” from 1982 to 1991 (Scalbert-Yücel 2010, 118-
9). Law Number 2932 actually specified that the mother-tongue of all Turkish citizens is Turkish! (Ibid.).
Other legislative changes that are important for the issue at hand include the changes in the 
citizenship law that made it easier to strip citizenship of those persons who do not act in accordance 
with the principles of the regime, thus defining, on the basis of political criteria, who deserved the 
membership of the state and who did not (Soyarık-Şentürk 2004, 136).124 The integrity of the nation was 
also protected in the penal code.
An integral part of the quest for political stability was the creation of a new party system envisioned 
in the constitution and other legislation passed during the rule of the military junta. The system was 
to be a two-party system with one center-right and one center-left party. The parties were expected to 
represent all interests rather than any particular ones and they were not allowed to form organic ties to 
the society, i.e. they were not allowed to open women’s branches, youth branches etc. An exceedingly 
high threshold of 10 percent of the vote nation-wide was set to guarantee the power of large parties.
In the new political structure, the military was elevated into a permanent position independent 
from, and above, the political sphere. The new constitution and the Law on National Security Council 
of 1983 (law number 2945, Millî Güvenlik Kurulu Kanunu) guaranteed the continued political power of 
the military, as well as its autonomy from civilian control. The number of military members of the MGK 
was increased to form a majority, and it was given more powers. The constitution stated: 
The National Security Council shall submit to the Council of Ministers its views on taking 
decisions and ensuring necessary coordination with regard to the formulation, establishment, and 
implementation of the national security policy of the State. The Council of Ministers shall give 
priority consideration to the decisions of the National Security Council concerning the measures 
that it deems necessary for the preservation of the existence and independence of the State, the 
integrity and indivisibility of the country and the peace and security of society. (The Constitution 
of 1982, Article 118, emphasis mine).
The scope of issues considered to fall within the sphere of national security was defined in Article 2 
of the Law on National Security Council as ”the protection and safekeeping of the constitutional order, 
national entity, unity of the state and all its international interests, including political, social, cultural and 
economic interests, and of its conventional law against foreign and domestic threats of all kinds” (Law no. 
2945, Article 2, English translation from Erdal 2010, 40, emphasis mine). 
122 The same applies to other ethnicities and languages as well.
123 The constitution was approved with an overwhelming majority in a tightly orchestrated referendum. The participation 
and approval rates in the Kurdish inhabited areas were somewhat lower than those elsewhere (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997: 
111-112). 
124 According to Öktem, around ten thousand political refugees from Turkey were stripped of their citizenship, and only 
regained their passports in the late 1990s (Öktem 2011). 
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The all-encompassing definition of issues falling under national security and thus the MGK’s 
mandate is spelled out clearly in Article 4 of the Law No. 2945 on the National Security Council that 
lists its duties as follows:
The National Security Council, (1) Determines the views with regard to the decisions on the 
formulation, setting, and implementation of the national security policy and maintenance of the 
necessary coordination. (2) Determines measures for the realization of national objectives and 
plans, as well as programs that are formulated according to the national security policy of the state. 
(3) Continuously monitors and evaluates political, social, economic, cultural and technological 
developments of the country and the components of national power that would influence the national 
security policy of the state. It also determines the basic principles by which the aforementioned factors 
could be improved in accordance with national objectives. (4) Determines measures that are deemed 
necessary for the preservation of the existence, independence, territorial integrity and indivisibility 
of the state and maintenance of stability and security of the society. (5) Determines measures that 
are deemed necessary for preserving the constitutional order, maintaining the national unity and 
integrity, orienting the Turkish Nation around the national ideals and values in accordance with 
the Atatürk’s Principles and Reforms. In order to eliminate threats directed against these principles of 
the state, both internal and external, The Council determines basic strategies, principles, opinions on 
planning and implementation of necessary precautions. (MGK 2011)
When one looks at the powers given to the MGK in the constitution, the wide definition of the 
concept of “national security” and its multi-field monitoring duties, the MGK emerges as the most 
powerful political force in the country. It remained so until the EU-induced reforms of 2002 and 2003. 
In conclusion, throughout the 1980s and 1990s, national security formed the framework of politics 
(Bayramoğlu 2004, 89). This differentiation of issues into arenas of political decision-making on one 
hand, and state concerns on the other, limited political activity as a wide arena was shut from political 
debates with this securitization of politics. In addition to wide internal powers, the state of emergency 
powers of the military were increased, and the military budget was effectively moved outside any civilian 
control (Bayramoğlu 2004, 85-6). 
4.1.3 a unified and haRmonious nation – educational mateRials 
as a testimony
In the aftermath of the coup The MGK also assumed the responsibility of equipping the state with an 
ideology. To legitimize its actions, the military utilized a discourse that included a new blend of Kemalism 
layered with Islam, and spiced with a fear of return to the anarchy of the 1970s. The military saw itself as 
the ultimate guarantor of Atatürk’s legacy and did its best to reinvigorate Kemalism as the state ideology. 
The generals saw Kemalism’s stress on national integrity and unity as a solution to the fragmentation 
and polarization of the society. The September the 12th regime used Kemalism, now labeled Atatürkism, 
which has a high dosage of authoritarianism and is about national unity, in a grotesque and inflationary 
way (Bora & Kıvanç 1996). 
This new Atatürkism was propagated via the educational institutions. The military instituted a series of 
90
educational reforms that sought to create the state and nation as imagined by the generals, and to prevent at 
all costs the consolidation of identities that threatened to fragment the nation into a politics of differences 
(Kaplan 2002, 119; Gürleyen 1998, 76). The importance attributed to education by the military, as well as 
the influence exerted by it in the country, is well exemplified both by the existence of the courses on national 
security (Altınay 2004)125 as well as by the post of ministry of education’s defense secretary (!) (Kaplan 
2002, 119). Thus, it is no wonder that some of the most interesting research on the kind of citizen and 
nation the Junta aimed for has been investigated via analysis of educational materials in post 1980 Turkey.126 
Researchers of nationalism have pointed out the importance of national (print) media, national compulsory 
education, and general military conscription in the creation and constant reproduction of nations during 
the modern era (Anderson 1991, Billig 1995). Schools engage a captive audience; educational materials 
carry the weight of official approval and impose specific interpretations on key social issues. They have 
limited utility outside the national-territorial unit and are widely perceived as defining national experience 
for schoolchildren. It is this systematic intervention into children’s subjectivities that makes the educational 
material important for both the state and the researcher (Kaplan 2002, Copeaux 2006 [1994]), even if it is 
highly problematic to estimate their actual influence on the world views and identities of the students.
As Ayşe Gül Altınay has pointed out, the goals of higher education spelled out in the Law of Higher 
Education (Law 2547, Article4, enacted 1981) included the following: students 
•  will be loyal to Atatürk nationalism and to Atatürk’s reforms and principles,
•  will be in accord with the national, ethical, human, spiritual, and cultural values of the Turkish 
Nation and conscious of the privilege of being a Turk,
•  will put the common good above their own personal interests and have full devotion to family, 
country, and nation,
•  will be fully conscious of their duties and responsibilities towards their country and will act 
accordingly
(Altınay 2004, 121, translation Altınay’s, available in Turkish in http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr,).
The resultant conceptualization of the Turkish nation bears much resemblance to that of the early 
republican period and it is clear that in some classes the main aim was not to inform the student but 
to propagate the spirit of September the 12th and to mold the ideas and behavior of the student. In 
general, researchers agree127 that the ideal of an organic, homogeneous nation was once again revived 
125 Ayşe Gül Altınay’s (2004) analysis of the content and reception of the teaching in the National Security Knowledge 
classes will be discussed in more detail in chapter eight.
126 These include the following: Fusün Üstel (2005) has analyzed what kind of citizens are raised in the civics classes, also 
Başak İnce (2012) has analyzed the conceptualization of citizenship in civics education materials. Etienne Copeaux (2006 
[1994]) has analyzed the telling of the national history of the school history books, Sam Kaplan (2002) has analyzed the 
relationships constructed between Islam, secularism and the military in school primers, Işık Gürleyen (1998) has analyzed the 
subject positions given to the citizens in the textbooks of the Turkish Republic history of renovation and Atatürkism classes, 
and Özlem Altan (2003) has investigated the nationalist and secularist framework of the religious education classes. Analysis 
of textbooks for the obligatory military taught high school course National Security Knowledge (Milli Güvenlik Bilgisi) form 
also a part of Ayşe Gül Altınay’s (2004) study on the influence of the military on Turkish youth. 
127 Since the studies analyze Turkish educational materials of different classes, from different perspectives, pose different 
research questions and use different techniques of analysis, their conclusions are not fully compatible. As their findings are 
here summarized only to the extent directly relevant for the issue at hand, those points the different researchers more or less 
agree upon tend to become highlighted.
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with concomitant communal definition of the good life. This time the definition of Turkishness included 
explicit references to religion, i.e. official adoption of the so-called Turkish-Islamic synthesis. The resultant 
position granted to non-Muslims or non-Turkish segments in the population was highly problematic.
A Militant Citizen and a Military Nation
The coup engendered clearly seen transformations in educational materials: the more participatory ideals 
of the so-called second republic (1960—1980) were abandoned and the self-sacrificing mentality was 
promoted once again. The aim of the educational system was the raising of patriotic citizens concordant 
with social norms, knowledgeable of their responsibilities to the nation, and committed to the territory 
of Turkey and Atatürk’s nationalism (Gürleyen 1998, 48; Copeaux 2006 [1994]).128 This patriotic-
nationalist aim is evident even to those without a knowledge of Turkish language: the books were filled 
with such national symbols as flags, pictures of soldiers, and maps of Turkey and the world of Turks (this 
latest from 1993 onwards); in addition these materials also included texts of the national anthem, pictures 
of Atatürk, his speech for the Turkish youth, and the teachers’ anthem (Gürleyen 1998; Copeaux 2006 
[1994], 407-408). According to military leaders, a lack of knowledge of the principles of Kemalism was 
one of the most important reasons behind the social and political crises of the 1970s and, therefore had 
to be explained to the Turkish youth. Besides the Kemalist-nationalist backdrop of all school primers, a 
separate compulsory course on Atatürk’s reforms was added to the curriculum, commencing from the 
third year of secondary school and repeated until the end of university education.
Mobilization against threats, a spirit of vigilance, is very noticeable in the textbooks of civics 
education, and this time the threats and enemies are labeled more explicitly than in earlier periods and 
divided into external and internal enemies (Üstel 2005, 278-279; Gürleyen 1998). Üstel points out how 
this inevitably leads to a paranoid world-view and militant crisis-citizenship. (Üstel 2005, 278-279.) 
These motifs of threat and danger became important aspects of the education program. Once again the 
citizen was expected (duty) to be sensitive and alert (in national questions/issues) (Üstel 2005, 282). 
Besides the perception of the individual citizen as vigilant and militant, the whole nation is depicted 
as a military nation. According to the analysis of Sam Kaplan (2002), the primers emphasize militarism 
or military nationalism, within which Turks are shown as a military people, Turks are soldiers and 
conquerors. Turkish children are taught to be willing to sacrifice themselves for the good of the nation 
and the country. Boys serve their nation by performing the military service, girls in other ways, especially 
by being virtuous. Counter to some claims, this “military tradition” is not centuries old, but was worked 
into the system after the 1980 coup. This representation was clearly in the interests of the military, which 
has had a keen interest in educational issues. Thus, through the curriculum, military and civilian officials 
in Turkey set out to forge powerful emotional bonds between the army and the civilian population, 
to persuade the youth to defend and, if need be, die for the Turkish nation. (Kaplan 2002, 124). The 
128 Turkish nationalism was closely connected with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and his modernizing project. In the course book 
on Atatürk’s renovation, “nation” was the most frequently used word, combined with: state, army, hero, honor, honesty, war, 
religion (Gürleyen 1998). Within history classes, the creation of the Turkish nation was connected directly to the person of 
Atatürk and the Kemalist ideology (with its symbols, quotes). The republic in its entirety has been connected to Kemalism 
to such a degree that criticism of Kemalism has been understood as a threat to the republic itself. Also, official Turkish 
historiography has been closely connected to the person of Atatürk so that it has been difficult to criticize it. (Copeaux 2006 
[1994].)
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Turkish army is presented as identical with the nation (Gürleyen 1998). An indication of the success of 
this kind of representation is provided by surveys in which the Turkish army was usually named as the 
most trusted institution in the country.129
The Turkish–Islamic Synthesis
In the 1970’s, a group of conservative intellectuals formulated a policy called the Turkish Islamic synthesis 
(Türk-İslam Sentezi, TİS), which can be described as a socially conservative branch of Turkish nationalism 
(Copeaux 2006 [1994]; Gürleyen 1998) that promotes Islam as an essential, even if instrumental, part 
of Turkishness. TİS represented an attempt to form a synthesis between Turkish, Islamic, and Western 
values. In one of its founding documents, TİS’ solution to Turkey’s problems of the 1970s is seen in 
the nationalization of education: the students should be taught that individuals can only live under the 
authority of a state and obedience to state authority is a virtue (Gürleyen 1998). TİS does not construct 
an oppositional relationship between Kemalist secularism and Islam; religion is rather seen as a tool 
in the ideological homogenization of citizens and the de-politicization of society. Religion can be used 
functionally as one of the bases of an authoritarian state. (Gürleyen 1998, 21). It is no wonder that the 
military found TİS attractive and useful, and that many of these ideas were utilized under the rule of the 
military junta. This functional use of Islam gave religion increased public visibility and legitimacy.130 The 
1982 constitution also made religious education obligatory from the 4th grade until graduation from high 
school (Kaplan 2002, 120). 
The earlier Kemalist historiography had provided an ethnic basis for Turkishness, and with the 
adoption of TİS, Islam was included into Turkish history. This inclusion of the history of Islam as a 
part of the history of the Turks helped to overcome the worst exaggerations of the Turkish history thesis 
(Copeaux 2006 [1994], 409), even if much of the Kemalist historiography was retained. The resulting 
history was not exactly secularist, but the Islam in the history books was the history of Islam, not 
religious dogma. Islam was used to give content to Turkishness, with which it is shown to be naturally 
compatible (Copeaux 2006 [1994]). The connection between Islam and Turkishness was complemented 
with a connection constructed between Islam and the military. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis emphasizes 
military tradition and service in the armed forces: the Turkish soldier is the defender of Islam, either 
gazi (older meaning of the word was soldier of Islam, in contemporary Turkish its use has been widened 
to include all military heroes) or şehit (traditionally a martyr for Islam, in contemporary Turkish all 
those die during military action or even merely during military service). “Islam once more has become 
a foundation of the state and the state army, its defender.” (Kaplan 2002, 122). So, despite political 
rhetoric, which assumes a sharp difference between a secular and a religious vision of the nation, the 
military ideals that children learn at school suggest a more ambiguous relationship between those two 
129 In the Eurobarometer of 2008, 82 percent of the respondents in Turkey replied they trusted the military. This is 12 
percent higher than the EU average but 11 percent lower than in Finland (Eurobarometer 69 2008, 17). The level of general 
trust towards the military has decreased in the 2000s because of the so-called Ergenekon coup plot case and other related 
court cases. In a report from late 2011, only 66.2 percent of the respondents fully trusted the military while another 18.2 
percent had partial trust in the institution (Gürsoy & Sarıgil 2011).
130 The symbolic role was strengthened with relevant structural developments. During the rule of the military junta, the 
budget of the Diyanet was increased by more than 50 percent; thousands of new mosques were built and 23 new faculties of 
theology were established (Öktem 2011, 62).
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world views. The curriculum emphasizes that the Turkish soldier is a pious defender of the nation (Kaplan 
2002, 113).
Both Copeaux and Gürleyen subscribe to the view that adoption of TİS as a part of the official 
ideology of the Turkish state during the military tutelage should be interpreted as a retreat from Kemalist 
secularism (Copeaux 2006 [1994], 409; Gürleyen 1998). Üstel also interprets the emphasis on Islam 
as a withdrawal from the strict laicism of the early republic. Laicism is considered secondary to strong 
social ties between people and social solidarity. Religion is used to strengthen the communal aspect of 
citizenship, bring order, and give a code of conduct for the individual. Interestingly enough, religion 
is legitimized with quotes from Atatürk. (Ibid., 291.) Based on her investigation of Turkish religion 
education primers, Özlem Altan questions this and argues that obligatory religious education is a part 
of the state control over acceptable religion.131 Obligatory religious education operates as legitimization 
for various facets of the official ideology. The sacred sphere is used to promote nationalism, militarism, 
and corporatist capitalism. For example, the longest chapter in the fifth grade primer on religion is on 
one’s love of homeland. The chapter on belief in the prophets is considerably shorter. The sacredness of 
protecting the homeland is an overwhelming theme in the books. (Altan 2003.)
Restoration of the Organic Nation
Much emphasis is placed on conservative understanding of society and the search for order and security. 
This search is formulated around the communal common “good life.” The individual is not the one 
to define ”the good life” for it is the community, the nation that defines it. This renders a rights-based 
understanding of the individual citizen impossible (Üstel 2005, 282). “The good life” is defined along 
(socially) conservative lines with stress on religious values and family. A culture of devotion and obedience 
on the axis of civic duties worked to restore the idea of an organic nation (milli birlik ve beraberlik). Once 
again the basic actor in the books is the nation, not the citizen. And the nation moves further and further 
away from the “agreement” based liberal concept of a nation towards one based on common origins, 
a natural rather than constructed entity. This is clear in the books in the definition of the founding 
elements/features of the nation, which are divided into objective/physical criteria and the spiritual/non-
physical. The objective physical (maddi) ones are language, religion and race whereas the non-touchables 
are unity of history and culture. (Üstel 2005.)132
In regards to the language of Turkey, there is no separation into mother-tongue(s) and the official 
language; instead, the importance of a single language is emphasized: ”It is important that one language 
131 Baraka A. Salmoni (2000) argued that Islam actually never left the curriculum in republican Turkey. The only period 
in which there were no courses in religion was 1934–1948, and during that period the subject was covered under history. 
During the first years of the republic, the study of religion was intended to bolster national feeling and Turkish esteem and to 
legitimize central parts of the Kemalist program in political, racial, and socio-economic realms. Thus, the fusion of Turkishness 
and Islam was not a new phenomenon to emerge in the 1970’s and 1980’s. Salmoni explains how religion was used to bolster 
Atatürkist renovation during the early years of the Republic: “...the modern Kemalist state and social order is associated with 
Muhammed himself, who, “had he existed today, would have played modern (asrî) games, and made his community wear the 
civilized and healthy brimmed hat.”” (Salmoni 2000, 43). There is congruence between Muhammad and Atatürk, between 
early Islam and Republican Islam. The Turkish republic is the modern reincarnation of polity of Muhammad in Medina. 
Muhammad’s actions are also portrayed in nationalistic terms and a holy aura is cast around the Republican venture and the 
modern state. It is said that Islam gives great importance to state and national loyalty; there is no religion without a homeland. 
A Muslim’s greatest duties are shown to be toward the government, the nation, and the homeland (Salmoni 2000, 44).
132 Compare with the early Kemalist formulations in chapter two.
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is used in writing and speaking within a community because it makes the community a nation” and 
”Turkish language is one of the oldest and richest languages in the world. Every Turk loves his language 
fore the Turks have upheld their history, traditions, and culture through the Turkish language.” (Ibid., 
289, the quotations are from 1994). 
The notion of Turkish race or ethnicity (ırk) is used to create mental/psychological mobility, and a 
basis for “healthy society”: “Racial [or ethnic] unity has an important role to play when a community is a 
nation. There can be a tie based on similarity between individuals that come from the same origins.” (Ibid., 
292, quotation from 1994). Other researchers have also noted the extreme nationalist formulations close 
to racism (Gürleyen 1998, 77). When a healthy community is defined as a homogenous one and Islam 
is added into the equation, the sphere of inclusion becomes quite narrow. Özlem Altan points out the 
corporatist view offered in religious education, according to which different groups in the society work 
together within harmonious relations. Here, the resemblance to the Kemalist formulations of the early 
republican period is striking. The corporatism of the books promotes a view of homogenous harmonious 
society and legitimizes the status quo (Altan 2003).
Kerem Öktem, a Turkish researcher, describes his own high school years in the preface to his Turkey 
Since 1989: An Angry Nation:
For a student in Turkey in the mid-1980s, only what was not explicitly forbidden was allowed, and 
this was not a lot. There were no Kurds, no Armenians, no Greeks and no Alevis in this grim post-
coup world, or so I thought… we were all Turkish, mostly Sunni Muslims, secular in our outlook 
and ready to defend any criticism leveled against the country by outsiders… and as is possible only 
in authoritarian regimes, I believed that Turkey was a tolerant place, where everybody lived together 
in peace, even though I knew that in fact people were being tortured in every bit of the country and 
being a non-Muslim was almost as bad being a ‘terrorist’. (Öktem 2011, xxiv.)
Many of the official formulations of the 1980s are deeply problematic. In order to secure external balance 
and stability, the internal one has to be in order, and to ensure this, all individuals and companies, official 
and private organizations, political entities and parties, the judiciary, executive and legislative branches 
of the state must act, think, and have an attitude in accordance with the reason of existence of the state 
and the advancing of the national goals. And the reason of existence of the Turkish state is (as is defined 
elsewhere) is to ensure that Turkish culture and Turkish core values live eternally within the Turkish 
nation and national unity and totality (İnsel 1998, 21). 
4.1.4 RetuRn to civilian Rule
The authoritarian political system was slowly liberalized under the premiership and then presidency of 
Turgut Özal from 1983 to 1993. Özal had been the technocrat minister of the interim government 
responsible for putting into effect the new liberal economic program. His center-right Motherland Party 
(Anavatan Partisi, ANAP) won 45 percent of the vote in the first multi-party elections after the coup 
in 1983. The main reason for the victory was that the party was perceived to be the only one out of the 
three parties competing not endorsed by the military (for more details, see Zürcher 1993, Kalaycıoğlu 
2005 and Öktem 2011, 66-68). The line and policies of the ANAP were a contradictory mixture of 
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economic liberalism and entrepreneurial spirit, together with cultural-political conservatism combined 
with a dose of Islam and Turkish nationalism. 
Under the watchful eye of the military, and limited by the National Security Council and President 
(previously General) Kenan Evren, the political sphere was gradually liberalized in the course of the 
1980s. The electoral laws were changed, the previously banned politicians were allowed to participate 
to politics, and the situation of human rights improved. The total ban for the use of Kurdish language 
was eased in 1991 and the radical labor unions were allowed to be re-established. Under Özal, Turkey 
resubmitted an application for EU (European Union, still EC, European Community at the time) 
membership and granted its citizens the right to petition the ECHR (European Court of Human Rights) 
in 1987.133
The Özal years are remembered for the sweeping changes that transformed the face of the country 
within a few years. In addition to the gradual civilianization and democratization on the political sphere, 
the period’s harsh neo-liberalist economic policies resulted in increasing economic inequality with 
growing groups of entrepreneurial noveaux riches as well as growing masses of urban poor. The growth of 
public social and political role of Islam took place simultaneously with the effects of deepening economic 
and cultural globalization, increasing western influence in popular culture from music to soap operas, 
and the commoditization of culture (see Öktem 2011). In the vein of the Democrat Party of the 1950s, 
the Özal governments also engaged in ambitious development projects: the road network was improved 
and extended, and phone lines and the electricity grid finally reached even the most remote villages. 
Within a decade, Turkey was transformed from an internal-facing, closed economy and society into an 
outward-facing and export-oriented country with a fast expanding economy, especially in the industrial 
and tourism sectors. The expansion of the industrial sector into the inner Anatolian cities contributed to 
the emergence of a new, religious, and conservative middle class and elite.
On the negative side, the Özal years are also remembered for the continued power of the “Guardian 
state” (i.e. the military and other security forces and the high judiciary, term from Öktem 2011) that 
continued the heavy-handed repression with routine torture and extended prison terms for dissidents. The 
repression was especially brutal in the Kurdish provinces. The neo-liberal restructuring and privatization 
of state enterprises was also accompanied by greed, embezzlement, bribery, and cronyism. For many, the 
aim was to become rich fast, regardless of the means. The emphasis on consumption led to increasing 
imports and thus increasing deficits in the balance of payments as the ambitious development projects 
and clientelist corruption led to government overspending. Özal’s policies reached high growth levels, 
but did so at the cost of stability. (Öktem 2011; Atasoy 2005; Kalaycıoğlu 2005; Zürcher 1993.) 
The “Lost Decade”
Turkey had entered the 1990s with a boom of self-confidence... Özal had the opportunity to repeat 
the Turkish right-wing politicians’ buzzwords such as “great Turkey” and “powerful Turkey” in a 
relatively “realistic” context; at the beginning of the 1990s, an assertive catch phrase, “The twenty-
first century will be the Turkish century,” was added to these mottoes. (Bora 2003b, 433-434)
133 For the importance of these two processes for the gradual improvement of the human rights situation in Turkey, see 
Ulusoy 2007.
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Contrary to the grand expectations, the 1990s were not an auspicious decade for Turkey, far from it. 
It has become considered a “lost decade” (Öktem 2011), a wasted opportunity characterized by severe 
internal economic and political problems and disappointments in the international arena. The modest 
process of democratization and normalization came to a halt after Özal’s death in 1993, and the new 
party system envisioned by the military functioned poorly with two center-left parties and two center-
right parties, instead of the aimed-for stable two-party-system. The resulting weak coalition governments 
chose to cooperate with the military; the economy was damaged by reoccurring crisis; mainstream 
politicians were proven to be hopelessly corrupt; the extent of the state involvement in illegal operations 
(the so-called deep state) became obvious through a series of scandals, and the war in the Kurdish areas 
escalated. The army used its autonomous status to deal as it wished with the escalating war in the Kurdish-
populated provinces, in which tens of thousands of lives were lost; the country became divided into two, 
i.e. the state of emergency region (OHAL, Olağan Üstü Hal Bölgesi) and Western Turkey. The human 
rights violations committed by the security apparatus continued while the perpetrators were protected, 
and the armed conflict on Turkish soil acted as yet another source legitimizing the central position of 
the military. At times the military even influenced Turkish foreign policy (for example the agreements 
of cooperation with Israel or the ousting of Öcalan from Syria in 1998) or toppled governments (the 
so-called February 28th process in 1997).134 Thus, besides the war in the South-East, the 1990s are often 
remembered through a series of interconnected crisis and scandals: the economic crises of 1991, 1994, 
1999 and 2000-2001; the Alevi massacres of 1993 and 1996;135 the Manisa trials starting in 1995;136 the 
Susurluk crash of 1996;137 the postmodern coup of 1997 (the February 28th process);138 and the Marmara 
earthquake in 1999.139 
The internal problems were accentuated by disappointments and challenging developments on the 
134 Kerem Öktem (2011), who looks at recent history of Turkey through the prism of a struggle between the democratically 
elected government and “the Guardian state,” i.e. the military and the high judiciary, sees the 1990s as a period dominated by 
the Guardian state.
135 In the Sıvas massacre of 1993 the Turkish security forces refused to step in and protect groups of Alevi from religiously 
motivated violence. 35 persons were killed. In the Gazi massacre the police was actually the main perpetrator and killed 17 
Alevi demonstrators. For more details, see Öktem 2011, 96-100.
136 In 1995 sixteen teenagers were detained for terrorist activities and tortured in the city of Manisa in Western Turkey. 
Despite the wide-spread public attention on this torture case, it took five years to acquit the youngsters (as they had confessed 
under torture) and three more years to finally bring a conviction for the torturers in 2003. The Manisa trials made obvious 
how wide-spread torture was in Turkey, and how the perpetrators were protected by the state apparatus. For more details, see 
Öktem 2011, 100-102.
137 There was a fatal car accident near the small town of Susurluk in November 1996. The victims were Hüseyin Kocadağ, the 
former deputy director of the Istanbul National Security Police, Abdullah Çatlı a Turkish-nationalist mafia hit man wanted 
for multiple murders (since the 1970s), his ex-beauty-queen girlfriend, and the lone survivor Sedat Bucak, a parliamentarian 
and the head of a pro-government Kurdish tribe involved in the Village Guard system, of which more below. There was an 
arsenal of weapons in the trunk, and Çatlı carried false police identity card as well as a green passport reserved for Turkish 
officials. The investigation of the accident made obvious the close connections and shady deals between the state and its 
security forces on one hand and the illegal nationalist gangs on the other. (For more details, see for example Gunter 2011, 
117-122 and Navaro-Yashin 2002, 171-180.) 
138 For more details, see next chapter.
139 The Marmara region, the most developed industrial region of Turkey was hit by a 7.5 magnitude earthquake. According 
to the official figures, a total of 18,000 people died, the unofficial figures are as high as 40,000 (Öktem 2011). The all-
powerful Turkish state proved incapable of organizing effective relief effort. For an interesting analysis of the relations of 
media, politics and the public sphere through the coverage of the 1999 earthquake in the Turkish press, see Gavrilis 2000.
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international sphere. Turkey’s EU-membership application was rejected in 1991140 and again in 1997;141 
the first Iraq War virtually ended cross-border trade with Iraq and thus damaged Turkey economically 
and resulted in de-facto autonomy for Iraqi Kurds, which was deeply troubling for Ankara; and finally the 
newly independent Central Asian Turkic states did not seem too eager to have Turkey as a big brother. 
In addition, Turkey was troubled by the bloody ethnic and nationalist wars and instability in Turkey’s 
immediate neighborhood in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Iraq. 
4.2 kuRdish claims foR diffeRence 1984–1999
Writing in 1989, Martin van Bruinessen states that “Most Kurds in Turkey have a strong awareness 
of belonging to a separate ethnic group, distinct, especially, from the Turks and from the Christian 
minorities living in their midst.” (van Bruinessen 1989, 613). Van Bruinessen goes on to note that this 
awareness does not mean that there is unanimity among them as to what constitutes this ethnic identity 
and what the boundaries of this ethnie are (Ibid.). Generally language and religion are seen as the main 
components of this identity, but due to the differences between the various linguistic and religious groups, 
it might be apt to consider the Kurds not as one ethnic group but rather a set of ethnic groups. (Ibid.) 
For example, many Shafi (Sunni Muslim of Shafi denomination) Kurds do not consider non-Shafis as 
Kurds, and Kurdish-speaking Alevis seem to have more in common with Turkish-speaking Alevis than 
Kurds. Thus, “There is, then, no unambiguous ethnic boundary separating Kurds from non-Kurds, and 
in the course of even recent history the boundaries as perceived by various groups have shifted.” (van 
Bruinessen 1989, 616.). 
As was seen in chapter three, after the brutal suppression of the uprisings of the 1920’s and 1930’s, 
many ethnic Kurds had been integrated into the Turkish society. Many individuals and groups were 
Turkicized (up to the 1960s), do not speak Kurdish nor consider themselves first and foremost as Kurdish. 
In other cases, the Turkifization was only skin-deep and abandoned when the ethno-nationalist Kurdish 
movement emerged in the late 1960s and in the 1970s. In the 1960s, an increasing awareness of, and 
support for, Kurdish ethnicity as separate from the Turkish national identity gained popularity among 
the radical left in Turkey. However, up until the end of the 1960s, there had been solidarity between the 
Turkish and Kurdish Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries, and demands for “the Kurdish people” were being 
voiced within the leftist movement (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997, 109). After the coup of 1971, when the 
radical left reorganized, it became divided into separate Turkish and Kurdish counterparts (Ibid., 110). 
As the movement became influential in the 1970s, it seemed to create a stronger sense of solidarity 
among the Kurds (Ibid.). Connected to this popularization of a distinct Kurdish identity separate from 
the other possible identities was the reinvention of specific Kurdish traditions (comp. with Hobsbawm 
& Ranger 1983 The Invention of Tradition). In earlier times such cultural symbols as modes of dress, 
140 The rationale behind submitting the application had mainly been concerned with internal politics with the aim 
of strengthening the hand of the Özal government vis-à-vis the military in the process of democratization. Nevertheless, 
disappointment of the rejection was deeply felt.
141 The inclusion of the ex-communist Eastern-European countries to the next round of European enlargement added insult 
to injury. In Turkey the Eastern European countries were seen as less developed than Turkey with its multi-party democracy 
dating back to 1946.
98
music, folklore, and cooking showed both great regional variation and also obvious similarities with 
other ethnic and religious groups within the same region. These symbols of separateness were suppressed 
by the republican government from the late 1920s onwards, thus making it possible for the nationalist 
movement of the 1970s to promote a re-invented and more unified Kurdish tradition, strongly 
influenced by the Iraqi Kurdish traditions. (van Bruinessen 1989, 614-5.) Books on Kurdish history, 
literature journals etc. began to appear.142 The Kurdish nationalists also worked to create a unified and 
modern Kurdish language that was disseminated via journals and literacy courses. A national music was 
re-invented and popularized via cassettes. People started wearing “Kurdish” clothes (i.e. Iraqi style) and 
adopted the Iraqi Kurds’ Newroz celebration as part of their tradition. (van Bruinessen 1989, 620-1).143 
In conclusion: 
Towards the end of the 1970s, it seemed that this nationalist movement was changing the self-
perception of a considerable section of the Kurds. People who had long called themselves Turks started 
re-defining themselves as Kurds; youngsters in the cities, who knew only Turkish, began to learn 
Kurdish again. (van Bruinessen 1989, 621.)
The answer of the military junta for the rising Kurdish voices was in the vein of the responses of the 
1920s and 1930s, and the existence of Kurds was denied on the official level. They were either argued 
to be of Turkic origins, or their linguistic and religious differences were used as a proof that no such 
nation/people/ethnie existed. Relics of the 1930s, i.e. the Turkish Language Society and the Turkish 
History Society, were also revitalized in a new format in the early 1980s to produce slanted research and 
propaganda on the origins and history of Turks (and Kurds).144 Numerous nationalistically motivated 
scientific works claimed that Kurds were actually of Turkish origins, and that there was no Kurdish 
language. (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997, 112.) In this atmosphere, even the use of the words “Kurd” and 
“Kurdistan” might be seen as treasonous (Watts 1999, 635).
142 For an interesting analysis of Kurdish historiography in the 1990s, see Konrad Hirschler’s (2001) “Defining the Nation: 
Kurdish Historiography in Turkey in the 1990s”. According to him, Kurdish national historiography in Turkey is mainly 
directed towards, influenced by, and responsive to Turkish national historiography on a popular level (which is still somewhat 
influenced by the Turkish history thesis and Sun Language theory—unlike the academic level of Turkish historiography) and 
in some instances the result is a symmetrically inverted Turkish History Thesis. Turks are also the main ‘other’ or the Kurdish 
nation. It is clear that the readership and authors of this predominantly ethnic history have been educated within the Turkish 
national discourse. Relationship with other Kurdish communities in neighboring countries is of minor importance. (Hirschler 
2001, 160-161.)
143 Turkey’s Kurds claimed the Newroz-celebrations as an ancient tradition of Turkey’s Kurds. These celebrations became 
occasions for mass demonstrations for Kurdish rights. As a response, the Turkish establishment claimed the celebration as an 
old Turkish tradition, Turkified as Nevruz. For more on this process, see Yanık 2006.
144 Foundations for the new Atatürk High Institution of Culture, Language and History (Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih 
Yüksek Kurumu) were included in the Constitution of 1982, and detailed in the Law number 2876. For details (in Turkish), 
see: http://www.ayk.gov.tr/. Another organization that worked to promote officially sanctioned history was the private 
but state-sponsored Research Institute on Turkish Culture (Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, TKAE). For more on the 
organization, see: http://www.turkkulturu.org.tr/. For a short summary in English of the origins, purpose and activities in 
the 1980s of these organizations, see Scalbert-Yücel & Le Ray 2006.
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4.2.1 violent stRuggle foR kuRdistan
One of the radical leftist and Kurdish nationalist organizations founded in the 1970s was the separatist, 
Marxist-Leninist PKK, which dominated Kurdish nationalism in Turkey between 1984 and 1999. The 
violent campaign of the PKK against the Turkish state (1984–1999) was crucial for popularizing an 
ethno-national Kurdish identity. The long-drawn traumatic conflict between the PKK and the Turkish 
state ended up claiming more than 30,000145 lives between 1984 and 1999 and shaped the context of the 
(political) news events analyzed in chapter six. (The armed struggle was resumed in 2004.) Because of the 
great importance of the PKK and the existence of an armed nationalist-separatist conflict, the main lines 
of the conflict are summarized here without going into the details of the emergence or structure of the 
PKK, nor the minutes of the activities of the two sides in the war.
The PKK was founded in 1978 by a small group or Kurdish radical leftists and aimed from the 
beginning for an armed war of national liberation. The organization classified itself as Marxist-Leninist, 
but Paul White categorizes it as Stalinist-nationalist (White 2000, 136).146 From its very start, the 
undisputed leader of the organization was Abdullah Öcalan, Turkey’s Kurd from humble origins and 
previously a student of the highly prestigious Faculty of Political Studies147 in the University of Ankara. 
In its first years this tightly-knit clandestine group was involved in propaganda work and building up the 
organization necessary for waging guerrilla war against the Turkish state. 
Radical leftist activism mixed with Kurdish nationalism has been cited as one of the reasons behind 
the 12 September coup, which persecuted the left especially harshly. The 12 September junta’s answer 
to the rising Kurdish voices mirrored those of the 1930’s, and after the coup the existence of Kurds in 
Turkey was once again denied on the official level. A long-time member of the parliament and Minister, 
Şerafettin Elçi was sentenced for a year in prison in 1981 for his earlier statement: “There are Kurds in 
Turkey. I am a Kurd.” (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997, 111). Only the most tight-knit clandestine organizations, 
such as the PKK, were able to survive the crack-down of leftist and Kurdish nationalist activities. The 
leadership of the PKK fled to Syria and Lebanon, where they opened training camps (Kirişçi & Winrow 
1997, 127). It was within this political context that the PKK started the armed insurrection in 1984, one 
year after the country had returned to civilian rule. The state responded with extremely harsh measures, 
and the conflict escalated. By the early 1990s an internal war was underway in the eastern-most provinces. 
In the public discussion in Turkey, the PKK was demonized and all its activities were summarily 
dismissed as separatist terrorist. As a response, the more scholarly works have often included detailed 
analysis of the various tactics used by the organization with concrete examples of cases to estimate the 
truth of the various accusations (for example: White 2000; Ergil 2007 and 2000). Here it suffices to 
conclude that the tactics utilized by the organization change according to the perceived needs of the 
time. Most of them have not been terrorist, at least according to the generally accepted meaning of the 
term, i.e. hitting random civilian targets for maximum public effect, but consisted of attacks against 
military and economic targets. The PKK attacks on military targets aimed to challenge the state’s ability 
145 I do not know how accurate a figure this is. It is the most common one cited in the press and in scholarly works. 
According to Ergil, this is the official figure that does not include the so-called mystery killings in the Kurdish provinces, 
which amount to as many as 10,000 more victims (Ergil 2007, 271).
146 For clear-headed summaries of the founding of the PKK, evaluations of its ideological claims and a summary of its 
strategic aims and regional alliances, see White 2000, 135-155 or Ergil 2000.
147 The old Mekteb-i Mülkiye that had educated already the Ottoman state administrators. 
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to maintain security in the region and the purpose of attacks on economic targets was to weaken the 
presence of the state and to disrupt its ability to provide basic public services (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997, 
127). However, in addition to this guerrilla warfare, the organization has also a history of attacking 
civilian targets, such as local villagers, members of rival Kurdish organizations, teachers, and journalists, 
as well as attacks against random civilian targets in Istanbul, or the tourist areas of Turkey. These fall 
clearly within the widely accepted definitions of terrorism, and the PKK was consequently classified as a 
terrorist organization by both the US and the EU. There is also proof of the organization’s involvement 
in drug trafficking, kidnappings, extortion, executions etc. (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997, ch 5; Yavuz 2001; 
Ergil 2007; White 2000.)
Since the inception of the armed struggle in 1984, the PKK gained a strong support-base,148 
developed a strong organization and a wide web of networks, and proved able to mobilize Kurds both 
within Turkey and the Kurdish Diaspora. Initially the violent campaign seemed to give the PKK an upper 
hand as the Turkish military was poorly prepared for guerrilla warfare within the country (Ergil 2007). 
PKK violence intensified in the early years of the 1990s, and for a period the organization practically 
controlled certain border areas in southeastern Turkey and set up an alternative administration with tax 
collection and local courts, etc. 
The response of the Turkish state to PKK activities was military in nature. In 1985 a system of 
village guards was set up;149 in 1987 a state of emergency (OHAL)150 was declared in those provinces 
with PKK activities and support; and in 1991 new anti-terror legislation was passed.151 In 1993–1994, 
the military was given a carte blanche to combat the PKK by the DYP (Doğru Yol Partisi, the True Path 
Party) government of Tansu Çiller, and by the late spring of 1994 it had managed to weaken the PKK to 
such an extent that the PKK lost all chance of military victory, resulting in the return of a relative calm 
to the region (Kirişçi and Winrow 1997, 127). Despite this, the PKK continued its violent campaign 
until the capture and trial of its leader Abdullah Öcalan in 1999. A unilateral ceasefire held from 1999 to 
2004, after which the PKK resumed its armed struggle.
The military upper hand had been achieved with extreme measures. In 1994 the military presence 
in the area was increased to a total of 300,000 security personnel, including military, gendarme, police 
and the village guards. The fighting force of the PKK was estimated to be between 4,000 and 5,000 
148 According to the estimation given by Doğu Ergil, the PKK had at best 500,000 active members, and a total of 1.5 million 
supporters (Ergil 2000 and 2007).
149 The controversial Village Guard system (Geçici Köy Korucuları) refers to the recruitment of local villagers to paramilitary 
units with modest monthly pay ($276 in 2007) and weaponry provided by the state. The system has been applied in 22 
provinces. It was instigated to improve security in the mountainous region, but had a number of negative consequences. It 
was used to test the loyalty of the villagers, made them a target of PKK violence, allowed the weapons and status to be used 
for personal gain by the guards, and strengthened the traditional (semi-tribal) power structures (Ünalan & al. 2007, 85-87). 
Hiring of these provisional village guards ceased in 2004, but in April 2006, there were still 57,174 of them. In addition, it 
was also possible to hire “voluntary” village guards, of whom there were 12,279 in 2003 (Ünalan & al. 2007, 85-87).
150 Continuously extended for fifteen years and in effect until 2002, the OHAL gave extraordinary powers to assigned 
governors. Initially the OHAL-region included the provinces of Bingöl, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkâri, Mardin, Siirt, Tunceli 
and Van with special provisions for the neighboring provinces of Adıyaman, Bitlis and Muş. Batman and Sırnak were later 
added to the list. From late 1994 onwards the area covered by OHAL administration was gradually narrowed.
151 The definition of terrorism in the law was broad and ambiguous. It also included non-violent actions and led to detentions 
on the basis of publications, and wide-spread human rights abuses.
101
at the time (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997, 130).152 One of the harshest measures was the forced evacuation 
of villages. Up to 3,500 villages were forcibly emptied by the security forces between 1984 and 1999, 
with a peak in 1993–1995. The evacuations involved extreme brutality, severe human rights violations 
(Norwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project 2005, 28), and often the total burning of the villages 
so as to prevent the villagers from returning. The stated rationale was to prevent logistical support for 
the PKK, but often those villages that had refused to join the village guards were chosen (a report by the 
TİHV, Türkiye İnsan Hakları Vakfı, The Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, from 1995 summarized 
in Yükseker 2007, 146). The official institutions refused to acknowledge the intentional policy of internal 
displacement, but both Turkish and foreign human rights organizations tried to draw attention to 
the issue as early as 1994–1995. The İHD (İnsan Hakları Derneği, The Human Rights Association) 
prepared a report of the problem to the international Habitat II conference held in Istanbul in 1996, and 
I remember a documentary film shown at the “Alternative Habitat II,” where a young villager lamented 
their situation as being forced to choose between the bullet and the fire, i.e. between two equally 
catastrophic choices: the PKK and the military. These examples show that the problem of displaced 
persons was already relatively widely known in mid-1990s.
The estimations of internally displaced persons (IDP) in Turkey have varied from the official figure 
of around 350,000 to those given by non-governmental organizations that range between one and three 
million. According to the Norwegian Refugee council report, a credible estimations of the numbers 
of the IDP have been in the range of 400,000 to one million persons (Norwegian Refugee Council/
Global IDP Project 2005, 50-52) and a study conducted by the Turkish Hacettepe University upon the 
request of the Turkish government showed that the estimated number of IDPs range between 953,683 
and 1,201,000 (Ünalan & al. 2007).
The combination of the violent nationalist struggle waged by the PKK with the harsh measures 
of the state resulted in increasing the popularity of Kurdish ethno-nationalism, radicalized it, as well 
as popularized and consolidated Turkish nationalism (among others Yavuz 2001, 11). Clashes between 
the PKK and the Turkish military brought high visibility to the “Kurdish issue,” even if it could not 
be publicly labeled as such yet. Instead it was referred to as a “problem of separatist terrorism” or “the 
South-East problem” in the official parlance. Thousands of Kurdish youth died or were wounded in 
the mountains, and “an entire generation of youth was born and socialized into this bloody and violent 
culture” (Yavuz 2001, 11). In many accounts, the state’s harsh measures have been estimated to have 
contributed more to the spread of Kurdish nationalist fervor among the Kurdish population than the 
actions of the Marxist-Leninist PKK, whose radical leftist ideology must have felt alien to many among 
the rather conservative and religious local population.153
The economic, social, human, and political price of the prolonged conflict was very high. 
Maintaining the strong military presence in the Kurdish regions was costly and placed a heavy burden on 
Turkey’s state finances.154 The destruction of infrastructure (roads, factories, schools, forests, villages) in 
the OHAL region by both the PKK and the Turkish military impeded local economic development. The 
152 According to the much higher estimation given by Doğu Ergil, the PKK had at its prime a total of 15,000 guerrilla 
fighters (Ergil 2007 and 2000). 
153 According to Öktem, especially the extreme brutality of the prisons in the Kurdish regions in the 1980s was a very 
important contributor for support for armed struggle against the Turkish state (Öktem 2011, 64-5).
154 Doğu Ergil has estimated that the conflict cost Turkey a total of 400 billion dollars (Ergil 2007).
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circle of violence led to rapid migration of the villagers to cities or from the area, with all the associated 
problems. The conflict also made it possible for the security forces to continue the widespread human 
rights abuses that had become the norm under the military rule in the 1980s. In the political sphere, 
the conflict impeded democratization, gave room for extra-legal, clandestine organizations within the 
state (the so-called deep state, derin devlet), and ensured the continuance of strong military presence in 
political decision-making.
Towards the end of the 1990s, Abdullah Öcalan changed the aim of the PKK from full independence 
to some form of autonomy within a federal structure, and after his capture and trial in 1999, Öcalan 
called for an end to the armed struggle. After his call to end the violence, a period of peace ensued from 
1999 until 2004.
4.2.2 WoRking Within the system: pRo-kuRdish political paRties 
1990–1999
Besides the violent separatist activities of the PKK, the official ideology of unitary Turkish nationalism 
was challenged from within the democratic parliamentary system, even if the environment of a violent 
conflict between the PKK and the Turkish Armed Forces left little room for democratic actors and 
strategies to flourish and cooperate (Somer 2008). From 1990 until present (2016), there has been a series 
of legal political parties that have centered on promoting the claim for wider cultural and political rights 
for Turkey’s Kurdish-speaking population. Five of these have been closed down by the Constitutional 
Court. Below I will summarize the development of pro-Kurdish155 political activities until 1999. The 
period after that will be taken up in the subsequent chapters.156
The first party in the series of pro-Kurdish parties was the People’s Labor Party (HEP, Halkın 
Emek Partisi) founded in 1990. Frustration over restrictions on voicing explicitly Kurdish demands led 
pro-Kurdish politicians to break away from the center-left SHP (Sosyaldemokrat Halkçı Parti, Social 
Democratic Populist Party) and form the HEP (Somer 2008). Among the founders were 11 members 
of the parliament (previously of the SHP), who wanted to work within the Turkish political system 
to gain more rights for the Kurdish-speaking population. HEP’s origins in the SHP and its members’ 
relationships with powerful politicians gave it a significant degree of political legitimacy from the start 
(Watts 1999, 643). The HEP’s pro-Kurdish stance was evident from its membership, activities, and 
the first party program, according to which the party aimed at “solving the Kurdish problem through 
peaceful and democratic methods in line with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the statutes of the Helsinki Final Document.” (from Watts 1999, 
636). Despite this explicit emphasis on human rights, the party’s demands for Kurdish political and 
cultural rights157 received much attention, accusations of collaboration with the PKK, and constant 
155 The label pro-Kurdish is used of organizations and individuals that actively support the demands for improved cultural-
political rights for Turkey’s Kurdish-speaking population. The term pro-Kurdish connotes a political stance rather than an 
ethnic identity. (Watts 1999, 651, footnote 6.) 
156 For an excellent presentation and evaluation of the legal pro-Kurdish activist movement in Turkey, see Watts 2010. 
157 According to Watts, only one page of the party program was devoted for the Kurdish issue par se (Watts 1999, 636).
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pressure by both public prosecutors and other politicians (Watts 1999, 630). HEP’s public meetings in 
the southeastern cities of Turkey attracted as many as 10,000 people and openly broached the “Kurdish 
question” (Ibid.), still a taboo at the time. 
It is noteworthy that the social-democrat SHP of the time seemed willing to see a democratic outlet 
for the expression of Kurdish identity. Yet, even the SHP rarely addressed the specific demands voiced, 
but instead directed its focus on the right to express such demands in a democratic system. This is the 
same theme that will be repeated in the discussions a decade later (see chapter 6). According to Watts, 
the question was about what constituted the bigger threat for Turkey: expression of ethnic Kurdish 
identity or suppression of democracy? If the answer was suppression of democracy, political expressions 
of Kurdish identity could be defended with support for the integrity of the country, as the SHP’s leader 
Erdal Inönü did. (Watts 1999, 645.)
After the elections of 1991, in which the HEP participated in alliance with the SHP, HEP’s demands 
became more explicitly pro-Kurdish, and at least some of the party leadership accepted or adopted the 
problematic label “Kurdish party” for the party (see Watts 1999, 637 and chapter six of this work). 
According to Watts, the new HEP deputies and key party members were less experienced in national 
politics, and very much rooted in local politics and constituencies, less cautious, and perhaps also more 
radical than the old SHP deputies had been (Watts 1999, 647). When the party failed to condemn the 
violent campaign of the PKK in clear terms, it was closed down by the Constitutional Court in 1993 
on the grounds of becoming a focus of illegal activities against the indivisible unity of the state with its 
territory and people (Güney 2002, 125). 
HEP was followed by the Democracy Party (Demokrasi Partisi, DEP), a continuation of the defunct 
HEP. The DEP faced intense pressure from both the PKK and the state. It was forced to withdraw from 
the local elections of 1994 when the pressure campaign against the party by the extralegal forces included 
a series of bomb attacks, the detainment of at least 140 party administrators, candidates and activists, 
and the raising of an armed attack against the party’s general secretary Murat Bozlak, along with the 
murders of several family members of important officios within the party (Watts 2010, 107-9). The DEP 
was closed in 1994; the parliamentary immunity of a number of its deputies was lifted; and they were 
given sentences ranging from three to 15 years in prison. For the Turkish audience, these events were 
personified by Leyla Zana, a young female deputy of the more radical wing of the DEP who attempted to 
swear her deputy’s oath in Kurdish (marked in the minutes of the Assembly as “unrecognized language”) 
as well as the dramatic escape of two other deputies into the house of the parliament, where they were 
granted temporary asylum.158 DEP’s closure in 1994 and the prosecution of its deputies removed pro-
Kurdish politics from the parliament, but did not end them. 
The DEP was reconstituted as the People’s Democracy Party (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, HADEP), 
which participated in the 1995 national elections receiving 4.2 percent of the vote nationally (i.e. not able 
to surpass the 10% national threshold).The high percentages it gained in the important cities of the Kurdish 
provinces were noteworthy: 54.2% in Hakkâri, 46.3% in Diyarbakır and 37.2% in Batman (Güney 2002, 
127-8). To the great relief of the regime and the other parties, HADEP did not do well in the larger cities of 
western Turkey that had sizable Kurdish immigrant communities. For example, HADEP got only 8.5% of 
the vote in Istanbul’s Sultanbeyli159 as opposed to the religious Refah Party’s (Welfare Party) 56%.
158 For a highly interesting analysis of these dramatic events, see Watts 1999.
159 One of the areas where most of the inhabitants are immigrants from eastern Turkey.
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Both Nicole Watts (1999) and Murat Somer (2008) have pointed out that the positions of the 
mainstream parties or representatives within a single party can be divided into hardliner stance and 
moderate (more accommodating) stance vis-à-vis the pro-Kurdish demands. While a majority of the 
parties and individual politicians has refused to accept pro-Kurdish politics as legitimate, there have also 
been a number of moderates who have argued for accommodating the pro-Kurdish voice in the name of 
democracy. In the first half of the 1990s, the moderate position was represented by the social-democrat 
SHP, which cooperated with the pro-Kurdish parties, and the left-of-center (kemalist) CHP (Cumhuriyet 
Halk Partisi, Republican People’s Party).160 Both parties supported limited cultural rights (education and 
broadcasting) for Kurds and opposed the state of emergency rule and the village guard system. The CHP 
party program actually referred to a Kurdish problem as early as 1994. Also the religious party of the 
time, the Refah party, was a vocal critic of government policies towards Kurds. Refah promoted religion 
as the main source of social solidarity, making the party popular in the 17 Kurdish-populated provinces: 
in the national elections of 1995, Refah received 27.2 percent of the vote in these regions (Kirişçi & 
Winrow 1997, ch 5).
The extreme hardliner position was represented by the ultra-right nationalist MHP (Milliyetçi 
Hareket Partisi, The Nationalist Movement Party), according to which there was only a problem of 
terrorism caused by the meddling of outsiders. The MHP also claimed Turkish origins for Kurds. For 
the left-of-center (Kemalist-secularist) DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti, Democratic Left Party) led by Bülent 
Ecevit, the problem in south-eastern Turkey was socio-economic and not ethnic. Violence labeled as 
terrorism was seen as a product of unemployment and the interference of external actors. Also the center-
right DYP, led by Tansu Çiller, was dominated by the hardliner-nationalist stance, some rare moderate 
public comments of the Prime Minister herself notwithstanding. Under the leadership of Mesut Yılmaz, 
the center-right ANAP also retreated from the more moderate position of late (president) Turgut Özal 
and became more hardline. 
For the public prosecutors (i.e. non-elected state officials) behind the closure cases of the HEP and 
DEP, there was no question of accommodating pro-Kurdish voices, and the pro-Kurdish deputies were 
referred to as “the PKK come down from the mountains” (Watts 1999, 646). This accusation was given 
credibility by the unwillingness of the legal pro-Kurdish actors to condemn the PKK violence in clear 
terms, their reluctance stemming from the fact that they drew their support from those segments of the 
population that sympathized with the PKK’s cause (Somer 2008, 226).
The pro-Kurdish parties visualized a concept of ethnic brotherhood (kardeşlik in Turkish) as an ideal, 
once in which Turks and Kurds would live side by side in equality in a pluralist, multi-ethnic society. 
This challenged the Turkish state ideology and met with loud resistance from the hardliners, the police, 
prosecutors, and members of the parliament. It was argued that suppressing the parties was necessary for 
the protection of Turkish democracy. Despite the difficulty of being moderate during the violent years of 
the 1990s and the threat of being labeled pro-PKK (Somer 2008, 226), the effectiveness of the hardliners 
was compromised by key mainstream politicians, who argued for a right for the pro-Kurdish politicians 
to participate in Turkish democracy as long as the parties worked within the system (Watts 1999, 649). 
Leading politicians seemed willing to address the issue in some manner: several times prime minister 
Bülent Ecevit argued in 1987 that the word Kurd should not be feared (Somer 2005a, 614), President 
Turgut Özal announced in 1990 that his own grandmother was Kurdish, and in 1992 the then Prime 
160 SHP and CHP merged under the name CHP in 1995.
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Minister, later President Süleyman Demirel acknowledged the existence “of a Kurdish reality” in Turkey 
(Yeğen 2007, 146 fn33). 
After the language legislation was relaxed in 1991, some alternative publishing houses began to 
publish books in Kurdish and on Kurds and the Kurdish issue. For example, Martin van Bruinessen’s 
classic work Agha, Shaikh and State. The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan from 1978 was 
published in Turkish (in Turkey) in 1991. All in all, by the early 1990s there was a legal, openly pro-
Kurdish political party, and an increasing numbers of books and articles focusing on Kurdish ethnicity 
began to appear. Top politicians also continued with their cautiously worded statements. In the mid-
1990s President Süleyman Demirel suggested “constitutional citizenship.” A little later Prime Minister 
Tansu Ciller reformulated Atatürk’s famous saying, “What a happiness to be the one who says I am a 
Turk” with “What a happiness to be the one who says I am a citizen of Turkey” (İçduygy & al.1999). In 
1999 Prime Minister Mesut Yılmaz stated that Turkey’s road to the EU goes via Diyarbakır (the main 
city of the Kurdish region). These and a number of other carefully worded statements have been repeated 
again and again in scholarly works on the issue, including (Bahceli & Noel 2011, 101-2; Yanık 2006, 
287; Yavuz 2001, 17).
On the basis of these developments, various commentators from early 1990s onwards have 
concluded that the “Kurdish reality” had become recognized in Turkey (among others: Pope 1991, 
Kirisci & Winrow 1997, Gürbey 1996). This recognition and the various comments have often been 
also connected with acknowledgement of Kurdish identity (Somer 2005a, 615 on Demirel), expectations 
of extending cultural rights (Pope 1991), and a debate over the meaning of the term “Turk” (Kirisci 
& Winrow 1997, 213). I will return to these debates in chapter six, where I hope to problematize and 
clarify how this assertion of recognition of a Kurdish reality should be interpreted. 
4.2.3 an issue of demogRaphy? 
The demographic aspect of the Kurdish issue has changed considerably from the 1930s, when the republican 
bureaucrats wrote their reports on “the Eastern question.” By the 1990s and 2000s, an important debate, 
closely connected to the question of “who should be defined as a Kurd?” has concerned the number of 
Kurds residing in Turkey. Because of the strong emphasis on the unitary, homogeneous nature of the 
Turkish nation, the Turkish state chose not to collect information on the mother tongues of its population 
after the census of 1965. This left the field open for wild claims, as well as for more or less well-informed or 
self-serving estimations. When they have not denied the existence of Kurds altogether, Turkish nationalists 
and other thus inclined researchers have tended to downplay their numbers. On the opposite side have 
been the Kurdish ethno-nationalist actors, whose interests have been advanced by emphasizing both the 
unifying features of the Kurdish people and their great numbers within Turkey. For example, Ahmet Türk, 
the leader of the pro-Kurdish party DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi) has claimed there are 25 million 
Kurds in Turkey (Konda 2007, 6). Consequently, the numbers cited over the years have varied greatly, 
from 0% to over 30% of the whole population and with a somewhat more reliable academic range of 12% 
to 19% (Mutlu 1996). The discrepancy in these latter figures stems both from the lack of consensus on 
defining who should be considered a Kurd, and from the lack of reliable statistical data.
An influential and much cited study by Servet Mutlu (1996) took the last census (from 1965) 
which included information on the mother tongues of the population of Turkey as its starting point, 
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and calculated the number of Kurds in Turkey on the basis of population growth patterns in different 
parts of the country. The study concluded that by the early 1990s, an estimated 12% of the population 
was of Kurdish background (Mutlu 1996, 532). In this statistical analysis the classification was based 
solely on the criteria of Kurdish language as the mother tongue of the previous generation, for whom it 
was known. This has often been a standard procedure, as mother-tongue is a verifiable and quantifiable 
criterion. While this strategy does not tell us anything about the self-identification of the persons, 
whether they see themselves as Kurdish, Zaza, Alevi, Turkish, all of these, or something else altogether, it 
has the advantage of overcoming some of the problems caused by forced assimilation.
Yet, those who follow modernist and constructionist ideas tell us that ethnic groups—like nations 
– should not be defined as natural and objective entities. These bodies of thought instead rely on the 
subjective understandings of the members of an ethnicity or an ethnic group themselves, rather than on 
classifying individuals according to clearly defined objective commonalities. Thus, it becomes difficult to 
define ethnicity or a person’s identity solely on the basis of a mother tongue. 
Another, more recent and probably, to date most accurate attempt to find out how many Kurds 
there are in Turkey utilized a combination of objective and subjective criteria for ethnicity, as well as 
some categorization by the researchers. The massive survey study Toplumsal Yapı Araştırması 2006. Biz 
Kimiz? (Research of Social Structure 2006. Who We Are?) was conducted by the research agency Konda 
in 2006 and published in 2007. The survey included questions on both the preferred self-designation and 
mother-tongue. Approximately 9 percent of the respondents claimed Kurdish or Zaza as their primary 
identity (subjective criteria of ethnicity). Starting from the presumption that oppression and practices 
of forced assimilation has dissuaded people from openly claiming a Kurdish identity to strangers with 
questionnaires, the researchers proceeded to add to the number of Kurds those who had given some 
other self-designation, but had marked Kurdish or Zaza as their mother tongue (objective criteria of 
ethnicity). Since the survey was conducted among the adult population, the next step was to take into 
account the larger than average household size among those who had Kurdish or Zaza as their mother 
tongue or identification. The survey thus concluded that 15.7 percent of the total population in Turkey 
is Kurdish or Zaza. The Biz Kimiz? was a very good attempt to answer the question of how many Kurds 
there are in Turkey, even if the combination of subjective criteria (how one defines oneself ), objective 
criteria (language) as well as ethnic categorization by the researchers161 can be criticized.162 (Toplumsal 
Yapı Araştırması 2006. Biz Kimiz? 2007.) 
The 1990s witnessed a hardening of borders between Turkish and Kurdish identities, so that more 
and more persons felt they could claim only one of the two (Somer 2004, 250), rather than combine 
these two identities. According to Murat Somer, who summarizes the findings of some nation-wide 
surveys, in 1996, 9.24% of all respondents declared themselves to be Kurdish. However, Kurdishness 
was the sole category selection for only for 2.71% of the respondents, who saw themselves as exclusively 
Kurdish. Others marked other categories such as Turkish or Sunni-Muslim as well. By 2002, these figures 
were 11.35% and 5.76%. This shows that more people identified themselves openly as Kurdish, and a 
larger share of those identified themselves as only Kurdish. 
161 By ethnic categorization I refer to “other-definition” made by outsiders.
162 First, the researchers enquired about the subjective feeling of belonging, but then combined the categories Kurdish and 
Zaza into one, despite the claim for a separate Zaza identity (these respondents did NOT say they considered themselves 
Kurdish). In addition, the researchers grouped all Kurdish and Zaza speakers under the heading Kurdish, regardless of the 
stated self-identification. Despite good intentions, the end result might enforce unacceptable categorizations on individuals. 
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Despite the hardening of the border between identities, it is obvious that a large share of those who 
identify themselves as Kurds hold also other identities they see as compatible with their Kurdish identity. 
To make his point, Somer also relates the experiences of Martin van Bruinessen from the 1970s, when he 
encountered a villager in northwest Iran, who identified himself as an Azeri, a Kurd, and a Persian (Somer 
2004, 244). Another example of multiple identities is a friend of mine living in Istanbul, who identifies 
himself as a Zaza, an Alevi, and a Kurd, all important identities for him. Yet, it is also important to note 
that he does not consider himself as a Turk.
The demographic aspect of the Kurdish issue has changed significantly from the early years of the 
Republic due to socio-economic change and mass migration. First of all, according to some estimations, 
by the second half of the 1990s, more than half of the Kurdish population lived outside their ancestral 
lands (Winrow & Kirişçi 1997, 135). According to the census of 2000, 30% of those born in the conflict 
zone163 resided in other provinces at the time of the census (Ünalan & al. 2007, 83). For example, the 
Kurdish population of Istanbul is generally estimated to be around three million, making it the largest 
“Kurdish city” in Turkey (Diyarbakır has a much smaller population). The geographic distribution of 
Kurds caused by urbanization and migration makes separatism less appealing for the Kurdish population. 
In the words attributed to the famous Kurdish intellectual Musa Anter, why would Kurds want to give 
up Istanbul? This attitude can also be surmised from election results. The pro-Kurdish parties have not 
received significant amounts of support in the larger cities of western Anatolia despite their significant 
Kurdish populations. Thus migrant Kurds do not seem to vote on the basis of ethnicity, but rather on 
other socio-economic factors (Grigoriadis 2006, 451; Esen & Ciddi 2011).
Another factor that works against separatism is the deep connections between Turks and Kurds. 
According to a survey study from 2009, 33.8 percent of Turks had a Kurd among their close relatives, 
whereas 67 percent of the Kurds had a close Turkish relative (SETA & Pollmark 2009, 68). Separatism 
and increasing tensions between ethnic groups are clearly not in the interests of most Kurds living in 
western Turkey, nor are they in the interests of mixed families. 
163 I.e. the region of the Return to Villages and Rehabilitation project including initially 12 provinces and later extended 
to 14: Adıyaman, Ağrı, Batman, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Elazığ, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Şırnak, Tunceli and Van 
(Ünalan & al. 2007).
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ChaPter 5: the tUrkish Press:  
CyCles of freeDom anD rePression
This chapter begins with a concise history of the Turkish press, which is presented here in more length 
than would be necessary purely for the contextualization for the analysis of media texts in chapters 
six and seven. This is to address a curious lack of English language sources on this fascinating topic. 
Turkish scholars of media have published almost exclusively in Turkish and thus Ahmad Emin’s book The 
Development of Modern Turkey as Measured by Its Press originally published in 1914 and Kemal Karpat’s 
illuminating article The Mass Media—Turkey published in 1964, remain essential English language 
reference works on the earlier part of the history of the Turkish press.164 This presentation, which is 
intended to work independently from the other chapters in this work, also owes much to two more 
recent, important historians of the Turkish press: Orhan Koloğlu (2006, 1992) and Hıfzı Topuz (2003). 
The history of the print press is told from the perspective of the freedom of expression as a series of cycles 
of relatively short periods of freedom between periods of repression. 
After the historical account, the focus turns to the long-lasting effects of the 1980 coup on the Turkish 
media: the main part of the restrictive legislation passed under the military Junta (1980–1983) remained 
in effect long into the 1990s, and the last vestiges still remained until the period analyzed in this work, 
i.e. 1999–2009. Also, the concentration of ownership that began after the coup in the 1980s and the 
subsequent use of media as a tool to advance the non-media interests of its owners have had a considerable 
influence on the Turkish media-scene as well as media contents, a situation that continues even today. 
The longest section of the chapter consists of an analysis of the legal and political context of the 
Turkish media and a description of the Turkish media-scene and the specific features of the media itself in 
the 1990s and early 2000s. The chapter ends with a look at the gradual transformation from the relatively 
free and optimistic atmosphere during the early AKP period (from 2002 onwards) to increasingly visible 
problems with freedom of expression and dramatic change of ownership of media, concentrated in the 
hands of pro-AKP actors.
5.1 the ottoman tuRkish pRess
The Ottoman Turkish165 press emerged quite late in comparison to the European countries. The first 
attempts to establish newspapers in the Ottoman Empire date back to the late 18th century, but until the 
official bulletin published by Mehmet Ali Pasha in Egypt in 1828, there were no newspapers in Ottoman 
Turkish, because for a long time the central state was opposed to the idea of an indigenous press (Çakır 
164 I highly recommend both sources for the earlier period. Ahmad (/Ahmet) Emin’s (Yalman) published dissertation is an 
accurate and lively account of the earlier history of the Turkish press. Emin uses a few secondary sources and hundreds of 
newspapers from 1869 onwards. It is still used as an important source for information by other historians of the Turkish press, 
for example, Orhan Koloğlu gives lengthy citations in his work published in 2006. The book has been available in digitized 
form since 2008. Karpat’s short and precise article also remains an interesting read.
165 The official language of the Ottoman empire was a form of Turkish written with Arabic script and with heavy borrowings 
from Arabic and Persian. It was not directly understandable for the Turkish-speaking population of Anatolia and Rumelia.
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2002). The first newspaper to appear in Istanbul was an official gazette of the central state, and the 
private press became into existence only later as the leaders of the Ottoman state realized the need for a 
public voice to protect its interests. For most of the Ottoman period the relationship between the state 
and the press was uneasy: the newspapers served an important function and were read and appreciated by 
the state elite, but at the same time they were under strict control and censorship.
5.1.1 the fiRst papeRs, pRess laWs and aRguments
The first Istanbul-based newspaper published in Ottoman Turkish was founded in 1831 by the order of the 
reformist Sultan Mahmut II.166 It was part of a wider program of reforms, the ultimate aim of which was 
to strengthen the central state and to build a modern army. To cover the expenses of modernization of the 
military, more efficient taxation and extended government control over the provinces were needed, an essential 
requirement for which was better communication. Therefore, in 1830, Mahmut II ordered the establishment 
of the weekly French language Le Moniteur Ottoman in French; the following year the Ottoman Turkish 
version, Takvim-i Vekayi (Chronicle of Events), started to appear. The stated aim of the newspaper was to 
make known: ”the true nature of events and the real purport of the acts and commands of the government” 
(quoted Lewis 2002, 51). The leaders of the empire saw Takvim-i Vekayi as a much-needed vehicle to inform 
the public about the state’s affairs and actions, to propagate their views, and to defend the Ottoman state 
against accusations of the foreign newspapers or the other than Ottoman-language newspapers within the 
empire. Thus the first Ottoman newspaper was created to answer the needs of the state, not of the public or 
bourgeoisie merchants (Koloğlu 2006, 25-26). Despite numerous articles on education, science, industry and 
trade, Takvim-i Vekayi was first and foremost an official gazette, and most of its 5000-copy circulation was 
distributed to state personnel through obligatory subscriptions. During the early period, a number of issues 
were published in Armenian, Arabian, Persian and Greek along with Ottoman Turkish.167 
The first privately owned newspaper in Ottoman Turkish, Ceride-i Havadis (Chronicle of Events) 
was published by an Englishman named William Churchill from 1840 onwards.168 Churchill promised 
to protect Ottoman interests in return for financial support. He was given a monthly wage and the 
paper’s employees acquired the status of state employees. Because Ceride-i Havadis only managed to sell 
166 Due to the capitulations granted to the European empires, the Ottoman state could not prevent publications published 
by foreign nationals or Christian minorities. I have chosen to omit the foreign and minority language press from this 
presentation, because I do not consider them to have formed an integral part in the continuum of the Turkish language 
media, even if they had an important influence on its development. For more information on foreign and minority language 
publications see: Çakır 2002, 7-10; Girgin 2001, 9-17; Topuz 2003, 71-78. 
167 The Ottoman state continued to publish an official paper under the name of Takvim-i Vekayi until the end of the empire. 
The paper underwent several changes during its existence and was closed down for long periods during the authoritarian reign 
of Abdülhamit II (1876–1909). Takvim-i Vekayi was followed by Ceride-i Resmiye (Official Chronicle) in 1920 and Resmi 
Gazete (Official Gazette) in 1928. 
168 The story behind the founding of Ceride-i Havadis is entertaining and exemplifies the influence of European powers 
within the Ottoman state through the capitulation agreements. Churchill, an English national, injured a Turkish boy in a 
hunting accident and was consequently manhandled by a group of angry Ottoman subjects and then arrested. Since the 
English had a decree of immunity according to the capitulation agreements, he demanded compensation. Besides monetary 
recompense, Churchill was also granted the permission to publish an Ottoman language newspaper. Different variations of 
this story are repeated in most histories of the early press (for example Girgin 2001, 21-22).
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about 300 copies during its first year, it was quite dependent on state support. 
The effect of this early state-led press is difficult to estimate. The majority of the population was 
illiterate, and the papers were mainly read by the state bureaucrats. Yet, according to Koloğlu, the early 
newspapers introduced new social dynamics to the Ottoman lands, including the increasing acceptance of 
a need for change, first steps towards secularization, a degree of centralization, the emergence of Europe-
centered world-view, the dependence on Europe for sources of knowledge, the first steps towards more 
dynamic public, the simplification of language, the entrance of Western words and concepts into Ottoman 
Turkish, and the emergence of the idea of nationalism based on language (Koloğlu 2006, 27-30). Thus, the 
early newspapers functioned perhaps more as means of education than means of news reporting.
In 1850 there were at least 13 newspapers published in Istanbul in languages other than Ottoman. 
In his interesting book Osmanlı’da Basın İktidar İlişkileri (The Press and Power relations in Ottoman) 
Hamza Çakır (2002) asserts that these foreign and minority language papers either worked against 
the Ottoman interests and defended French or other interests, or traded their good will for money. 
Petitions for support from the Ottoman treasury as well as records of exact sums paid can be found in the 
extensive Ottoman state archives (Ibid., 25-28). Some reporters working for European newspapers even 
received monthly wages from the Ottoman state! Çakır calls this practice blackmail, where both domestic 
minority-language and foreign newspapers and journalists demanded money from the Ottoman state in 
exchange for either positive reporting or at times just for neutrality (Ibid.). The Ottoman bureaucrats 
viewed the results of this bribery as less than satisfactory, and considered the attitudes of foreign and 
minority language presses in general as hostile (Çakır 2002).169 The repressive printing law of 1857 
(Basımnâme Nizamnâmesi) and the 1858 penal code were used as attempts to bring the domestic 
minority language press under state control (Çakır 2002, 29-30).170 
An independent private Ottoman Turkish press developed in the 1860s. The central state authorities 
had come to realize that the Ottoman Empire needed independent newspapers to propagate its views. 
The state had not been able to control the minority language press and wanted to create an independent 
but loyal Ottoman biased, Ottoman Turkish press to defend its interests. Thus the first licenses to 
publish Ottoman Turkish newspapers were granted to those individuals who promised not to publish 
anti-state material (Çakır 2002, 31-35).171 The first independent newspapers were Tercüman-i Ahval (The 
Interpreter of Events 1860–5) of Agah Efendi and Ibrahim Şinasi; Tasvir-i Efkâr (Depiction of Opinion 
1862–1867) of Şinasi and later Namık Kemal; and Muhbir (Reporter 1866–1867) of Ali Suavi. By 1867, 
sixteen Ottoman language newspapers and periodicals were being published in Istanbul, four of which 
were dailies. Gradually, the idea of journalism began to change from that of being a hobby of state 
bureaucrats to that of being an independent profession.
For most of the second half of the 19th century and the first years of the 20th, the newly emerging 
Ottoman press had precious little freedom. The press laws of the 19th century were quite repressive 
and introduced strict censorship.172 However, there were considerable differences in how strict the 
169 In Karpat’s opinion the foreign language press was offensively condescending, but relatively objective (Karpat 1964, 262).
170 At that time there was no truly independent Ottoman-language press. 
171 Another important development was a division of the reforming elite into factions that supported different modes of 
development. Some younger bureaucrats disagreed with the leading Tanzimat reformers Âli Pasha and Fuat Pasha, fell out of 
favor, and turned to journalism to propagate their views (Zürcher 1993, 70-74).
172 The 1864 Matbuat Nizamnamesi and the Âli Pasha Kararnamesi of 1867.
111
enforcement of the legislation was in different periods: during the late 1860s and the very beginning 
of the 1870s the political opponents of the regime could not publish within the Empire and had to 
move their publishing activities to Europe;173 most of the 1870s were relatively free, with lively debates 
during the first constitutional period of 1876–1878; this was then followed by the increasingly draconian 
censorship during the rest of the long reign of Sultan Abdülhamit II (1876–1909). 
The press in the early 1870’s was outspoken, and publicized vehement arguments between different 
reformist intellectuals (Emin 1914). The newspapers of this period were very critical of the central 
government, permanently in the opposition (Koloğlu 1992), and typically short-lived.174 Gradually, the 
debates raised in the press of the 1870’s evolved from the publishing of purely abstract ideas to reporting 
on concerns of concrete policies as well. The papers criticized corruption and lamented the poverty and 
adverse condition of the Ottoman people.175 The reformist early journalists of the late 1860s and 1870s 
have been labeled as Young Ottomans, whose published ideas had long-lasting influence. The Young 
Ottomans were a source of inspiration for the later Young Turks, while Namık Kemal’s attempt to merge 
European liberalism and Islamic tradition inspired later Muslim modernists.176
5.1.2 the long authoRitaRian Reign of sultan abdülhamit ii
The Young Ottomans and their favored press played important roles in the promotion of the first 
Ottoman Constitution in 1876. The ensuing two-year constitutional period was that of an excited 
freedom, which came to a sudden halt in 1878 when Sultan Abdülhamit II abolished the parliament 
and suspended the constitution. This authoritarian governance included the founding of a censorship 
committee, which by 1884 gradually brought all kinds of publications, from foreign language newspapers 
to books, under draconian censorship (Koloğlu 1992).177 The freedom of the press was curtailed, and the 
173 Ali Suavi’s populist Muhbir (Reporter 1867–68) appeared in London, Namık Kemal’s more intellectual Hürriyet, 
Freedom, (1868–70) first in London and then in Geneva. The papers were distributed through the foreign postal offices to the 
Ottoman Empire, where they are thought to have had considerable influence.
174 This was due both to economic inexperience of the owners and chief editors and the restrictive practices of the state, 
which closed down papers and exiled some of the more influential journalists to faraway provinces.
175 The most important newspapers of this period were Ali Bey’s moderate Basiret (Consideration 1870–78) and Namık 
Kemal’s radical Young Ottoman İbret (Warning 1872–73).
176 The Young Ottomans regarded European civilization as an innovation created by skill and ingenuity rather than a 
product of socials forces (Karpat 1964, 261). Their idea of parliamentary representation was based on the idea of rational 
democracy, in which the elite would debate the course for the best for the entire social body in an atmosphere of civility and 
order. European egalitarian ideas were strongly opposed. For an excellent account of the thoughts and influence of the Young 
Ottomans see Mardin 1962.
177 According to Ahmet Emin, censorship started only in 1880 with the court proceedings of the ex-Grand Vizier 
Midhat Pasha and even then it was not official, proper censorship (Emin 1914, 64). It is difficult to know whether Emin’s 
understanding attitude towards censorship and other limitations of freedom of expression are typical for the time of writing 
his book (i.e. 1914) or a personal stance. Topuz (2003, 197) states that as late as 1954, Ahmet Emin Yalman was one of the 
defenders of the repressive press legislation. He was to suffer from it personally, as he was sentenced to a fifteen month prison 
term in 1959 at the age of 71. In any case, Emin is much more understanding than later scholars and journalists (See among 
others: Şapolyo 1971; Gevgili 1983; Kabacalı 1990; Koloğlu 1992; Çakır 2002). Emin often lays the blame on the press itself; 
he especially condemns the Young Ottomans, whom he presents as radical troublemakers who upset the balance in the society. 
He also strongly condemns the anarchist freedom of the press at the beginning of the II constitutional period (1908 onwards).
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most progressive-minded journalists were once again exiled to the provinces. Soon the whole press was 
suppressed, including the foreign and minority language publications. This time, European inter-power 
rivalry prevented the European states from interfering. It became impossible to openly discuss politics in 
the press: topics deemed particularly dangerous included liberalism, nationalism, and constitutionalism. 
Sultan Abdülhamit personally urged the censors on, and more and more topics were forbidden from 
public discussion. There were long lists of words not to be used, including such words as ”constitution,””
strike,””anarchism” and even ”Macedonia,” “international” and ”big nose” (Çakır 2002, 58; Topuz 2003, 
56). Without the right to write about current events, the papers filled their pages with encyclopedic 
articles from various fields of science and literature. Still, papers were at times asked to refrain from 
certain literary discussions as well, and some papers were closed down because of misleading spelling 
mistakes. Even the state’s own gazette, Takvim-i Vekayi, was closed for a large part of the time after 1879.
Together with extremely strict censorship, Sultan Abdülhamit II continued and expanded the earlier 
practice of open-handed subsidies to non-political and pro-government publications. For some periods, 
we even know the exact sums paid to various papers (Çakır 2002, 68; Topuz 2003, 59-61). In exchange 
for money, the papers published material given to them by the Palace. Despite the repressive legislation 
and strict censorship, the press flourished: Sultan Abdülhamit II was both an authoritarian ruler who used 
religious rhetoric and a reformist who secularized, modernized and extended the educational system; the 
improved educational standard and increased literacy178 meant more readers for the press; more readers 
also generated more income, making higher professional standards possible.179
The emergence of opposition towards the end of the 19th century caused Abdülhamit’s government 
to adopt policy that was even more oppressive.180 Domestic censorship became extremely strict and no 
new newspapers were granted permission to publish. The Ottoman government had an active policy 
towards publications outside of the empire as well: it undertook measures to prevent the importation of 
both Ottoman language and foreign language newspapers to the empire; it bribed Ottoman writers to 
return to the Empire; it opened court cases against Ottoman Turkish publications abroad, and purchased 
shares in foreign papers. (Çakır 2002.) Despite all of this, some critical periodicals still managed to reach 
younger members of the intelligentsia, bureaucracy and army officers, and are considered to have exerted 
significant influence among the literate population of the Empire. The extremely repressive policies led 
to a decline in the Ottoman press during the early years of the 20th century. In 1908 there existed a total 
of 120 newspapers and periodicals in the whole of the Ottoman Empire (Girgin 2001, 91). Only three 
or four Ottoman language dailies were published in Istanbul, and their total circulation was only slightly 
over 30,000 copies (Emin 1914, 78; Gevgili 1983, 210). The estimated total circulation for other-than-
Ottoman language papers was around 70,000 copies (Karpat 1966, 268). 
178 According to Donald Quataert, “Estimates suggest general Muslim literacy rates equaling about 2-3 percent in the early 
nineteenth century and perhaps 15 percent at its end.” (Quataert 2005[2000], 167). Literacy rates among the Christian and 
Jewish population were probably considerably higher. 
179 The most important papers of Abdülhamit’s period were the Tercüman-i Hakikat (the Interpreter of Truth, 1876) of 
Ahmet Midhat Efendi, also called the “great didactic,” Sabah (Morning, 1876), Ahmet Cevdet’s İkdam (Diligence, 1894), 
Vakit (Time, 1875) and Ahmet İhsan’s (Tokgöz) art and literary journal Servet-i Fünun (Wealth of Knowledge, 1891).
180 İttihat-ı Terakki Cemiyeti (İTC, The Committee of Union and Progress, known as the Young Turks in Europe), a secret 
society aiming to reinstate the constitution and parliament, was founded in Istanbul in 1889. The group was mainly comprised 
of younger bureaucrats, intellectuals and army officers. The Young Turks in exile published several short-lived periodicals in 
England, France and Egypt. The most important ones were: Meşveret (Consultation), Ezan (The Prayer Call), Şûrâ-yı Ümmet 
(Council of the People), Mizan (Balance), Osmanlı (Ottoman) and Terakki (Progress).
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The 19th century newspapers and periodicals had been founded by representatives of the new kind 
of intelligentsia, and the new generation of the bureaucrats educated in the new school system that had 
been reformulated in the Tanzimat.181 These educated individuals knew foreign languages and had been 
influenced by European thought through the new schools and foreign publications. They were, first 
of all, political thinkers, whose main aim was to save the Ottoman Empire from the perceived threats. 
For them journalism was a means to this end, and in their opinion the key to saving the empire was to 
change the system of government from that of a monarchy with absolute powers vested on the ruler to 
some form of representative decision-making. They openly criticized the Tanzimat reformist bureaucrats 
for being subservient to Europe and for preferring superficial western imitation over their own culture. 
They constructed a model that attempted to build a synthesis of Islamic ethic and western material 
development. The traditional Divan-literature (poetry) was not deemed suitable for proliferating new 
ideas, and new tools were utilized: western style poetry, drama, novels and short stories. Newspapers and 
periodicals were seen as tools that were especially suitable for spreading important new thoughts and 
concepts. Concepts like millet (nation) and hürriyet (freedom) were introduced or given new meaning in 
the newspapers. 
The emerging press served several functions. The press was very useful in educating the reading 
audience: the upper echelons of society slowly absorbed some ideas of enlightenment. This was one the 
stated aims of the journalists, who saw themselves as educators of the public and as re-shapers of the 
society, enlighteners of the people. According to Heper and Demirel: “...the elite journalists of the time 
(as well as those of the later periods) took on the role of didactic intermediaries between an idealized 
West and ‘a backward society’.” (Heper and Demirel 1996, 109). At the same time the press functioned 
as a training ground for young intellectuals interested in politics. Quite a few of the most important 
writers and political thinkers of the 19th century initially made their reputations by writing for the 
newspapers.182 The press also prepared the ground for language reform. The young writers wanted to 
overcome the barrier between the ruling elite and the ordinary people, who used practically two different 
languages: written high Ottoman Turkish and spoken common Turkish. Written Ottoman language had 
to be reformed and simplified for the newspapers to be understandable to all groups of the people. 
The rulers of the empire obviously understood the importance of the press and accepted its existence. 
The new newspapers were read, and often appreciated by the ruling elite, to which most of the writers 
also belonged. The new journalists were, however, walking a thin line: new ideas could be introduced and 
theoretic discussions conducted, but anything resembling direct criticism of government policies could 
easily lead to the closing of the paper and exile of the writer. The state’s position towards the journalists 
is hard to gauge in modern terms. On one hand, their publications were closed and their attempts thus 
thwarted, but the journalists themselves were generally not seen as enemies of the state. Instead, journalists 
were often offered state employment, and quite a few of them eventually became state bureaucrats. Often 
the press also fulfilled the function the state had expected of it: it helped to form a counter-voice against 
the hostile foreign or minority language media and responded to any outside criticism with vehement 
counter attacks and heart-felt praise for the Ottoman government and the Ottoman system.
It is somewhat difficult to estimate the actual influence of the press during the 19th century. Writing 
181 Period of Ottoman reform 1839–1876.
182 The most important were: İbrahim Şinasi, Namık Kemal, Ahmet Midhat, and Recaizade Ekrem. An excellent account of 
the early Turkish authors in English is Evin 1983.
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in 1914, Emin thinks the press had a great impact on the society: “The press changed medieval society 
into self-conscious, self-critical and possibly even progressive one” (Emin 1914, 49). Girgin agrees with 
him, for the first papers started to change the dynamics of the Ottoman society by advocating such ideas 
as the need for change, secularism, Europe-centered world-view and simplification of language (Girgin 
2001, 25-29). Yet, one should also keep in mind the very low literacy rates in the Ottoman Empire of the 
time: not many besides the government bureaucrats could read.
5.1.3 intense debates fRom the ii constitutional peRiod to the 
WaR of independence
The authoritarianism of Sultan Abdülhamit II ended with the Young Turk coup of 1908. On the 23rd 
of July the Sultan was forced to re-proclaim the 1876 constitution and announce the coming of general 
elections, which started the II Constitutional Period of the Ottoman Empire. Since Abdülhamit II still 
controlled the press, the initial news went almost unnoticed, with only a small unobtrusive announcement 
of the upcoming elections. But, the press became quick to seize the moment. The next day they didn’t 
send copies to the censors, refused to let the censors in their premises (Girgin 2001, 95), announced 
the news of a new constitution as a message of freedom and joy, and started publishing articles by well-
known, previously banned authors. The combined circulation of the more popular papers soon rouse 
to over 100,000 copies and even those were not enough to meet the demand. Writing in 1914, Emin 
describes the excitement in Istanbul: “The sleeping city became at once ablaze with excitement and 
enthusiasm. The streets, where people did not usually even feel free to walk fast, lest they attract the 
attention of spies, were filled with noisy crowds, listening joyfully to revolutionary speeches or making 
demonstrations before public buildings, newspaper offices, and foreign embassies.” (Emin 1914, 87) The 
climate was one of vague but general expectation that things would now change for the better.
The first phase of the so-called Young Turk period passed in an atmosphere of freedom of thought, 
expression, and association. The long silenced public discussion on politics and social issues revived, the 
number of publications exploded (Emin 1914, 88; Koloğlu 1992; Zürcher 1993, 132), and circulations 
grew. The press also became profoundly political. Once again, one of the main topics of public discussion 
was reform of the state. It had become painfully obvious that the state and society had to be restructured, 
and the direction of the reform was debated in the press. The debates were once again quite state-
centered, as the state was seen as the main instrument of change. The heated debates of this period are 
often presented as a three-pronged argument: various strands of Ottomanism, (pan-)Islamism and (pan-)
Turkism or Turkish nationalism.183 The central question of the debate was the one to which the renowned 
19th century Ottoman intellectual Namık Kemal had already tried to answer: How to build a synthesis 
of European and Ottoman civilizations? How to become modern while staying oneself? (Zürcher 1993, 
132.) 
With no legal restrictions (that would have been observed) and no experience of freedom, the debates 
were vehement. Soon the press was divided into two camps: supporters and opponents of the ruling İTC 
(İttihat-ı Terakki Cemiyeti = Committee for Union and Progress). Each political party or group found 
183 This is a very rough simplification of multi-voiced debates that had their roots in the 1860s.
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its own publication, and the first explicitly Islamist, Kurdish, and leftist publications appeared.184 After a 
failed coup attempt in April 1909, the İTC put an end to this short period of anarchistic freedom. Most 
newspapers and periodicals of the opposing camp were banned and their employees exiled. A new press 
law was passed in July 1909 as a part of larger reform package drafted to consolidate the constitutional 
and parliamentarian system and to strengthen the central authority. Modern scholars consider this law 
adopted from France rather liberal, but the press of the time did not approve of it. In line with the 
more authoritarian policies, the freedom of the press was gradually curtailed with new legislation passed 
between 1909 and 1914. Official censorship on military matters was enforced during the Balkan wars 
(1912–13); publications that criticized the government were banned; and several well-known journalists 
were murdered by “unknown” assailants between the years 1909 and 1911. The number of newspapers 
in Istanbul declined. Again, some opponents went into self-exile and published their papers from abroad. 
Other papers opted for a new tactic: after each ban they would continue publishing by nominally 
changing their editor-in-chief and by slightly modifying the name of their paper Emin 1914).185 
Despite the continuing restrictions on freedom of expression, the quality of the newspapers actually 
improved significantly during the II constitutional period. Newspapers began to feature drawings, 
caricatures and maps to enliven the articles. The editorial was considered to be the most important part 
of the paper, followed by political news, and then news from the provinces and abroad. Letters from 
readers followed these, then news on cultural events and news on small incidents and advertisements. 
Usually each page had only one headline, and the whole front-page was reserved for the so-called hard 
news. Human-interest stories and stories of crimes were hidden deeper in the paper. Standard news 
articles included a commentary or an opinion on the topic. In 1911 the first news agency was opened in 
the empire. 
After the Ottoman Empire joined the First World War on the German side in 1914, the state 
re-adopted censorship and widened the scope from military matters to political affairs as well. The 
World War at the same time alleviated the importance of the press as a channel of information and 
imposed severe limitations on it. Censorship ensured that the press coverage corresponded to the official 
statements and policies of the state. Several newspapers were either closed down by the state, or had to 
cease publication due to paper shortages and other emergency measures. The stout supporters of the 
İTC were the only ones to survive.186 During the Young Turk period the Turkish press gradually became 
a mass medium, and started to reach the lower urban groups as well. Improved literacy rates served to 
dramatically increase the circulation of newspapers and periodicals. Both the political debates of 1908–9 
and the need to create a home front during WWI facilitated the emergence of mass media.
During the years of armistice (1918–1919) and the War of Independence (1919–1922), the Turkish 
press was divided into a liberal Istanbul press and a nationalist Anatolian press.187 Initially, most of the 
liberal press supported the sultan and the Istanbul government, while all of the Anatolian newspapers 
184 The most important newspapers of the time were the older Tercüman-i Hakikat, Sabah and İkdam, and the newly founded 
Yeni Gazete (New Gazette), Tanin (Roar, 1908) and Mizan (Balance). An important periodical was Yeni Mecmua (The new 
magazine) edited by the influential political thinker Ziya Gökalp and financed by the İTC.
185 Both the phenomenon of unsolved murders and the tactics to counter state pressure by constant name changes also 
became typical of the pro-Kurdish papers of the 1990’s.
186 I.e. Tanin, İkdam, Sabah and Tasvir-i Efkâr (Koloğlu 1992, 60).
187 I have chosen to use the conventional label “nationalist Anatolian press” for the Anatolian-based newspapers of the time, 
while I also acknowledge that the Anatolian independence movement was not unanimously and simply nationalist.
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supported the emerging independence movement led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha from 1919 onwards.188 
The press was of special importance for the independence movement because it needed to mobilize the 
war-weary population of Anatolia, which was no easy task, for the Ottoman Empire had been at war for 
almost ten years and had suffered an immense number of human casualties. Newspapers İrade-i Milliye 
(Will of the People/Nation, 1919) and Hakimiyet-i Milliye (Sovereignty of the People/Nation, 1920) 
were founded to spread the propaganda of the independence movement and to inform the population 
about the events taking place in Anatolia. 189
During the struggle for independence the press in Anatolia was allowed to function freely without 
official censorship, as long as the newspapers expressed support for the struggle for independence. Yust 
(1995) lists a total of 61 newspapers or periodicals that appeared in Anatolia between 1918 and 1922. The 
extent of the freedom of press is highlighted by the fact that among these were a communist or Islamist-
Bolshevist paper190 and a Pan-Islamist or Islamist paper.191 Şapolyo (1971), a journalist who began his 
career in journalism as a reporter in Ankara during the War of Independence, gives a lively account of the 
difficulties faced by the press during the war. Being a journalist meant hard work under hard conditions 
for minimal pay. The newspapers were printed with manual printing presses, some almost a century old. 
The antiquity of the equipment could at times be an advantage as printing could continue even during 
the frequent electricity cut-offs. Şapolyo (Ibid.) describes the journalist supporters of the independence 
movement as committed, idealistic, and enthusiastic. A new generation of journalists emerged during 
the War of Independence; they were to prove vital for the formation of the new republic and to put their 
imprint on the Turkish the press well until the sixties.192 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha, hailed as the founding father of the Republic of Turkey, saw the relation 
between the press and the state as a very close one. On his initiative, a news agency called the Anatolian 
Agency (Anadolu Ajansı) and the Directorate General of Press and Information (Matbuat ve İstihbarat 
Genel Müdürlüğü) were founded as early as 1920, several years before the founding of the Turkish 
Republic itself. In the preamble to the declaration of the directorate, Mustafa Kemal described one of the 
functions of the press as: ”to produce a union of ideas and spirits as the modern time dictates” (BYEGM 
2004). 
The situation in Istanbul was quite different from the relative freedom of Anatolia. The papers 
functioned under censorship and other restrictions and it was very difficult to obtain any information on 
the events taking place in Anatolia (Topuz 2003, 140). The Istanbul papers themselves were divided in 
their opinions. Some papers such as Peyam-ı Sabah, Alemdar (Standard-bearer) and Istanbul supported 
the Sultan and virtually waged war against the independence movement. Yet, there were also Islamic 
newspapers and a growing group of supporters of the movement in Anatolia, and these managed to 
188 According to Koloğlu the resistance against the independence movement led by Mustafa Kemal was mainly due to the 
strong presence of the previous Unionists (Committee of Union and Progress) forces in their camp (Koloğlu 2006, 116).
189 The most important newspaper supporting the movement was Yunus Nadi’s (Anadolu’da) Yeni Gün (The New Day (in 
Anatolia) (Şapolyo 1971).
190 Arif Oruç’s Seyyare-i Yeni Dünya (The Herald of a New World) and Tan (Dawn)
191 Sebil-ür Reşad and Anadolu’da/Ankara’da Peyam-ı Sabah (The Anatolian/Ankara Morning Press), which adopted the same 
name as the ardent opponent of the Nationalist Movement in Istanbul as a ploy to increase circulation (Yust 1995, 99).
192 Among this group were Yunus Nadi (Abalıoğlu), Necmettin Sadık (Sadak), Falih Rıfkı (Atay), Ali Naci (Karacan), Kazım 
Şinası (Dersan), Ahmet Emin (Yalman), Mehmet Asım (Us), Celal Nuri and Suphi Nuri (İleri), Yakup Kadri (Karaosmanoğlu), 
Hüseyin Cahit (Yalçın), Halide Edip (Adıvar), and Peyami Safa (Gevgili 1983, 211). 
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sent information, money, and arms to Anatolia.193 The end of the war saw the closing of those Istanbul 
based newspapers that had been most aggressively opposed to the independence movement, and their 
journalists and editors were exiled. The chief editor of Peyam-ı Sabah was arrested in Istanbul and lynched 
by a mob on the way to Ankara. Still, the press remained somewhat divided in the yearly years of the new 
Republic: Anatolian based newspapers were loyal supporters of the new Ankara government, whereas 
most of the Istanbul newspapers maintained a more critical stance and thus had strained relations with 
the new leaders of the country.194
5.2 the neW Republic: pRess as a tool foR kemalist pRopaganda
The Press is the common voice of a nation. (a quote attributed to Atatürk, both in BYEGM
and on the www-pages by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism) 
Jan Erik Zürcher divides the time of the one-party system from 1923 to 1945 into two periods: the formative 
phase from 1923 to 1926 and the heyday of the Kemalist one-party system from 1927 to 1945 (Zürcher 
1993, 5, 184). The first phase started with the victory of the independence movement against Greece and 
continued with an internal power struggle, from which Mustafa Kemal Pasha emerged as the victor. During 
the first years of the new republic, when Mustafa Kemal and his party CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, 
Republican People’s Party) had not yet consolidated their hold over the state, the press was relatively free. 
Mustafa Kemal Pasha needed the press to propagate the ambitious reform program he was about to embark 
upon. Thus, two press congresses were arranged between him and the prestigious members of the moderate 
Istanbul press in 1923 and 1924. At these meetings Mustafa Kemal emphasized the difficult situations the 
government was facing and urged the press to act in accordance with the Ankara government. Despite the 
good will and mutual understanding displayed during these congresses, the relationship between the state 
and the press remained strained and the press continued its criticism of the new regime and its policies.195 
In consecutive stages the ruling party crushed all political opposition and established state control 
over the Turkish society at large, including the press. The years between 1927 and 1945 were then 
years defined by the complete control of the party that was submerged into the state. The press and the 
educational institutions became tools used to spread the Kemalist message. The first signs of restrictive 
193 These included: İleri (Progress), İkdam, the liberal Vakit, the nationalist Tevhid-i Efkâr (Union of Opinion) and Akşam 
(Evening). 
194 The most influential newspapers of the early republic were: İkdam, Vakit (1918), Sabah, İleri (1919), Tasvir-i Efkâr/
Tevhid-i Efkâr (reopened in 1908), Tanin (1908) and Akşam (1918). They had either supported the Nationalists during the 
war of independence or had remained neutral. Only the newly opened Vatan (The Homeland 1922) was opposed to the 
government.
195 Some historians of the Turkish press put the blame for the state’s subsequent restrictive policies squarely on the press. 
For example, İnuğur describes the relations thusly: “If this peaceful atmosphere of Izmir [congress] had continued in the days 
to follow, it might have ensured conditions suitable for the country to move on to a multi-party system. However, since the 
friendly atmosphere between the Istanbul press and the Ankara government did not last long, the freedom of the press was 
at times restricted (İnuğur 1992, 50). Topuz, however, does not see the restrictive atmosphere as being dependent on the 
actions of the press: “In order to realize the reforms, it was not necessary to create an atmosphere of terror with the Law for the 
Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu) and to close newspapers and to take to court the journalists alongside with 
the rebels in the Independence Tribunals (İstiklâl Mahkemeleri) (Topuz 2003, 154).
118
policy had come earlier in 1923, when three newspapers196 published articles propagating first the 
keeping and then the restoration of the caliphate. These papers were sued and tried for treason in special 
Independence Tribunals (İstiklal Mahkemeleri), but the trials ended with acquittals of the journalists and 
owners. In 1925, the ruling party CHP used the Sheikh Said uprising in southeastern Anatolia to suppress 
all opposition to its power. A state of emergency was declared in the eastern part of the country and the 
parliament passed the Law on the Maintenance of Order (Takrir-i Sükûn Kanunu), which empowered 
the government to ban any organization or publication anywhere in the country it considered as causing 
disturbances to law and order (Zürcher 1993, 179). The fledgling opposition party Terakki Perver 
Cumhuriyet Fırkası (Progressive Republican Party) was closed, as well as the most important newspapers 
and periodicals.197 The leading journalists of Istanbul were arrested and brought before the Independence 
Tribunals, but these resulted in the actual sentencing of only the leftist journalists. Only two national 
newspapers managed to remain in operation after all of these events: the staunch supporters of the 
government, Hakimiyet-i Milliye in Ankara and Cumhuriyet198 (Republic) in Istanbul. Under the Takrir-i 
Sükûn Kanunu, the budding civil society was crushed, including the left as well as the conservative and 
Islamic elements. The law remained in effect until 1929. Kocabaşoğlu (1984) terms the period from 1925 
to 1931 as “the period of storytelling.” In his view the press was forced to resort to the printing of tales 
and storytelling since it was denied the possibility of discussing politics or of publishing real news. Topuz 
calls the time an era of silence (Topuz 2003, 154). In 1931 the first press law of the republic was passed. 
It explicitly forbade expressions of support for the caliphate, sultanate, anarchism or communism, and 
gave the government the power to close down any publication that published anything contrary to the 
“best interests of the country” (Gevgili 1983, 214). 
Another crucial development for the press in the early years of the republic was the change of 
the alphabet from Arabic to Latin in 1928. For the press, the effect was devastating in the short run. 
It rendered the entire reading audience illiterate199 with one stroke and the circulation of the papers 
plummeted from an estimated total of 45,000 copies to fewer than 20,000 (Özükan 1983, 231). The 
state compensated for the losses by giving direct financial support to the papers for three years, which 
made the press even more dependent on the state and the ruling party. In the long run, the Kemalist 
emphasis on literacy and education benefited the press as increased levels of literacy during the early 
Republican period increased the number of potential readers.
During and after the War of Independence the press had turned from multilingual to Turkish-
language only, and during the first years of the Republic it changed from a multi-voiced representative 
of various ideas and societal groups to a unified supporter and propagator of the Kemalist ideology. 
Nevertheless, the party leaders remained deeply mistrustful of the press. The hardliner Recep Peker went 
so far as to call Istanbul newspapers ”nests of poisonous snakes” (quoted in Topuz 2003, 147). In the 
opinion of the hardliners, it was the duty of the press to explain and propagate the Kemalist reforms 
196 Tanin, İkdam and Tevhid-i Efkâr
197 Among these were: Tanin, İleri, Son Telegraf (Last Telegraph), Istikbâl (Future), Vatan, Millet (Nation) and Yeni Alem 
(New World). Quite a few magazines and provincial papers were also closed (Kocabaşoğlu 1984; Gevgili 1983, 212).
198 The Kemalist-statist Cumhuriyet is still being published, and is one of the newspapers analyzed in this study. For a concise 
history of Cumhuriyet, see Kaya 2010.
199 The estimations of the literacy rate at the time are between 10 percent (for example, Koloğlu 2006, 119) and 15 percent 
(Quataert 2005[2000], 167, for the end of the 19th century).
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for the people (Kocabaşoğlu 1984). But even those papers supportive of the government were closely 
monitored and Yunus Nadi’s Cumhuriyet, which was generally considered to be the voice of the CHP, 
was closed down on three different occasions (1934, 1940 and 1941) for criticizing the government. A 
religiously oriented press was not tolerated at all and the leftist papers were under tight control.200 
At the same time the country was said to have enjoyed complete freedom of expression, at least in 
the rhetoric of the CHP:
The press of Turkey is not under any limitations except some laws pertaining to the defense of certain 
reforms. We know that many western colleagues envy our freedom of press. The leaders of the republic 
have left the task of controlling the faults of the press to the press itself. Any writer can read the laws 
and adjust his writing to them with ease. (quoted in İnuğur 1992, 161, also Topuz 2003, 162). 
At times mild criticism was allowed, but there were no guarantees of this. Each successive minister of 
interior defined the limits of freedom according to his own understanding.
In 1935, 38 dailies, 78 less frequent newspapers, and 127 magazines were being published in 
Turkey (Şapolyo 1971, 237). The newspapers had very low circulations. It has been estimated that the 
combined circulation of all the national newspapers at the end of the 1930’s and the beginning of the 
1940’s was around 60,000 to 65,000 copies, i.e. fewer than four newspapers per 1000 persons (Özükan 
1983, 31; Koloğlu 2006, 125). Despite the rapid spread of literacy, the national newspapers were read 
almost exclusively by the intelligentsia and the bureaucrats, which did not form a sufficient base for a 
financially independent press. Additionally, the papers were plagued by constant lack of news print and 
journalism as work was both undervalued and underpaid. An important development was the beginning 
of the state radio broadcasts in 1938, which was seen by the state elites as the most powerful channel of 
indoctrination and education of the public. Both the news and entertainment programs were greeted 
with interest and widely followed, but the number of radio sets remained limited; as late as 1942 there 
were only 4.1 radio receivers per thousand inhabitants (Karpat 1964, 275).
The control of the press was tightened even further with the mounting international tension prior to 
the Second World War. During the summer of 1938, the press law was changed and became even more 
oppressive, and the press was placed under very strict control. With the Emergency Rule of 1940, the 
government was granted total powers over the press. It had the right to close publications indefinitely 
with a single phone call. During the war years newspapers were given detailed instructions concerning 
the contents of the news.201 
200 Exceptional for the period was the journal Yarın (Tomorrow, 1929–1930) of Mustafa Kemal’s friend Arif Oruç. Yarın 
was able to voice moderate criticism against the government and also managed to reach a circulation of 50,000 copies at its 
best. At the end, the magazine was closed down due to CHP parliamentarians’ demands, and Arif Oruç had to leave the 
country. Another important journal was Kadro (Cadre, 1932–1934). According to Gevgili, Kadro attempted to construct a 
unified ideology and worldview for the Kemalist movement (Gevgili 1983, 216). In Kadro different writers debated important 
issues such as the relationship of the state and the civil society, statism, and society. At times, the journal published opinions 
diverging from the official policy. Kadro was closed down in 1934 and the owner Yakup Kadri Karaosmanoğlu was sent 
abroad. The reasons for the banning of Kadro might be more complicated than the government’s intolerance of criticism. 
According to Heper, Atatürk himself wanted the paper closed because he did not want his current of thoughts to be codified 
into a dogma (Heper 1985).
201 The most important papers of the period were Cumhuriyet, Akşam, Tan, Vatan, Yeni Sabah (New Morning, founded 
1938), Tanin (closed down in 1947), Vakit, Son Posta (Latest Post), Ulus (Nation) and Tasvir-i Efkâr.
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The press of the one-party period was undoubtedly suppressed. The state elite saw the press first and 
foremost as a propagator of the Kemalist reforms and a defender of national interests as defined by the 
state elites (Işık 2002, 139-140). This view did not leave room for an independent critical press and all 
criticism was seen as negative, as something inspired by hostile outside powers and conducted by vatan 
haini (enemy of the nation), an accusation that quite a few journalists had to answer to during the early 
years of the republic. In the minds of the party elites, the press had to be taken under government control 
via restrictive legislation and financial incentives. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that a large 
share of the owners, journalists and editors were voluntary and ardent supporters of the one party system 
and the Kemalist developmentalist reforms (Heper & Demirel 1996, 110; Zürcher 1993, 189; Koloğlu 
1992). Journalists and intelligentsia at-large joined state bureaucrats in the formation of the reformist 
elite, the “center.” For many journalists Kemalism was a great source of inspiration. The majority of the 
media owners were members of the party, and forty journalists moved on to become parliamentarians 
between 1919 and 1938 (Kocabaşoğlu 1984). 
5.3 the pRess duRing tRoubled democRacy
After the Second World War, Turkey joined the Western camp and was expected to democratize its 
political system. The first steps towards a multi-party political system were taken in 1945, when four 
influential members of the Kemalist party CHP were ousted from the party for publishing critical articles 
in the newspapers Tan and Vatan. Under the leadership of Celal Bayar and Adnan Menderes this group of 
four founded their own party, the Demokrat Parti, DP (The Democrat Party). This new party managed 
to win 62 seats in the first heavily trigged multi-party parliamentary elections of 1946. Even though the 
journalists and owners of the press were still ideologically and emotionally committed to the principles 
of Kemalism, over time they had grown tired of the stifled system under the one-party rule, and a great 
majority of the press joined the supporters of the new party. 
The beginning of the multi-party period resembles the beginning of the II Constitutional Period 
in 1908: numerous new publications were started, and the press grew increasingly self-assured; it voiced 
criticism of the government and Turkish conditions and demanded greater freedom. Despite the still 
rather restrictive legislation, groups within different ideological currents were able to publish their own 
newspapers or periodicals and political debate was lively. However, the mainstream press still remained 
financially dependent of the state, for it was the state that still subsidized the purchasing of paper and 
formed the major source of advertisement income.202 The landslide victory of the DP in the 1950 elections 
strengthened the liberalization that had already begun under the CHP after the elections of 1946. The 
new press law of 1950 (in force until 2004) was a liberal one. It lifted most of the restrictions limiting the 
freedom of the press, including the right of the government to close newspapers without a court order. In 
1952 the social and professional security of the journalists vis-à-vis the owners was improved. 
The early 1950s were a golden period for the press. It was on good terms with the new government 
and had almost total freedom of action. There were no court cases and no arrested journalists (Topuz 
2003, 193). Gavin D. Brockett, who has investigated the debates on national Muslim identity in the 
202 In 1969 the state was still responsible for 56% of all advertisement income of the press (Koloğlu 2006, 195).
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religious provincial press, has argued that a countrywide national print culture emerged for the first 
time in Turkey in late 1940s and early 1950s as a consequence of the rapid expansion of print media in 
combination with infrastructural modernization (Brockett 2011, 84). The number of printing houses 
increased, as did the numbers of newspapers and journals, and they were able to reach a wider audience 
than previously. In the early 1950s, the print media became an increasingly common feature of public 
life, not only in metropolitan centers but in almost every province (Ibid. 88).
In 1948, a veteran journalist named Sedat Simavi founded a new newspaper named Hürriyet 
(Freedom). It was the first true mass newspapers in Turkey and had a revolutionary influence on the 
press of the time (Şapolyo 1971, 242; İnuğur 1992, 231-232). Typical for Hürriyet were short articles 
written with simple language that targeted a wide audience and made politics and political participating 
known and understandable for the masses. Hürriyet had many photographs and advertisements, and 
reported widely on scandals and such. In a few years Hürriyet became the highest circulation daily in 
Turkey selling 200,000 copies daily. By 1969 Hürriyet sold a million copies a day. Because of Hürriyet’s 
success, the other newspapers had to change their policies and reporting-style to continue in existence 
(Koloğlu 1992). One of the papers analyzed in this study, Milliyet (Nation) was founded in the footsteps 
of Hürriyet in 1950 by another long time journalist, Ali Naci Karacan. 
An important change in the newspapers of the 1940’s and 1950’s was the increased emphasis placed 
on news reporting, to the expense of editorials. Politics came to assume the central place within news 
topics, while the economy still received rather scant attention (Koloğlu 1992 and 2006). During this 
period, the newspapers started to publish more so-called magazine type articles and to have separate sport 
sections. Moreover, under the DP rule it became possible once again to publish articles about Islam. 
Another important development in the 1950’s was the increased political independence of the press. 
Important newspapers did not ally themselves with a specific party. According to Kemal Karpat, the 
circulation of a paper actually suffered if it was thought to support a certain party (Karpat 1964, 280). 
Koloğlu agrees and claims that the idea of the press being constantly in the opposition in order to increase 
the circulation was born in the fifties (Koloğlu 1992, 71). 
In general, the development of the press was impressive. Printing techniques improved and 
newspapers started to use more photographs. Distribution networks developed together with a widening 
network of hard surface highways: whereas before 1946 readers outside of Istanbul had to wait for their 
paper from one day to a full week depending on where they lived, by the late fifties a majority of the 
readers was accustomed to getting its newspaper in the morning. The first chair of journalism studies was 
established in 1950, and the media became a seriously taken branch of production (Koloğlu 2006). Daily 
circulation grew fast, from an estimated 150,000 copies in 1949 to 500,000 copies in 1955 (Özükan 
1983, 231). Along with technical development and improved infrastructure, Koloğlu attributes this to 
the change in the newspapers themselves: instead of acting as the voice of the governing elite towards 
the people, they started to also function as a voice of the people towards the government (Koloğlu 
1992, 2006). An essential factor was the increased coverage of important social issues. As a result, the 
newspapers became more interesting for the audience. The daily circulation of the biggest newspapers 
Hürriyet, Yeni Sabah and Milliyet grew to a steady 100,000 plus each.203
203 Other important newspapers of the period were Vatan, Cumhuriyet, Akşam, Yeni Istanbul, Dünya, Istanbul Ekspres, Ulus, 
Zafer (Victory) and Son Havadis (Latest Tidings), Dünya (the World, founded in 1952) and Tercüman (the Interpreter, 
founded in 1950).
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After the promising start, it soon became obvious that the DP was not committed to political 
liberalization in the long run. Orhan Koloğlu summarizes the attitude of the DP: liberalizing when in 
opposition, repressive when in power (Koloğlu 2006, 121).204 The first signs of trouble appeared in 
1951, when the government curbed the activities of the leftist groups. In 1953, the DP made a number 
of amendments increasing government control over the universities and the press. In 1954, right before 
the parliamentary elections, the press law was tightened again, and the government control over the 
bureaucracy was extended. Around the middle of the decade the intelligentsia, journalists among them, 
started to turn against the DP. One reason behind this was the heavy inflation, which was having dire effects 
on salaried workers. It became obvious that the DP could not keep its promises of economic affluence, and 
with criticism mounting in the press, neither was it willing to keep its promises of political liberalization. 
In 1955 demonstrations against Greece turned into riots and led to a state of emergency.205 Under the state 
of emergency the government gave detailed instructions to the press concerning what they were allowed 
to, and what they were not allowed to, publish. Closing down newspapers became once again a part of 
everyday life, and legislation related to the press was gradually tightened. The DP carried on the tradition of 
distributing official government announcements to its supporters. This practice made cooperation with the 
party very lucrative and led to the creation of the so-called besleme basın (= fostered press).
At the end of the decade the number of court cases against publications and journalists multiplied. 
Topuz describes the situation thusly: ”Those responsible for the newspapers Zaman, Ulus, Yeni Gün, 
Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Dünya (World), Vatan, Tercüman (Interpreter) moved to the courts a few days every 
week” (Topuz 2003, 204).206 There was no preventive censorship, but the prosecutors forbade reporting 
on an ever-growing range of topics. The state-controlled radio churned out such crude propaganda that 
people formed clubs for those “not listening to the radio.” This use of radio for blatant government 
propaganda increased the importance of an independent press, and this time silencing the press was not 
possible. The newspapers continued reporting despite the mounting pressure, and dissident voices made 
themselves heard.
On May the 27th of 1960, a group of younger Army officers y led a coup d’état with the applause 
and approval of the intelligentsia and the students, among whom the DP had been very unpopular. 
Representatives of the army came to power in the form of the Millî Birlik Komitesi, MBK (National 
Unity Committee). The aim of the coup was to remove the more and more authoritarian DP from the 
helm and to guarantee wider civic rights and a freer society. The restrictive legislation adopted under 
the DP was annulled and the limitations for the freedom of expression were lifted. An independent 
state organization, Basın İlân Kurumu (Press Advertisement Institution), was founded to monitor the 
distribution of the state’s official announcements to different papers. The aim of this organization was to 
support the private press in an equal way and to prevent financial control exerted by the state over the 
press. The organization functioned well and reached its aims overcoming the initial apprehension and 
opposition of the media owners. 
204 Koloğlu goes on to criticize the CHP, the DP and the press on their concentration on narrow political issues only. The 
continuation of the state-centric economic policies went on despite the liberalizing rhetoric, and this went virtually unnoticed 
as the press did not devote space to economic issues. (Koloğlu 2006, 128-130.)
205 See chapter three.
206 Topuz gives the following figures for 1954 –1958: court cases were opened against 1,611 journalists with 238 of 
these ending with conviction (Topuz 2003, 205). Koloğlu cites the figures for 1955–1960: a total of 2,300 cases with 867 
convictions (Koloğlu 2006, 124). 
123
The liberal constitution of 1961 was drafted by a group of university professors under the MBK. 
The constitution guaranteed autonomy to the universities and the state radio and television corporation 
TRT (Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu). One of the aims of the new constitution was to explicitly 
guarantee the freedom of expression. The earlier constitutions had stated only that “the press is free 
within the limits of legislation,” which did not prevent drafting extremely restrictive legislation. This time 
the authors of the constitution wanted to ensure that even a majority in the parliament would not make 
it possible to limit the freedom of expression and thus wrote the guarantees explicitly to the constitution: 
“the press is free and cannot be censored,” “publishing [about a topic] cannot be forbidden,” “newspapers 
or periodicals cannot be confiscated,” “newspapers or periodicals cannot be closed” (article 22, Topuz 
2003, 234).
Nuri İnuğur, a well-known historian of the Turkish press sees the early 1960s press as being very 
free and liberal (İnuğur 1992, 409). As was described in chapter three, the sixties were a decade of 
lively political debate in Turkey. Countless new periodicals that represented different ideologies and 
currents of political thought were founded. This time, leftist and moderate pro-Islamist papers were 
also tolerated.207 However, Hıfzı Topuz (2003, 233-239), another well-known historian of the press, also 
criticizes the situation of the 1960’s: many of the earlier restrictive laws remained in force despite the 
liberal constitution of 1961, but in the atmosphere of liberty they were not enforced, mainly because the 
ruling AP (Adalet Partisi, Justice Party, heir to the closed DP) had learned from the mistakes of the DP 
and avoided direct confrontation. So, the press was free, and all possible topics could be openly debated, 
but a great share of the freedom was based on good will and the general climate. The freedom was not 
guaranteed in the press legislation and would not last.
The freedom in the sixties had a positive effect on the quality and content of the newspapers. The 
combination of social mobility, rising political consciousness, improved technology and the expansion of 
the distribution networks served to raise the circulation of newspapers and opinion-oriented publications 
greatly (Koloğlu 1992).208 The artificially low price of newspapers contributed towards the rise in 
circulations. The sale prices covered only about one quarter of the total expenses (Koloğlu 1992). The 
rest had to be covered with advertisements and the still continuing practice of state subventions. Towards 
the end of the decade the dailies started once more to put emphasis on the editorials and commentaries. 
Other positive developments included the improved education of journalists and the founding of the 
Institute of Higher Education for Press and Publication inside the Faculty of Social Sciences of Ankara 
University in 1965. 
The end of sixties was a difficult period in Turkey with economic instability, high inflation, growing 
social inequality, student unrest, and street violence. In 1971, the high commanders of the army decided 
to interfere. They issued an ultimatum demanding the restoration of order and the continuation of the 
Kemalist reforms (labeled by commentators “a coup by memorandum”). Because the government was not 
able to stop the violence, a state of emergency was declared in twelve provinces, including Istanbul. The 
army used the situation to crush the leftist movement; leftist organizations were shut and their members, 
including many journalists, were arrested or imprisoned, and there were widespread rumors of torture. 
207 Some of the important leftist papers of the time were: Yön (Direction), Devrim (Revolution), Türk Solu (The Turkish 
Left) and And (Vow).
208 Circulations of newspapers: neutral: Hürriyet 600,000, Günaydın 350,000 and Milliyet 200,000, politically committed: 
Cumhuriyet and Akşam 150,000 each, and the conservative Tercüman 300,000.
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The right wing groups were mostly left alone. The liberal constitution of 1961 was changed so that 
universities, television and radio lost their independent status and the freedom of the press was restricted 
in the matters concerning among other things “the protection of the unified state and people,” “social 
order” and “national security” (Girgin 2001, 135; Zürcher 1993, 273). Several publications, including 
the prestigious (Kemalist) Cumhuriyet, which had moved towards the left together with the CHP of the 
1960s, were temporarily closed.
The 1970’s were a difficult decade for the Turkish press in more than one way. One of the most 
important sources of concern was the emergence of television. During the 1970’s the state owned TRT 
extended its broadcasts to cover the whole country. The advent of television interrupted the promising 
rise in the number of newspaper readers. The number of people regularly reading newspapers was still 
very low in 1975, only 40 copies were sold per 1,000 persons, but circulation figures had been rapidly 
growing since the beginning of the 1950’s (Özükan 1983, 231). The advent of television had also another 
adverse effect on the income of the press as almost half of the state advertisements and announcements 
were given to television. The small publications suffered the most; the larger ones fared better because 
they were able to benefit from the new technological innovations such as offset-printing presses. The 
purchase of these new and expensive printing presses in the 1970s can be seen as the starting point for 
centralization of ownership, a development that was to reach its peak in the 1990’s. It was sensible to 
own more than one publication, which could then be printed in the expensive printing press. (Koloğlu 
2006, 133-6.)
The number of newspapers decreased during the seventies, whereas the number of weekly and 
monthly magazines increased rapidly. As the size of the reading audience did not significantly increase 
during the period, intensive competition ensued. In order to be more competitive against the new 
magazines, the newspapers added more pages, colors, pictures, various extras and additional parts, and 
concentrated more on light and entertaining topics such as fashion. The custom of lotteries and small 
gifts to the readers in order to increase sales spread to the serious newspapers from tabloids. Yet, the 
numbers of readers did not grow, and the papers continued efforts to attract readers from each other. As 
a result even some of the well-established old newspapers went bankrupt. 
The troubled 1970’s in Turkey included an unstable political situation with weak coalition governments 
with the two major parties, the CHP and the AP unable to cooperate with each other, a mounting economic 
crisis, and escalating street violence. Koloğlu (1992) holds the press at least partly responsible for the chaotic 
situation. In his opinion the press constantly attacked the politicians and blamed them for all the difficulties 
facing Turkey. Even the neutral newspapers took sides and published news that supported one party over 
another, joined arguments between different politicians, feasted on their sex scandals, and did their best 
to break the trust on the political system (Ibid.). Topuz (2003) takes a somewhat different perspective to 
the 1970’s in his book. According to him, the problem in the 1970’s was not one that was based on the 
relations of the press and the state: the politicians had learned a bitter lesson from the military take-over 
and did their best to avoid confrontation with the press. In his opinion, the problem was the terrorists, the 
“underground forces” who attacked journalists and other intellectuals. The 1970s were also a decade of 
small circulation or marginal radical ideologically and politically committed periodicals. One reason behind 
this was the fragmentation of the left. The leftist organizations alone had around 80 periodicals and the 
ultra right groups were responsible for almost 40 more (Koloğlu 1992). 
The highest circulation papers at the end of the seventies were Hürriyet, Günaydın (Good Morning, 
1968), Milliyet and the first real representative of the yellow press, Tercüman. By 1980, only Cumhuriyet 
remained from the newspapers established by the founding generation of the republic.
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5.4 RepRession and suppoRt: the pRess afteR the 1980 coup d’état
The effects on the press of the coup d’état of September the 12th in 1980 and the consequent three year 
military rule should be considered from two different perspectives. First of all, the new liberalizing 
export-oriented economic program enforced after the coup reshaped the Turkish economy, which also 
affected the media as an industry. Second, restrictive legislation and severe limitations on the freedom 
of expression were introduced during the military junta’s rule, and these shaped the context of news 
reporting. 
Press historian Orhan Koloğlu (1992) has argued that the impact of the new liberalizing economic 
program called İstikrar Kararları (stabilizing measures) that had been adopted prior to the coup in 
January was in some ways more significant than the actual coup itself. The IMF (International Monetary 
Fund) dictated a new program that aimed to stabilize Turkey’s shaky economy through privatization 
and liberalization of the still state-led economy. In exchange, the IMF would then provide the state with 
much needed capital from abroad (Ibid). 
During the military junta and Turgut Özal’s (prime minister 1983–1989 and president of the 
Republic 1989–1993) governments, Turkey adhered to the IMF recommended liberalizing economic 
policy. The stated aim was a fundamental transformation of the structure of the economy, removal of 
the dominance of the state in key industries and in banking; and removal of its influence in pricing 
and resource allocation (Gültekin & Yilmaz 2005, 66). The main elements of the program were the 
elimination of price controls including controls over interest rates, foreign exchange rate reforms, 
liberalization of trade and foreign direct investment, and the privatization of the state owned enterprises 
(Eder 2004, 57). In the opinion of Feroz Ahmad (1993), because it entailed a fast increase in income 
inequality and a massive transfer of income from the poorer wage-earning sections of the society to 
the rich capital owning sector, this economic policy would have been impossible to realize within a 
democratic system209. This redistribution was achieved by suppressing the trade unions and keeping the 
level of wages artificially low. According to Çağlar Keyder (1987), the real income of the working class 
decreased by 30-50% in the beginning of the 1980’s and the share of paid labor in the national income 
decreased quickly from about 35% to around 20%. The transformation of the Turkish economy was 
remarkable and achieved a measure of success: the gross national product grew throughout the 1980’s 
and the export sector expanded rapidly. 
The media was first of all influenced by the new liberalizing program via the price of paper. 
The state subvention of paper ended, and its prices skyrocketed,210 leading many newspapers to the 
verge of bankruptcy. The newspapers then embarked on massive promotion campaigns in desperate 
attempts to gain more readers and wider market shares. For a while the promotion campaigns of the 
mainstream press seemed to work, and the total daily circulation grew from roughly four million to 
over five million by 1990. Yet, the increase proved to be temporary, and the circulation dropped to 
only three million in 1994, when the Turkish economy was hit by yet another crisis. The promotion 
209 Some scholars and other commentators actually consider the economic program as the main consideration behind the 
coup, see for example Aykol 2008.
210 The price of newsprint rose by 621% between December 1983 and April 1988. Nazlı Ilıcak, a controversial journalist, 
columnist, media owner and politician blames Prime Minister Özal and his center-right ANAP (Anavatan Partisi, The 
Motherland Party) for this. According to her, increases in the price of newsprint were used as a deliberate means to control 
and even punish the papers (Ilıcak 2000, 61).
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campaigns had interesting and negative effects; they created a new kind of reader who shopped for 
those newspapers with most side benefits. A large group of readers would change newspaper according 
to the attractiveness of the promotion campaign, and the circulation of individual papers fluctuated 
wildly. This was especially true for the cheap boulevard papers (such as Tan and Bulvar). Their 
circulations could oscillate between 100,000 and 800,000 copies depending of the success of the 
ongoing promotion campaign. Moreover, several papers could not shoulder both the rise in the price 
of paper and the growing advertising expenses and consequently either went bankrupt, were closed, 
or sold with nominal prices to companies that had accumulated their capital in other sectors of the 
economy (Koloğlu 1992).211 The change of media ownership from the hands of the old journalist 
families to big industrial conglomerates has been viewed as an important negative turning point for 
the Turkish press (among others Nozawa-Dursun 1997). 
The leftist press ranked as one of the big losers of the struggles in the 1980s. The military rulers were 
strongly biased against the left, and the anti-terrorist campaign and de-politicization targeted especially 
the leftist organizations. The leftist papers did not fare well in the liberal competition either, because they 
were unable to attract enough advertisers. Surprisingly enough, the fledgling religious or pro-Islamist 
press was able to survive by cultivating closer ties with the emerging pro-Islam business (Koloğlu 1995, 
134). The new importance, legitimacy, and visibility granted to Islam by the official establishment was 
reflected in the press as well and pro-Islam business corporations started to publish their own newspapers. 
In addition to the major effects of the coup to media as a business, it also had more direct influence 
on the press. Immediately after the coup several publications were closed and a strict censorship was 
enforced on the rest. The already limited broadcasting hours of the state television were cut down and 
the television was used to propagate the military junta’s views. A state of emergency was in effect for 
seven years. During this period the scope of news reporting was severely limited and several newspapers 
were temporarily closed.212 Journalists and editors were almost routinely detained, arrested, convicted 
and jailed, starting new publications was made very difficult and those leftist papers that did not have to 
declare bankruptcy were closed by the state (Koloğlu 1992). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the new constitution of 1982 drafted under the tutelage of the 
military aimed to limit the freedom of thought and expression, not to guarantee them. In Hıfzı Topuz’s 
(2003) opinion, the concept of freedom of thought is misunderstood in the constitution. First it is stated 
that freedom of thought is guaranteed, but at the same time, expressing these same thoughts is made 
subject to a punishment (Topuz 2003, 260-261). So, in other words, one is guaranteed the freedom 
to think whatever one wishes inside one’s head, but one is not given the right to communicate these 
thoughts to the public, and publication of these freely thought ideas can become subject to punishment. 
The old, relatively liberal press law of 1950 (in effect until 2004) was modified once again in 1983, 
introducing higher fines and new restrictive measures. The limitations placed on the press can be seen as 
a part of the military’s ambitious attempt to de-politicize the society.
211 Centralization of ownership was characteristic for the Turkish economy of the 1980’s in general. It was one consequence 
of the shift from the import subsidized industrialization (ISI) policy to the export oriented economic policy. The internal 
market shrank and many of the small and medium sized companies were either closed or incorporated to the larger companies 
(Keyder 1987). 
212 Papers closed down temporarily during the years 1980–84: Milli Gazete four times: 72 days total, Cumhuriyet four times: 
41 days, Tercüman twice: 29 days, Günaydın twice: 17 days, Güneş once for ten days, Milliyet once for ten days, Tan once for 
nine days and Hürriyet once for seven days (Kabacalı 1990, 219).
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The restrictions had a negative effect on the contents of the press: when the press had to back down 
from reporting on social issues, it reported widely on sex scandals and bloody murders, and filled the 
pages with pictures of semi-nude women (Nozawa-Dursun 1997). Nozawa-Dursun gives the tabloid 
Tan as an example: “Tan’s content was characteristic of Turkish newspapers in the 1980’s. It appealed 
to masses, especially men, with simply written articles, fortune telling, photo stories, photographs of 
naked women and its low price” (Ibid., 17-18). Thus the restrictive state policies contributed to the 
tabloidization of the Turkish press that had begun during the 1970s.
As the country returned to civilian rule in 1983, the press strongly supported Turgut Özal’s center-
right ANAP (Anavatan Partisi, The Motherland Party), the only party seen as independent from the 
military. Yet, the civilian regime proved a disappointment for the press. The oppression under the 
military-made legislation continued under the ANAP rule. Journalists, together with other intellectuals, 
were prosecuted, fined, imprisoned, and beaten up by the police and security forces. Topuz compares the 
Özal reign with that of Sultan Abdülhamit II’s (Topuz 2003, 271). In Nozawa-Dursun’s opinion ANAP’s 
Prime Minister Turgut Özal’s aim was to turn the press into a loyal and manageable tool for the use of 
the government (Nozawa-Dursun 1997). Özal is widely cited to have commented that two and half 
newspapers are enough for Turkey. According to Nozawa-Dursun, writing in 1997, Özal was successful 
in his aim to break the press. Mainstream newspapers avoided critique against the government and the 
state in the 1980s and 1990s (Ibid).213 
Several scholars have pointed out that state involvement in the economy remained strong despite 
the harsh liberalizing economic program. Mine Eder argues in her article on populism in Turkey, that the 
state’s role in economy did not decrease, but became more discretional, non-political (i.e. not governed 
by representative decision-making), technocratic and remained very much clientilist (Eder 2004, 58-64). 
In line with this continued state involvement, the media business continued to receive state subventions, 
and once again those media supportive of the government policies could gain considerable financial 
benefits. This formed a strong incentive for the larger newspapers to give partial news and information on 
important topics such as economy, instead of independent, objective and critical line (Nozawa-Dursun 
1997, 20). The periodical advertisement boycotts during the Özal years could be used as an example 
of the state’s new role: newspapers that criticized the government were at times denied advertisements 
from the state-owned companies (for details, see Ilıcak 2000). The patronage networks, rent-seeking, and 
corruption led to shady dealings, wide-spread corruption and numerous business scandals, in which the 
media holding companies have been also involved. 
In Orhan Koloğlu’s (1992) opinion, the press truly supported Özal and ANAP until 1987 and 
adopted a more critical stance only after that. He sees the accommodating tone of the press as a result 
of the lack of political alternatives for Özal rather than caused by any outside pressure. In his view, the 
journalists were painfully aware of the precarious situation in the country, and acted responsibly to avoid 
sliding back to the terrorism and chaos of the seventies (Koloğlu 1992). In general Koloğlu agrees with 
Nozawa-Dursun about the junta’s de-politicizing efforts, and sees the policies of the Özal regime as a 
continuation of this. Özal wanted to silence the intelligentsia, the writers and the journalists. Within 
the decade, 70,000 people were prosecuted because of political activities (Koloğlu 1992). There had 
213 For a detailed, even if not unbiased account of the various arguments and tensions during the Özal years, see Nazlı Ilıcak 
2000. Ilıcak herself is one of the much debated media personalities in Turkey. She has written for various newspapers from 
Tercüman to Yeni Şafak and Sabah.
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been more than 2,000 court cases against the press with 3,000 convicted writers, editors and artists. The 
editors were sentenced for a total of more than 5,000 years in prison (Topuz 2003, 273).
In 1990, Alpay Kabacalı, who himself had been in prison after the 1971 coup, concludes his history 
of censorship in Turkey:
When we compare different periods with each other, we discover that we have not advanced during 
the past decade, but have taken steps backwards… we are among the countries of the world lagging 
most behind in regards to the freedom of the press and thought. Rising from this hollow is not easy. 
Even if the obstacles for real democracy were to be lifted, the press still needs to solve the problems 
stemming from its own structure.214 (Kabacalı 1990, 255.)
As a conclusion it is in order to note the long-lasting the effects of the 1980 coup on the Turkish media. 
The main part of the restrictive legislation passed under the military Junta (1980–1983) remained in 
effect long into the 1990s, and the last vestiges still remained at the time of the news events looked at in 
this work (from 1999 to 2009).
5.5 media in the 1990s and eaRly 2000s
5.5.1 exteRnal limits on media: legislation
The 1982 Constitution drafted under the military rule has been one of the most problematic legal 
structures in Turkey from the perspective of freedom of expression since its ratification. As has already 
been pointed out both in the previous chapter and the section above, the 1982 Constitution was not 
aimed to guarantee the freedom and the rights of the Turkish citizens, but to restrict and to control 
the society. It aimed to depoliticize the society and made explicit references to topics that were not 
to be discussed. The Constitution was repeatedly amended, and some of the most restrictive articles 
were modified or removed in 1996, 2001, 2002 and 2003. For example, the reform package of 2001 
removed the clause that forbade using a language forbidden by law in disseminating opinion from Article 
26. Combined with a law (number 2932) that defined Turkish as the mother tongue of the Turks, this 
clause was used to criminalize public usage of Kurdish language(s) for a decade (1982–1991). Despite a 
long series of amendment packages, part of the authoritarian and undemocratic core of the constitution 
remained in effect still in 2009.215 
Two of the problematic articles were decreed un-amendable in the constitution, and even proposing 
such a change was forbidden. Thus, Article 2 that explicitly decrees the secular nature of the Turkish state 
remained in effect in the 2010’s as did Article 3, which states that “The Turkish state, with its territory 
and nation, is an indivisible entity. Its language is Turkish.” (1982 Constitution, Article 3, emphasis 
214 Translation mine.
215 A large package of reforms to the 1982 Constitution was approved by a referendum in September 2010. The same 
referendum also approved the plan to draft a new constitution for Turkey, but the progress was very slow and at the time of 
writing this chapter, the 1982 Constitution remained in effect. 
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mine). These principles were used to curb the activities of the Islamists and pro-Kurdish organizations 
and individuals respectively. The state-centric ideology behind these formulations is evident from the 
wording: both the nation and the language are subjugated to the state, which is seen as the subject, as 
the owner. The problematic formulations were not limited to these two articles, as it was also explicitly 
forbidden to exercise any of the rights and freedoms embodied in the constitution with the aim of 
violating the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation, or endangering the existence 
of the secular order of the Turkish Republic (Article 14). Furthermore, the constitution stipulated state 
control over religious education, which was made compulsory in primary and secondary schools, as well 
as forbade exploitation of religion or religious feelings in politics, and basing the order of the state even 
partially on religious tenets (Article 24). Article 28 of the constitution dedicated to the press began by 
stating that “The press is free, and shall not be censored” but added later: “Anyone who writes or prints 
any news or articles which threaten... the indivisible integrity of the state with its territory and nation... 
anyone who prints or transmits such news or articles to others for the above purposes, shall be held 
responsible under the law relevant to these offenses.” (Article 28, the Constitution of the Republic of 
Turkey 1982). 
Other legislation passed in the early 1980s was also restrictive. The Turkish Penal Code was used 
to curb freedom of expression. Some of the most blatant violations of freedom of expression, such as 
articles that penalized distributing leftist or Islamist propaganda were removed from the Penal Code in 
1991, after intense internal and external pressure. Nevertheless, the Penal Code was used to enforce the 
state’s indivisible character (with its territory and nation) throughout the 1990s. The choice of wording 
made it possible to convict a person based on propaganda action only (Article 125). The Penal Code was 
amended again both in 2002 and 2003. The prison sentences for “insulting the state and its institutions” 
or “threats to the indivisible unity to the Turkish republic” in Article 159 were reduced first in 2002 and 
then again in 2003, and only criticism intending to ridicule or insult was defined as an offense. Even so, 
a court’s opinion of what criticism was remained entirely subjective and thus open to abuse (RSF Turkey 
reports for 2003 and 2004)216. The amendments also narrowed the scope of Article 169 of the criminal 
code, punishing ”complicity with terrorist organizations.” Article 312 of the criminal code punishing 
”incitement to hatred on the basis of class, race, religion, sect or region” was amended so that only action 
that was deemed endangering public order was to be punished. Besides the positive amendments, a 
new criminal offense of ”insults denigrating a section of the population, which in some way undermine 
human dignity” was introduced (RSF 2004). It is not surprising that trials of journalists criticizing the 
government or the army continued even after the amendments of 2002 and 2003. 
Turkey’s current Penal Code (TCK, 5237)217 dates to 2004 and was adopted as a part of Turkey’s 
EU-encouraged process of democratization. However, even the new Penal code retained a number of 
restrictive and problematic formulations and was widely criticized both within Turkey and in international 
216 The international Reporters sans Frontières (RSF) publishes an annual Press Freedom index as well as yearly reports 
on press freedom issues in various countries. I will note the year of these reports in brackets, even though there is no easy 
way to check the citation as the RSF website has archives of only Press Freedom Index, not the annual country reports. The 
RSF site has an archive going back to 2002 that has individual articles on Turkey. Other organizations following freedom 
of media internationally and including Turkey are: International Press Institute (IPI) with online articles on Turkey dating 
back to 2007: http://www.freemedia.at/country-reports/europe/turkey.html. A third organization is the Committee to Protect 
Journalists, CPJ: https://cpj.org/europe/turkey/.
217 Legislation of the Republic of Turkey can be accessed online in Turkish: http://www.mevzuat.gov.tr/Kanunlar.aspx.
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arenas. In a short review of legal threats against the freedom of expression in Turkey from October 2010, 
the General Secretary of the Press Council (Basın Konseyi) Ersü Oktay Huduti (2010) listed a total of 
25 problematic articles in the Penal Code, only some of which will be covered here. It remained a serious 
criminal offense to insult, deride or defame the President (Article 299), the Parliament, the security 
forces, the Military, the Judiciary, the Republic of Turkey (Article 300) as well as the Turkish nation 
(Article 301) or the organs of the state (Article 301). It was also a punishable offense to deride a section 
of the population on the basis of social class, race, religion, denomination, sex or regional differences 
(Article 216/2) or the religious values held dear by a section of the population (Article 216/3) (Huduti 
2010). The international Reporters sans Frontières (RSF) publishes yearly reports on press freedom issues. 
Their Turkey report for the year 2010 considered Article 301 as the most problematic of these even after 
the amendments of 2008 changed the formulation from “Turkish identity” to “Turkish nation,” and 
the maximum prison term was reduced from three years to two (RSF report 2010).218 In addition to the 
insult-clauses, public peace and harmony was protected by penalizing “fomenting fear and panic among 
the people” (Article 213), “incitement to crime” (Article 214), “praise for crime and criminal offender” 
(Article 215), “incitement of people to hate and enmity” (Article 216), and “incitement for breaking the 
laws” (Article2 17). Also disclosing information that is relevant for the security and political interests of 
the state was penalized, as well as disclosing information decreed secret (relevant articles: Article 327, 
Article 329, Article 334, Article 336, Article 339) To make the situation worse, Article 218 allowed for 
the possibility of increasing the penalties by half when it is media committing the offense.219 
As restrictive as the Penal Code was, it constituted only a part of the legal arsenal that could be 
used against the media and freedom of expression. The other problematic legislation included the law 
against terrorism from 1991 (law number 3713) and the law against damaging the memory of Atatürk 
(Law number 5816 from 1951). The problematic and restrictive law against terrorism was amended 
several times. Until the changes of 1996, actions aimed to change the basic attributes of the Republic 
of Turkey as defined in the constitution were defined as terrorism, making it possible to prosecute even 
non-violent activity as terrorism. The law also established the crime of publishing “propaganda against 
the indivisible unity of the state” (Article 8). The law was much criticized both in Turkey and abroad 
because it obviously led to imprisonment on the basis of opinion. Due to the constant criticism the law 
was amended in 1996. The penalties were reduced and Article 8 was narrowed so that the courts had to 
determine malicious intent on the part of suspects. This still left a lot of room for judicial subjectivity, 
and even verbal propaganda was still defined as terrorism (ÇGD 1998, 46-50, Nozawa-Dursun 1997). 
In 2003 the infamous Article 8 of the Anti-Terror Law, punishing ”propaganda against the indivisible 
unity of the nation” was fully repealed and journalists being prosecuted under it were acquitted (RSF 
2004). Yet, in 2010 the law still included prohibitions against publishing propaganda, statements or 
announcements of terrorist organizations as well as collective punishments for offenses (Article 6 and 
Article 7, Huduti 2010). 
There were also steps forward in the sphere of freedom of expression: In 2004 a new press law 
(number 5187) replaced the old press law of 1950, which had become a confusing collection of 
218 Article 301 was the most infamous as internationally acclaimed Turkish authors such as Orhan Pamuk and Elif Şafak 
have faced charges on the basis of Article 301 in widely publicized cases. 
219 The other problematic articles include those defining penalties for obscenity (Article 226) and slander (Article 267), 
violations of the secrecy of criminal investigation (Article 285), attempts to influence legal procedures (Article 288), and 
attempts to turn people against military service (Article 318).
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stipulations after 15 rounds of modifications during its more than five decade life-span. One of the 
most important changes in the new press law was the abolishment of prison terms for media owners and 
editors, which unfortunately were replaced with extremely punitive fines. Another relaxation came with 
the lifting of the state of emergency in the last provinces in the Southeast in November 2002. Under Law 
2935 on the State of Emergency (OHAL) the governors had enjoyed wide powers over media activities 
in the area. 
Third significant development came also in 2002, when the Law Concerning the Founding and 
Broadcasts of Television and Radio (no. 3984, 1994) was modified to allow television and radio broadcasts 
in languages other than Turkish. Until 2002 the use of Kurdish in broadcast media was forbidden by 
law, according to which ”Radio and television broadcasts will be made in Turkish”; however, for the 
purpose of teaching or of imparting news “those foreign languages that have made a contribution to the 
development of universal cultural and scientific works” could be used (Article 4). So, although oral and 
written use of Kurdish language in public had been legal since “the Law Prohibiting Languages Other 
than Turkish” was repealed in 1991, this liberalization did not apply to broadcasting for more than a 
decade. In 2002 the following sentence was added to Article 4 of the broadcasting law: “Furthermore, 
public and private radio and television organizations can broadcast in different languages and dialects 
traditionally used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives.” Note the great care taken to avoid the terms 
“Kurdish” or “minority.” Limited hours of Kurdish language broadcasts in state television were finally 
begun in the summer of 2004. On the negative side of development from the perspective of freedom of 
expression was the law (number 5651) on Publications on the Internet from 2007. The internationally 
criticized law gave the state authorities wide range of powers to block access to Internet-sites. It was 
actively used, at times even for cases that effectively fall outside the scope of the law. For example, access 
to the site Youtube was blocked for a better part of 2008–2010.220
All in all, important steps towards better ensured freedom of expression were gradually taken during 
the 1990s and especially during the first years of the 2000s. The legislative reforms were evaluated as 
positive, even if inadequate. By the middle of the first decade of the new millennium, both RSF and 
the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) noted the improvement in their annual reports on Turkey, 
but considered the freedom expression still seriously limited. Journalists continued to face criminal 
prosecution for their work, for criticizing the government or the army, and journalists defending the pro-
Kurdish demands were constantly harassed by police and the courts (RSF 2004, CPJ 2004). As has been 
noted in relation to Turkey’s general program of democratization, the implementation of the reforms also 
tended to be uneven. For example, in 2004 the CPJ noted that “prosecutors continued to use the laws 
that remain in the books to bring suits against journalists and writers, particularly those who criticized 
the army and judiciary, or who wrote critically about sensitive political issues, such as the struggle of the 
220 The strict Internet-legislation seemed to be one of the main reasons behind Turkey’s dismal rank in the global Press 
Freedom Index at the end of the decade. The law was enthusiastically used, and several thousands of sites were blocked in 
Turkey in a few years. Allegedly many for arbitrary and political reasons (RSF 2011 quotes OSCE). The law allowed blocking 
sites on the basis of “adequate suspicion” of offenses, and the site-blocking could be based on administrative decision instead 
of a court order. In addition websites were frequently blocked for offenses beyond the scope of Law 5651, such as “insulting 
Turkish identity” (Article 301 of Penal Code) “dissemination of terrorist propaganda” (Anti-Terrorist Law), and “incitement 
to hatred” (Article 216 of Penal Code) (RSF report 2011). As elsewhere, the blocking of popular websites did not prove 
effective as it is possible to access the sites via proxies, or in the case of the Turkish sites to move them to another host and 
address. Besides blocking the sites, court cases were initiated against journalists and editors of Internet journals and blogs. 
One journalist I interviewed in 2002 faced later charges for Internet offenses. 
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country’s Kurdish minority for greater cultural rights or the role of Islam in politics and society.” (CPJ 
2004). During the early years of the 2000s, the number of cases against journalists and writers decreased 
only some, but the number of convictions and journalists sentenced to prison decreased dramatically. 
The positive development is easy to verify by a look at the statistics, which show a clear numeric 
improvement from the 1990s to the early 2000s. The situation in the early 1990s was bleak: in 1990, 
586 court cases were opened against 49 publications; in 1991, 77 publications were confiscated; in 1993 
journalists and editors were sentence to a total of 115 years in prison (Topuz 2003, 279-281); at the end 
of 1994 there were 65 journalists in prison; in 1995, 15 publications were closed and 112 journalists 
were in prison, with most of them convicted for crimes defined in the law against terrorism (Ibid., 304); 
in 1997, a total of 49 newspapers, 29 periodicals and 23 books were confiscated, 147 court cases were 
opened against the media and in 89 of these a guilty verdict was reached (Ibid., 307). 
In 2000, 24 journalists were imprisoned (CPJ 2001); in 2003 14 journalists were arrested and eight 
journalists were in prison (RSF 2004);221 in 2001 the leftist Yeni Evrensel (New Universal) was suspended 
for 40 days, pro-Kurdish İkibinde Yeni Gündem (The New Agenda in the 2000s) for 33, Islamist Yeni 
Asya (New Asia) for 30 and the leftist Günlük Evrensel (Daily Universal) was confiscated for 30 times, 
Yeni Asya for 6 times, Islamist Akit (Covenant) for 2 and its continuation Anadolu’da Vakit (Anatolia 
Time) for 2. During the same year the Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) forbade television 
broadcasts for a total of 1407 days and radio broadcasts for 2651 days. In 731 cases (for television) 
the cited reason was “irticai” (reactionary, which refers to Islamists) and in 475 cases it was cited as 
“bölücülük” (separatism, which usually refers to pro-Kurdish activities) (Topuz 2003, 316-318).
When looking at the restrictive legislation, one should also take into account the political climate, 
how strictly the legislation is enforced at different times and to whom it is applied. Most, though not all 
of the cases in the 1990s targeted journalists working in marginal or alternative media. An interesting 
exception was Oral Çalışlar, a journalist working for the prestigious daily Cumhuriyet, who faced no 
consequences for his interviews with the PKK leaders Kemal Burkay and Abdullah Öcalan published in 
Cumhuriyet in May 1993. Six months later, when these same interviews were republished in a book titled 
The Kurdish Problems, the book was confiscated and Çalışlar was fined and sentenced for two years in 
221 According to the CPJ report the figure was at least five. Most of the journalists in prison in 2003 were convicted for 
“belonging to an illegal organization.” This sentence was at times a source of friction between international journalists’ 
organizations and the Turkish ones, such as the Press Council (Basın Konseyi), which did not acknowledge most of the 
imprisoned journalists as being in prison for journalistic offenses. Thus, their imprisonment was not seen as a problem for 
freedom of expression. To get a clearer picture of the reasons for the friction I compared the reports for the situation at the 
end of 2003, when both RSF and the Turkish Basın Konseyi (BK) reported eight journalists serving prison sentences (Basın 
Konseyi’nin Hapisteki Gazetecilerle İlgili Raporu 2004). The BK had investigated 30 cases, where there was a claim that 
the sentenced was a journalist. Of these, eight were concluded to have either been convicted and still in prison either for 
their journalistic work or were journalists, whose involvement in illegal activity was not well proven. Of these eight, five 
were sentenced for “being members of an illegal armed organization” (either leftist DHKP-C, TKPML-TIKKO or Turkish 
version of Islamist Hizbullah), one for both being a member and also for violating the Article 312/2 of the Penal Code, one 
for violating the law against terrorism and the Penal Code Article 160. One was sentenced for three months for insult. The 
other sentences were very hard, most of them over 12 years. Of those not considered to be sentenced for journalist offenses, 
most were convicted for being members of various illegal organizations, but there were also some sentences for arson, drug 
dealing and fraud. Most of the sentenced were journalists, but since the sentence was not a result of their journalist activities, 
it was not considered as a violation of freedom of expression by the BK. The RSF and BK lists also vary. Of those convicted 
of journalist offenses in BK’s opinion, only four had made it to the RSF listing. There was also disagreement over the case 
of Sinan Kara, who was sentenced for attacking Turkey’s ex-Prime Minister Tansu Çiller’s son. According to RSF, he was 
convicted because of his work (trying to take a picture of Mert Çiller).
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prison. What makes the event exceptional is the reputation of both Cumhuriyet and Çalışlar as staunch 
supporters of Kemalism (Nozawa-Dursun 1997, 254-55). As will be discussed in the analysis section, the 
official attitude towards the Kurdish question gradually relaxed after the capture and trial of Abdullah 
Öcalan in 1999 and the abating of armed struggle with the PKK at the end of the 1990’s. 
Another aspect, which is not obvious from the legislative text only, is the wider impact of the 
repressive legislation. Alpay sums the Turkish experience of the 1980s and early 1990s thusly: 
Regulations that make discussion of many topics a criminal offense result in self-censorship. Many 
aspects of religion and sexuality, the cult of Atatürk, the Kurdish and Armenian questions, and 
questions pertaining to the military are among sensitive topics that have for many years been avoided 
or taken up at great risk. (Alpay 1993, 83.) 
According the RSF, there were no journalists or other listed media professionals in prison by the end of 
2010. According to yearly Press Freedom Index published by the Reporters sans Frontières, Turkey did 
best in mid 2000s, when it ranked below 100 within 170 some countries world-wide. However, by 2010 
Turkey had regressed to the dismal rank of 138/178. Why was that? In his analysis of the situation of 
freedom of expression in Turkey by 2010, the General Secretary of the Press Council Huduti lamented 
the problematic and restrictive formulations of the legal texts, but was even more worried about the 
mentality behind them. In his opinion, the greatest threat against freedom of expression in Turkey was 
the general view that restrictions of freedom of expression are legitimate. Freedom of expression was not 
seen as a right to be protected, but as something that can be limited by turning legal texts into means of 
censorship (Huduti 2010, 2), and many of the laws were open to various subjective interpretations. For 
example, demands for minority rights based on Kurdishness could be claimed to fall within the category 
of discrimination on the basis of race or regional differences.
In conclusion: the legislation described above was used to control the content of the public discussion. 
The laws targeted mainly pro-Kurdish, leftist, or Islamist individual journalists and small alternative 
media. The mainstream media had more leeway, and it was (and is) possible for a small alternative paper 
to face charges on basis of stories the contents of which were published earlier in mainstream media. 
In the early 2000s, the journalists facing prison sentences were from small radical papers. Journalists 
of established larger papers writing on sensitive topics were perhaps fined or even arrested, but not 
sentenced to prison terms. This was clearly substantiated by the BK, RSF and CPJ reports. In any case, 
the restrictive legislation gave only possibilities for suppressing the media, possibilities that could be used 
depending on the political climate.
5.5.2 exteRnal limits on the media: pRessuRe and violence
The restrictions and pressure exerted on the media and the individual journalist did not remain only 
judiciary in the 1990s. An important source of pressure on the Turkish media was the military. The 
Turkish armed forces (Türk Silahlı Kuvvetleri, TSK) was a powerful political actor in Turkey until well 
into the 2000s. The military intervened in politics four times during the history of the Republic: in 1960, 
1971, 1980 and 1997, but each time it returned power to the civilian government. Yet, the mere existence 
of the National Security Council (MGK) as well as the way it operated (until the EU harmonization 
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packages in 2001 and 2003) gave the military a strong institutional role in political decision-making. The 
council was made up of the President, the Prime Minister, a few other ministers, the Chief of General 
Staff, and military force commanders.222 From 1982 onwards, the MGK was authorized to provide 
recommendations to the government on formulation and implementation of national security policy, 
and the government was to give priority consideration for these recommendations. (Bılgıç 2009, 803-5.) 
As was discussed in the previous chapter, the notion of national security was very widely defined, and 
matters somehow related to external or internal security were not under the authority of the cabinet 
(ÇGD 1998, 8-11), but regulated by the MGK. The Council also employed a secretariat, which had the 
power to follow and supervise the implementation of the Council’s decisions in various state organs such 
as Council of Higher Education (Yükseköğretim Kurulu, YÖK), which is an autonomous public body 
responsible for the planning, coordination, governance and supervision of higher education in Turkey , 
as well as Radio and Television Supreme Council (Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu, RTÜK), which is 
responsible for the regulation of the radio and television broadcasts all across Turkey.223
In line with this general political influence of the military, army briefings for the media were a part 
of the routine for the press in the 1990s. Important members of the media establishment were invited 
into the briefings, where they were informed about the views of the military on current events and given 
instructions on how to report on these issues.224 As an example, the ÇGD report gives a briefing by the 
MGK in 1991 where the media was told how it should report on events pertaining to PKK and the 
Kurds (ÇGD 1998). Bayram Ayaz writes in his book about a briefing given by some generals in the fall of 
1993, which the media in unison described as a beginning of a positive dialogue between the media and 
the armed forces (Ayaz 1997, 98). Another example is from 1997, when the MGK asked the media to 
forget the so-called Susurluk case225 and to concentrate on stopping fundamentalist Islam.226 Surprisingly 
enough media seems to have followed the instructions, at least for a while.
In the so-called postmodern coup of 1997 (in Turkish the most commonly used term is 28 Şubat 
süreci, i.e. the February 28th process), the Turkish military used the media to topple the Refah-Yol 
coalition composed of the Islamist Refah Partisi (RP, Welfare Party) and the center-right Doğru Yol 
Partisi (DYP, True Path Party). In his article on the political role of the Turkish military, Ali Bayramoğlu 
describes the Feb. 28th process as a new way for the military to act. The previous coups had been hard, 
instant events, whereas in 1997 the military did not rely on military or legal powers, but worked to 
shape the public opinion and to gain legitimacy for its actions via the media. It struggled to “militarize 
democracy” (Bayramoğlu 2004, 97), and strengthening the military’s influence over the media was a 
222 The MGK was established in the 1961 constitution, which states that its duty is to convey its opinions on national 
security to the Council of Ministers. The law on the MGK from 1962 gave the Council the power to establish the fundamental 
principles of the national security policy. The powers of the Council were expanded after each military intervention. In 1971 
the MGK’s responsibility was expanded to providing policy recommendations to the government, and after the 1980 coup 
the number of civilian members was reduced (Bılgıç 2009, 803-4).
223 The Council actually had representatives in these state organs. 
224 MGK’s influence was exerted through its secretariat, formed from military or ex-military personnel. The rather small 
secretariat included the posts of consultant for written media, consultant for visual media and consultant for Internet. In 
addition, the Psychological Operations Branch of the Turkish General Staff had personnel of 200. 
225 See previous chapter.
226 Some journalists and researchers believe that the whole Susurluk scandal was allowed to balloon to such system shaking 
proportions because the army wanted to give a lesson the power hungry police forces (Ayaz 1997).
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part of this new mode of action. Bayramoğlu quotes in length a memorandum of the Psychological 
Operation Branch of the General Staff227 from 1997, which lists the achievements and plans of the 
branch for the year 1997. The achievements include the publication in the press of more than 200 
anti-Refah Party news articles written by the branch. At the same time, journalists known to be close 
to the military were asked to write about certain topics, such as possible closure of the Refah Party. The 
plans included analysis of newspapers, and actions based on the analysis, be it coercive or supportive 
as deemed necessary (Bayramoğlu 2004, 98-99). The military’s tactic worked well, and the Prime 
Minister had to resign.
Tülay Bektaş (2001) has analyzed the role of the press in the February 28th process from a different 
angle: she evaluated whether the Turkish press was willing to set aside its ideological confrontation228 in 
an acute crises of democracy so as to come to the support of the democratic system. According to her 
analysis, this did not take place. The secularist press supported the military all the way: the military 
was shown to be the guardian of democracy and secularism, working against a government that was 
seen to form an Islamist threat to the secular-democratic regime. The dailies gathered public support 
for the implementation of the National Security Council demands. The whole issue was presented in a 
manner emphasizing conflict and confrontation. From the analyzed papers only the religiously oriented 
daily Zaman took the side of Refah and resisted the ultimatum, but even it emphasized the need for 
cooperation between the government and the MGK. (Bektaş 2001.)
Another example of army-steered news reporting is the Kurdish issue, where the military has at 
times given quite detailed instructions on media practices. An illuminating example is from the end of 
1998, when the press was asked to use a less familiar name than the usual nickname “Apo” (meaning 
elder brother) for Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. After this he was mainly termed with quite 
established or standardized epithets such as ”the separatist chief,””the terrorist chief,””the man responsible 
for 30,000 deaths” or ”killer of children” and the Kurdish question became the so-called Kurdish question 
in the press (Finkel 2000, 7). The armed forces also used to have separate media bureaus, whose one 
purpose was to report on those journalists or media they considered to act out of line. If a journalist 
continuously reported against the interests of the state (or the armed forces), he or his chief editor was 
then contacted (ÇGD 1998, 39, 66-67). The journalist could be either asked to stop reporting on the 
issue, or could even be fired.
The EU-induced reforms begun after 1999 curbed the military’s political power. A major package of 
constitutional amendments that influenced the position of the MGK was passed in 2001, and another 
even more important one in 2003. The number of civilian members was increased, the Council’s role was 
downgraded to an advisory one, and the government was no longer expected to give priority consideration 
to its recommendations. The scope of national security was also narrowed, and the duties of the MGK 
limited accordingly. The previously central secretariat of the Council lost its authority to follow up and 
supervise the implementation of the MGK decisions within various state organs. Nevertheless, in an 
interesting evaluation of the role of the military in Turkey’s process of Europeanization, Tuba Ünlü Bılgıç 
argues that even if the civil-military balance shifted in favor of the civilians and the Turkish armed forces 
were deprived of some of their constitutional channels of influence in the process of reform, it still 
227 Genel Kurmay Başkanlığı Psikolojik Hareket Dairesi until 2005 after that known as Information Support Bureau, Bilgi 
Destek Daire Başkanlığı.
228 More on the secularist-Islamist divide of the press below.
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remained deeply involved in the political processes. She argues that even Turkey’s EU-process itself has 
been influenced by the military (Bılgıç 2009). 
In hindsight, it is easy to argue that since the beginning of the 2000s, the armed forces have lost 
much of their power to direct political decision-making and to limit public discussion. In 1997 the 
decisions of the MGK combined with a military-lead media campaign toppled the government, and in 
2007 the military’s attempt to prevent the ruling AKP’s Abdullah Gül’s election to Turkey’s presidency 
led to early elections, but backfired when the AKP received a resounding victory and Gül was elected 
president. By 2010 the military itself seemed to be on trial in the so-called Sledgehammer case, and 
the e-memorandum of the General Staff on the use of Kurdish language failed even to cause much of a 
reaction. According to one commentator, Halil M. Karaveli, the memorandum “was mostly met with 
a shrug, with almost no one getting worked up over it.” (Karaveli 2010). The difference to 1997 was 
remarkable.
Another source of concern for those Turkish media professionals of the 1990s who insisted on 
reporting on sensitive topics was the threat of violence. The leftist and pro-Kurdish reporters were 
harassed, and their work was disturbed with extra-legal measures. Journalists were arrested randomly, 
threatened, physically abused, and even murdered. The cases from the 1990’s include the murders of 
five journalists from the pro-Kurdish Özgür Gündem (Free Agenda) in 1992 and a bomb in its office 
in 1994. In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the state security apparatus, i.e. the army, the police, and 
the gendarme had taken to using excessive physical violence systematically, and this continued until the 
end of 1990s. Most of the abuse of individual journalists seemed to be random and initiated by single 
policemen,229 but there were some examples of more organized action against the media, such as the 
police attack to the leftist Kurtuluş (Liberation) and the beating up of everyone in the premises in 1998, 
which clearly had the approval of higher officials. Occasionally, journalists of the important mainstream 
dailies could also be subjected to beatings and threats by the police. The Turkish state has also been 
accused of involvement in numerous mysterious murders in the 1990’s. Some of these accusations, such 
as detonating a bomb in the office of the pro-Kurd Özgür Gündem and the murder of its owner, were 
substantiated during the research of the so-called Susurluk-case. 
Something that has been hard for outsiders to grasp is the fact that this excessive use of violence was 
widely known and reported in Turkey. Journalists as well as normal people did not just close their eyes 
and pretend it was not happening. I remember how, on my first trip to Turkey in 1995, I sat one evening 
watching television. There was a news program on, showing again and again a few minutes long video, 
where a line of demonstrators collided with a line of police, the demonstrators fell back and the police 
beat them up. The focus was on a demonstrator lying on the asphalt, who was kicked by every policeman 
on his way to chase off the demonstrators. In the background a commentator repeated over and over 
again something that I could understand even with my at the time rather rudimentary Turkish: “This 
could be your brother, your sister, your father...”. 
Police and the security forces used to intentionally disrupt the work of the journalists, who were 
often arrested together with the demonstrators about whom they were reporting (CPJ 2000). Officials 
229 Maybe the best-known case in the 1990s was the murder of Metin Göktepe, a journalist from the leftist Evrensel 
(Universal). Several policemen beat him to death in 1996, when he was reporting on the funeral of a prisoner who had died in 
a prison uprising. The fact that the six police officers responsible for his murder were finally convicted for seven and half years 
each in 1999 can perhaps be interpreted as a sign of a change in atmosphere (http://www.metingoktepe.com/davahakkinda.
php).
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seemed to have difficulties with differentiating the opinions and stance of the journalist and the opinions 
of the groups about whom the journalist was reporting. Because of this, most of the imprisoned or 
arrested journalists were referred to as ”so-called journalists,” meaning that in the minds of the Turkish 
officials they were political agitators and terrorists, disguised as journalists (ÇGD 1998, 40). This same 
confusion was apparent in the legislation and its interpretation: publishing statements made by illegal 
organizations or interviews of their leaders were defined as criminal offenses. Another reason behind 
the repression was that some opinions were simply not considered as legitimate in Turkey. Kurdish or 
leftist activists were viewed as threats to the security of the state, and the security forces participated 
in clamping down all the activities of these groups, including activities such as publishing periodicals. 
According to the encompassing definition of “issues of national security,” the security forces were even 
expected to monitor and work counter to such activities, and the army often emphasized the need to 
clamp down divergent political views. 
The journalists were also threatened by the PKK and radical, violent Islamist organizations. For a 
period, the PKK treated the mainstream press as a representative of the Turkish state, and it threatened 
and kidnapped several Turkish journalists in the 1990’s. Radical Islamists murdered well-known secularist 
journalists such as Uğur Mumcu in 1993 and Ahmet Taner Kışlalı in 1999. The police were accused 
of ignoring the murders, which were solved only years later (Nozawa-Dursun 1997, 262).230 All in all, 
Turkey was estimated to be one of the most dangerous countries for journalists in the 1990s (Nozawa-
Dursun 1997, 262). By the early 2000s, the extent of the violent threat had abated, even if not totally 
disappeared: for example, in 2002 a total of 31 and in 2003, 17 journalists were either attacked or 
threatened with violence (RSF reports of 2002, 2003). 
The most notable incident after the turn of the millennia was of course the murder of the Turkish-
Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007. In January 2007, Hrant Dink, the editor-in-chief of an 
Armenian-Turkish periodical was killed in Istanbul. The 17-year old suspect was arrested a day later, and 
19 other people were also charged. The shooter was convicted in 2011 and one of the 19 other persons was 
convicted in 2012, the others were released. Dink family’s lawyers and NGO’s have pointed out numerous 
irregularities in the investigation of suspicions of state officials’ complicity. Also, Turkish security authorities 
had been warned about an ultra-nationalist assassination plot against Dink, but failed to act.
5.5.3 special featuRes of the tuRkish pRess
Features typical for the Turkish media landscape in the 1990s and early 2000s included low and 
fluctuating circulations of newspapers, the emergence and dominance of private television, centralized 
(non-media-based) ownership, marketization, tabloidization, and growing emphasis on entertainment, 
de-unionization and low status of news journalists, importance of columns and columnists and media’s 
continued independence from party politics. When combined with the above-described restrictive 
legislation and pressure, many of the features of the Turkish press contributed towards the emergence of 
a culture of self-censorship on issues of “national security,” of which Kurdish issue was undoubtedly one 
of the most important ones.
230 The perpetrators were finally sentenced in 2002.
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Low Circulation Figures
The working environment of the Turkish press differs in many ways from that of the Western European 
countries. First of all, the circulation figures in Turkey are very low. The figure generally given for the 
end of the 1990s was slightly over four million, and by 2008 and 2009 the figures most often cited were 
between four and half and five million. Despite some growth, these were very low figures for a country 
with a population as large as Turkey’s (seventy million by the end of 1990s and around 78 million by 
2010). Out of the more than 2,600 newspapers published in Turkey (2009), more than 160 were national 
newspapers, which were responsible for the majority of the total circulation. Out the national papers, 37 
were published daily at the end of the period analyzed in this work (in 2010, according to the figures 
given by BYEGM). Newspaper circulation per 1,000 inhabitants was 95 (Barış 2010).231 As low as these 
figures are, there is a noted improvement when one compares them to the corresponding figures of the 
1990s, when the total circulation per thousand people was estimated to be as low as 82 copies (in 1996, 
Ayaz 1997, 23).232 Also characteristic for Turkish newspapers are great fluctuations in circulation figures. 
In the 1990s it was possible for the circulation of a paper fluctuate by more than 150,000 copies within 
a space of one year. For example, the circulation of the daily Hürriyet fluctuated between 450,000 and 
600,000 copies in 1999, that of Milliyet between 300,000 and 500,000 copies in 1999, and the extreme 
example was the daily Star in 1999, which’s circulation fluctuated between 200,000 and 600,000 copies 
(Gencel 2000, 23-25).
There are several obvious socioeconomic and demographic reasons behind the low circulation figures. 
First of all, the literacy rate was estimated to be only 85%, so that for 15% of the population, mainly 
women, reading a newspaper was simply not an option. Second, the level of education was relatively 
low: half of the population was primary school graduates (five years until 1998, eight years since that). 
Furthermore, the population is very young: 35% of the population is under 14-years old (Gencel 2000, 
1), and the age-group below 14 seldom reads newspapers anywhere. Third, Turkey is a relatively poor 
country, and low income levels restrict spending. At the beginning of the period analyzed in my study, 
only 2.3% of the family income was spent on culture and entertainment (Gencel 2000, 1). All of these 
factors seriously limited the number of people for whom newspapers were accessible.
There are a few studies from the 1990s that give more detailed statistic information on the Turkish 
reading habits: in 1995 it was estimated that only two million Turkish households out of a total 11 
million regularly purchased a newspaper. Even if the number of people estimated to read each copy 
would be considerably higher than in Western Europe,233 the low circulation figures confirm the results 
of a survey study made in the beginning of the 1990’s, according to which 68% of adults never read 
newspapers. Men were more regular readers than women with 56% never reading a newspaper, whereas 
80% of women never read one. Only 12% of women were in the habit of reading a paper daily with 
30% of the men doing the same (White 1999, 167). Besides being a matter of gender, reading habits 
231 The corresponding figures for neighboring Greece were circa 1.9 million daily copies sold to a population of circa 10 
million, i.e. around 200 copies for 1000 persons (Kontochristou & Mentzi n.d. and SGI 2011). In Egypt, circa 2.1 million 
newspapers were sold in the year 2003 (Nation Master nd.) to a population of circa 64 million, i.e. 32 copies per 1000 
inhabitants.
232 Actually Aytül Tamer gives even lower figures in her article. For 1999 she gives the total circulation per thousand as 50, 
and for 2006, the latest year in her statistics, the figure is still only 66 (Tamer 2010, 367). 
233 In Western Europe the number of readers per copy tends to range from 2.3 to 3, whereas the somewhat unreliable figures 
for Turkey are from 5 to over 9 readers per copy depending on the paper (Koloğlu 2006, 177).
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were a question of income: people in low-income groups read very little. These factors are crucial for 
understanding the Turkish media: target audiences of even the relatively cheap and populist dailies such 
as Posta actually consist of middle to upper income individuals (Doğan Holding 2005). The importance 
and influence of the Turkish newspapers is somewhat increased by the structure of readership: they are 
read by the most influential sections of the population, who in turn convey information and views to 
others.234 Still, the small circulation of the newspapers should be taken into account when assessing the 
results of this study.
The limited circulations of the newspapers emphasize the importance of television in the distribution 
of information. For many in the lower echelons of society, and especially for women, it is the only 
medium through which they receive information on subjects concerning the society at large. Income 
groups largely define the usage of television as entertainment and a way to spend time: the group with 
highest income spends the least time in front of the television and the group with the lowest income 
the most. Television viewing in Turkey is quite high when compared with the rest of Europe, on average 
more than 5 hours a day (MediaScape Türkiye ’98 1999, 24 and Barış 2010).
The state television and radio corporation TRT was founded in 1964 to be responsible for radio 
and all, at the time, future television broadcasts. Television broadcasts were begun in 1968, and by 1974 
the daily broadcasts were accessible (at least theoretically) for more than half of the population. Color 
broadcasting started in 1981 and a second TRT channel was launched in 1986. (TRT n.d.) The TRT 
monopoly was broken in 1990 by the private satellite television Star 1 (later Interstar and Star TV), 
broadcast to Turkey via a satellite from abroad, and thus technically not breaking the law. The station 
was owned by Cem Uzan, a scion of a wealthy family owning the Rumeli Holding Company, and Ahmet 
Özal, son of President Turgut Özal. Other channels followed suit, and in 1993 the de-facto situation 
was acknowledged and legislation was changed to allow private television. The different media holding 
companies immediately established their own television channels.
By the early 2010s, TRT had 15 television channels and there were a host of private ones. According 
to Barış, the content of the most popular private television channels (ATV, Kanal D, Show TV, Star TV 
and TGRT and TRT 1), is quite similar with entertainment, news, football and locally made dramas and 
sit-coms. The Samanyolu and Kanal 7 have an Islamic orientation. There are also 24-hour news channels 
such as NTV, CNN-Türk, Habertürk, Sky Türk, and TGRT Haber, and the music channels Kral TV and 
Number One TV (Barış 2010).
Concentration, Marketization, Entertainment
On the surface and judged by the number of publications, Turkish press at the turn of the millenia 
seemed multi-voiced and pluralistic. When the ownership of the media is taken into account, it becomes 
obvious that Turkish media was very concentrated. In 1999, the national media was governed by five 
large groups, who together owned 80% of the national media. These groups were: Doğan, Bilgin, İhlas, 
Uzan and Aksoy (Türkiye’de medya ve seçimler 1999). 
Concentration of the ownership of Turkish media began in the 1960s, accelerated in the 1970s, and 
culminated in the 1980’s and 1990’s. Most of Turkish media was gathered into few media conglomerates 
of gigantic proportions. This concentration did not take place only within the sector per se, for the 
234 At least according to the gate-keeping theory of communication studies.
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new owners were individuals or companies investing profits gained from other sectors into the media. 
These large media corporations owned national, regional, and local newspapers and magazines, radio 
and television channels, advertisement and news agencies, circulation networks and Internet service 
providers. They also had shares in fields as diverse as banking, insurance, tourism, telecommunications, 
automobile industry, construction and energy. There was a radical change from traditional mode of 
ownership, where the owner of the newspaper was also the head of the paper without other business 
interests, to a new mode of ownership where the owner has several other business ventures besides media 
and no background in journalism.
All in all, the effects of the concentration of media ownership into the hands of huge multi-
field corporations have been viewed as negative. For example, Hızfı Topuz (2003, 347-348) lists the 
negative effects of this monopolization of media as the following: concentration of media ownership to 
the capitalist class makes the contents more uniform, which limits the freedom of expression. Even the 
apparent different ideas and ideologies presented in different papers are not real. Monopolization works 
against syndicalism. The owners of the hegemonic media use the media as bargaining power to gain a 
hold over the government. To do this, they cannot allow free reign for the journalists. Monopolization 
brings along magazine-type entertainment functions to news reporting and thus impoverishes culture. 
With time, monopolization leads to the disappearance of small media companies, which in turn leads 
to unlimited hegemony. Participation in the media sector becomes incumbant on the ability to access 
big capital. The media is expected to act as the fourth power in society, as a guardian of the political 
system, but in corporate reality, its power does not stem from the public or the society, but rather from 
the holding company whose interests it is forced to serve. It is problematic when the aim of the media is 
not to generate profit from the media sector, but to ensure the profit of the holding company from other 
sectors (Topuz 2003, 347-348).
Also the concentration of power caused by the concentration of ownership has been an important 
source of concern: 
If the media becomes monopolized, will a ‘small number of people or organizations’ create a hegemony 
of cultural and political feelings and thoughts for the community, which means a possibility to steer 
the whole community towards of one’s own benefits. It is a possibility to create a form of control over 
millions of people’s actions ranging from ways of spending time to voting. (Katırıcıoğlu: Medya ve 
tekelleşme. Radikal 19.11.1998, quoted in Tılıç 1999, 39). 
In the opinion of Andrew Finkel (2000, 2), a well-known American journalist living in Turkey, the owners 
mainly use the power of the media towards the state to benefit from the slow process of privatization of 
state assets. He calls it the unholy alliance between the benefit seeking media owners and the state. 
Writing ten years later, a well-known researcher of Turkey, Svante E. Cornell describes the situation with 
the following words: 
Turkey’s media landscape suffers from numerous flaws. Chief among these is the dominance of large 
holding companies over the media landscape. As a result, major newspapers and television channels 
are owned by firms with broad and substantial economic interests. For many, winning government 
tenders is a chief objective. This means that owners of media outlets seldom see these as their main 
preoccupation, but often as assets they can use for leverage—either by using their assets to pressure 
incumbents to win favors—or by appeasing the powers that be. (Cornell 2010)
141
Another defining trend of the 1990’s was the growing marketization of media. Adherence to the IMF 
dictated liberalizing economic policy caused the marketization of many areas of society, including 
the media. Press, radio and television developed into a fast growing industrial sector: the media 
industry. This development was not unique to Turkey; for example, the famous British researcher of 
media communication, Norman Fairclough criticizes Thatcher’s Britain and other similar regimes of 
corresponding processes (Fairclough 1995, 11). Fairclough links this marketization of different spheres 
of society with a cultural change leading to consumer societies (Ibid.). Turkish writer Rıfat Balı follows 
in Fairclough’s footsteps and connects the growth in media sector with the birth of consumer society in 
Turkey (Balı 1999, 48-49). Producers must market their products to the consumers somehow, and the 
easiest way to do this is via the mass media.235 The problem with marketization is that the media owners 
do not have purely journalistic aims and rarely publish papers for purely political aims either. They 
expect the papers to make profit. However, profit as aim changes the nature of papers so that the main 
function of the paper is not to provide information for the public, but to gain a wider audience and thus 
make more money (Balı 1999).236 
The crudest example of marketization and promotion in Turkey were the so-called Encyclopedia War 
and Pen Fights (Kalem Kavgaları) between the Doğan, Sabah, and Hürriyet groups in the beginning of the 
1990s. There had been newspaper promotion campaigns off and on since the 1920’s, but with the advent 
of the private television (from 1990 onwards) they reached a new pitch. The so-called “Encyclopedia 
War” began when a coupon campaign by Sabah, which promised the readers a quality encyclopedia, 
became a huge success and Sabah’s circulation more than doubled. This led to a corresponding drop in 
the circulation of its main competitors: Hürriyet and Milliyet. A month later Milliyet launched its own 
campaign and promised its readers a better encyclopedia. Hürriyet followed suit and also promised its 
readers an encyclopedia. Most readers soon changed back to their accustomed newspapers. Soon papers 
started to give presents to their readers with almost every number: Sabah detergent, Hürriyet toothpaste. 
The combined circulation of daily papers grew from a steady three million to a peak of six and a half 
million. The struggle to increase circulation was aggravated by the columnists, who supported their 
respective papers with vehement attacks in their columns targeting the competitors and their columnists. 
The competing companies were accused of shady businesses and defrauding government funds. The 
owners put an end to these so-called Pen Fights when they became too destructive. At the end of the 
struggle Milliyet had managed to raise its circulation by 230,000 copies whereas Sabah and Hürriyet had 
lost 180,000 copies from their combined circulation (Koloğlu 1995, 137).237
235 For a recent English-language presentation on the Turkish media, consumerism and neoliberalism after 1980, see Aktan 
2014.
236 Critique against commercial newspapers has been voiced since the birth of German science of newspapers, 
Zeitungswissenschaft in the 1870’s. Combining the information providing function of the press with the profit generating 
function of a capitalist company has been viewed as problematic as long as newspapers have been studied in Europe. 
Commentators of each decade seem to see the newspapers of earlier time confirming better to the ideal, and the newspapers of 
our time corrupting it. Critics have also questioned whether it is appropriate to describe the main function of a newspaper as 
providing news for the readers; perhaps it would be more accurate to see it as providing audiences to advertisers.
237 The promotion campaigns were extremely visible and also very popular. I personally witnessed a rather intense period 
of the promotion campaigns in 1995–1996. The new private television channels advertised the newspapers of the parent 
company in often repeated, long and tedious, cheaply produced television advertisements. Many of my Turkish friends 
collected coupons from the papers to get sets of plates or suitcases. For long times afterwards it was possible to recognize 
various household items in Turkish homes as having come from one campaign or another.
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The larger groups have also often worked together. They have joined forces against other papers 
by founding a joint advertising agency and a distribution network. There have been widespread rumors 
of deals between the media companies that prevent other companies hiring journalists sacked from the 
others (ÇGD 1998, 39). Despite some cooperation, extensive promotion campaigns occurred time 
and again in the 1990’s. The leftist-statist (and Kemalist-nationalist) Cumhuriyet gained some sort of 
cult reputation with its slogan mocking these promotion campaigns: “We give our readers only news!” 
Turkish researchers of the press have evaluated the effects of the promotion campaigns as very negative. 
The press lost prestige as peoples’ choice of newspaper was not based on the quality of its news reporting, 
but the value of the goods it was giving (Topuz 2003, 349-355). In any case, the promotion campaigns 
ended by the close of the 1990’s.
The often-lamented emphasis on media’s entertainment function can clearly be seen on the pages 
of Turkish mainstream newspapers. The papers are colorful with big photographs and short articles and 
the majority of the articles are about light and entertaining subject matters such as style, celebrity gossip, 
and tragic human-interest stories. A newspaper with more than thirty pages might have only two pages 
of foreign news together with four pages of sports news and four pages of light entertaining articles. 
In some papers, the serious news articles appear only towards the end of the paper, after all the human 
interest stories and even television programs. Another feature in most of the secular papers has been the 
high number of large pictures of very scantily clothed women. Only the pro-Islamist papers and the 
Cumhuriyet have not published those at all. The cheaper end newspapers seemed to carry at least one 
partially nude female figure on each spread. According to Gencel-Bek, marketization or tabloidization of 
the news media has been mistakenly discussed under the concept of journalistic ethic in Turkey (Gencel-
Bek 2004, 382). She argues that the explanation behind this trend should not be looked for in the 
personal fault of individual journalists or even their loss of professional direction as a group, but rather in 
the industry’s fierce competition for ratings and the use of media by the owner groups to promote their 
other businesses (Ibid.)
Journalism as a Profession
The professional situation of most of the journalists in Turkey is quite weak, both in relation to the 
owners of the media and the state. Young journalists often work for years without a written contract, 
for a wage below the minimum, without insurance or a press card, and without the right to join a trade 
union or the chance of finding a new job if one is fired (Barış 2010). In a striking opposition to the 
position of the regular news reporter are the many famous columnists, who have a regular following and 
very high salaries.
There are several reasons for the weak professional position of the regular news reporter. First of all, 
until the 1980s Turkish journalists were not very well educated and as a rule quite poorly paid (Alpay 
1993). The improved educational levels in the 1980s and 1990s failed to produce material benefits or 
improve the standing of journalists vis-à-vis the owners. In Koloğlu’s (1995) opinion, only the kind of 
young journalists who are willing to adapt to the “will of the owners’” stay in the field, more independent 
minded persons move on to other sectors, and thus most reporters are young, recently graduated, and 
inexperienced (Koloğlu 1995, 142). The situation was aggravated in the early 1990s when the media 
patrons broke the syndicalization among journalists. The host of small professional organizations of 
journalists had not been very efficient even before as most of them were not actual trade unions but 
rather professional clubs, which were never oriented in protecting the interests of the journalists (Abakay 
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1984, 142, Topuz 2003). Then in 1991, the owner of Milliyet, Aydın Doğan, fired all those journalists 
who refused to resign from their unions, and other media patrons soon followed his example. As a result, 
at the time of writing this, over twenty years later, most of the media employees labor without social 
security as they are forced to work without permanent contracts. Media workers who have no contract 
cannot obtain a press card at all, and in any case it comprises a lengthy process with uncertain outcome. 
Furthermore, they cannot join the Turkish Journalists Union (Türkiye Gazeteciler Sendikası, TGS), the 
trade union that has the authority to negotiate collective agreements. (Barış 2010.) The turnover in the 
field has been high as many journalists had to leave the profession in the purges of the early 1990s, and 
during the economic crisis of 2001 an estimated 5000 media professionals lost their jobs. 
There exists numerous national or local press and media organizations, such as the Press Council 
(Basın Konseyi, BK), Association of the Turkish journalists (Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti, TGC) and 
the Progressive Journalists’ Association (Çağdaş Gazeteciler Derneği, ÇGD), which actively promote 
freedom of expression.238 The international organizations likewise monitor violations on the freedom of 
speech and defend the rights of journalist (such as Reporters sans Frontiéres, RSF and Committee to 
Protect Journalists, CPJ) as well as other human rights organizations follow actively the events in Turkey.
An interesting and striking feature of the Turkish newspapers is the great number of editorial 
columns. The columns are widely and enthusiastically read and the more popular columnists are 
established and influential opinion leaders. They receive great amounts of mail from their readers and 
have their devoted followers. The prevalent attitude is that for a journalist to be successful is to end up as 
a columnist. According to Balı, the status of a columnist is extremely high, he gets invited into exclusive 
events and television discussion programs, his face is seen in the paper on daily bases, and he becomes 
part of the common media property, a public figure, a star (Balı 1999, 56). As well-known public figures 
with their devoted readers, the columnists enjoy considerable freedom vis-à-vis their papers. They are not 
seen to represent the opinion of the paper, but their own views, and are thus allowed to say things that 
the paper does not want to be seen to stand for. Sometimes this freedom is used as a tactic; newspapers 
hire columnists known for their radical views in order to attract diverse audiences. The high number of 
columnists also changes the nature of news reporting. Often the news reports lack background details 
and interpretation of causes and effects, as these are expected to be provided by the columnists.
When considering this highly regarded and quite independent position that the columnists have, 
it is possible to research the limits of the freedom of expression imposed by the state in Turkey and 
the limits of generally agreed upon ”good taste” by analyzing columnists who are not subjected to self-
censorship imposed by the paper to the same degree as news reporters.
238 In an article written in 2000 Andrew Finkel accused the press of its inability to protect the freedom of expression (Finkel 
2000, 7). When one looks at the reports of the Basın Konseyi from early 2000s, there is some truth to this claim. The Basın 
Konseyi, which functions under the direction of the larger media corporations, severely criticized the Turkish state in its 
Turkish language reports, but on the English-language pages it instead concentrated on defending Turkey’s reputation by 
rebuffing claims of the international CPJ concerning Turkish journalists in prisons by claiming that these individuals were 
sentenced for non-journalistic crimes (http://www.basinkonseyi.org.tr/english/council_report.htm. 09.05.2002).
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Independent, Secularist or Islamic
The high-circulation dailies have not generally been committed to support any single party, i.e. 
traditionally they have not had organic ties to the parties.239 Radical leftist media is marginal. 
Apart from narrow party politics, the mainstream newspapers of the 1990s and early 2000s were 
often divided into two opposing groups: the secular(ist) camp and the moderate Islamist one.240 The 
effects of this division on the reporting and attitudes of the newspapers in question have been studied 
in quite a few case studies. The conclusions of Tülay Bektaş’ (2001) analysis of the press in the February 
28th process of 1997 have already been detailed above. According to her, the secularist press strongly 
supported the military in its overthrow of the democratically elected government of the Islamist Refah 
party, and the secularist papers emphasized conflict and confrontation in their reporting (Bektaş 2001). 
In general, the analysis of media texts from late 1990s and the period until 2002 confirms the popular 
idea that in contested issues along the axis of the secularist-Islamist struggle, the papers each had their 
predetermined (polarized) positions, and all individual news stories were presented from this perspective 
(Alan 2002, 71 on the headscarf issue).241
The coming to power of the AKP in 2002 in a single-party government halted for a timemuch of 
the confrontation between the secular media and the pro-Islamic political actors. The AKP had its roots 
in the Milli Görüş (National Outlook) movement and political Islamism, but was branded post-Islamist, 
moderate and conservative. The government’s honeymoon with the mainstream media lasted for several 
years, and the fast transformation when AKP took power has been significant enough to have merited 
several case studies. Not surprisingly, the pro-religion/pro-Islamic242 Yeni Şafak was found to have favored 
239 A detailed analysis was conducted of the press in the elections of 1999 (Türkiye’de medya ve seçimler 1999). The study 
researched the news policies of eight different newspapers prior to the 1999 national elections. The newspapers were divided 
into groups according to ownership. Doğan, Bilgin, Aksoy and Uzan groups were seen to support the (secular) political 
center, and the pro-Islamic İhlas group was seen as a supporter of the political opposition (the pro-Islamic FP, Fazilet Partisi, 
Virtue Party). The result of the analysis was that the pro-Islamic party of the time, Fazilet received most attention, but it was 
presented in a rather negative light. Hürriyet and Milliyet of the Doğan Corporation were seen to support the center parties, 
both right of center ANAP and left of center DSP (Demokrat Sol Partisi, The Democrat Left Party). Sabah and Yeni Yüzyil 
of the Bilgin group were seen to mildly support the CHP and ANAP. From the pro-Islamic dailies, the moderate Türkiye 
and Zaman gave most attention to the center right and right wing parties including the nationalist MHP (Milli Hareket 
Partisi, National Movement Party) and the moderate Islamist FP. The radical Islamist paper Akit clearly supported the FP. 
Independent leftist Cumhuriyet clearly supported the moderate left, especially the CHP, after which the most attention was 
rather surprisingly given to the pro-Kurdish HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, People’s Democrat Party) (Türkiye’de medya 
ve seçimler 1999).
240 In a book from 1997, Bayram Ayaz went further and divided the Turkish press into the nationalist right, the left of 
the social democrats, the socialists, the supporters of the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis, the conservative center-right liberal, the 
center-left liberal and the democratic papers (Ayaz 1997, 83).
241 According to one study, the secular-liberal Milliyet portrayed the türban (headscarf ) issue in a manner almost parallel to 
the official view and promoted the perception of türban as an ideological symbol the use of which should be prohibited. The 
religious Zaman promoted the türban as a sign of faith for some Muslim women and deplored its prohibition as a violation 
of freedom of religion. The Kemalist-nationalist Cumhuriyet’s view was diametrically opposed to that of Zaman and much 
more rigid and determined than that of Milliyet. A special case was the liberal daily Radical, which discussed the issue within 
a framework of human rights and political liberalism. (Alan 2002.)
242 I have some terminological problems with the Islamic actors in Turkey. The term Islamist denotes promoting political 
Islam or Islam as the basis for the political system. I have decided to use it for Refah, which promoted multiple legal systems, 
partially based on Islam. I have not used it for the AKP or the press and other branches of business that have supported a 
wider role for religion in the society. Instead I have referred to them with the more neutral terms religiously oriented, pro-
Islam or pro-Islamic.
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the AKP throughout the period analyzed, whereas the Kemalist-nationalist (or statist-leftist) Cumhuriyet 
remained firmly in opposition (Taşdemir et al. 2003). Interestingly, the important secular daily Hürriyet 
had been rather neutral towards the party all along (Başkan 2004). Importantly, the line of the secular-
liberal Milliyet quickly changed from hostile to impartial, and the populist Sabah turned from opposing 
the party to actually favoring it (Başkan 2004 and Taşdemir et al. 2003). These last two secular dailies had 
campaigned against the party prior to the elections, but changed their stance after the election victory. 
These case studies are based on the premise of the Turkish press being very much influenced by its 
ownership structure. It is thought that the media owners, i.e. the gigantic holding companies, cannot 
afford to be in open opposition and thus reflect the views of whoever is in power. This premise is then 
substantiated by textual analysis and a causal link is construed. Another possible approach could have 
been that of democratic consolidation and reconciliation between the (moderate) secularists and the 
(moderate) Islamists. Yet, it is undeniably true that the media patrons have had considerable political 
power, which they have exchanged for certain services. An important factor in this barter-trade of favors 
is the ongoing economic influence of the state, the neo-liberal rhetoric notwithstanding. The government 
of Turkey yearly directs loans to companies in sectors considered crucial, and has enough discretion 
to direct these credits to those companies that have been supportive of the government. The press is 
considered to be especially important, and the amount of these credits can be very high (Topuz 2003, 
356).
5.5.4 inteRnal limits of discussion: self censoRship
The combination of legal-political restrictions on the freedom of expression, the extra-judicial pressure, and 
the highly centralized ownership structure described above contributed to a wide-spread culture of self-
censorship in Turkey. In most cases the repressive tools did not need to be utilized. Mainstream newspapers 
rarely run into open problems with the state, and charges against them have been rare and sporadic. This 
relative freedom was partly due to the powerful positions of the owners of the press corporations and partly 
due to their willingness to operate within the limits set by the state elites or the army. Self-censorship, 
ideological prejudices of the journalists, and internal censorship and unofficial warnings within the papers 
usually ensured that news reporting remained within the officially accepted line.
As the media patrons are also heads of large multi-field conglomerates, it is important for them to 
maintain good relationship with the state and its decision-making organs. That is why, despite their size 
and influence, they have still submitted to outside pressure. The companies have asked their journalists 
not to write about certain sensitive topics, refused to publish them and finally they have even fired those 
individual journalists who have been unwilling to follow the rules. Several journalists and chief editors 
have explained how some top end officials of the armed forces have contacted them solely to command 
them to stop reporting on a certain topic. In general, actual commands have not been needed, but the 
journalists and editors have been willing to take the hint, so to say. The Turkish press cannot be said to 
have fulfilled its (theoretical) duty as the fourth power, the check for the other three. The press has also 
been criticized for not standing up for their own; the mainstream press has not sympathized or supported 
the more ideological small papers in their plight. 
Two critics of the press in the 1990s, Ragıp Duran and Bayram Ayaz, also noted the limited range of 
sources the media employs. The main sources for news were found to be state and other public officials. 
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The number of other than official sources used with any regularity was very limited and all the newspapers 
used the same informants and news agencies (Duran 2000, 30; Ayaz 1997, 33-34). The limited sources 
created narrow and monotonous news reporting. Also the owners, editors, and journalists tended to come 
from quite a homogeneous background and shared roughly the same worldview and political opinions. 
”If the cooks and the ingredients stay the same, we are served the same food every day” (Duran 2000, 
30). In Duran’s opinion the monotonous output was the reason for the very low circulation figures; the 
newspapers were not very interesting.
Writing in 2000, the foreign correspondent and journalist Andrew Finkel (2000) claimed that the 
main problems of the Turkish press were internal, and the press itself was to blame for the poor condition 
of the freedom of expression. The press had not stood up; it has not defended the freedom of expression 
(Finkel 2000, 7). Because of its ownership structure the press was deeply involved in the very same 
corruption it is supposed to reveal and investigate. It was not willing to defend its own rights or those 
of its employees; it did not fulfill the standards it had set for itself; it chose to remain silent, and it 
distributed lies and did sloppy work in general. Under normal conditions, an open market competition 
between different media ensures good quality work as a newspaper jealously guards its good name to 
survive in a crowded market. Nevertheless, this system did not work in Turkey. The general respect and 
trust for Turkish media was low,243 but in Finkel’s view, the reader did not have a real choice (Finkel 
2000). Despite important changes in Turkey’s media market, this situation has not dramatically altered 
to this date. 
Another critic, Ragıp Duran accused the media of too close ties to the state and decision makers 
of the country. According to him, the press functioned as distributor for state propaganda, rather 
than independent provider of information (Duran 2000, 32). It was impossible for the press to have 
independent publishing policies when the papers were not financially independent. Despite the abolition 
of direct state subventions, the state still retained considerable economic power over the press via its 
owners. Already in 1993 Alpay wrote that
The government has opted for a policy line aimed at destroying newspapers financially and 
economically just because newspapers have been publicizing the government’s shortcomings and 
mistakes. It is widely believed that changes in newspapers’ leading editors and attitudes towards the 
government are often due to economic pressures by the government on newspaper owners in the form 
of punishments or rewards… newspaper owners’ interests in businesses outside the press are believed 
to render them even more vulnerable to economic pressures by the government. (Alpay 1993, 84.) 
The price of dishonest press and nonfunctioning public opinion for the society is high. It contributes to 
the morally degrading idea of laissez faire society where anything goes. One can defraud state property 
and violate human rights without ever having to face charges. Furthermore, finding solutions for sensitive 
issues, forming a social consensus and realizing democratizing reforms is made harder without properly 
functioning public space. The proprietors of newspapers have not seemed to understand that the very 
function of the press is to reflect the truth, not to use its power to create a better truth. (Finkel 2000, 4).
243 According to the Eurobarometer of 2008, only 23% of the respondents in Turkey said they trust the newspapers (EU 
average: 44%), 25% trust the television (EU average: 53%) and 28% trust the radio (EU average: 61%) (Eurobarometre 69 
2008, 18).
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5.5.5 the 2000s, a neW thReat emeRges
The ownership structure of Turkish media underwent major changes in the early 2000s. As was stated 
above, in 1999, the scene was dominated by five important media holding companies: Doğan, Bilgin 
(Sabah/ATV), İhlas, Uzan and Aksoy (Türkiye’de medya ve seçimler 1999). By 2003 Aksoy had sold its 
media ownings, and the Çukurova (Karamehmet) group had risen to the top five. By 2010, the picture 
had changed dramatically: The Uzan and Bilgin/Sabah groups had disappeared and Doğan had suffered 
serious setbacks. At the same time, the pro-government (Islamic-conservative) companies had made 
significant gains in the media market. The events began in 1999, when Turkey’s economy was hit by 
another crisis, which subsequently turned into a banking crisis. During the next few years, six banks were 
taken over by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TSMF), and, as many of the media corporations 
owned banks as well, this had major repercussions for the media sector. At the time, the events were 
interpreted having taken place either as a result of the greed and irresponsibility of the large holding 
companies, or as a “media war” taking place between the influential media patrons.
One of the bankrupted banks taken over by the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TSMF or in some 
sources, such as Topuz 2003, 324: BDDK, Bankacılık Düzenleme ve Denetleme Kurulu) was Etibank, 
which belonged to the second most influential media holding group in Turkey, the Bilgin/Sabah group. 
The TSMF sequestered all other companies belonging to the owner of the holding company, Dinç Bilgin, 
including his newspapers, of which the daily Sabah was the most important one, and his television 
station. The consequent events of dismantling the Bilgin/Sabah group were surrounded by numerous 
rumors and purposeful false information, and thus somewhat difficult to follow. Apparently Bilgin first 
attempted to sell his media companies to a new group named MTM founded by Turgay Ciner (the 
owner of Park Group), Mehmet Emin Karamehmet (the main owner of the Çukurova Group) and a 
third person, but the TSMF did not accept this sale, and Bilgin returned to head Sabah once more. 
Towards the end of 2002 he licensed Sabah and ATV, claimed to be the only companies he had left, to 
Turgay Ciner for five years. The license fee was agreed to go directly to TSMF, but was not even nearly 
enough to cover the debts of Etibank. 
The 2003 account of the events by the influential researcher of the Turkish press, Hıfzı Topuz 
sheds some light to the complicated nature of the process and why it was very difficult to find accurate 
information on the chain of events. According to Topuz: 
The media wars in 2002 were between these groups: the Doğan group, the Bilgin group, the 
Karamehmet group, the Uzan group. At the base of these wars were these events: The Doğan Media 
Group made a 500 million dollar offer to the BDDK to buy the newspaper Sabah and [the television 
channel] ATV. The BDDK leased Sabah and ATV out to Ciner. The atmosphere became heated when 
the BDDK did not accept Doğan Group’s offer. Following this, Aydın Doğan took an important 
group of employees from Sabah and ensured the founding of Vatan [newspaper]. The real target 
was Dinç Bilgin. However, when Dinç Bilgin was imprisoned and released because of the Etibank 
trial, Aydın Doğan supported him. Perhaps Aydın Doğan’s aim was to prevent Sabah from going 
to Turgay Ciner’s and Mehmet Emin Karamehmet’s hands. But, Dinç Bilgin made a deal with the 
Karamehmets and Turgay Ciner, despite Aydın Doğan. Following this, the Doğan Group started an 
attack campaign against Dinç Bilgin and Turgay Ciner. Turgay Ciner and the Sabah Group started 
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a counter-campaign with claims of their requisition of the Petrol Office244 and other such claims 
of corruption. Also, they founded the United Press Distributing Company [to function] against 
the Doğan Group’s distribution company Yaysat. The Akşam Group of Karamehmet’s participated 
together with the Sabah Group in the campaign against the Doğan Group. (Topuz 2003, 324) 245
I will return to the subsequent story of the newspaper Sabah and the Bilgin group in 2007, after the story 
of the collapse of the Uzan family’s empire in 2003–2004. In the early 2000s, the Uzan group was usually 
listed as the fourth largest media conglomerate in Turkey. The group owned five television channels, six 
radio stations, the popular daily Star, a news agency, distribution network and several advertisement 
agencies. The story of Uzan family’s media holdings started when a son of the family, Cem Uzan, joined 
with the late president Turgut Özal’s son to found the first Turkish private television channel in 1990. 
The channel broadcasted from Germany to Turkey via a satellite, thus paving the way for other private 
television channels. The Uzan group also had extensive holdings in banking (Imar Bankası), finance, 
insurance, telecommunications (Telsim), energy, automobile manufacturing and construction sectors 
(Gencel 2000, 7). Cem Uzan was also the founder and the chairman of the Genç Parti (GP, Young 
Party), which touted a youthful, populist, nationalist anti-EU and anti-US platform. Partly because of 
the backing of the family media, the party managed to win 7.5% of the vote in the national elections of 
2002, and was considered as a semi-serious competitor for the winning AKP.
The Uzan group disintegrated in 2003–2004, after the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund assumed 
control, first of their bank Imar Bankası, and then the rest of more than 200 Uzan family companies. 
The Uzan family’s debts to the Turkish state were estimated to be around 8.5 billion dollars. The Uzan’s 
were in trouble outside of Turkey as well: they were found guilty for defrauding billions of dollars of 
Nokia and Motorola funds (in the Telsim-case), and several members of the family had to go into hiding. 
Several court cases were also opened against Cem Uzan. The television channel of the group, the Star 
TV was sold to the Doğan Media Holding, and the newspaper Star to a group known to be close to the 
ruling AKP. Due to the notorious business practices of the family, the take-over was generally not seen 
as a political maneuver, except by Cem Uzan himself, who maintained that he was a target of politically 
motivated manhunt. In any case, the economic power of the Uzan group and the political power of their 
party had been broken. The Genç Parti participated in the 2007 general elections, but managed to gain 
only 3% of the vote. Cem Uzan fled Turkey in 2009 and applied for asylum in France. In 2010 Cem 
Uzan’s father Kemal Uzan filed a complaint against Turkey at the European Court of Human Rights 
demanding $165 billion compensation for the allegedly illegal cancellation of the licenses of the Uzan-
owned energy companies Kepez and ÇEAŞ.
In 2007, the Sabah/ATV group (still Turkey’s second most important media company, which had 
been leased for Turgay Ciner in 2002) was sold to the only bidder, Çalık Energy, known for its close ties to 
the AKP. The deal was apparently financed by state banks and a Qatar-based foundation (Cornell 2010). 
This started to raise serious questions of the aims of the AKP, also in relation to the previous take-over of 
the Uzan-owned media (see for example: Cornell 2010). By 2007, AKP’s five-year long honeymoon with 
244 The formerly state-owned oil company the Doğan group had purchased. It is good to remember that holding companies 
have been accused of supporting the government in exchange of winning privatization tenders.
245 I am not sure there exists a good and concise description of the complicated processes that culminated in the changes of 
media ownership. For a concise but still quite detailed description, see Adaklı 2006, 358-369. 
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the liberal mainstream press was over, and with the mounting political tension between the secularists 
and the AKP, more critical voices were once again heard in the media. The mainstream media that had 
been moderately supportive of the government started to voice increasing (but still relatively moderate) 
criticism against the AKP. 
The AKP was not willing to accept this criticism, and began putting heavy pressure on the media. 
In 2008, tax inspectors found Turkey’s largest media company, the Doğan Holding, guilty of tax 
irregularities, and it was subsequently ordered to pay a half a billion dollar penalty. The owner of the 
holding company, Aydın Doğan, accused the government of a politically motivated attempt to silence 
the media and connected the tax inspection and fine to his media’s reporting of several corruption cases 
of AKP actors (The Wall Street Journal 2009).246 The AKP government retorted that the tax inspection 
was a routine investigation, and has unjustly been used politically against them. As a result of the tax 
debt, Aydın Doğan but had to put several of his most important newspapers up for sale.247 
All in all, it is easy to argue that the actions amount to a systematic campaign against the freedom 
of the press, where the critical press is pressured both by economic and legal means. The AKP ministers, 
including the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan himself, have been quick to use the restrictive 
legislation to open court cases against media outlets and individual journalists. Likewise, the so-called 
Ergenekon and Sledgehammer conspiracy trials have been used to target representatives of the media 
as well.248 Over the past years, the media uncritically supportive of the government has been supported 
and expanded by the actions of the governing AKP. Şahin Alpay’s description of the early 1990s, already 
quoted above, seems once again apt: 
246 The most visible of which was the case of Deniz Feneri (Lighthouse), a charity organization that channeled money from 
donors in Germany to AKP actors. 
247 There were several rumors and news of the sale of the Doğan papers from 2009 onwards. First Milliyet was to be sold to a 
German media group Springer, and then to a Turkish group İpek, known for its close ties to the Muslim network Fetullahçılar. 
In 2011 Milliyet and Vatan were sold to Turkish buyers (Karacan group and Demirören group), by 2012 Karacan had had to 
sell its share to Demirören, known to support the AKP. There is reason to believe the tax inspection was politically motivated 
and it is noteworthy that similar action has not been taken against companies supportive of the AKP, not even those publicly 
accused of corruption. For an English-language presentation of the reorganization of media ownership in the early 2000s, see 
Aydın 2014.
248 Both the so-called Ergenekon and Sledgehammer conspiracies were supposedly plans to overthrow the AKP government. 
The Ergenekon investigation began in 2007, when an arms depot was discovered by the Istanbul police. The ensuing 
investigation revealed a loose, clandestine, ultranationalist organization of the “deep state,” within which various individuals 
and organizations had plotted to overthrow the government. Prosecutors accused the group of planning to create chaos 
through bombings and attacks to force the army to step in and topple Erdogan’s government. Some 275 people were charged 
with belonging to the group, among them many retired and active military officers, lawyers, academics and politicians. In 
August 2013 the court reached its verdicts. Only 21 accused were acquitted, and many accused received very long prison 
sentences, including the ex-Chief of the General Staff (2008-10) General İlker Başbuğ, the nationalist lawyer Kemal Kerinçsiz 
known for pressing charges against famous Turkish authors such as Orhan Pamuk and Elif Şafak for denigrating Turkishness 
and Doğu Perinçek, the head of the socialist-nationalist Workers’ Party (İşçi Partisi, İP). Another conspiracy to overthrow 
the government was uncovered in early 2010, when a plot by the armed forces from 2002–2003 named Sledgehammer 
(Balyoz) was leaked to the daily Taraf. Apparently, a group of people had drawn a detailed “Sledgehammer Operation Plan,” 
which aimed to create disorder in Turkey to provide the pretext for a military coup. When the court reached its verdict in 
2012, more than 300 people were given prison sentences. However, Turkey’s Constitutional Court overruled the verdict on 
Sledgehammer in 2014, and all convicted were freed. The ruling on Ergenekon was overturned by the High Court of Appeals 
in 2016, and the convicted were freed. Apparently the evidence was either collected illegally or fabricated. Both the AKP and 
the Gülenist movement have been accused of using the cases as well as some large-scale corruption cases to target its political 
opponents and the military. (For analysis of the coup plans and court cases, see Jenkins 2013, 2014 and 2016.) 
150
The government has opted for a policy line aimed at destroying newspapers financially and 
economically just because newspapers have been publicizing the government’s shortcomings and 
mistakes. It is widely believed that changes in newspapers’ leading editors and attitudes towards the 
government are often due to economic pressures by the government on newspaper owners in the form 
of punishments or rewards… newspaper owners’ interests in businesses outside the press are believed 
to render them even more vulnerable to economic pressures by the government. (Alpay 1993, 84). 
After a liberalizing period based on mutual good will, the AKP government returned to the more 
intolerant and repressive practices of the previous era. 
By the 2010’s it had become increasingly clear that the 1990s (simplistic) classification of the media 
into secularist and Islamist camps had become increasingly obsolete. Instead, mainstream media could 
be divided into both the strongly pro-AKP camp and the media that does not wholeheartedly support 
the AKP. Supporters of the AKP government have made important gains in the mainstream media 
since 2002. Pro-AKP ownership of mainstream media has grown from roughly 20 percent to around 
50 percent during the AKP decade in power. Both the sacking of important columnists such as Hasan 
Cemal (Milliyet) and Can Dündar (Milliyet) and their replacement with more pro-AKP opinion leaders 
as well as mainstream media’s initial silence on the Gezi Park demonstrations have been interpreted to 
reflect either the new ownership structure or perhaps the relative powerlessness of the media patrons vis-
à-vis the AKP government. At this point it is perhaps in order to remember that despite the return to 
restrictive policies and changes in the balance of power between the pro-government and critical media, 
it was still possible to raise voices critical of the government in Turkey. I will return to the topic of 
freedom of media under the AKP rule in chapter nine, the epilogue.
At the end of the first decade of the 2000s, the major media companies in Turkey were: Doğan 
Group, Turkuvaz, Ciner Group, Çukurova Group, Doğuş Group, and Feza Group. All the major 
commercial channels and newspapers belong to these media holdings. Additionally, the distribution of 
the print media was dominated by Doğan Group’s Yay-Sat and Turkuvaz Group’s Turkuvaz Dağıtım 
Pazarlama. (Barış 2010.) In 2010, Doğan Group retained its prominent position among the media 
conglomerates with its mainstream major dailies Hürriyet, Milliyet (sold in 2011) and Vatan (sold in 
2011), the boulevard daily Posta, and liberal Radikal (closed in 2016). The important newcomer 
with close connections to the ruling AKP was the Turkuvaz Group, owned by Çalık Holding. As was 
described above, they have acquired the mainstream Sabah, previously of the Bilgin group, in addition to 
smaller papers. The flagship of the Ciner Group was the Gazete Habertürk, launched in 2009. Çukurova 
Group owns the nationalist dailies Akşam, H.O Tercüman, and the boulevard paper Güneş. The daily with 
highest circulation in Turkey was the liberal-Islamic Zaman, which was owned by Feza Group, generally 
supportive of the AKP, but counted among the sphere of influence of the Islamic group of Fethullah 
Gülen not the AKP.249 The more conservative Islamic daily Yeni Şafak of the Albayrak business group was 
a staunch supporter of the ruling AKP. The voice of the Kemalist-nationalist opposition was the small 
circulation old quality daily Cumhuriyet, and the interesting new-comer was the independent daily Taraf. 
(Barış 2010.) 
As a sign of the volatile market situation, several new newspapers were successfully launched: Vatan 
249 This distinction became very important in 2013–2014, when the Gülen movement and the AKP struggled for power. 
The daily Zaman was taken over by state authorities in 2016.
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(the fatherland) was founded by Doğan company in 2002, and 2007 witnessed the founding of the 
independent daily Taraf (Side), which later leaked a number of secret documents related to the Turkish 
military and had an important role in the starting of the so-called Ergenekon and Sledgehammer (Balyoz) 
cases. The last newcomer is Gazete Habertürk founded in 2009 by the Ciner Group. By 2011 Vatan had 
a circulation of more than 111,000, Taraf over 52,000, and Habertürk over 253,000 (Medyatava 2011). 
Another significant development was the growing influence of the new media as a source of 
information. There were approximately only one million Internet users in Turkey in 2000, which meant 
only 1.66% of the population (Gencel 2000, 65). By 2004 the figure was still only 7.5%, but by 2008, 
the number of Internet users had increased dramatically to 26.5 million, a penetration of 34.5 percent 
(Barış 2010). By 2010 the estimated number of Internet users was already 35 million (RSF 2010b),250 
and by 2015 roughly 55% of the population used Internet (TÜİK 18.8.2015).
250 For more information on the digital media and social media in Turkey, see Tunç & Görgülü 2012 and Akdoğan 2012.
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ChaPter 6: Pro-kUrDish DemanDs in the Print meDia
This sixth chapter analyzes how pro-Kurdish activism and demands for Kurdish cultural, linguistic and 
political rights and recognition of separate Kurdish identity were (re)presented in the Turkish mainstream 
press (1999 –2005), and what this tells us about the kind of Turkishness constructed by the press. The 
material analyzed in the four case studies consists of news articles and columns related to Turkey’s Kurdish 
speaking population, their claims for specific rights, and their representation or explicit discussions on 
how to solve “the Kurdish issue.” These cases investigate the gradually increasing visibility of Kurds as 
Kurds in the non-state public discourse. In the final, fifth case study presented in the next chapter the 
focus is on two rounds of the so-called citizenship debates, i.e. explicit debates on citizenship in Turkey 
and whether redefinition of Turkish citizenship could contribute towards resolving the Kurdish issue. The 
overall aim is to shed light on how the mainstream print media has participated in the (re)construction 
of the nation vis-à-vis the Kurdish demands for specific rights and what kind of part it has played in the 
slow and uneven process of recognition of cultural and linguistic diversity in Turkey. 
I will begin this chapter with a few words on why it is worthwhile to concentrate on the products 
of the mass media in investigating constructions of Turkishness (and Kurdishness) and the boundaries of 
being a good citizen in Turkey. Before moving on to the analysis of the case studies, a concise summary 
of the development of research on Kurds is presented. A separate section is devoted to the few previous 
studies of Kurds and the press in Turkey.
6.1 media, RepResentation and text
Media is important; it has become one of the most pervasive phenomena in our culture. Our knowledge 
about the world around us is mediated through press and broadcasting institutions.
The mass media, and especially the news media, have an unequivocal position in society when it 
comes to establishing and disseminating common cultural references. (Winkler 2002).
Thus analysis of the language used by the media can provide insights into how that mediation can affect 
the representation of people, places and events: 
The mass media have become one of the principal means through which we gain access to a large 
part of our information about the world, as well as to much of our entertainment. Because of this, 
they are a powerful site for the production and circulation of social meanings, i.e. to a great extent 
the media decide the significance of things that happen in the world for any given culture, society or 
social group. The language used by the media to represent particular social and political groups, and 
to describe newsworthy events, tends to provide the dominant ways available for the rest of us to talk 
about those groups and events. (Thornborrow 2004, 56). 
The media has the power to select what counts as news, and who gets to appear in the papers, television 
and radio. The media also has the power to define “the way that stories about people and events get told 
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and the frameworks in which people get to appear and talk.” (Ibid., 57) These public representations 
(of “us” and “them”) are crucial for identity politics. As identities are constructed within representations 
rather than outside them (Hall 1999b), representations themselves have become a site and an object of 
struggle in negotiating and contesting identity. It is important to recognize the power of representations: 
the ways in which people are represented have real consequences (Taylor 1994, Pietikäinen 2003). 
The development of print media has been considered a crucial element in the increasing hegemony 
of nationalism in the modern era (Anderson 1991), and national media is seen, and has been investigated, 
as one of the principal sites of the daily production of the nation (Billig 1995; in Turkey Yumul & 
Özkırımlı 2000). Two other crucial cites are education and compulsory military service. In Turkey the 
content of school primers has been the focus of several studies (for example Copeaux 2006 [1994]; Üstel 
2005; Kaplan 2002) whereas the sensitive topic of the influence of the compulsory military service on 
youth in Turkey has been a difficult one (Altınay 2004). Also nationalism and/or representations of 
ethnic and cultural diversity in the media have received some scholarly attention (Yumul & Özkırımlı 
2000; Ayaz 1997; Somer 2005a; Sezgin & Wall 2005).
As media is seen as a crucial site for representation of identities in the contemporary world, there 
exist a number of studies on ethnicity, minorities, or representation of cultural difference in the Western 
media (for an overview of studies in the EU members states 1995–2000 see EUMC 2002). Often 
questions of ethnicity are about drawing and redrawing of boundaries. As Simon Cottle states in his 
introduction to Ethnic Minorities and the Media: 
Boundaries define the borders of nations and territories as well as the imaginations of minds and 
communities… they serve to mark out the limits of a given field, territory or social space. Depending on 
where one is positioned or is able to stand—whether inside or outside, at the centre or on the margins, 
or perhaps crossing and recrossing border—they serve simultaneously to include some of us, exclude 
others and to condition social relations and the formation of identities. Over time, boundaries can 
become deeply embedded in the structures and institutions of societies, in their practices and even in 
their ‘common sense’. Once institutionally sedimented and taken for granted, these boundaries all too 
often harden into exclusionary barriers legitimized by cultural beliefs, ideologies and representations… 
The media perform a crucial role in the public representation of unequal social relations and the play 
of cultural power. It is in and through these representations that members of the media audience are 
invited to construct a sense of who ‘we’ are in relation to who ‘we’ are not. (Cottle 2000, 2.) 
In the case investigated here, the boundaries are drawn between good citizens and others, Turks and 
foreigners, normal and deviant, insider and outsider.
The collective findings of the research efforts on ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity in the 
Western media generally make for depressing reading. News representations of ethnic minorities have 
been described as biased and partial, favoring majority over ethnic, cultural or religious minorities, which 
are typically represented within a context of problems, crime and disturbance (Cottle 2000, ter Wal 
2002, Pietikäinen 2003). In addition there are problems with negative stereotyping, a tendency to ignore 
structural inequalities and the racism experienced by ethnic minorities, a lack of background reporting to 
ethnic, cultural and religious issues, insufficiently checked factual bases, underrepresentation of minority 
opinion, and an over-reliance on official sources (ter Wal 2002). 
Fundamental questions of ethnic or cultural minority representations transcend national borders, 
but as the existence of ethnic minorities has been a taboo in the Turkish public sphere, and immigration 
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has not been a major issue, many of the research questions generally associated with investigating ethnic, 
cultural, and religious diversity are not the most important ones in the Turkish case. At the same time 
it should be borne in mind that it would not be all that difficult to construct negative representations 
within the “code language” used for Kurds and the Kurdish issue. Also, as will be discussed in more detail 
below, with the increasing visibility of the category Kurdish (Somer 2005a), the situation has already 
begun to change by the early 2000s: according to the findings of Sezgin and Wall (2005), the Kurds 
were mainly presented in a negative manner.251 I.e. Kurds were more visible than before but presented in 
predominantly negative ways.
6.2 ReseaRch on kuRds
Kurds were a seriously understudied topic in Turkey until the late 1990s or even early 2000s.
Until this recent period, speaking about Kurds was a genuine taboo in Turkish universities. It generally 
seemed that academics only contributed to official ideology production by denying the existence of Kurds 
and Kurdish issues and that only non-academics dealt with it. (Scalbert-Yücel & Le Ray 2006). 
Scalbert-Yücel and Le Ray summarize the conclusions of a few works on Turkish universities that argue 
that the university (like other Turkish educational institutions) has been used to train good citizens 
and to spread national culture and nationalism. Since the coup of 1980, the universities have not been 
autonomous, and the Law 2547 of 1981 on higher education gave the universities the task of ensuring 
loyalty to Atatürk’s nationalism and his reforms and principles, being in harmony with the national, 
ethical, human, spiritual and cultural values of the Turkish nation, putting the common good above the 
own personal interests and having full devotion to family, country and nation, etc. (Scalbert-Yücel 2006). 
In accordance with the legislation, science and academics have been used to serve ideological production.
The most notable early exception to the silence on Kurds in Turkey were the publications of the 
sociologist İsmail Beşikçi, and his treatment is an illuminating example of the price of breaking the 
taboos of the official ideology in the Turkey of 1970s and 1980s. According to Martin van Bruinessen, 
Beşikçi’s 
works of the 1970s are important not only as studies of Kurdish history but also, or even especially, 
as one of the all too rare critiques of the Kemalist ideology and associated prejudices that not only 
dominated mainstream academic discourse but also loomed large over debates on the left. (van 
Bruinessen 2003-4[/2005].) 
By a systematic critique of Kemalist policies, Kemalist ideology and the Kemalist historiography, and by 
admitting that Kurdish ethnicity was relevant, Beşikçi came to be associated with “the enemy” and was 
isolated from the academic world (Ibid.). Beşikçi’s claims struck at the roots of the worldview of Kemalists 
as well as Turkish leftists. He was dismissed from his office as an assistant professor, and furthermore 
251 For more details, see 6.2 below.
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sentenced to prison for violating the indivisibility of the Turkish nation, after having been denounced 
to the military by the rector and deans of his own university after the 1971 coup (Ibid.). He continued 
to do research and to publish increasingly polemical and radical works and was repeatedly sentenced to 
prison for his work in the 1980s and 1990s.
As the existence of Kurdish ethnicity or Kurdish people within Turkey was officially denied for 
most of the 1980s, it could not legitimately be researched. Instead there was pseudo-scientific research 
produced in research institutes such as the revitalized state-run Atatürk High Institution of Culture, 
Language and History (Atatürk Kültür, Dil ve Tarih Yüksek Kurumu) and the private but state-sponsored 
Research Institute on Turkish Culture (Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü, TKAE) that aimed to prove 
there were no Kurds in Turkey, i.e. that Kurds were actually Turks. Quite a few of the books published in 
the 1980s were republications from the 1960s or even the 1930s (Scalbert-Yücel & Le Ray 2006).
Outside of Turkey, research on Kurds had begun already in the 1920s with the works of Russian 
diplomat-scholars such as Basile Nikitine and Vladimir Minorsky. Members of the Kurdish Diaspora in 
Europe, such as Kamuran Bedirhan and Ismet Cherif Vanli had worked to popularize the issue as a Kurdish 
(national) one. Yet, research on Kurds remained scant, as political division into several countries and linguistic 
divisions (both into various Kurdish languages as well as the language context of Turkish, Arabic and Persian) 
were and remain important obstacles (Scalbert-Yücel & Le Ray 2006). An important hallmark from the 
1970s was the work of the Dutch anthropologist Martin van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh and State (1978).
The increased international visibility of Kurdish populations as distinct groups both in Turkey and 
in Iraq in late 1980s and early 1990s inspired international research on Kurdish history and Kurds in 
regional politics. Van Bruinessen was joined by Robert Olson (1989), David McDowall (first edition 
in 1996, the 2004 edition used in this study), Michael M. Gunter (1997), Nicole F. Watts (1999) 
and others. A number of Kurdish Institutes were founded in the Western countries, and they publish 
scholarly journals such as Journal of Kurdish Studies, International Journal of Kurdish Studies, Etudes 
Kurdes, Kurdologie and Kurdische Studien (for more details of the activities of these institutes, see Scalbert-
Yücel & Le Ray 2006).
The development of studies on Kurds in Turkey was encouraged by the translation into Turkish of a 
number of important works on the topic in the early 1990s. In the second half of the 1990s an increasing 
numbers of researchers working in Turkey started to study Kurds. Two hallmark works included Doğu 
Ergil’s 1995 non-scholarly report Doğu Sorunu: Teşhisler Tespitler (The Eastern Problem: Diagnosis and 
Findings) generally known as Güneydoğu Raporu (South-East Report), which was publicly debated in the 
Turkish press, and Kemal Kirişçi’s and Gareth M. Winrow’s The Kurdish Question and Turkey. An Example 
of a Trans-State Ethnic Conflict (1997). There were also important contributions from well-known 
researchers such as Mesut Yeğen (1999, 2003, 2004, 2006) and Murat Somer (2004, 2005a, 2005b, 
2007). Yet, until the first years of the 2000s, the quantity of research remained limited, and it consisted 
of the work of a small number of foreign and Turkish researchers. 
The field started to develop rapidly in the first decade of the 2000s. The following examples can be 
given as indicators of the scope of the transformation: in 2005 the quality journal New Perspectives on 
Turkey (published by the Turkish Homer Kitabevi) had a special issue on Kurds and Turkey’s South-East; 
and in 2009 Toplum ve Kuram, Lêkolîn ü Xebatên Kurdî, a Turkish-Kurdish-language (semi-academic) 
journal concentrating solely on issues related to Kurds and their situation began to appear in Turkey. 
Also, judging by the presentations at The World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies 2010 (Barcelona 
19-24th, July), there are many young researchers working on various topics to do with Kurds, and thus 
many more works on Turkey’s Kurdish speaking population are likely to appear in the near future.
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Yet, one should note the continuing limitations and attitudinal constrictions: it was still problematic to 
do research on the Kurds in Turkish state universities at the end of the period investigated in this work (i.e. 
2009). In addition, publications that worked to either occlude the ethno-political nature of the conflict or 
aimed at denying the existence of Kurds in Turkey were not a phenomenon limited to the early republican 
period and the 1980s. In 2006, Scalbert-Yücel & Le Ray noted that such works were carried on until the 
1990s, but actually the genre remained alive and popular in the first years of the 2000s. 
There still seemed to be a market for pseudo-scientific works on Kurds/the Kurdish issue that catered 
to the nationalist Turkish readers. These works were colored by an essentialist approach to nations, 
ethnicities and identities. One relatively recent, striking example of this kind of work was Kart-Kurt 
Sesleri Arasında Kaybolan Gerçek. Kürtler ve Türklük (The Truth Lost among the Kart-Kurt Sounds: Kurds 
and Turkishness)252 by Ali Rıza Özdemir (2009). In this book Özdemir sets out to find out who the Kurds 
are. In his opinion, the answer to this question will resolve the problem: “If Kurds are Turkish, they 
are Turks; if they are not, the Turkish nation and state has to accept the Kurds as a separate entity…” 
(Özdemir 2009, 14). It may not come as a great surprise that, after a careful consultation of a number of 
sources, he comes to the conclusion that “viewing the Kurds as a branch of the Turks is not a consequence 
of political discourse but the result communicated to us by historical and sociological sources.” (Ibid., 
283).253 In comparison, the conclusions of the ex-diplomat Bilâl N. Şimşir in Kürtçülük II. 1924—1999 
(2009) seem rather moderate. According to him, there is no Kurdish problem in Turkey. Instead there 
is a problem of separatist terrorism and “Kurdism” (Kürtçülük) created and encouraged by European 
powers and America (Şimşir 2009, 691). But, Şimşir works to merely deny the ethnic dimension of the 
Kurdish conflict rather than the existence of Kurds as such. He even speaks of “the Kurdish people.” 
Despite the continued publication of this sort of works, they do not represent the academic mainstream 
any longer, and both of the examples given above were written by individuals outside of the academia.254
252 Supposedly the word “Kürt” is onomatopoetic and comes from “Kart-Kurt” sounds made by walking on snow. 
253 Besides this denial of the existence of a separate Kurdish ethnicity, this astonishing book is full of striking examples of 
essentialist and Turkish nationalist stances. 1) The author relies on Atatürk’s definition of the Turkish nation (Özdemir 2009, 
32 onwards). 2) He seems to adhere to the Turkish History Thesis: “We should not forget that the Turkish nation is not a 
nation of few thousands of years, but a nation that came into existence in the deepness of history and has spread into the four 
corners of the earth.” (Ibid., 33). 3) He is also a believer in the European conspiracy theory, according to which the Europeans 
discovered the Kurds to weaken Turkey. Yet, the scientific efforts to establish a separate origin for them have not brought any 
significant results. (Ibid., 34). The author works hard to give a scientific veneer to his nationalist rhetoric:”Kurds are a Turkish 
tribe, has been proposed by a number of persons in the scientific circles as well as concluded by quite a few researchers.” (Ibid., 
106.) 4) He works to prove that the Kurds were not in Anatolia before the Turks (Ibid., 121), and 5) that there is no proper 
Kurdish language but a vernacular mixture of Arabic, Persian and Turkish. Because of that, it is impossible to teach Kurdish 
as a mother tongue at schools even if teaching in one’s mother tongue is a human right (Ibid., 210). In the final chapter the 
author works to refute the label of ethnic mosaic as Turkey does not fulfill the minimum condition that at least 35 percent 
of population is of ethnic origins. In Turkey, less than 10 percent of the population is ethnic. “Because of this, according to 
objective and scientific results, Turkey is not an ethnic mosaic.” (Ibid., 277-8). Translations are mine.
254 Çakır Ceyhan Suvari, who has analyzed a few more recent works with “Turkist” argumentation, actually argues that 
Turkism remains the prevailing ideology in the scholarly publications on ethnicity and history in Turkey today (writing in 
2010). Yet, the authors he gives as examples are not first and foremost historians or researchers of ethnicity/nationalism, 
but have made their academic careers in other fields, two of them in psychiatry. In addition, three of the four are already 
retired. Thus it is difficult to argue that they represent the mainstream of Turkish scholarly research, despite their fame and 
the enormous popularity of their works. Vamik Volkan is a vocal public personae, Erol Göka received Turkey’s authors’ award 
for his Türk Grup Davranışı (Group behavior of Turk) in 2006, and by 2014 over 40 prints had been taken from Ali Tayyar 
Önder’s Türkiye’nin Etnik Yapısı (Ethnic Structure of Turkey) from 1998. 
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6.3 ReseaRch on kuRds in the pRess
The number of studies on media and Kurdish issue in Turkey has been limited. To my knowledge, only 
three works were published in the 1990s on Kurds in the mainstream media. In addition, a history of 
Kurdish language press (Yücel 1998), an article on media identities for Kurds and Alevis (Yavuz 1999)255 
and an article on the pro-PKK MED-TV that was broadcasted to Turkey via satellite (Hassanpour 1998) 
were published in the 1990s.
Out of the three books published in the 1990s on Kurds and the Kurdish issue in the mainstream 
press, only one is a scientific study based on a quantitative analysis of the coverage of four Turkish dailies 
(actually the versions published in Germany256) on the Kurdish issue for a period of four months in 
1995 (Ayaz 1997). The study Türkiye’de İnsan Hakları ve Kürt Sorunu Örneğinde Türk Basını: Militarizm, 
Devlet, Basın İlişkisi (Turkish Press in the Case of Human Rights and the Kurdish Issue in Turkey: the 
Relationship between Militarism, the State and the Press) was a part of a larger research project conducted 
in Germany, but interestingly this part of the project was published in Turkish by a publishing company 
based in Turkey. 
Based on quantitative analysis, the author, Bayram Ayaz, came to the following general conclusion: 
The press either knowingly or unwittingly propagated Turkish nationalism (milliyetçilik/Türkçülük). This 
was especially apparent in relation to the news reporting on the Kurdish issue. (Ibid.) The Kurdish issue 
was seen by the press as a problem of terrorism and separatism, which was created on purpose to prevent 
the emergence of a strong Turkey. The issue was presented as a national ordeal. According to Ayaz, the 
Kurdish war and the attitude of the press has had an important impact on the rise of chauvinist Turkish 
nationalism. (Ibid., 202.) The press supported uncritically the state terror against Kurdish identity. The 
violent practices of the military and other security forces were accepted as legal. Turkey’s military strength 
was a matter of pride, while the violence and deaths of opponents were celebrated. (Ibid. 203-205.) In 
the opinion of Ayaz, self-censorship (see also previous chapter) was the main reason behind this one-
sided presentation and the lack of free and critical discussion on the Kurdish issue, which also hindered 
democratization. One of the critical journalists, Şahin Alpay (in Milliyet at the time), pointed out that 
when the Kurdish issue is seen only as a security problem, there is no real discussion on the topic and 
the society does not learn the truth of it. To prevent separatism, the state limits the freedom of thought, 
debate and the press, which in turn prevents finding a solution for the multiethnic and multicultural 
situation of Turkey (Alpay, Milliyet 29.7.1997 in Ayaz 1997, 205).
The other two books are not analytic studies but descriptive commentaries (Bulut 2001 [originally 
from 1992], Odabaşı 2001 [originally from 1994]). Both authors are journalists/writers by profession. 
Odabaşı’s book Güneydoğuda Gazeteci Olmak (Being a Journalist in the South-East) is based on his own 
experience as a news reporter based in Diyarbakır in 1985-1993, and gives illuminating descriptions of 
the kinds of problems involved in journalistic work in the Kurdish populated areas under the State of 
Emergency rule (OHAL, Olağanüstü Hâl). Whereas Ayaz’s conclusions are based on text analysis of the 
255 Besides his main topic of research in Islamic movements, Hakan M. Yavuz has written several articles on Kurds. In the 
article “Media Identities for Alevis and Kurds in Turkey” (1999), Yavuz discusses the opening of identity spaces for Alevis and 
Kurds in the 1990’s with new forms of media such as local radios and satellite television.
256 The German versions differ in some aspects from those published in Turkey, but according to Ayaz, the differences are of 
small importance: “The Turkish daily newspapers are published exactly the same, with the exception of some supplements (ek) 
and some minor changes.” (Ayaz 1997, 16).
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finished product, Odabaşı’s work sheds light on the journalistic practices and production process of the 
news texts. He argues that the coverage of the Kurdish inhabited region remained within the framework 
set by the official line of OHAL administration, and consisted largely of press releases of the OHAL 
Regional Governorate (Bölge Valiliği), which unfortunately were not always exactly true.257 This was 
the case even for those newspapers with reporters with good knowledge of Kurdish language and local 
contacts (Odabaşı 2001, 15-17). Thus the extent and content of coverage was defined by a combination 
of the general line of the paper in question and the official line of the OHAL administration. The local 
journalist was in dire straits: if he attempted to report “the real events,” he was considered by the state 
officials as “a PKK journalist,” an attitude not shared by the PKK, which at times also targeted the 
journalists (Odabaşı 2001, 18).258
Bulut’s book Türk Basınında Kürtler (Kurds in the Turkish Press) originally from 1992 and republished 
in 2001 aims to be argumentative and provocative rather than academic (or even systematic), and its 
main value lies in a number of interesting examples and quotes, as it contains neither a systematic analysis 
nor a bibliography. The author has perused almost 700 newspapers concentrating on the Sheykh Said 
revolt of 1925, the uprising of Mount Ararat (Ağrı Dağ) in 1930, the Dersim uprising of 1937 and the 
PKK period (examples from years 1984-90 and 1992). According to Bulut’s observations, the attitude 
of Cumhuriyet, which he looks at for the early republican period (1925, 1930 and 1937) was typical for 
that time. The daily emphasized the indivisible unity of Turkey and denied the existence of a Kurdish 
national culture and identity. It defended the assimilationist policies, slandered the Kurdish leaders, and 
either worked to conceal the massacres or defended them and the military. Bulut finds the attitude of the 
newspaper almost racist. (Bulut 2001.)
For the period of 1984-1987 Bulut looks at Milliyet, which, according to him, worked to distance 
itself from the state and had an independent social-democratic or liberal stance at the time. Yet, contrary 
to expectations, in regard to the Kurdish issue, he finds Milliyet’s reporting very state-centric and 
nationalist. To make his point, Bulut quotes Milliyet’s reporter in Diyarbakır, according to whom the 
paper’s reporting on Kurds is correct to the extent the official announcements are correct (Bulut 2001, 
17). Hürriyet, the paper with the highest circulation of the time, is included as a negative example of the 
state-centric line. According to Bulut, from the very beginning of the republic, the mainstream press has 
tended to consider the state as being in danger, and has worked to defend it within a framework of crisis 
(Bulut 2001, 27-28). Thus, even in late 1980s, when the newspapers were asked by the leaders of the 
state (generals among them) to be silent on the Kurdish conflict, they acquiesced (Bulut 2001, 47). 
The general conclusions of all three books are similar. In late 1980s and early 1990s reporting 
on Kurds was either virtually non-existent or strictly limited by the military. The mainstream media 
institutions either could not or would not oppose the rules set by the military. Similar critique against 
the mainstream media has also been presented in a more general setting by a number of journalists, 
writers and media researchers such as Doğan Tılıç (1998) and Ragıp Duran (2000). As was discussed 
in the previous chapter on media, Turkey has had serious problems with freedom of expression. Besides 
repressive legislation the highly centralized media ownership as well as the close economic connections 
257 Odabaşı gives as an example a press release that announced the death of eight PKK guerrillas in military action. The 
author, however, claims that in reality the dead were Northern Iraqi villagers involved in tea smuggling (Odabaşı 2001, 
15-17). There have been several similar cases later during the conflict.
258 Odabaşı relates his experiences in public for the first time in the book, which was first published in 1994. In the beginning 
of the second edition he tells he could not find work as a journalist after publishing the book. 
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between the media patrons and state elites have also limited the possibilities of open discussion on 
sensitive issues, such as the Kurdish issue, and have further contributed to self-censorship (Topuz 2003, 
347).
With the increase in volume of research concerning Kurds, a few Turkish researchers have also 
discussed Kurds in state and mainstream public-political discourse (Yeğen 2004, Somer 2005a and 
2005b). There exists (at least) two articles written in the first half of the previous decade that investigate 
Kurds in the Turkish media (Somer 2005a, Sezgin & Wall 2005).259 Both analyze the important daily 
newspaper Hürriyet. I will summarize the findings of these two works in relatively much detail as they 
are highly relevant for my own analysis.
The main argument of the rather theoretic and somewhat speculative article Resurgence and Remaking 
of Identity. Civil Beliefs, Domestic and External Dynamics, and the Turkish Discourse on Kurds by Murat 
Somer (2005a) concerns the causal mechanisms explaining swift discursive changes. The empirical part of 
the article is a straight-forward quantitative content analysis of the coverage of the daily Hürriyet of issues 
related to Kurds from 1984 to 1998, i.e. during the period of the violent conflict between the Turkish 
State and the PKK. In 1984 and 1985 Hürriyet published only 25 articles related to Turkey’s Kurds and 
only 3 of these used the word “Kürt” in reference to a person, group, concept or place (Ibid., 591). In 
the 1980s the paper very rarely covered issues related to Kurds and did not generally use the word. Until 
the 1990’s, an uninformed observer would not have known that there are Kurds in Turkey. By 1998, the 
number of articles had risen to almost 500 per year (Ibid., 598). In addition to the increased coverage, 
the linguistic categories the newspaper employed changed so that it became considerably more likely 
to use the category “Kurd”. In 1998 almost one hundred (20%) of the articles used the term “Kurd.” 
Also, the share of non-security related articles of all articles on Kurds grew, and these were more likely 
to use the category Kurd than the security related ones. However, even in the second half of the 1990s, 
more than half of the articles were security related. Somer asks when, why and how this transformation 
happened, and if there were actual changes in beliefs and values or merely expressions. (Somer 2005a.)
He points out that the change was not continuous and gradual but that there were several 
unsustained surges. The earliest one was in 1987-8, when the first articles with non-security content were 
published: “Let Us Not Fear the Word Kurd” and “Turks Who Don’t Speak Turkish” (Somer 2005a, 
614 cites Cemal 2003, 102-110). The change was also surprisingly swift and did not occur as a result of 
changes in the official policies, legislation, and state practices (Ibid., 593). On the basis of the content 
analysis, Somer concludes that the known yet suppressed category of “Kurd” resurfaced and was remade 
within the civil discourse260 during the 1990s (Somer 2005a, 618). He argues that the causal mechanisms 
behind this transformation are linked to democratization and intra-elite conflict on instrumental beliefs 
of what would best serve the national interests.261 External developments also played a role (end of Cold 
259 It is quite likely that more have been published by the current time. There appear quite a few journals on communication 
studies (such as Kültür ve İletişim – Culture and Communication, İletişim, Selçuk İletişim), and collections of articles on 
communication studies are published by several universities and publishing houses.
260 Somer highlights the need to differentiate between state discourse and mainstream social-political discourse because 
within a formal democratic system and privately owned media, the military-bureaucratic elite cannot simply dictate the course 
of events. For Somer’s further distinction between the terms public discourse and civil discourse, see Somer 2005a, 607.
261 Somer actually looks at a number of causal mechanisms: 1) civil expressions of previously held back beliefs, 2) 
interdependent civil beliefs, as well as facilitating conditions: 1) shallow beliefs, 2) vertical restrictions as the dominant control 
mechanism, 3) network effects, 4) low private belief resistance. (Somer 2005a.)
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War, the situation in Iraqi Kurdistan). Writing in 2005, Somer sees that the new visibility of the Kurdish 
category can facilitate the expression of Kurdish interests, but it can also be used to promote exclusionary 
Turkish nationalist values (Somer 2005a, 618). There are a number of interesting details in Somer’s 
article that I will return to in relation to the findings of my case studies below. 
In their article Constructing the Kurds in the Turkish Press: A Case Study of Hürriyet Newspaper Sezgin 
and Wall (2005) analyzed how Kurds were constructed in Hürriyet’s news articles from 1997 to 2002. 
The period “was chosen because it covers two important periods: the last years of civil war between the 
PKK and the Turkish Army and the immediate post-civil war period” (Ibid., 789). The authors expected 
the discourse to change after the cessation of violence. Unlike Somer, they selected only articles that 
explicitly used the category Kurd and approached them with discourse analysis. 
Sezgin and Wall discovered that Kurds were mainly discussed in relation to Turkey’s EU bid, 
suggesting that without the EU, Kurds would have been virtually ignored. To their dismay, they 
found no significant changes in the coverage of Kurds within the period: ”In sum, the coverage has 
been discriminatory towards Kurds and uses a degrading tone in describing them. It suggests that their 
culture is not worthy of respect and even constructed an image that it is arguable whether their language 
and culture are real entities…” and ”The findings demonstrate that the coverage was an indirect tool of 
oppression rather than an agency of change.” (Ibid, 795). The general content analysis of Somer (2005a) 
and the detailed discourse analysis of Sezgin and Wall (2005) can be seen to complement each other; 
the combined result of these two studies is the increased visibility of the category Kurd, which is either 
negative in content or used in negative contexts. I will also return to some of the findings of Sezgin and 
Wall (2005) in more detail below in relation to my own findings. Some of their findings and conclusions 
are supported by my analysis, whereas in some other instances I wish to contest their interpretations. 
Based on the results of these previous studies, I set out to investigate how Kurds and the Kurdish 
issue were portrayed in the Turkish press (other than Hürriyet, which was the most studied paper).
6.4 the sample
6.4.1 the selected dailies
Five newspapers were included in the first four case studies presented in this current chapter. The main 
paper analyzed is Milliyet, and the reporting in Milliyet is compared and contrasted with that of four other 
papers: Zaman, Yeni Şafak, Cumhuriyet and Sabah. The criteria for the selection of particular newspapers 
were: circulation, political or ideological outlook, ownership and general prestige. The aim was to have 
a representative sample of the mainstream press.262 The combined circulation of the five dailies included 
in the study comprised roughly a third of the total circulation throughout the period looked at, but 
with great fluctuations in the circulations of the individual papers. The fluctuations in the circulations 
of individual papers are first of all typical for the Turkish mediascape (see chapter 5), and in the case of 
the religiously oriented pro-AKP (at the time) papers (Zaman and Yeni Şafak), reflect the changes in the 
262 When evaluating the findings, it should be kept in mind that none of the selected dailies are considered as especially 
nationalist. 
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balance of power during the period investigated.263 The main aim of the study is not to compare and 
contrast the papers, but the main differences are noted when relevant.
Milliyet
The daily Milliyet was chosen to represent a quality (secularist) daily with a high circulation. Milliyet 
was founded in 1950 and is one of the oldest still appearing newspapers in Turkey. During the period 
analyzed in this study it belonged to the biggest media conglomerate in Turkey, the Doğan group (from 
1979 to 2011, when it was sold). Doğan Yayın Holding also had two other mass papers (Hürriyet and 
Posta) with circulations higher than that of Milliyet. Milliyet was very popular in the 1990s selling an 
average of circa 550 000 copies in 1997, but its circulation declined to about 250,000 by late 2004 and 
remained around that figure to the end of the period studied (Mediascape Türkiye ’98, 1999: BYEGM 
2004, Tunç & Görgülü 2012, 20). According to Doğan Yayın Holding in 2002, Milliyet targeted a 
“highly educated elite” and its editorial policy was defined to “emphasize loyalty, respect and tolerance,” 
“reflecting the traditional values of patriotism, democracy and family” (Doğan Holding 2002). The Open 
Source Center’s report from 2008 described Milliyet as “a nationalistic paper with a liberal slant. Though 
not as popular as Hürriyet, it is generally considered more serious and reliable.” (OSC 2008, 7).
Zaman and Yeni Şafak
The moderate pro-Islamic Zaman, founded in 1970 under the name of Adalet (Justice), was the highest 
circulation pro-Islamic newspaper during the period analyzed. In 1997 its circulation averaged circa 
270,000 copies, by September 2004 it sold over 360,000 and by 2008 the circulation had grown to circa 
750,000 copies (Mediascape Türkiye ’98, 1999, BYEGM 2004, Tunç & Görgülü 2012). Zaman was 
considered to belong to the Fetullah Gülen group264 and advocated relatively moderate Islamic outlook. 
Zaman’s circulation grew together with the popularity of moderate Islam and the Gülen movement. It 
seems Zaman had little problems with the state (even before the AKP governments), despite its’ pro-
Islamic editorial policy. It had been pro-state in most subjects: it was economically pro-liberal, anti-
socialists, and viewed the leftists and the Kurds with suspicion. They were seen to act against Turkey and 
the Turkish state because of foreign incitement. During the reign of the AKP from late 2002 onwards, 
it was supportive of the AKP government and critical of the nationalist MHP and the Kemalist CHP 
(OSC 2008, 24). Beginning around 2012, increasing tension, competition, and clashes between the 
AKP and the Fetullahçılar began to be noted (for example Kaya & Cornell 2012) with an open struggle 
for power from 2013 onwards.
Yeni Şafak, which was founded in 1995 and belongs to the Albayrak family, is an interesting daily 
in the Turkish mediascape. It is pro-Islam and used to be counted among the more radical papers with 
263 It is good to keep in mind that the circulation figures given by the papers are not always reliable as inflated figures may 
assist in obtaining a larger share of both private and public advertisements. For example in 2009 there were public accusations 
against Zaman and Yeni Şafak that much of their print was distributed free of charge rather than sold (see Tamer 2010, 374). 
The argument over Zaman is probably caused by the fact that its circulation is based on subscriptions rather than sales at 
newspaper stands, which is not the standard in Turkey. Also in 2013 there were calls for all the papers to publish the true 
circulation figures differentiated according to the method of distribution (Gerçek Gündem 2013).
264 On Fetullah Gülen, his following and their ideology, see Yavuz & Esposito 2003.
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this kind of outlook, but unlike the other radical pro-Islamic papers, it was well established. Before the 
consolidation of AKP’s power, its journalists and editors were harassed and fined at times, but mostly it 
was allowed to function. It has been close to the ruling AKP, but has been known for its independent 
editorial policy, rather than functioning simply as a mouthpiece of the successive Islamist parties. Unlike 
the other pro-Islamic newspapers or dailies, it also has an intellectual air. A number of its columnists are 
well-known Islamist intellectuals, and some of them used to be known as leftist intelectuals. Yeni Şafak’s 
circulation was slightly above 100,000 copies. 
Cumhuriyet
Founded in 1922, Cumhuriyet, is the oldest newspaper still published in Turkey. Its editorial policy can be 
described as state-centric, leftist, nationalist, Kemalist and staunchly secularist. In selecting Cumhuriyet as 
one of the papers included in the analysis, I follow an established tradition of Turkish media research (See 
for example Nozawa-Dursun 1997, Oktar 2001, Bölükbaşı 2002, Koç 2004, Fırat 2002, Durna 2002). 
Also, at least in the beginning of the period analyzed Cumhuriyet still retained some of its old prestige. 
Its circulation may have only counted between 36,000 and 83,000 copies, but it is (or rather used to be) 
the paper read by the educated elite, intellectuals, and bureaucrats and via its influential target group and 
reputation it wielded considerable influence. A question of special interest with Cumhuriyet is how much 
its news reporting and the views of the columnists differ from those of the other mainstream newspapers. 
Cumhuriyet is, after all, the old mouthpiece of the Kemalists, which moved to the left together with the 
CHP in the 1960’s, became increasingly nationalist in the 1990s and staunchly secularist (and anti-AKP) 
in the 2000s.265
Sabah
Sabah is a high-circulation populist-secularist newspaper. Sabah was founded in 1985 by Dinç Bilgin, 
who owned the paper until 2007. When first launched, the paper’s editorial policy was based on 
exaggerated news stories, large color photographs, and criticism of the government. This policy soon 
made Sabah the highest circulation newspaper, but was forced to undergo a change in the beginning of 
the 1990’s when the paper failed to attract sufficient numbers of advertisers due to its low income target 
audience group. The new editorial policy targeted more educated and wealthier, in comparison, social 
groups. The editorial policy remained populist, however, and based on photographs, emotional appeal 
in headlines and simplified easy-to-understand language in the texts themselves (Nozawa-Dursun 1997, 
157-159). In 2002 Sabah was taken over by the state and first leased to Turgay Ciner, and then later sold 
to Turkuvaz Radio Television Newspapers and Publishers Ltd., a subsidiary of Çalık Holding, known to 
be very close to the ruling AKP and Prime Minister Erdoğan (OSC 2008, 21-22).266 Sabah’s circulation 
dropped from over 600,000 in 1997 to under 400,000 by 2004 and has varied between circa 550,000 
and 366,000 since (Tunç & Görgülü 2012, 20).
265 For a history of Cumhuriyet, see Kaya 2010.
266 For more details, see chapter 5.
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6.4.2 selection of neWs events and aRticles
The first four case studies each analyze one news event that is related to the Kurdish demands for political 
and cultural rights. These news events are as follows: 
1) The elections of 1999, when the pro-Kurdish HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, People’s 
Democracy Party) won 37 municipalities in the South-East, but failed to overcome the national 10% 
threshold to send representatives to the parliament. The sample in the first case consists of all the news 
articles and columns on HADEP, the Kurdish issue, South-Eastern Anatolia or the fight against the PKK 
in the five newspapers in the sections on politics and/or domestic news during a 10 day period from 
15th until 24th of April with the elections held on Sunday April the 18th. All together there were 33 news 
articles and two columns.
2) The last two weeks of January 2002, a period that marked an active petition campaign for Kurdish 
language teaching with 38 news articles and 17 columns related to the issue. 
3) The closure of HADEP by the Constitutional Court in 2003 with 26 news articles and 4 columns 
immediately following the event (i.e. a period of three days). 
4) The discussion fired by Prime Minister Erdoğan’s speeches in August 2005, when he acknowledged 
the existence of “a Kurdish issue” in Turkey with 35 news reports and 21 columns within a period of four 
(or partially five) days.
It is obvious that the inclusion of these news events is a choice, not a necessity of any kind. These 
particular news events were chosen first of all because of their non-violent character so as to have a 
distance from the reporting on violence, secondly because of their explicitly political nature, and thirdly 
because of their perceived importance in the evolvement of the public (non-state mainstream) discussion 
on the Kurdish issue in Turkey. The events are also different from one another, as I wish to illuminate 
different aspects of the problematic through the cases. To be more precise, I use the elections of 1999 
to investigate how pro-Kurdish political activism is presented in a routine event of formal democratic 
governance. The petition campaign of 2001–2002 is investigated to highlight the representations of 
citizen activism outside of formal party politics and the continued importance of Turkish language as 
a marker of Turkish national identity. The closure of the pro-Kurdish party HADEP in 2003 is looked 
at to illuminate pro-Kurdish political activism as a target of non-democratic legal pressure and the 
problematic relationship between the legal pro-Kurdish political parties and the PKK. The beginnings of 
increasingly publicized debates and significant changes in the ways the issue can be publicly addressed are 
investigated through the reporting on a statement by a leading Turkish politician, considered a hallmark 
event (Erdoğan’s statement in 2005).
Through these events I look at how the Kurdish demands for cultural and political demands were 
presented and discussed in the mainstream print media. The aim is to investigate and illuminate the 
evolvement of the public (non-state) mediated discourse regarding the Kurds and the Kurdish issue in 
Turkey from 1999 and the cessation of PKK violence to the so-called Kurdish opening of the AKP in 
2009. As will be discussed below, during this period a process of democratization took place in Turkey, 
and as a part of that process the linguistic rights of non-Turkish speaking Muslim minorities were 
improved. By the end of the period, both Kurmanci and Zaza, the main Kurdish languages spoken in 
Turkey, had been acknowledged as spoken languages and were used in regular broadcasts. The process of 
democratization also meant more open public debates on issues previously deemed too sensitive. Yet, as 
will be demonstrated by my analysis, this transformation or opening of the public discussion was a slow 
and uneven process, with much ground left to cover at the end of the period analyzed in this work. 
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The sample consists of both news articles and columns, but the analysis concentrates on news 
articles rather than columns. News reports are emphasized because of their special role in the creation 
of common social reality. News are seen to represent the world as it is, as factual. Thus the news media 
create one of the most significant arenas for constructing politics and identity. Through news selection 
the news media have the power to contribute to what we see in the world and the ways or frames in 
which we see it. 
Analysis of news articles is supplemented with analysis of columns because of the great importance of 
the columnists for the public discussion in Turkey.267 In general, the news reports offer little interpretation 
or wider contextualization as that is a function expected of the columnists. The well-known columnists 
write with their own name and fame, and have much greater freedom vis-á-vis the papers than often 
anonymous news reporters, so that it is possible to research the limits of the freedom of expression 
and the limits of political correctness through the columns. However, it should be kept in mind that a 
columnist does not necessarily represent the line of the newspaper in question: well-known columnists 
with a range of ideological backgrounds are recruited to widen the appeal of the paper among different 
segments of potential readers.
The decision to resort to a series of five case studies was practical. Because there was still a marked 
reluctance to use the word “Kürt” (Kurd/Kurdish), the results of searches of electronic archives would 
not have produced most of the relevant articles, and manual search of several papers over a span of several 
years would have required a team of research assistants. Yet, this particular kind of sample also limits 
what the analysis can hope to give answers for. A relatively standard procedure for analysis, especially 
quantitative analysis of the representation of ethnic or cultural difference or minorities would begin 
with a categorization of themes or topics under which minorities are reported on (for example Raittila 
& Kutilainen 2000 or Pietikäinen 2003). As I decided to proceed with a series of case studies, where the 
selection of the sample is based on the topic (theme) of the article, a thematic analysis is not relevant. 
Thus I will not be able to provide an answer to the basic question of under what kinds of headings or 
topics are Turkey’s Kurds discussed in the mainstream press.
6.5 on the method
In short, I look at how the news stories of the events get told, and what that might indicate about the 
point of view from which they are told. This level of language is called linguistic representation and is 
something that has drawn the interest of linguists since the 1970s. Linguistic structures can determine 
how events are represented, and thus lead to different versions, or views, of the same event (Thornborrow 
2004, 58). It is possible to analyze representations of the Kurdish political and/or cultural demands 
and Kurdish ethnicity in the news in terms of textual features contributing to the representations and 
indicating journalistic practices that frame the choices made when writing news reports. There are 
different kinds of textual structures and process involved, out of which only a portion can be analyzed 
in one study because of constraints of time and effort. There are also a number of available methods for 
analysis with different focuses and emphasis. I initially considered three common and readily available 
267 See previous chapter.
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options for analysis of media texts: qualitative content analysis, discourse analysis, and frame analysis. 
After lengthy consideration, however, I decided not to use a ready-made methodological tool-kit268 
despite the many advantages offered by such a choice, but developed a set of questions asked to each of 
the texts. 
The general approach towards the texts has been much influenced by critical discourse analysis 
(CDA) (Fairclough 1995, Jokinen & al. 1993, Jokinen al. 1999, Valtonen S. 1998, Ricento 2003, 
Gill 2008) with its critical stance towards taken-for-granted knowledge, its recognition that the ways 
in which we commonly understand the world are historically and culturally specific and relative, the 
conviction that knowledge is socially constructed—that is, our current ways of understanding the world 
are determined not by the nature of the world itself, but by social processes, and the commitment to 
exploring the ways that knowledge—the social construction of people, phenomena, or problems are 
linked to actions and practices (Gill 2008, 218). CDA also focuses on the text itself rather than using 
it as a means to approach some reality behind the discourse; it views all language use as constructive 
and constructed; it emphasizes discourse as a form of action used to do things such as to offer blame, to 
make excuses etc.; and it is convinced of the rhetorical organization of discourse with competing versions 
of reality (Ibid., 220-1). However, CDA is at its best in a highly detailed in-depth analysis of a small 
number of texts, whereas I am not interested in analyzing all the ways a certain text functions, but only of 
some of the aspects, and a relatively large number of texts. I also find the concept of discourse somewhat 
unintuitive and lacking in explanatory power. Thus the description is “influenced by CDA” rather than 
discourse analysis as such. Some of the ideas offered by framing analysis (from van Gorp 2008) were also 
used to analyze how individual speakers framed their statements and opinions. 
The set of questions was derived from previous research of ethnicity and media269 as well as Kurds 
and citizenship in Turkey, and further developed in dialogue with the texts analyzed. Taking into account 
the amount of text to be analyzed and the resources available, I decided to focus on the following two 
sets of textual features: 1) naming of participants, locations and processes, and 2) quotation patterns.270 
In addition to these, I also looked at selected causal structures and absence or silences.
So, the first set of questions I asked to all the texts were about word choice: what are the participants 
268 Content analysis, even in its qualitative variant, is ideal for analyzing relatively large numbers of texts, and has the 
benefit of being widely utilized in the analysis of media texts with a number of instructions and user manuals on coding, as 
well as an aura of scientific reliability. The down-side is a degree of incompatibility between content analysis and the social 
constructionist premises of my study. Content analysis is also not particularly good for analysis of silences and absences. Frame 
analysis is a much used methodological choice as it is at the same time qualitative, suitable for analysis of larger amounts of 
texts, and explains well the relationship between the actual texts and how the reader might understand the text as a part of 
a larger picture. Thus it provides a sound a theoretic and methodological means for the researcher to build the connection 
between the manifest content and the latent, implied content. (For concise and clear presentation of framing see for example 
van Gorp 2008 and Reese 2008). Yet, in practice developing issue specific sets of frames does not save the researcher from 
a highly subjective interpretative process easy to criticize (van Gorp 2008), and in this case the adoption of more universal 
frames means losing in texture and explanative power (Reese 2008) and difficulties in illuminating the nuances in the process 
of change.
269 Especially on Turkey: Somer 2005 and Sezgin & Wall 2004. On ethnicity and/or minority in the media: Pietikäinen 
2003 and ter Wall 2002a & 2002b.
270 Because the total number of texts analyzed is fairly high for a qualitative study, the systematic analysis included only a 
limited number of features that were coded. A number of other features were noted down, but not systematically analyzed 
throughout the whole sample. I would describe the analysis as not very complex, and it its better suited to the analysis of the 
relatively straight-forward news texts rather than columns or the few opinion-pieces and editorials within the sample which 
tend to use a larger repertoire of stylistic features and to be more nuanced.
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called/how are they labeled? Of special interest were labels used for Kurdish or pro-Kurdish actors or 
objects of action as the term “Kürt” has been such a problematic label. If not referred to as Kurds, what 
other labels or categories are used? Can the content of these be evaluated as negative or positive? How 
do the categories relate to the categories Turkish or citizen? In addition to labels of actors, I also look 
at the labeling of locations (such as the Kurdish-inhabited regions of Turkey or the region) and processes 
(such as terrorism, the South-East problem or the Kurdish issue). Naming and labeling practices give a 
clear indication of how the issue at hand is understood. To give just one example, there is a world of 
difference between the labels civil war, uprising, terrorism or communist revolution, which can all be 
used to describe an ongoing conflict.
The second set of questions concerns quotation patterns, i.e. who gets to say what in the news and 
how their comments are framed. A powerful way to participate in the public discussion in the news 
arena is to have a voice there. Yet, access to the news (especially national news) is highly controlled. Thus, 
quotation patterns are a valuable indicator of the position of minorities in the news and the way in which 
a particular perspective is given on the reported events or issues (ter Wall 2002, 18). Quotation patterns 
also describe aspects of news-making practices: to whom the journalists turn to ask for comments 
and information. Previous research has shown that minority opinion tends to be underrepresented in 
mainstream media (for example ter Wall 2002, Pietikäinen 2003). I also pay attention to the prominence 
given to the quotation in the news reports as well as the attribution of credibility to various actors, 
and the possible counter arguments (by journalist) added to the quotations. There is a consequential 
difference between speaking directly to the reader, perhaps in the heading or answering to accusations 
made against one, or for example making “a statement” or “a claim.” I also pay attention to how various 
speakers frame or legitimize their stances in the texts.271
Following the example of discourse analysis, special attention is also paid to causal structures and 
absences. They are a highly interesting focus for analysis as investigating them tends to reveal much 
of the (unvoiced) presumptions or presuppositions of the author. A prime example of construction of 
interesting, i.e. skewed causal relation, is the reporting in the daily Sabah of the closure of the pro-Islamic 
Fazilet, a predecessor of the AKP. The Sabah headline of 23rd of June 2001 proclaimed: “Fazilet’i iki kadın 
yaktı” (Fazilet was scorched by two women). This is a handy way of shifting the agency, and in this case 
also the blame, from the Constitutional Court to women MPs.272 
In the presentation of the results of the analysis, I have chosen not to move directly up to a more 
abstract level (such as that of frames or discourses), but will first describe the more concrete level of 
findings, some of the nitty-gritty details of the linguistic analysis before moving onto interpretation 
of the findings. Despite the danger of boring the reader with the details, this mode of presentation is 
selected to highlight the limitations set by “political correctness” when speaking or writing in public on 
this sensitive topic, and to visibly decipher the roundabout ways developed to express various aspects of 
271 For the details of the coding used in cases 1-4, see the full gird of questions and the coding sheet included in appendix 
6/1 and 6/2.
272 A young covered woman by the name Merve Kavakçı was elected as an MP from the Fazilet ticket. At that time female 
MP’s were not allowed to enter the parliament while wearing a headscarf. Her attempt to swear her oath of office with the 
scarf on was considered scandalous by the secularists, who duly prevented her from taking the office. This incident was 
interpreted as provocation by the secularists and cited as one of the reasons behind the party closure. The second woman 
referred to in the headline was Nazlı Ilıcak, an important media person who had joined the Fazilet and supported Kavakçı’s 
decision to remain covered. 
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the issue. At times there is a close resemblance to a code language, fully understood with all the nuances 
only by a reader socialized to this mode of expression (see Somer 2005, 619). It is very illuminating to 
both give some concrete examples of this, especially for the reader not familiar with Turkish language, 
and to use these details to highlight the limitations imposed by political correctness.
6.6 case 1: hadep in the 1999 elections
The first case study looks at the news reporting on the fate of the pro-Kurdish political party HADEP in 
the April 1999 national and local elections. April 1999 is a good starting point for analyzing change. The 
elections took place after the capture, but before the trial, of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK; 
during the trial the PKK started its unilateral ceasefire; and in December 1999 Turkey formally became 
an EU applicant country. The combination of these developments elicited the possibility for a peaceful 
resolution of the Kurdish issue. Besides being a good chronological starting point to compare the later 
cases with, reporting on a routine event of formal political life, such as elections, is likely to provide a good 
example of how the newspapers represented the pro-Kurdish political activism and how they discussed 
the Kurdish issue when the immediate context was not the violent struggle between the Turkish armed 
forces and the PKK. Because of the criticism the deficiencies of Turkey’s democracy has drawn from 
Europe, free elections have become emphasized as the symbol of democracy. Turks are justifiably proud 
of their long tradition of free elections, as the 1999 national elections were the 14th multi-party elections 
since 1946. More importantly, with the exception of the 1946 and 1983 parliamentary elections, the 
elections in Turkey have been considered both free and fair.
6.6.1 backgRound
Abdullah Öcalan is Captured
A hallmark event occurred mere weeks before the 1999 elections analyzed below: in February 1999 the 
founder and undisputed, authoritarian leader of the PKK and a hero of most nationalist Kurds, Abdullah 
Öcalan, was captured and brought to Turkey to face trial. The chain of events had started in the fall of the 
previous year. Since the coup of 1980 Öcalan had led his movement from PKK camps located in Turkey’s 
neighboring Syria. In the fall of 1998, the Turkish military initiated a pressure campaign to oust the PKK 
from its bases in the Bekaa along the Syrian-Lebanese border. This campaign was enthusiastically joined 
by the government and supported by the mainstream media (Tılıç 1999, Kalaycıoğlu 2005, 151-4). 
Syria gave in to the pressure, and Öcalan was duly exiled, leading him to first flee to Moscow and then 
to Rome, where he was arrested in November 1998 and promptly applied for asylum. The initial news of 
his capture in Italy was received with great joy in the Turkish national press with dramatic headlines such 
as ”Victory for the Turkish Nation” (Zaman 16.11.1998), “Victory for Ankara” (Milliyet 15.11.1998) 
and ”We pressured, we succeeded” (Sabah 14.11.1998).
For days Öcalan’s capture was the most important news event in Turkey, even overshadowing the 
imminent government crisis. Italy’s refusal to extradite Öcalan to Turkey as he would most certainly 
face death sentence there gave rise to a strong press reaction in Turkey. The press organized pressure 
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campaigns against Italy and encouraged boycotts against Italian consumer goods.273 Nationalist lynch 
mobs attacked pro-Öcalan demonstrators in Turkey, and Kurdish pro-Öcalan demonstrators attacked 
Turkish journalists in Rome. According to the journalist and researcher Doğan Tılıç, the Turkish media 
can be held responsible for the demonstrations against Italy, the lynch mobs, and the atmosphere of 
general hysteria. Its news reporting was so nationalist that the journalists became targets of violence, as 
they were not seen as spectators and reporters but rather as actors taking part in the events (Tılıç 1999).
Italy refused to extradite Öcalan to Turkey; Germany was not willing to take him; and Italy was 
not ready to grant him asylum, so he was simply released and disappeared for a while. On February the 
18th, just two months before the 1999 elections, Öcalan was captured (abducted) in Kenya and brought 
to Turkey for trial. Once again, the news was celebrated by the press (Öktem 2011, 111). The leader of 
the interim minority government Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit (DSP, Demokratik Sol Parti, Democratic 
Left Party) took the credit for Öcalan’s capture. Since the official Turkey had for years placed the blame 
of the violence on the person of Abdullah Öcalan, now routinely referred to as the “baby-killer” or “head 
of the terrorists” (Öktem 2011, 111), people expected the Kurdish war to be finally over. Mainstream 
media published humiliating images of the blindfolded Öcalan, which galvanized many nationalist 
Kurds to join the widespread pro-Öcalan demonstrations in Turkey and abroad (Ibid.). This in turn was 
interpreted as traitorous by the Turkish public. 
The nationalist fervor surrounding the capture of Öcalan was one of the factors contributing to 
the subsequent election victory of the center-left Kemalist-nationalist DSP and the right-wing ultra-
nationalist MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, The Nationalist Movement Party) in the April elections. 
In the trial to start later that year, Öcalan asked for peace and for the PKK to lay down its arms (Öktem 
2011, 111-2), thus giving rise to a period of relative peace that was to last until 2004. But, at the time of 
the elections that was still in the future. 
Pro-Kurdish Parties before the 1999 Elections
As was already detailed in chapter four, there had been legal pro-Kurdish political parties in Turkey 
since the founding of the People’s Labor Party (HEP, Halkın Emek Partisi) in 1990. The first parties, 
HEP and DEP (Demokrasi Partisi, the Democracy Party) had parliamentary representation but no 
local rule. DEP had to withdraw from the local elections of 1994 as they were forced to bow to the 
heavy pressure being brought to bear both by the PKK and an array of state and extralegal forces. The 
pressure campaign by the extralegal forces included a series of bomb attacks, detentions of at least 140 
party administrators, candidates and activists, an armed attack against the party’s general secretary Murat 
Bozlak, and the murders of several family members of important members of the party (Watts 2010, 
107-9). DEP’s closure in 1994 and the prosecution of its deputies removed pro-Kurdish politics from 
the parliament, but did not end them. DEP was reconstituted as HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi Partisi, 
People’s Democracy Party).
HADEP had already participated in the 1995 national elections, but was not able to overcome 
the 10 percent threshold, and failed to send representatives to Parliament. It received 4.2% of the vote 
nationally, and noteworthy high percentages from the important cities of the Kurdish provinces. To the 
273 The boycotts did not last long but were popular. For example, some of the Turkish employees of the Istanbul Internet café 
I was managing at the time asked us to quit serving Italian Lavazza coffee as a protest against Italy.
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great relief of the regime and other parties, HADEP did not do well in those large cities of western 
Turkey with sizable Kurdish migrant communities.
HADEP and the 1999 Elections
HADEP was more circumspect than DEP in its party program and public statements, and from 1999 
onwards started to carefully distance itself from the PKK (Güney 2002, 130). On the basis of analysis 
of the party program, Aylin Güney came to the conclusion that HADEP’s attempted to distance itself 
from radical politics and broaden its scope to address Turkey’s general problems (Güney 2002, 134-5). 
HADEP considered the Kurdish issue as one of Turkey’s most important problems, seen to be caused 
by wrong policies that had squandered the country’s money on military expenditures while preventing 
democratization and impeding economic and social development. As the solution, HADEP offered 
measures for economic development and enhanced democracy achieved by peaceful means (Ibid., 
129.) First, HADEP promoted the adoption of constitutional citizenship,274 and cultural identities 
were presented as compatible with the overarching identity of citizenship of Turkey. Second, HADEP 
proposed the abolishment of special provisions against Kurds: the ban on non-Turkish names for persons 
and places, the ban on education and broadcasting in Kurdish, and the restrictions on political activities 
conducted in the Kurdish language. Third, the party wanted targeted economic and social support for 
the South-East, including land reform and free-trade zones (Ibid.)
HADEP criticized the Turkish state for authoritarianism, centralized state structure, disregard of 
the rule of law, for assimilationist policies towards non-Turks, and oppression (Ibid. 132-133). Much of 
the criticism and many of the called-for reforms bear close resemblance to those demanded by the EU. 
The concrete proposals included: civilian rule over military, civilian majority in the National Security 
Council (MGK) and a more narrow scope for its activities; judicial reforms including abolishment of 
the death penalty, a just electoral law, removal of the 10% threshold, allowing elections coalitions, wider 
syndical freedoms and rights, improved freedom of expression, end to torture, and a new constitution; 
decentralization of government, stronger local government and promotion of political participation; 
democratization of education, end of ethnic and chauvinistic approach in educational materials (for more 
on educational materials, see chapters four and eight); autonomous universities; secular and democratic 
state with no discrimination and based on pluralism; promotion of local and cultural identities at the 
local level; and finally EU membership. (Ibid., 133-134.)
Despite the party program promoting democracy and universal human rights, in January 1999 the 
Chief Public Prosecutor Vural Savaş asked the Constitutional Court to close the HADEP on the grounds 
that there was an organic link between the party and the PKK. According to the prosecutor, HADEP 
was channeling support to the PKK, while the PKK was threatening those who did not vote for the 
party. Despite his two attempts, the prosecutor failed to prevent HADEP from participating in the April 
18th elections in 1999, but the party had to campaign under heavy pressure from the state officials; the 
resultant 4.7% of the nationwide vote can be considered an important success for the party. It also did 
very well in the local level and won a total of 37 municipalities in the Kurdish areas. This created a new 
situation of pro-Kurdish local rule.
274 Within constitutional citizenship national unity is not based on cultural affinity but voluntary loyalty of citizens to the 
state. The ideas of constitutional citizenship will be discussed in more detail in chapter seven.
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Nicole F. Watts has divided the types of coercion against pro-Kurdish activists into four categories: 
policing, juridical-legal, extralegal (e.g. violence including murder), and bureaucratic. From 1990 
to 1998, parties were closed and their properties confiscated, party administrators and activists were 
murdered, shot, jailed, fined, taken to court, and threatened. Physical attacks on party buildings and 
individual members were common. The coercion campaign was also successful: the intensive and violent 
pressure campaign against DEP caused it to withdraw from participating in the local elections in 1994. 
By the elections of 1999, however, the authorities relied more heavily on juridical, bureaucratic, and 
political means (Watts 2010, 106-9, 121). Thus, in comparison to the earlier period, HADEP faced 
relatively little physical harassment in its 1999 election campaigning. In this particular case the juridical 
pressure did not reach its aims either as the attempt to prevent the party’s participation to the elections 
failed.
In general, elections in Turkey are considered fair and relatively free. There was no OSCE election 
monitoring mission to observe the 1999 elections, so I quote from their report of the 2002 elections, 
while acknowledging that some of the most problematic legislation was removed between these two 
elections. The OSCE report for the 2002 elections states: 
The elections were held under election laws that establish a framework for democratic elections in 
line with international standards… 
At the same time, the broader legal framework and its implementation establish strict limits on 
the scope of political debate in Turkey. Non-violent expression of political views beyond these limits 
is still restricted by a variety of laws and is rigorously enforced… These restrictions on free speech 
and the practice of dissolving political parties and banning candidates stand in stark contrast to the 
otherwise pluralist election system in Turkey, as well as its international commitments. 
Parties must win at least 10% of the vote to enter the TGNA; this is an exceptionally high 
threshold by European standards… 
There is a high level of public confidence in the integrity of the election process and particularly in 
the Supreme Board of Elections. The election administration includes political parties at the polling 
station, county and provincial levels, further increasing public confidence. The system is open and 
transparent. The voting and counting procedures include a number of strong safeguards against 
fraud. (OSCE 2002.)
The Human Rights Watch World Report 2000 does not denote much space to the 1999 elections. In 
relation to HADEP, only the following is stated: 
HADEP narrowly escaped closure by the Constitutional Court on grounds of “separatism” prior to 
the April elections, when electorate and candidates were subjected to severe intimidation. Ballots cast 
for HADEP were destroyed in at least one constituency. The party failed to secure any parliamentary 
seats but gained control of thirty-seven local authorities in the southeast, including Diyarbakir. 
(HRW 2000.)
What the HRW report fails to note are the strict security measures and the violence surrounding the 
1999 elections, which was noted by several of the articles in the sample: a rocket launcher attack killed 
two election workers and two soldiers, five people were killed and 63 injured in fights, and another four 
persons died of heart attacks while voting (C9906).
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6.6.2 an oveRvieW of the RepoRting
The 1999 elections were generally considered as a victory for democracy in the press because of the high 
voter turnout percentage. The result of the elections was a surprise, with victories of the left of center 
DSP and the right wing ultra-nationalist MHP. In the subsequent analysis, one important reason for 
the success of the nationalist MHP was thought to be PKK terrorism and the fight against it, as well 
as the capture of Öcalan described above. PKK and terrorism came up in the reporting, but in general 
a connection was not made between PKK terrorism and the political will of the Kurdish citizens as 
expressed in the elections.
Most of the papers included in the sample denoted surprisingly little space for HADEP’s fate, 
with a moderate increase of votes on the national level and a spectacular success in the local. In all five 
newspapers analyzed there were only 20 news articles directly related to HADEP and 13 other news 
articles somehow related to the Kurdish issue or PKK terrorism during the 10-day period around the 
elections. In addition I was able to find only two columns on the issue.275 In the reporting, the much 
criticized 10% threshold was not seen as a problem for democracy in relation to HADEP and the Kurds: 
the fact that a party with more than half of the vote in some areas was left outside the parliament was not 
presented as a setback for democracy.
Table 6.1. Number of Articles
  News Columns
Milliyet 6 1
Zaman 5  
Yeni Şafak 3  
Cumhuriyet 15 1
Sabah 4  
Total 33 2
Cumhuriyet paid the most attention by far to HADEP and the Kurdish regions with a total of 15 
news articles and one column.276 Of the news reports, only five were actually centered on HADEP; two 
more were calls to end the unequal treatment of the South-East voiced by local civil society organizations, 
and one was a more general estimation of election result by Turkish scholars.
Milliyet carried a total of six news articles and one column somehow related to HADEP and the 
elections during the 10-day period under scrutiny. Of these, one was merely a list of districts that changed 
hands from either ANAP (Anavatan Partisi, the Fatherland Party) or RP (Refah Partisi, the Welfare Party, 
at the time already Fazilet) to either MHP or HADEP. The rest focused on HADEP and included a long 
article on the views of various HADEP representatives on the election results.
Since the ousting of the religious Refah party from power by the military in 1997, the Islamists/
conservative religiously oriented actors had presented themselves as champions of democracy, yet there 
were only very few articles on the fate of HADEP in the religiously oriented dailies Zaman and Yeni 
275 For the full list of the articles, see appendix 6/3.
276 The study Türkiye’de medya ve seçimler 1999 (Media and elections in Turkey) noted that Cumhuriyet clearly supported the 
moderate left, especially the CHP, after which the most attention was given to the pro-Kurdish HADEP (Halkın Demokrasi 
Partisi, People’s Democrat Party).
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Şafak. This notable lack of interest in parliamentary and local representation of the Kurds, at least at 
this stage, gives some justification to the claims that the religiously oriented actors initially had a narrow 
understanding of democracy, one that was directed at gaining more rights for believers (Toprak 2005, 
175). The lack of attention is rather curious when one considers that HADEP won municipalities 
that had been previously governed by the religiously oriented Fazilet, the predecessor of the AKP. The 
moderate pro-Islamic daily Zaman carried five relevant news reports during the 10-day period. Two of 
these were short commentaries of the election results, one medium-length one was on the decision of 
the Constitutional Court to allow HADEP to participate in the elections. Interestingly it personified 
the attempt to close the party to the Chief Prosecutor Vural Savaş and highlighted that his opinion is 
not the only one or even the majority one. The remaining two articles were on violence/security. The 
other religiously oriented daily selected for the study, Yeni Şafak, did not consider the fate of HADEP 
important: there were only three very short pieces related to HADEP. There were no Kurds, no Kurdish 
issue, no interest.
The high-circulation, populist newspaper Sabah had four news articles relevant to the case at hand. 
Out of these, two very short ones on HADEP/elections used rather neutral language, but included no 
background information. The two articles on violence were much longer. The one detailing the funerals 
of soldiers used a very emotional and nationalist language.
6.6.3 selected findings
Presentation of the findings of the analysis is highly selective. I do not describe all, or even most of the 
ways the texts work, but concentrate on three important findings of the analysis and make one comment 
on the context of the reporting. The first finding is that the term “Kurd/Kurdish” was still avoided in the 
news texts as a label for any concrete groups or individuals. It remained an abstract category. The second 
finding is that HADEP was presented as (mostly) legitimate and the pro-Kurdish actors had a voice in 
the national media, even if their ability to openly voice Kurdish cultural and political demands was quite 
limited. The third finding concerns the missing context of the short news articles. For example, there 
was virtually no background information on Kurdish cultural or political demands or why HADEP was 
harassed. Finally I comment on the difference between reporting on politics and HADEP and reporting 
on violence.
1. There Are No Kurds in Turkey
The first point of interest is the use of the sensitive term or label “Kurd/Kurdish” (Kürt), which was very 
much avoided in the news texts: NO individuals were labeled as Kurds. And in none of the articles were 
any of the members, candidates, or voters of HADEP or other public personalities labeled as Kurdish. 
Secondly, the word was also very sparingly used to refer to larger, non-defined groups of people (only 
C9911) so that most of the time there were no Kurds but rather the people, voters of South-East, HADEP 
voters, citizens, inhabitants of the region, people of the South-East. 
This marked reluctance to use the label Kurdish for individuals and organizations is a clear 
continuation of the earlier practice of silence on the existence of other ethnicities than Turkish in Turkey. 
One of the basic demands of the pro-Kurdish actors has been a public recognition of Kurdish identity 
173
in Turkey, but this was obviously not taking place as the papers did not yet label even representatives of 
the pro-Kurdish (or Kurdish nationalist) HADEP as Kurdish. The issue of labeling is a complex one and 
it is possible to interpret this reluctance and its consequences in different ways. For example, the PKK 
is only very rarely referred to as a Kurdish separatist organization. The constant representation of the 
war in the South-East as taking place between a terrorist organization and the state may has probably 
played a part in down-playing possible inter-ethnic or inter-communal tensions. Also, many of Turkey’s 
Kurds would not appreciate to be publicly labeled as Kurdish, and various politically active Kurdish 
actors have often preferred to claim Turkishness rather than Kurdishness. For example, the HADEP 
representatives can also choose to emphasize their Turkishness (C9911). It is important to note that 
within my sample, representatives of the pro-Kurdish party did not generally use the word Kurd either, 
at least in the quotations that made it to the news articles. They spoke of the people of the region, civil 
organizations and public opinion. This preference, if it indeed was their preference rather than censorship 
by the journalists, should be understood within the context of claims for legitimacy in the mainstream 
public discussion, where claims to Kurdishness were viewed with suspicion. In any case, the reluctance of 
the pro-Kurdish actors themselves to use the label Kurdish, or the reluctance of the newspapers as it may 
be, to cite such utterances further highlights the difficulty and sensitivity of the category Kurdish as late 
as the end of the 1990s.
The word Kurd(ish) was used a few times as a part of the abstract Kurdish issue (in articles C9908 
and M9906). In addition, there also seemed to be some reluctance to use the euphemism South-East 
issue (C9908, M9902). In general, the content of the problem or issue was not discussed in the articles. 
The most we learn from the sample on this issue is that it is a reaction to certain wrong practices of the 
government in the region (M9906) and that the HADEP victory shows that the message and expectations in 
the South-East have not changed: a majority of the inhabitants of the region hope that the South-East problem 
is approached from a cultural and peaceful focus, along with economic and social perspectives (M9902). The 
South-East problem is a handy euphemism to avoid the terms Kurdish as it gives a geographical definition 
for the problem and overlooks the ethnic aspect.
The politically laden term Kurdistan277 is generally not used in Turkey, but neither were the 
politically less sensitive possible alternatives such as Kurdish inhabited region or equivalent used. In many 
instances any collective term was avoided by using an easily recognizable list of place names such as: 
Diyarbakır, Batman, Hakkarı, İğdir, Kars, Adıyaman, Mardin, Şırnak. Yet, the region or the South-East 
was constructed as different from the rest of the country in the news discourse through the label OHAL 
region278 or simply “the region” (bölge) and the descriptions of the extensive security measures in the area. 
This is especially true for Cumhuriyet, which had the highest number of articles on HADEP, Kurds and 
the PKK. Representatives of the local civil society organizations actually asked for the region not to be 
treated in an extraordinary manner (C9913).
277 It appears only in the names of organizations of the Kurdish Regional Government, such as Irak Kürdistan Demokratik 
Partisi (Democractic Party of Irak Kurdistan, C9902). 
278 Olağan Üstü Hal bölgesi refers to the area under state of emergency until November 2002. Literally the term means the 
area of extraordinary conditions. 
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Table 6.2. Labels in the newsreports
Labels Used for Kurdish/pro-Kurdish actors Milliyet Zaman Yeni Şafak Cumhuriyet Sabah Total
Kurd(s) 1     2   3
Kurdish (for named persons)           0
Kurdish (for concrete groups)           0
Kurdish issue/problem 1     1   2
South-East issue/problem 1     1   2
(HADEP/our) voters 1     1   2
citizens       4   4
people/our people 4         4
people/inhab. of the region 1 1 1 1   4
traitor   1     1 2
terrorist (PKK)   2 1 5 2 9279
other     1     1
             
Labels used for places            
South-East or Eastern (Anatolia) 4 1   7 1 13
the Region (or OHAL region) 2     6   8
A list of recog. place names 3 1   2   6
Recognizing “the Kurdish Reality” in the 1990s?279
In the light of previous academic discussions on the issue, I was somewhat surprised by the obvious 
difficulty in the use of the term “Kurdish” in the news articles as late as 1999 and actually also in 2002 
and 2003 as will be shown below. In the official rhetoric throughout the 1980s, there were no Kurds in 
Turkey, as was detailed in chapter four and above, and the PKK was presented as a separatist terrorist 
organization encouraged or even created by a conspiracy of outside powers hostile to Turkey. With 
the escalating violence and increasing visibility of pro-Kurdish demands made by the legal parties, the 
official line had become difficult to maintain by late 1980s and early 1990s despite the efforts of the 
military. 
Due to the increased public use of the term Kurdish, the military held at least one briefing at which 
it explained to members of the media what it thought the proper language and content of their reporting 
should be. It argued that “Kurd” was “their” (the rebels) term and the media’s usage of the term gave 
the impression that the military was fighting Kurdish communities rather than Marxist-Leninist rebels 
(Somer 2005a, 612). The press seemed to conform to the official line, at least to a degree, and when the 
leading daily Hürriyet avoided the category Kurd, it used words such as “they,” “traitors,” “separatists” 
instead (Somer 2005a, 599). Still, the first stories on Kurds from other than a security angle appeared in 
the late 1980s. According to the quantitative content analysis of Murat Somer, in the period 1991-1992 
there was a surge in the use of the term “Kurdish” in the press (Somer 2005a), though his analysis does 
not go into the details of how the term was used. 
As was also already noted in chapter four, a number of leading politicians seemed willing to address 
the issue in some manner. The most often quoted comments repeated over and over again in various 
sources were: President Turgut Özal’s statement that his own grandmother was Kurdish, the 1992 
279 All PKK activists are usually labeled terrorist.
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acknowledgment of the existence “of a Kurdish reality” in Turkey by the then Prime Minister and later 
President Süleyman Demirel (Yeğen 2007, 146 fn33), his suggestion of “constitutional citizenship” in 
mid-1990s, Prime Minister Tansu Ciller’s reformulation of Atatürk’s famous saying into the form “What 
a happiness to be the one who says I am a citizen of Turkey” (İçduygu & al.1999; Bahceli & Noel 2011, 
101-2; Yanık 2006, 287; Yavuz 2001, 17). These led to the conclusion that the “Kurdish reality” had 
become recognized in Turkey (among others: Pope 1991, Kirisci & Winrow 1997; Gürbey 1996). These 
comments have also often been connected with an acknowledgement of Kurdish identity (Somer 2005a, 
615 on Demirel), expectations of extending cultural rights (Pope 1991), and a debate over the meaning 
of the term “Turk” (Kirisci & Winrow 1997, 213). 
The extent of the continued sensitivity vis-á-vis the term Kurdish and the lack of Kurds as Kurds in 
my sample from 1999 in a context of routine political process forces one to pause and consider to what 
this “recognition of the Kurdish reality” in the early 1990s actually refers. I argue that as important as it 
was symbolically, it should not be over-interpreted to herald the acceptance of a separate Kurdish identity 
in the public sphere, let alone an extension of cultural rights.  As Mesut Yeğen has rightly pointed out, 
only the physical existence of Kurds in Turkey was actually acknowledged, not any form of cultural 
rights. There was a bizarre logic, according to which: “You, but not your rights, are recognized.” (Yeğen 
2007, 137). 
My analysis also shows that this recognition remained on the abstract level only, and Kurds as Kurds 
or the Kurdish identity were not visible in public, at least on the pages of the papers included in my 
sample in the said context of a routine political process. When interpreting the results, one should also 
take into account my sample, which consists of news events centering on the pro-Kurdish demands for 
cultural and political rights as well as the Kurdish issue, so that one would expect to find visible Kurds 
in the articles analyzed. At this point it probably in order to also remember that the dailies selected 
into my sample are not considered as nationalist ones but rather moderate in this respect. My findings 
and argument are corroborated to some extent by findings of Hülya Tanriöver (2004),280 who watched 
popular Turkish TV serials with Turkish families (in 1997 and 2000) and found out that there were no 
characters with ethnic identities other than Turkish in the serials, and furthermore, none in the audience 
seemed to notice anything was missing. 
Thus I wish to emphasize the continued deep-seated sensibilities and silences in routine 
situations of public language use in regards to the existence of Kurds in Turkey. For the press, as well 
as for the politicians, the fear of being stigmatized as pro-PKK or “bölücü” (separatist) obviously 
remained great. According to Somer, this was one of the factors that led mainstream actors to express 
their ideas in roundabout ways, by using code words. There are a number of good examples of this. 
In 1998, when Erdal Inönü, the leader of the center-left SHP (Social Democratic Populist Party), 
argued for Kurdish linguistic rights, he did it without using the word Kurdish once (Somer 2005a, 
613, cites Cemal 2003, 96). Everybody understood that he was talking about Kurds, but the fact 
that he avoided certain terms and categories conveyed the message that he was willing to operate 
within the mainstream, challenging its boundaries from within. Also, in more than one instance 
President Demirel talked of “them” when propagating a more moderate, accommodating stance 
(Somer 2005a, 614, Yanık 2006, 287), once again avoiding the problematic label. What Murat 
Somer has described as a politically correct discourse for discussing the possibility of a non-military 
280 A presentation given in 2004.
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solution with a careful selection of officially approved terminology is exemplified by the following 
excerpt in my sample:
That HADEP dominance in the region has risen to seven from five in the previous elections shows 
that even if the party loses ground in Turkey general, the message and expectations in the South-East 
have not changed: it is the hope of most inhabitants of the region of the necessity of approaching the 
South-East problem from a cultural perspective and peaceful resolution in addition to economic and 
social solutions. In other words, even if terror and violence were to be minimized, it is understood 
that identity problems would remain.281 (M9902).
There is a noteworthy difference between the news articles and the columns in this regard. The columnists, 
well-known and much read, have much more freedom to write as they wish. They do it with their own 
name, fame, and risk. In this case, both columnists used the work “Kürt.” Both columns referred to 
Kurdish nationalism, and there were our citizens of Kurdish origins (CM9901). Hikmet Çetinkaya (in 
Cumhuriyet) even mentioned Kurdish intellectuals. 
One should also keep in mind that by 1999 a number of scholarly works on Kurds and the Kurdish 
issue had been published in Turkey, in Turkish. These prove that it was indeed possible to have a 
discussion on the Kurds and the Kurdish issue publicly in some venues, but that the mainstream dailies 
looked at here chose not to.
2. HADEP:”We Are Not the Boogeyman”282
Perhaps the most interesting question that came up in relation to the texts was the question of HADEP’s 
legitimacy: Was HADEP shown as a legitimate representative of its constituency consisting mostly of 
Turkey’s Kurds? The answer is both yes and no.
The press may not have been very interested in the fate of HADEP in the elections (or otherwise), 
but in the articles that did appear, the party was presented as a legitimate political actor and a 
representative of the local constituencies. This was emphasized with detailed numeric information on 
the high numbers of votes various HADEP candidates received. HADEP was (mostly) not connected 
to the PKK or terrorism in the news discourse: at least in this first case it was not shown as a pawn 
of the PKK, unlike in the analysis of Sezgin & Wall (2005, 792) of the coverage of the daily Hürriyet 
and some of the other cases in this work. In one article it was described as emphasizing the Kurdish 
question, human rights and basic freedoms in its program (M9906), thus connecting it with human 
rights rather than terrorism.
In addition to legitimacy, the representatives of the party had a voice in the national media, 
once again unlike in Sezgin & Wall (2005, 792). In the articles included in my sample, HADEP 
representatives were able to address the audience directly. In 31 instances either HADEP as a party or 
identified spokespersons for the party, such as newly elected mayors, were used as sources (see table 
281 Bölgede önceki seçimde beşken yediye çıkan HADEP üstünlüğü, Türkiye geneli bakımından bu parti gerilese bile, 
Güneydoğu’daki mesajın ve beklentilerin değişmediği gösteriyor: Bölge sakinlerinin çoğunluğunda, Güneydoğu sorununa 
ekonomik ve sosyal çözümlerin yanında kültürel eksenli bir barışçı çözümle yaklaşılması gerektiği umudu bu. Bir başka 
deyişle, terör ve şiddet asgariye indirilse bile, kimliksel sorunların varlığını koruduğu anlaşılıyor.
282 “Öcü değiliz,” a statement by a HADEP representative (M9904).
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6.3). In addition, there were also five other quotations from local civil society organizations and their 
spokespersons.283 Of these quotations eight were given a prominent place in the heading (M9904, 
M9905, YŞ9903, C9901, C9909, C9911, C9913, S9904) and a couple of exceptions notwithstanding, 
the quotations were not supported, opposed, or questioned with textual means but the approach towards 
them was neutral. Most of the HADEP representatives spoke as the representatives of the local voters 
addressing their constituencies with promises of improved services, but a few also commented on national 
politics. This corroborates the conclusions of Nicole F. Watts, according to whom the pro-Kurdish parties 
had managed to create a quasi-tolerated if disliked space for themselves in mainstream Turkish political 
culture in the 1990s (Watts 1999, 650).
Table 6.3. Quotations/Sources Milliyet Zaman Yeni Şafak Cumhuriyet Sabah Total
pro-Kurdish pol. actor, unnamed 3 1 1 6
pro-Kurdish pol. actor, named 7 1 1 15 1 25
other pro-Kurdish/local org. 5 5
people/inhab. of the region
state official 1 4 2 7
military/security forces 1 1 2 4
Tr political actor (named/unnamed) 1 1
specialist 4 4
The importance of the fact that HADEP had a voice in the national media should not be overlooked 
or taken for granted. According to the report by Jessika ter Wal, a general feature found in almost all EU 
member countries was that migrant or ethnic, cultural, or religious minorities were not quoted very 
frequently and were not treated as regular news sources. It was obvious that minorities can be news 
actors but not sources. One example ter Wal cites is from Netherlands, where minority members were 
often presented in images to illustrate the discussion about (but not with) them. Another common 
feature was that the minority interviewees were mainly ordinary people not experts or professionals. In 
Denmark migrants were mainly quoted in defensive position (refuting allegations made against them), 
and minorities were not quoted on issues (such as the headscarf ) that concerned them. They were also 
not considered a potential audience and so were both quoted less and not addressed as an audience, 
but only as an object of reporting. In conclusion, official sources tend to dominate the discussion on 
issues of ethnic, cultural, and religious diversity. (ter Wal 2002, 40-41.) The Finnish media researcher 
Sari Pietikäinen also agrees that the relative voicelessness of ethnic minorities seems to be characteristic. 
According to her, the small proportion of minority quotations, and the restricted use of minority 
members as sources, may be partly explained by real hindrances in obtaining information. People who 
can be reached quickly are interviewed and used as sources, and often they are authorities and officials. 
They may also be considered as more objective. (Pietikäinen 2003, 595.)
283 It is perhaps in order to note that I did not consider it important to attempt to estimate who of the various speakers 
might be ethnically Kurdish or not. Rather I looked at representatives of the pro-Kurdish movement as well as other voices 
representing local concerns, albeit, not necessarily Kurdish nationalist ones.
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One needs to take into account that in Turkey the question of ethnic minority voice in mainstream 
media is different from most European countries. First, there are no clear physical characteristics 
distinguishing Kurds from Turks, and forced assimilation has virtually erased many other potentially 
differentiating characteristics. Kurds in Turkey tend to have Turkish surnames (adopted in 1935) and 
either Turkish or common Muslim first names (as giving Kurdish first names has been forbidden).284 
Also, by 2000s, 99% of Kurdish adult males knew Turkish (Smits & Gündüz-Hoşgör 2003). For most 
of Republican history, there has been strong Kurdish representation in politics through the mainstream 
political parties (Winrow & Kirişçi 1997). Thus, Kurds have always had a voice in public as long as 
they were willing to participate in the discussion as a part of the Turkish nation. What they have 
lacked has been the right to express particularly Kurdish views, a voice as Kurds, as was also evident in 
my sample.
In conclusion, the existence of HADEP and its participation in the democratic process was 
extremely important as it gave the possibility of having a pro-Kurdish voice in the national media; even 
if its possibility of openly voicing Kurdish cultural and political demands was quite limited. Also, as 
will be seen in the next case analyzed, when there was no official, recognized organization behind the 
pro-Kurdish demands, there were no pro-Kurdish voices in the media. This is also true for articles with 
a security angle. Despite the danger of stating the self-evident, it is perhaps worth noting that no pro-
Kurdish sources were cited in the nine articles in this first case, where the main or secondary perspective 
or framework was security. According to Murat Somer’s previously summarized study of the daily 
Hürriyet, security related articles were also less likely to use the word Kurd(ish) (Somer 2005a).
3. Missing Information: Why Could Zeynel Bağır Not Enter the Town of Lice?
HADEP might have been legitimate and visible, but there were severe limitations on how HADEP 
could be discussed. Most importantly it was not presented as a Kurdish or pro-Kurdish party in news 
reports. The sole exception was a single column in Milliyet, which proclaimed: “No matter how much it 
is covered, it is known that HADEP is a party that turns around “an ethnic Kurdish axis” and represents 
“the nationalist Kurdish current” (CM9901). The general refusal to label (or to stigmatize) HADEP as an 
ethnic or a Kurdish party made the events described in the news reports impossible to understand on the 
basis of the manifest content of the texts. The reader was expected to possess a wealth of a priori cultural-
political knowledge.
Several news articles told about the difficulties HADEP had in their campaign work. It was written, 
for example, that HADEP candidate Zeynel Bağır, who was prevented from entering the (voting) district, 
became the mayor of Lice (C9907), yet one never learned the answer to the question asked in the heading 
of this section, that is, why exactly was Mr. Bağır prevented entry to his constituency? 
In another article, the repressive measures were highlighted: 
Permission was not granted to the meetings HADEP wanted to arrange in the district centers on the 
basis of “security” considerations. There was an attempt to prevent even the most natural propaganda 
284 For example, the chairman of the pro-Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) was Ahmet Türk. There are of course also 
well-known Kurdish families such as the Bucaks or Fırats and preferences of first names such as Selahattin (i.e. Salah al-Din). 
There can be also discrimination based on presumed Kurdishness of an individual. The presumption can be made on the basis 
of level of proficiency in Turkish language, place of origins etc.
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work such as putting up posters… Almost all of the vehicles used by it… were confiscated by citing 
various reasons… many members of its board, heads of the districts and its election workers were 
detained. (M9906)285
In a curious manner there is no agent behind the pressure but all is conducted in passive. This is very 
much counter to the findings elsewhere, according to which reporting tends to grant active participant 
status to officials and a passive one for members of minorities (see for example Pietikäinen 2003 or 
Blomqvist 1996). In my interpretation, this connects with the general lack of background information 
on the Kurdish issue in the media (compare with Sezgin and Wall (2005, 790). Only one news article 
and one column (M9906, CM9901) in all five newspapers explained in any way what the fuss with 
the party was about: HADEP is in a situation where there are several allegations against it, the worst being 
‘separatist activities,’ and many court cases have been raised against it and it has been marginalized by the 
central administration. (M9906).
In the others, there was a significant lack of background explanation as to why the campaign work 
of the party (shown as legitimate by the press by classifications such as “most natural propaganda work”) 
was prevented. Sezgin and Wall also noted this lack of necessary information vital for understanding the 
chain of events in the texts on several occasions (Sezgin & Wall 2005, 790, 794). No explanation is given 
as to why Kurds want language rights or why this would somehow hurt Turkish interests and feelings 
(Ibid., 790). This is a constant feature in the articles; about half of them seemed to be missing something. 
The texts are very much a part of a larger whole, parts of which are not there on the pages of the press 
but are only hinted at. These are issues that are expected to be known by the reader, part of the cultural 
knowledge expected of newspaper readers in Turkey. A priori knowledge is of course expected in most 
cases of routine news reporting, but vis-à-vis the Kurdish political actors the silences were deeper than 
mere avoidance of repetition. No information was provided on such issues as: Why exactly is HADEP 
being harassed (and in most cases also by whom). How “the region” is different from the rest of the 
country. Why the central state officials or the MHP refuse to work together with democratically elected 
HADEP mayors. Why terrorists would attack the elections. Why it was not possible to transport the 
ballots from rural South-East during the night time. Why the PKK wanted to turn political and why that 
would that be bad. I would attribute the cause for these silences to the narrow constraints of political 
correctness and habitual self-censorship rather than any outright pressure by the security apparatus on 
mainstream media on how to report on elections, even if the restrictive role played by the military should 
not be ignored. 
In conclusion, HADEP had a voice in the mainstream media, but what it could say, or what could 
be said about it, was severely limited. None of the articles mentioned anything about the demands and 
political agenda of the party. This must have severely curtailed its efficiency in widening the scope of 
discussion and attempting to gain wider acceptance for the existence of a separate Kurdish ethnicity and 
cultural rights. 
285 … HADEP’in il ve ilçe merkezlerinde düzenlemek istediği miting ve toplantıların önemli bölümüne “güvenlik” 
gerekçesiyle izin verilmedi. Hatta en doğal propaganda faaliyeti olan afis asma çalışması bile engellemeye çalışıldı ve … … 
kullandıkları hemen bütün araçlara … çeşitli gerekçeler öne sürülerek el konuldu… çok sayıda yönetim kurulu üyesi, il ve ilçe 
başkanları ile seçim çalışmasında görev alan üyeleri gözaltına alındı.
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The Context of Security and Nationalism
Before moving on to the next case, it is in order to say a few more words on the context of the reporting 
in 1999. In April of 1999, the PKK-proclaimed cease-fire was still in the future, and there were regular 
violent clashes between the Turkish military or gendarme and the PKK fighters. As the articles on 
the fighting between the TSK (Turkish Armed Forces) and the PKK published around the elections 
were included in the sample, it is possible to make some tentative remarks concerning them and the 
differences in comparison to the HADEP-related articles. The articles on “operations” against “terrorists” 
were quite technical in nature, detailing equipment used etc. and were clearly based on the press releases 
of the OHAL governing body, sometimes repeated in verbatim from paper to paper (for example Z9902, 
S9903, C9902). This confirms the findings of Ayaz (1997) and Odabaşı (2001) of earlier periods.
The articles (Z9903, S9902) on funerals of soldiers martyred (şehit) in the fighting were given within 
a militant-nationalist framework/rhetoric. Even though reporting on violence is not my main focus in 
this study, I want to give an example of this kind of nationalist writing as it set the tone within which 
peaceful claims for a separate Kurdish ethnicity were also understood:
Gendarme Garrison Commander Colonel Varol Kutlu emphasized that martyrs are not buried into 
the ground but into the hearts of the nation. Explaining that the terrorist organization deceives, 
deludes ignorant people, Kutlu said: “A certain part of ignorant citizens286 and our so-called 
intellectuals cause damage to the State of the Republic of Turkey with extraordinary irresponsibility 
and insensitivity (/stupidity). They show themselves as taking part in [i.e. supporting] adventurous 
ideas and theses such as giving themselves a separate status and political identity. These traitors should 
know that the Turkish nation continues to break the hands that water every part of the land with the 
blood of martyrs and [attempt to] reach our fatherland. (Z9903)287
HADEP was subsequently closed by the Constitutional Court in 2003 for “aiding an illegal organization,” 
i.e. the PKK. The next pro-Kurdish party DEHAP had been founded in 1997 as a precaution for the 
closure of HADEP after the disastrous HADEP party Congress of 1996.288 DEHAP participated in the 
national elections of 2002, gaining a record 6.2% of the vote.
6.7 case 2: unconstitutional petitions foR kuRdish language in 2002
This second case study looks at a two-week period of the reporting on a petition campaign for elective 
Kurdish language courses in the universities and Kurdish language teaching in primary schools that took 
place in 2001–2002. This case investigates and illuminates the role of Turkish language as a marker of 
286 Note the labeling of Kurdish nationalists as ignorant citizens.
287 Garnizon Komutanı Jandarma Albay Varol Kutlu da, şehitleri toprağa değil, milletçe kalplerine gömdüklerini belirtti. Terör 
örgütünün, cahil insanları kandırıp, aldattığını anlatan Kutlu, “Bir kısım cahil yurttaşlar ve sözde aydınlarımız, olağanüstü 
vurdumduymaz ve sorumsuzlukla Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Devleti’ne zarar vermektedirler. Kendilerine ayrı bir statü ve siyasi kimlik 
verilmesi gibi maceracı fikirlere ve tezlere taraftar gözükmektedirler. Bu hainler bilsinler ki, her karış toprağı şehit kanıyla sulanan 
ve vatanımıza uzanan elleri, Türk milleti kırmaya devam edecektir dedi.
288 See case three for more information on the HADEP 1996 party Congress.
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national identity and the consequent difficulties in accepting the demands for multicultural linguistic 
rights by citizens whose mother tongue is not Turkish. In addition, it also sheds light on the negative 
representations of political activities that do not fall within the sphere of formal party politics.
6.7.1 tuRkish language as a maRkeR of national identity
The Turkish language is one of the most beautiful, rich and easy languages in the world. Therefore, 
every Turk loves his language and makes an effort to elevate its status. The Turkish language is also 
a sacred treasure for the Turkish nation because the Turkish nation knows that its moral values, 
customs, memories, interests, in short, everything that makes it a nation was preserved through its 
language despite the endless catastrophes it has experienced. (This quote is contributed to Atatürk, 
citation from Eraydın Virtanen 2003, 13). 
As was already discussed in chapters two and three, fluency in Turkish language has been one of the main 
markers of belonging to the Turkish nation. The emphasis has been on shared culture, and “language is 
not just one of the main aspects of national culture to be spread; it is one of its most efficient vehicles.” 
(Scalbert-Yücel 2010, 118). Thus, the language of education (as well as of the state) was defined to be 
Turkish, and use of other tongues was actively—at some periods aggressively—discouraged. Articles 14 
and 17 of the Eastern Reform Plan (1925) drafted in the aftermath of the Sheikh Said revolt of 1925 
stipulated that in the eastern provinces everybody speaking a language other than Turkish would be 
punished. Implementation of the ban was left to the local authorities, and people speaking languages 
other than Turkish were fined from time to time (Scalbert-Yücel 2010, 118). In the 1930s there were also 
the “Citizen speak Turkish!” campaigns, but until the coup of 1982, no language was officially banned 
on the national level. 
The ban on Kurdish came with the constitution of 1982 and joined legislation. Law number 2932 
criminalized the use of Kurdish in publishing and broadcasting (albeit without mentioning the term 
Kurdish). It even specified that the mother tongue of all citizens is Turkish! (Scalbert-Yücel 2010, 118-
119). This total ban was of relatively short duration, and the 1983 “Law on Publications and Broadcasts 
in Languages Other Than Turkish” was repealed in 1991. This legal modification now permitted limited 
use of Kurdish, including Kurdish-language publications, but not broadcasts or education. As Özlem 
Eraydın Virtanen has pointed out, despite this change, the constitutional basis for such prohibitions 
remained. In addition to the Constitution, restrictive articles were also included in the Political Parties 
Law, the Foreign Language Education and Teaching Law, the Law on Fundamental Provisions of 
Elections and Voter Registries, and the Provincial Administration Law (Eraydın Virtanen 2003, 23). 
Thus, the ban lifted in 1991 was only that on private use and publications. Kurdish language could still 
not be used, for example, in politics, education, or broadcasting.
In addition to severe restrictions on the use of Kurdish language, a negative image was created for it 
from the 1920s and 1930s onwards by Turkish scholars. It was argued that Kurds are “mountain Turks” 
who speak an inferior form of Turkish with strong Persian influence. In the words of Dr. Clémence 
Scalbert-Yücel, the general approach was along the lines that “Kurdish is not a language; it is only a sum 
of very poor, degenerated Turkish dialects. Indeed, it is not even recognized as a dialect—it is only a pile 
of words that do not enable its speakers to form a literature, except a very sterile oral literature—and it 
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certainly cannot be taught.” (from Scalbert-Yücel 2010, 120). This negative, derogatory image was used 
to encourage assimilation to Turkishness, as well as a basis for non-recognition of Kurdish language. 
Even during the first decade of the 2000s, the language of education remained exclusively Turkish 
with Article 42 of the Constitution stating that “No language other than Turkish shall be taught as a 
mother tongue to Turkish citizens at any institutions of training or education.” (from O’Neil 2007, 
85).289 Kurdish-speaking children had no right to receive teaching of, or teaching in, their mother 
tongue. Until 2003 the giving of Kurdish names for children was also severely discouraged. In an 
article from 1995, Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and S. Bucak have argued that the restrictions on use of 
Kurdish language in Turkey actually amounted to a linguistic genocide of Kurds (Skutnabb-Kangas & 
Bucak 1995, 360).
As a consequence of these factors, i.e. the close connection constructed between Turkish national 
identity, the indivisible Turkish nation, and Turkish language as the carrier of this identity, and the 
officially approved derogatory rhetoric and long-standing restrictive policies towards the other local 
languages, the demand for multi-cultural linguistic rights has been a difficult one. 
6.7.2 modest impRovements in minoRity language Rights
Much happened in Turkey after the 1999 elections studied in the previous case. The most important 
development for the topic at hand was undoubtedly the trial of PKK’s leader Abdullah Öcalan and the 
subsequent ceasefire. In the widely publicized trial of Abdullah Öcalan290 in 1999, he made conciliatory 
speeches promoting Turkish-Kurdish brotherhood and called for the PKK to cease its armed struggle. 
Following his wishes, the PKK started a unilateral ceasefire that was to last until 2004. The cessation of 
PKK hostilities and a period of relative peace in the South-East of Turkey offered a good opportunity for 
advancing a peaceful solution for Turkey’s problems with its Kurdish-speaking minority. 
The other important development took place later during the same year, when Turkey was included 
among the European Union membership applicant countries at the Helsinki Summit in December 
1999. After a 40-year long difficult process of Turkish integration into the EU (previously the European 
Economic Community, EEC), it was finally accepted among the membership candidates. There was 
a feeling of euphoric celebration of this historic achievement with pictures of the smug Turkish Prime 
Minister Bülent Ecevit in the “European family portrait” of the Helsinki Summit. Even though the EU 
does not formally demand acknowledgement of minorities with subsequent multicultural and linguistic 
rights from its members, Kurds have seen Turkey’s membership as a guarantee of stability, peace, and 
wider minority-rights in Turkey. They have thus been among the most enthusiastic supporters of Turkey’s 
EU-membership.291
289 See also the Constitution of the Republic of Turkey 1982, Article 42, which was still valid in early 2015.
290 The trial that resulted with the death penalty was held at the State Security Court and later deemed unfair by the 
European Court of Human rights. However, the Turkish Higher Court of Appeals upheld the conviction, which was later 
commuted to life imprisonment (Öktem 2011, 111-2).
291 According to Ali Çarkoğlu, 71% of people who know Kurdish language and 85% of those supporting the pro-Kurdish 
HADEP also supported Turkey’s EU membership in 2002 (Ali Çarkoğlu 2003). The corresponding figure for all citizens of 
Turkey at the time was 64%.
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Despite the cessation of violence and the EU-euphoria, only modest steps were taken towards 
fulfilling the so-called Copenhagen Criteria during the next two years. All EU-applicant countries 
must sufficiently fulfill the Copenhagen criteria before the access negotiations can be formally opened. 
The Copenhagen criteria comprise political, economic, and legislative aspects: stability of institutions 
guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and respect for and protection of minorities, 
the existence of a functioning market economy and the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and 
market forces within the Union, and the acceptance of the Community acquis: ability to take on the 
obligations of membership, including adherence to the aims of political, economic and monetary union. 
Several reasons can be discerned for this lack of progress in fulfilling the Copenhagen Criteria, one of 
which was the composition of the ruling coalition government. The country was governed by a coalition 
formed by the winners of the 1999 elections: the center-left DSP and the (ultra-)nationalist MHP, 
reinforced by the center-right ANAP (Anavatan Partisi, The Fatherland Party). This odd coalition tried 
to harness the prevailing nationalist sentiment (Öktem 2011, 112).
The DSP Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit, who had held influential positions in Turkish politics for 
47 years, never acknowledged the existence of a Kurdish issue in Turkey. He actively toured the South-
East and was apparently well-acquainted with the Kurdish provinces, but in his opinion the problems 
in the Kurdish populated South-East were caused by poverty and feudal social structures (for example 
in Yavuz 2001, 20).292 In line with this view, the government’s East and South-East action plan of 1999 
included only economic measures and did not refer to cultural issues such as the language of broadcasting 
or education. According to the journalist Belma Akçura, the action plan was actually drafted by the 
National Security Council, not the politicians (Akçura 2008, 181-182). 
In the late 1990s and early 2000s Ecevit’s rhetoric turned increasingly nationalist resembling that 
of his coalition partner of the time, Devlet Bahçeli of the MHP (Öktem 2011, 112). The founder of the 
MHP, Alparslan Türkeş (d. 1997), had been one of the most ardent defenders of the argument of Kurds 
as essentially Turkish (Akçura 2008, 241; Bora 2002b, 694-5). His successor, Devlet Bahçeli, distanced 
the party from extreme right wing nationalism to gain wider electoral support, but unitary nationalism 
remained at the core of the party’s ideology and program. Another factor contributing to the failure 
to seize the window of opportunity offered by the cessation of the violence and the EU conditionality 
or anchor (for the use of these terms, see Uğur 1999 and Tocci 2007) was undoubtedly the continued 
political power of the National Security Council (MGK) and the military, which did not support a non-
military solution. 
Yet, some modest steps to improve minority rights were taken between the spring of 1999 and 
winter of 2002. In October 2001 the parliament passed 34 amendments to the Constitution as a part of 
the EU-reforms. One of the amendments was the deletion of the mention of languages prohibited by law 
(Eraydin Virtanen 2003, 35). The influence of the EU’s demands and EU pressure was also starting to 
have some effect on the public discussion in Turkey as will also be apparent from the analysis of the case 
below.
292 This was a fairly typical left of center Kemalist approach to the issue from the mid-1960s onwards.
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6.7.3 the petition campaign and the sample
University students started a petition campaign after the changes in the Constitution, in November–
December 2001 to demand elective Kurdish language courses in the universities, and parents of Kurdish-
speaking children campaigned to have Kurdish language teaching in primary schools. The petitioners 
signed and handed first hundreds and then thousands of petitions to university rectors, school boards, 
and other officials.
The Turkish state establishment concluded that the campaign was organized by the PKK and reacted 
accordingly: the ministry of interior and the ministry of education both sent instructions to officials 
under their authority not to accept the petitions but to report to the police instead. Petitioning turned 
into demonstrations with the police detaining 3,621 petitioners and demonstrators between January 
and August 2002. Despite the non-violent character of the petition campaign, 466 people were charged 
with ”assisting an illegal armed organization” (HRW 29.6.2004), i.e. the PKK. In addition, many of the 
students were suspended from their universities.
The Turkish press was not very interested in the topic and reporting on it was sporadic. The period 
chosen for analysis is the last two weeks of January 2002, when there were relatively many articles on the 
issue (n=55, 38 news articles and 17 columns). 
Table 6.4. Number of Articles
News Columns
Milliyet 9 8
Zaman 4 1
Yeni Şafak 3 4
Cumhuriyet 13 3
Sabah 9 1
Total 38293 17294
6.7.4 selected findings
1. Kurdish Language and Kurds293294
One of the most often reoccurring words in the news reports was the Turkish word “Kürtçe,” i.e. Kurdish 
language. It was used in all of the news articles and in more than half of the headlines (23/38). This clearly 
indicates that by 2002 the Turkish mainstream media had come to terms with the existence of Kurdish 
language and was able to refer to it freely.295 The difference from the official parlance is essential. Within the 
official discourse, the idea of languages prohibited by law still remained. Even after the reform of the Language 
Law that took place later the same year in August 2002, the word Kurdish was still avoided in the official 
language with formulations such as the different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens 
in their daily lives.296 It is also worth noting that at times the media would use the term “Kurdish language” 
293 The news articles and columns were analyzed separately as they represent different types of texts.
294 The number of columns analyzed was 16 as two columns were from the same columnist.
295 References to Kurdish language had been occasionally made in the mainstream media already since 1991.
296 Türk vatandaşlarının günlük yaşamlarında geleneksel olarak kullandıkları farklı dil ve lehçeler.
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even when the original source had preferred some euphemism such as other than the official language (resmi 
dilden başka bir dil, for example in C0211) or the language they want (istediği lisan in YŞ0202).
Important questions follow from this manifest visibility: How was the word used? Was a negative 
image constructed for the language? In most cases the word “Kürtçe” appeared as a part of the neutral 
compound “a demand for Kurdish language education” (Kürtçe eğitim istemi/talebi). Counter 
to expectations based on previous research (Scalbert-Yücel 2010, Sezgin & Wall 2005), negative 
representations of Kurdish language were mostly absent.297 One sole exception notwithstanding, there 
were also no references to the wide range of dialects (or separate languages, see chapter 3) of Kurdish, 
even though the great degree of variety has been one of the powerful arguments used against Kurdish 
language education, typically expressed in the form of the simple question: “Which Kurdish?” As positive 
a finding as this lack of denigration is, it was at least partially due to the nature of the debate, which was 
not really over the possibility or impossibility of Kurdish language teaching at schools in Turkey but over 
the right to make the demand, of which more below.
The visibility of Kurdish language was not combined with existence Kurdish actors in the news 
articles. The word “Kürt” or the plural “Kürtler” (i.e. a Kurd/Kurdish or Kurds) were not used often, and 
appeared only in nine news articles out of 38. Once again it was in most instances not used to refer to 
actual Kurds, but was used as an adjective in the meaning “Kurdish.” It was mostly used either as a part 
of the concept Kurdish issue or to describe the claims and aims of the PKK’s political campaigns listed 
as the creation of: Kurdish history (Kürt tarihi), Kurdish literature (Kürt Edebiyatı), Kurdish [sports] teams 
(Kürt takımları), Kurdish Journalists’ Union (Kürt Gazeteciler Birliği), Turkish-Kurdish separation (Türk-
Kürt ayrımı), “Kurdish high school” (“Kürt Lisesi”), geography of Kurdistan (Kürdistan çoğrafyası) (all these 
examples from S0206). All of these listed items can be considered sensitive, and it is no coincidence 
that the main source in these articles listing the PKK’s plans (S0206, S0208, M0205, C0206, C0209, 
C0211) was a report prepared by an intelligence organization, i.e. a safe source to quote from. 
In only three instances was the word “Kürt” used to refer to Kurds as a general group (C0206, 
S0207, C0211), and in none was it used to refer to the activists demanding Kurdish language rights. 
Thus, individuals and groups petitioning for Kurdish language rights were not labeled as Kurds but as 
persons, students, teachers, mothers, guardians, women, children and so forth. Turkish language also offers a 
range of possibilities to avoid problematic labels, including such handy participle constructions as dilekçe 
verenler (those who give petitions), kolektif hak talep edenler (those who ask for collective rights), etc.
To test whether the reluctance to categorize individuals as Kurds was particular for my sample, I did 
a test search in the www-archive of the daily Milliyet. For 2002, the search in the sections on politics, 
economy and daily agenda gave 88 hits (for the word Kürt). In most cases the word was used as a part of 
the Kurdish issue (=Kürt sorunu), in 17 cases it referred to an unspecified group or was part of some general 
term such as Kurdish people, Kurdish citizen, half of the Kurds, the Kurds in Turkey, Kurdish ethnic groups etc. 
In only three instances was it used to refer to an actual, concrete, even though unnamed person. In light of 
this, my sample can probably be considered fairly representative of the use of the term for the period.
Many articles connected the campaign directly with the PKK, yet the petitioners were not presented 
as terrorists but were rather seen as being used (duped) by the PKK. Only in very few instances was the 
297 The exception was voiced by the OHAL governor, according to whom Kurdish is not compatible with modernity (in 
M0207). In addition, two columns (CM0207, CC0201) connected the demand for Kurdish language education with a 
failure of the state to teach the official language to all its citizens. In the context of Turkish only educational system the 
demand for minority mother-tongue education becomes thus seen as rooted in poor educational background and ignorance. 
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approach to both the petitioners and those supporting them negative with such terms as all kinds of 
elements endangering [Turkey’s] unity and harmony ([Türkiye’nin] birlik ve dirliğini tehdit eden her türlü 
unsur, S0202) or separatist (bölücü, S0202). In general, the opposing sides in the action were constructed 
to be a demand for Kurdish language teaching without an active agent on one side, and the state and 
state officials who are denying this right on the other. This corresponds closely with the findings of the 
Finnish researcher Sari Pietikäinen on the reporting on the demands for rights by the indigenous Sami 
minority in Finland (Pietikäinen 2003, 603).
One of the obvious differences between the news and the columns was in the use of the word 
“Kürt,” which was used more comfortably in the columns (10/16) than the news. In most cases it still 
referred to concepts such as the Kurdish issue or a non-specified group of people, but in two columns it 
was used of the petitioners (citizens of Kurdish origins = Kürt kökenli vatandaşlar in CSM0207 and youth 
of Kurdish origin = Kürt kökenli gençler in CC0203).
Kurds were also referred to as our Kurdish citizens or our Kurdish-origin citizens in several of the 
columns and the word citizen (vatandaş/yurttaş) was generally and frequently used. This is a clear and 
important divergence from the language use in the news articles. First, the word citizen can be used 
instead of the word Kurd to imply that Turkey’s Kurds have an equal status to (ethnic) Turks as citizens 
of Turkey or as a part of the term citizens of Kurdish origins to emphasize the common bond of citizenship 
over possible ethnic differences while not denying the said differences. Second, the word citizen is often 
used in news discourse in situations of state official/politician–ordinary people interaction, but as far as I 
know, not of demonstrators as a rule. (Demonstrating against state practices is not compatible with the 
conceptualization of citizenship as passive, where political participation takes place only on the formal 
level.) Thus the use of the word citizen of the petitioners (CM0207, CYŞ0202) implies that the campaign 
was seen as legitimate by these columnists, unlike in the news reports. Also, the use of citizens of Kurdish 
origins in the context of mother tongue education may imply wider acceptance of political claims and 
citizen’s activity made on the basis of ethno-cultural Kurdish identity. 
2. ”Everyone knows [that] our ordinary Kurdish citizen does not want “Kurdish language education””298
This time there were virtually no pro-Kurdish sources cited unlike in the previous case analyzed, where 
the context was formal party politics. The petitioners did not have a say in the national media, which 
corresponds to the conclusions of Sezgin and Wall (2005, 791). They were not given the opportunity 
to explain why they had participated in the campaign, or why they were demanding Kurdish language 
education. They were neither interviewed, nor introduced with names as individuals in any of the articles 
in my sample. They were merely members of a faceless group. Only two persons made comments that 
could be seen as representing pro-Kurdish stances, but these were not petitioners. The petitioners were 
the cause for the debate, but did not get to participate in it; instead it was conducted over their heads 
by various well-known Turkish politicians (28 instances) and the security establishment (15 instances),299 
who claimed to know what the petitioners wanted, why, and what was best for them.
298 Sıradan bir Kürt vatandaşımızın “Kürtçe eğitim” istemediğini herkes biliyor (CS0201). This short quote contains a 
division of Kurds into “our ordinary Kurdish citizens” and implicitly the “others,” who demand Kurdish language rights. I will 
comment on these kinds of constructions at length in case four.
299 Using top military personnel as sources in relation to also the Kurdish political demands seems to be typical for Turkish 
mainstream media. See for example Erdem 2014, 53. 
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Just as in the news reports, there was a total lack of Kurdish voices in the columns as well. Despite 
this lack of Kurdish sources, many of the columnists claimed to know what Kurds want: ordinary Kurds 
do not want Kurdish teaching at schools (for example CM0207 and CS0201). There were also elitist 
tones in some of the columns: Kurdish teaching was said to hinder the possibilities of social mobility of a 
portion of the population and thus it would not be good for them (CC0201).
A multitude of reasons can be discerned for this lack of activist voice. First of all, a pronounced lack 
of minority views and sources is fairly typical for reporting on minority issues in Western democracies 
in general (ter Wall 2004, 40-41). Second, a reluctance to transmit the views of presumably nationalist 
Kurdish activists is perhaps understandable in a country where journalists are sentenced for involvement in 
terrorism on the basis of interviews of PKK leaders and where the mere repetition of PKK demands can lead 
to indictment. The continuing influence and repressive role of the security apparatus is difficult to gauge, 
but some indication is given even in some articles within my sample as C0202: “The journalists were also 
harassed in the fighting and tumult that ensued in front of the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and the bus 
stops” and “HADEP’s regional and district buildings remained under blockade the whole day.” Also, the 
columnist Aydın Engin describes himself as “an experienced press defendant” and obviously expects to be 
indicted for his column (CC0202), where he petitions for Kurdish language teaching. 
Third, the lack of voice of ordinary people can perhaps be also interpreted as a symptom of the 
centrist, elite-led project of modernity in Turkey, within which the citizen is expected to be passive and 
obedient to the state rather than actively campaigning for wider rights (see chapters two to four). The 
self-assured elite, to which the journalists also belong, is perhaps not in the habit of “going to the people” 
but is rather used to knowing best. Then again, one reason for the lack of varied sources may be simply 
shoddy journalism within strict time constraints. 
Whatever the reason behind this lack of Kurdish or pro-Kurdish activist voice, it underlines the 
importance of the participation of pro-Kurdish actors in formal party politics. As was seen in the previous 
case, the pro-Kurdish actors, i.e. HADEP representatives, had a voice in the national public space when 
they participated in formal party-politics.
3. Language Rights as a Threat?
As I was going through the news reports and columns, I began to wonder about the state’s hard-handed 
and clumsy handling of the issue. I was not alone. The following quote is from the well-known columnist 
Can Dündar, writing in Milliyet at the time:
According to the government this is “PKK’s latest political action…”
I think so too!.. 
[…]
Very well, what does Turkey do against this action?..
Just what the PKK wants…
It tears the petitions into pieces and makes the petitioners regret they were born; it opens court cases 
that will clearly return from Europe [ECHR] and so prepares the ground for a fall. If the last action 
is really “a front of Apo,” it means that a man who is kept in isolation on a faraway island300 has 
300 The prison island of İmralı in the Sea of Marmara. 
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managed to show to the world with one order, within one week Turkey’s insincerity in the topic of 
human rights and its intolerance towards “even petition papers”. (CM0205)
The petition campaign was presented as a game of the PKK, the aim of which was told to turn into a 
political movement and have the issue of language rights taken to the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) through the detentions and convictions caused by the campaign (for example in S0204).301 If 
one takes this at face value, one has to conclude that the PKK was quite successful: There was relatively 
much publicity and debate caused by the harsh reaction of the Turkish state, the arrests, and court cases. 
At least in theory the establishment could have interpreted the legislation differently and stated to the 
petitioners: “Thank you, but unfortunately we cannot possibly do anything about this as the language 
of education is decreed in the legislation.” Instead, the local level administration was instructed to refuse 
to receive the petitions and to inform the police. In addition, the police started arresting the petitioners 
in great numbers. Naturally, this was followed by an argument as whether this sort of petitioning can 
be allowed. The question that begs to be asked is: why did the Turkish state establishment and top 
politicians (Minister of Interior and Minister of Justice) play into the hands of the PKK, whose aim was 
told to be mass arrests and the following publicity?
The answer must lie in the continued strength and rigidity of the nationalist hard-liner stance 
(classification from Somer 2005a), according to which multicultural rights would constitute a threat for 
the Turkish nation and the state. Despite the carefully neutral terms or euphemisms used to describe the 
petitioners themselves, the news articles conveyed a sense of danger, a threat created by the combination 
of presenting the petition campaign as initiated by the PKK and routine references to police, detentions, 
criminal investigations, court cases in State Security Courts (!), statements of the National Security 
Council and intelligence agencies in connection to language rights.
Will Kymlicka (2004) has discussed the differences between approaches towards minority 
nationalism in the Western democracies and post-communist Eastern and Central Eastern (ECE) 
countries. According to him, in the established Western democracies even radical minority nationalist 
demands stopping short only from violent secessionist claims are approached from the perspective of 
justice and subjected to normal democratic decision-making processes. In the ECE countries minority 
nationalist claims have become securitized, and even relatively weak minority nationalist claims are 
perceived as a threat to the state. According to Kymlicka it has been widely accepted in the ECE countries 
that minorities are disloyal and have collaborated with former oppressors or continue to collaborate with 
current enemies or potential enemies; thus a strong and stable state requires weak and disempowered 
minorities, and, therefore, the treatment of minorities is above all a question of national security (Ibid.).
In Turkey the issue has been complicated by a combination of the official denial of the existence 
of any Muslim minorities and the presence of secessionist violence, but it is obvious that it shares much 
with the approach prevalent in the ECE countries. Claims for even modest minority rights such as 
mother tongue elementary education have become securitized to such a degree they become equated 
with an existential threat to the state. And, as Kymlicka has pointed out (Ibid.), the securitization of 
301 This is a quite an interesting causal construction: the aim of the campaign for Kurdish language education was actually 
not to achieve Kurdish language education, but to have enough detentions and convictions to be able to take the issue 
to the European Court of human rights. This reading of the situation is explained by the fact the writers are aware that 
according to Turkey’s legislation of the time, it was impossible to achieve Kurdish language education by petitioning the local 
administrators.
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minority issues can serve the interests of the ruling political elite because it can be used to trump normal 
democratic processes of debate and negotiation. The state cannot afford to discuss and negotiate when it 
is not secure in its existence. 
It is somewhat difficult to estimate how contemporaneous readers may have interpreted some of the 
articles. For example in Cumhuriyet’s account (C0202) of a demonstration in Istanbul the discrepancy 
between the actions of the security forces vis-à-vis the petitioners/demonstrators is very pronounced: 
Why would demanding wider linguistic rights by petitioning local state officials justify the presence of 
thousands of police equipped with tanks, trained dogs, and even sharp shooters? Two almost opposite 
interpretations are readily available: either the reader is expected to possess the knowledge of why such a 
force is necessary, or more likely in this case, the amount of detail aims to covertly criticize the extreme 
security measures, especially as these same police are also told to have harassed the journalists reporting 
the event.
In general, the danger of multi-lingual education seemed to be so self-evident in the minds of the 
commentators that one did not have to explain the reasons for it, or justify it in detail even in those 
articles where the existence of the danger was explicitly pointed out (for example by Tansu Çiller in 
M0204). This idea of language rights as a threat should also be considered in the context of inherent 
state-centrism of the Turkish press. Mine Gencel-Bek has argued in relation to Turkey’s EU-process, 
that the “we” in the press tended to be the Turkish state rather than the citizenry, and the process of 
democratization and improving human rights were presented as “concessions” to be given to the EU 
in order the make financial gains (Genel-Bek 2001). The Turkish press tends to protect the interests of 
the state rather than those of the citizens, and within the context of a national unity endangered, wider 
cultural rights of the citizens become equated with a threat.
Despite the strong influence of the nationalist hard-liner stance and the wide-spread perception of 
linguistic rights as a threat, the harsh reaction of the state establishment was by no means inevitable or 
unavoidable. As Nicole F. Watts (1999) and Murat Somer (2005a) have pointed out in relation to other 
instances, there was also an intra-elite disagreement on how to respond to Kurdish political activity this 
time. Ex-Prime Minister and leader of ANAP Mesut Yılmaz was not alone in his calls for moderation 
and accommodation: …there is benefit in acting with moderation towards these [demands] (…bunlara karşı 
daha ılımlı davranılmasında fayda var, S0203).302 Yet, the fact that Yılmaz also combined his moderate 
stance with emphasis on the impossibility of Kurdish language education, points towards the limited 
room for accommodation.303
It also needs to be pointed out that an acceptance of the existence of Kurds, Kurdish language, 
and the existence of an intra-elite disagreement do not necessarily mean the willingness to support 
multicultural rights. Nicole F. Watts (1999) has looked at the HEP/DEP period, which began with the 
founding of HEP with a split from the ranks of the SHP after the conference on the Kurdish issue in 
Paris in 1989 as seven SHP deputies were expelled from the party for having attended the conference. 
302 Elsewhere Yılmaz also argues against the paranoia of seeing enemies everywhere: Not everyone within the 60-70 million 
is trying to take over the state. Naturally there are enemies of the Fatherland. There are enemies of the state, the nation\ and the 
Republic. However, these are marginal groups. Their numbers do not exceed those in any other country (S0209).
303 One difficulty in resolving the Kurdish issue in Turkey has been the way it has been used in the power struggles between 
the mainstream parties. Calls for moderation and proposals for non-military solution have invariably been denounced as 
cowardly or even traitorous. This topic of the Kurdish issue as a tool in Turkish party politics is something I will return to in 
the following cases.
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She argues that the decision was not unanimous, but that there was serious intra-party argument on 
whether conference attendance represented treachery or freedom of expression. Yet, “Debate focused not 
on Kurdish rights per se, but on the underlying implications of attendance at a conference that discussed 
them.” (Watts 1999, 642).
The same applies to my case more than a decade later: the discussion was still not about Kurdish 
(language) rights as such, but whether such demands can be allowed to be made. So, the elite did not 
speak with one voice, but just as Somer has noted (2005a), the argument was more about tactics than 
content. Despite the public debate, there was a general agreement on the basic fact among the high 
ranking politicians appearing in the news: teaching Kurdish in Turkish state schools is simply out of the 
question. In conclusion, the intra-elite disagreement was not about granting wider cultural or linguistic 
rights but was still limited to a debate over the legality to make the demand for these wider rights such as 
Kurdish language teaching. This was true for most (though not all) of the columns as well.
4. Citizen’s Rights, Democracy and Minority Rights
While most of the discussion remained within the framework of security and unity, there was also a 
wide-spread understanding among the commentators in the news articles that demands for minority 
language education could also be understood and discussed within the framework of democracy and 
human rights. This human rights based perception was often connected to the EU and the ECHR. The 
sample of Sezgin and Wall (2005) shows a connection to Turkey’s EU bid in most articles on the Kurds, 
and they concluded that Kurds would have been almost entirely ignored if it had not been for constant 
EU pressure.304 My analysis does not fully corroborate this conclusion. In the first case analyzed, only 
one of the articles had an EU-connection, and in the second the role of the EU in the discussion was not 
major, with references to the EU in only seven of the 38 news articles (S0204, S0209, YS0202, M0201, 
M0204, M0208, C0211). In most of these, it was assumed that the EU or various EU actors would 
have sympathy for Kurdish demands, and this was then argued against. The other relevant outside actor 
mentioned was the ECHR (S0204, S0209, M0203, C0202, C0211), which was also seen as likely to be 
taking the side of the Kurdish demands for cultural rights.305 So, there seemed to be an awareness that 
in the European context the demands for Kurdish language would be evaluated from the perspective of 
human rights, yet in none of the articles was this human rights aspect discussed in any detail.
Of the papers in the sample, Cumhuriyet gave the most space for different opinions and voices, 
some of which approached the question from the perspectives of democracy and citizenship rights. 
AKP’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was the only one of the important politicians who argued that Kurdish 
language education is possible. He also used the word Kurd when doing so (S0207). In addition to 
Erdoğan, a CHP politician (C0201) argued that the use of one’s mother-tongue and the retention of 
ones cultural richness constitute basic democratic rights. Still, he made this assertion without referring 
304 Sezgin and Wall (2005) seem to group all articles somehow connected to the Turkish democratization and reformation 
process as EU-related. In my opinion this underestimates the domestic pressures to democratize as well as the actions of the 
domestic supporters of democratization (see Ulusoy 2007 and Kubicek 2005). 
305 The role of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in the articles gives some support for the conclusions of 
Kıvanç Ulusoy (2007), namely that the impact of Turkey’s decision to give her citizens the right to petition the ECHR in 
1989 lies at the core of the country’s improved human rights situation\ rather than Turkey’s EU-candidacy from the Helsinki 
Summit of 1999 onwards.
191
to the petitioners as Kurds. One ANAP Diyarbakır MP also argued for the right to make the demand 
for Kurdish language education as a democratic right (C0212). Civil society, intellectuals (other than 
columnists), and researchers did not figure in the discussion.
The columns differed from the news and the stance of the columnists from that of the politicians 
and state officials cited in the news. Several of the columnists explicitly argued that petitioning the state is 
a basic democratic and/or constitutional right of all citizens (CM0205, CYŞ0201, CYŞ0202, CYŞ0204, 
CZ0201, CC0202). These columnists criticized the state for violating the rights of its citizens when it 
detained and arrested the petitioners for non-violent actions. Yet, some other columnists saw the petition 
campaign as illegal, as contravening the constitution, and as an act of civil disobedience (CM0205), 
and that thus the state officials were justified in their repression. Interestingly enough, it was possible 
to legitimize both stances with the constitution. But, even this debate remained mostly over the tactic 
and legitimacy to demand rather than over the content of the demand, i.e. the right for mother tongue 
education for non-Turkish speaking citizens.
There was also an important difference between the columns and the news articles in regards 
to the possibility of Kurdish language education: while most columnists either did not comment on 
it or were against it, three columnists (CM0201, CZ0201, CC0202), of the 16, supported Kurdish 
language teaching at schools and two more considered it at least possible (CYŞ0202, CC0203). These 
columnists framed their arguments with democracy, human rights, and citizens’ rights. One columnist 
even petitioned for the right to be taught Kurdish. In his opinion it would help him in his profession 
(CC0202). This is the only article in the sample that uses the term minority. In this sarcastic petition, the 
Cumhuriyet columnist Aydın Engin publicly uses his constitutional right to petition the state as a citizen. 
He cites the relevant article of the constitution, declares he has no connection to the PKK, and is not 
involved in violent activities. He describes himself as “an experienced press defendant” and tries to ward 
of possible indictment by reminding readers of the international agreements Turkey has signed to protect 
minority cultures and languages. 
Turkey is, after all, party to several treaties and declarations that concern minority linguistic rights: 
the Treaty of Lausanne from 1923, the legally non-binding UN Declaration of Human rights, the binding 
international multilateral European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by Turkey in 2003 with 
reservation on Article 27), the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified in 1995, but with 
reservation on Articles 17, 29, 30), and the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ratified in 2002). In line with these treaties and the reservations placed on them, Turkey’s 
legal responsibility regarding the language rights of Kurdish citizens is that of noninterference: Turkey 
should uphold nondiscrimination on the basis of language and guarantee freedom of expression. Use of 
Kurdish should be allowed in communication and private media, but the state is not explicitly obliged to 
provide education or other services in Kurdish, even though the provisions of the treaties can be used to 
argue for minority language education and other services as a guarantee for nondiscrimination. Turkey 
has not ratified the regional European treaties that explicitly provide for minority language education 
(O’Neil 2007, 79-84.)
Despite these few voices arguing for Kurdish language education, the question of mother tongue 
education as a fundamental human right, as a basic linguistic human right of Kurdish-speaking children, 
did not really come up in the sample. Research has indicated that linguistic-minority children taught 
through the medium of dominant language often perform considerably less well than native speakers 
(For example: Taylor & Skutnabb-Kangas 2009, 171). This has been used to argue that mother tongue 
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education, at least in primary school, is a necessary part of basic human rights (among many others: 
Taylor & Skutnabb-Kangas 2009). This discussion has been largely ignored in Turkey, where there is 
strong tendency to emphasize only the negative aspects of bi-lingual education and problems involved in 
bi-lingual societies, which was not peculiar only to my sample or even merely newspaper writing. Rather, 
it was noticeably strong in other settings as well: both the high costs involved in the upkeep of bi-lingual 
societies and the negative learning results associated with bi-lingual settings under certain conditions 
tend to be raised in the discussion, whereas the more positive examples, such as Switzerland and Finland, 
or the results of Soviet Union minority language policies have been largely ignored.
6.7.5 demanding the impossible in 2002?
On the basis of my analysis, it is possible to conclude that the increasing visibility and tacit 
acknowledgement of the existence of linguistic and cultural diversity in Turkey was not at this stage 
translated into a willingness to tolerate political activity or limited cultural rights based on this diversity. 
The de facto existence of non-Turkish ethno-cultural identifications and their expression had become 
accepted to a degree, but this acceptance was limited to the private sphere. In the public sphere the 
supposedly ethnically neutral “supra identity”306 or the status of Turkish citizenship did not allow 
the expression of other ethno-cultural identities. Neither was citizens’ activity based on these other 
identifications deemed truly legitimate.
Thus, a campaign of petitions by citizens to state institutions to receive educational services was 
generally constructed not as citizens’ activity but as a threat to the state and connected with separatist 
terrorism. The aims of this inherently political action rendered it illegitimate, and thus a good, proper 
citizen of Turkey would not engage in the campaign. Granting even modest cultural and linguistic 
minority rights was simply not deemed possible by most of the commentators in the mainstream 
press in January 2002. The framework within which the topic was discussed was still quite narrow and 
considerable terminological constraints remained. Also the word “minority” was still a taboo.
All in all, on the basis of the dominance of the hardliner nationalist stance in the mainstream press, 
the near future did not look promising from the perspective of minority rights. Furthermore, certain 
mainstream politicians and journalists set impossible preconditions for allowing improved minority 
rights or for merely demanding them. For example, ex-Prime Minister Tansu Çiller argued that those 
who demanded collective rights from the state should first define their ties to the state. She also expected 
them to acknowledge that they were a part of the Turkish supra-identity (S0204). This is a difficult 
demand. Who is this “they” that should respond, and how could it be realized? Who would or could be 
in the position to speak for those in the Kurdish minority demanding these rights? The HADEP claimed 
it was not behind the campaigns, and the government could not enter into discussions with the PKK. Or 
would it have been sufficient to include a paragraph on the issue in each of the petitions? 
Another often voiced, and as impossible demand, was the end of violence or the end of PKK activity 
before any cultural rights could be granted. For example, the well-known conservative columnist Taha 
Akyol argued that “as long as the PKK continues its separatist policy and ethnic nationalist ideology, there 
can be no Kurdish language education…” (CM0203). The question that begs to be asked is: how do 
306 More on this terminology in relation to case four.
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the cultural rights of Kurdish-speaking citizens depend on the activities of an illegal Kurdish-nationalist 
group fighting for its own ends? Especially as it has been forcefully argued in Turkey that the PKK does 
not represent the Kurdish population. There are two possible ways to understand the demand vis-à-vis 
the Kurds. Either they are, after all, seen as a unified whole in their support of the PKK and thus held 
collectively responsible for its activities, or, the more likely interpretation is that only those in support of 
separatist ethnic nationalism would demand mother tongue education. By 2002, the PKK had more or 
less upheld its unilateral ceasefire for more than two years. Was the precondition for Kurdish minority 
rights actually the complete and unconditional surrender of the PKK?
Another columnist, Güneri Cıvaoğlu, argued that the campaign was badly timed (CM0204). He 
went on to explain that Turkey was in the midst of a process of gradual progress, and sensible ground-work 
was being laid in broadcasting and the strengthening of Turkey’s democracy within the EU-membership 
process. In his opinion, the campaign strained the general atmosphere conducive for gradual reform and 
was thus negative. If one stops to consider this argument, it is difficult to see when the time would be 
more appropriate for significant improvements in minority cultural rights. 
However, contrary to what could be expected on the basis of the events and analysis of the debates 
that took place in early 2002, the next steps in improving minority language rights were taken a mere 
eight months later. In August 2002 the Law on Teaching Foreign Languages (2923) was changed so that 
languages used by Turkish citizens in their daily lives (including Kurdish) could be taught in private 
language schools. Initially, this improvement remained limited in scope. Education on the learning of 
“different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives,” could only 
be conducted in private courses that would charge tuition fees. These language courses could, also, not 
target children. After the changes in legislation, most charges against the petitioners were dropped, and 
most of those convicted were freed. Most decisions to suspend the student rights of the petitioners were 
also annulled.
The changes made to the law on broadcasting in 2002 and 2003 also made possible Kurdish 
language broadcasts, even if initially strictly limited. Radio and TV broadcasts in “the different languages 
and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives” could not exceed 45 minutes a day 
and four hours a week for radio, and 30 minutes a day and two hours a week for TV. All TV programs 
had to be subtitled in Turkish, and radio programs had to be translated (Scalbert-Yücel 2010, 125). 
The legislation was also not implemented immediately and both private language courses and Kurdish 
language broadcasts were only began in 2004. Broadcasting in other languages finally began on state TV 
and radio (TRT-3 and Radio 1) in June 2004. The program titled “Our cultural richness,” also broadcast 
in Bosnian, Circassian and Arabic, was symbolically important, but drew a quite limited audience and 
interest (Ibid., 126). 
A few, symbolically important, courses of Kurdish as a foreign language were initiated in 2004, but 
they faced a number of problems. First of all, the bureaucracy used bureaucratic red tape as a tool with 
which to actively hinder the establishment of new centers and courses. In addition to this, the function 
of teaching Kurdish as a foreign language only to adults was somewhat unclear. Thus it was difficult to 
begin and finance the programs, and most attempts were soon abandoned. Critical estimations of the 
early reforms are, thus, not overly positive (Scalbert-Yücel 2010, 124). 
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6.8 case 3: pRo-kuRdish hadep is dissolved in 2003
The first case looked at how the mainstream press reported on the fate of the pro-Kurdish HADEP in 
the 1999 national and local elections. This third case looks at how the press constructed the decision of 
the Constitutional Court in 2003 to dissolve HADEP and ban 46 party members from politics for a 
period of five years. Despite the fact that the indictment was submitted prior to the 1999 elections, only 
a few of the news reports analyzed in the first case focused on the unsuccessful attempts of the Chief 
Public Prosecutor Vural Savaş to close the HADEP party and thus prevent HADEP’s participation in 
the elections. It took more than four years after the initial indictment for the Constitutional Court to 
finally reach its verdict: It dissolved the party of acting against the unity of the country and supporting 
the activities of an illegal terrorist organization, i.e. the PKK.
There are several reasons why I chose the subject of the closure of HADEP as a news event to be 
analyzed. Turkey has been justifiably proud of its long democratic tradition, a tradition which, however, 
has been repeatedly marred by military coups and—since the enacting of the restrictive Constitution 
of 1982—by a series of party dissolutions. As political parties are seen as essential for functioning 
democracy, their dissolution is a clear disruption of democratic order, which can be expected to raise 
discussion and debate on the state of the democracy in question, the limits of the political sphere, and 
freedom of expression. Also, as was shown previously, in relation to elections HADEP was constructed 
by the media as a legitimate, or at least semi-legitimate, political actor with significant electoral support 
in southeastern Turkey.
Nicole F. Watts has argued that the state efforts to suppress pro-Kurdish parties and to restrict 
their activities underwent a change in 1999. Before that, the emphasis had been on extralegal measures, 
including murders. From 1999 onwards, juridical coercion became the preferred means with high 
numbers of investigations and court cases against party administrators and elected officials (Watts 2010, 
113). The number of detentions peaked in 2002 (and again later, in 2006). After the elections of 1999, 
pro-Kurdish mayors had become the movement’s most visible representatives and thus increasingly 
obvious legal targets with high-profile cases against metropolitan Diyarbakır mayor Feridun Çelik and 
other mayors were charged with aiding the PKK. During the year 2002, 393 HADEP administrators 
were arrested (from Watts 2010, 114, who uses İHD sources).
By 2003, the political landscape of Turkey had dramatically changed from that of 1999–2002. At 
the end of July 2002, the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) decided to hold early elections 
on the 3rd of November of that same year. The political maneuvering and resultant uncertainty had 
constricted the election campaign process into a period of just a few weeks. The pro-Kurdish political 
actors anticipated the Court’s ruling on the closure case, and participated in the elections under the 
banner of a new party, DEHAP (Demokratik Halk Partisi, Democratic People’s Party). The elections were 
considered quite free and fair, even though there were a number of reports of detentions of DEHAP 
supporters, pressure on village leaders to prevent villagers from supporting the party, and alleged beatings 
of domestic election observers and villagers. Despite these the level of such harassment had actually 
decreased substantially in comparison with previous elections. (OSCE/ODHIR 2002.) 
Only two parties passed the 10% national threshold in the national elections of 2002. The Justice 
and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP), a party with Islamist roots and a socially and 
culturally conservative but economically liberal program won 34.3% of the vote and was awarded 363 
of the 550 seats in the Parliament. The leftist-statist (Kemalist and increasingly nationalist) Republican 
People’s Party (CHP) won 19.4% of the vote and was awarded 178 seats. Neither of these parties had 
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been represented in the outgoing Parliament. The outgoing Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit’s Democratic 
Left Party (DSP) drew only 1.2% of the vote, while his governing partners, the National Movement 
Party (MHP) and the Motherland Party (ANAP) drew 8.3% and 5.1% respectively. (OSCE/ODHIR 
2002.) DEHAP did well and managed to increase its share of the vote to a record 6.2% from HADEP’s 
4.7% in 1999, but this achievement was still not enough to meet the national threshold. 
6.8.1 can political paRties be dissolved Within a democRacy?
The existence of multiple political parties is seen as integral for a functioning democracy, along with 
constitutionalism, rule of law, pluralism, representation, and fundamental freedoms and rights (Koçak 
& Örücü 2003, 401). The existence of multiple parties ensures representative decision-making within 
which pluralism and diversity are integrated into the system. Because political parties are seen as essential 
for democracy, the freedom of political association is protected on the international level. The European 
Convention of Human Rights does not contain a specific provision concerning political parties, but the 
right to associate freely within political parties is perceived as an integral part of freedom of association. 
Despite this, political parties have also been closed in the name of protecting democracy. Thus the ECHR 
has laid down conditions for the prohibition and dissolution of political parties. A party can be dissolved 
if it—as an organization—advocates the use of violence or uses violence as a political means to overthrow 
the democratic constitutional order and forms such a danger to the free democratic political order or to 
the rights of individuals that less radical measures would not prevent the danger. (Koçak & Örücü 2003, 
405-6.) Violent actions of individual party members or non-violent attempts to change the constitution 
do not form sufficient grounds for dissolution of political parties according the ECHR.
The legislation and judicial practices in Turkey have differed from the norms set by the ECHR. 
Articles 1, 2, and 3 of the 1982 Constitution contain some fundamental tenets of the Republic as 
irrevocable provisions. These decree, among other things, that the Turkish state, with its territory and 
nation, is an indivisible entity and its language is Turkish. In addition, Article 69, which defines the basis 
of party closures, is worded so that in effect the Constitutional Court has much room for maneuver. 
Turkey’s Constitutional Court dissolved a total of 20 parties between 1983 (return to civilian rule) 
and 2009.307 Koçak and Örücü have grouped the dissolutions of political parties in Turkey under two 
headings: procedural irregularities in view of Law No. 2820 on Political Parties, and substance. The latter 
refers to dissolution for either anti-secularism or “threat to the territorial integrity of the state and unity 
of the nation” (Koçak & Örücü 2003). 
The closing of HADEP in 2003 was the fourth dissolution in a series of pro-Kurdish parties. HEP and 
the short-lived ÖZDEP (Özgürlük ve Demokrasi Partisi /Freedom and Democracy Party) were banned 
in 1993, and DEP in 1994. HEP was dissolved for infringing upon the principle of indivisible integrity 
of the state with its territory and nation, and for becoming a center for the execution of illegal political 
activities. ÖZDEP and DEP were dissolved for undermining the territorial integrity and secular nature 
of the State and the unity of the nation. DEP leaders had referred to the existence of a separate Kurdish 
people in Turkey fighting for its independence, the creation of an independent state and destruction of 
307 By 2011 the Constitutional Court had dissolved a total of 28 parties since its establishment in 1962 (Algan 2011, 810).
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the existing state, and had defended acts of terrorism as part of the struggle for independence.
The ECHR ruled against Turkey in all three cases prior to the closure of HADEP in 2003. In 
relation to the three cases it argued that: defending the right of self-determination and language rights 
was not contrary to the fundamental principles of democracy and would only become unacceptable if 
acts of terrorism were advocated; that Turkey should allow diverse political projects to be proposed and 
debated, even those that call into question the way a state is currently organized, provided that they do 
not harm democracy itself; and that political bodies should be able to make public proposals that conflict 
with the main planks of governmental policy or prevailing public opinion. In the case of DEP, even 
though three statements made by the leader of the party, Hatip Dicle, were deemed to be disreputable, 
capable of inspiring hatred and providing justification for use of violence, the court did not condone the 
closing of the entire party on the basis of spoken statements made by a single leading member. (Koçak & 
Örücü 2003.)
These decisions clearly indicate that threats to the indivisibility and national and territorial 
integrity of the state, ideologies such as communism, and claims of language rights and the right to self-
determination are not considered to be inconsistent with fundamental principles of democracy by the 
European Court of Human Rights, unless accompanied by acts of violence.308 (Koçak & Örücü 2003, 
413-421.) 
The Turkish Constitution was amended in 2001 so as to better accord with the rulings of the ECHR. 
The aim of the amendment was to impede the closing of political parties by clarifying  the problematic 
Article 69 (Algan 2011). Yet, despite the past rulings of the ECHR and the Constitutional amendments, 
the Constitutional Court of Turkey continued to dissolve political parties, including yet another pro-
Kurdish party in 2003.
6.8.2 the sample
In general the papers were not very interested in the closure of HADEP; only 26 news articles and 4 
columns touched on this event immediately after the party’s dissolution. 
Table 6.5. Number of Articles
News Columns
Milliyet 2 1
Zaman 12 0
Yeni Şafak 2 1
Cumhuriyet 6 1
Sabah 4 1
Total 26 4
308 The other major reason for the banning of political parties in Turkey —violation of the secularism principle of the 
Constitution—has been viewed with more understanding by the ECHR. In 2001 the Court ruled that the dissolution of 
the Islamist Refah Party in 1998 by the Turkish Constitutional Court was not in violation of the European Convention of 
Human Rights.
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Thus, dissolution of a party, which had received 4.7% of the votes in the elections in 1999, was not 
considered important news. For comparison: when the religious Fazilet was banned in 2001, the religious 
Yeni Şafak alone published over 140 articles on the issue, while the staunchly secularist Cumhuriyet 
published almost 70. The effects of the closure of Fazilet were of course of different magnitude. The party 
had received 15.4% of the votes in 1999 and had more than hundred seats in the parliament, whereas 
HADEP had not participated in the November 2002 elections and had won no seats even before that. In 
addition, the ruling hardly came as a surprise. According to one of the columnists in the sample, party 
closures had become such everyday occurrences in Turkey that they no longer merited front page news 
(CC0301). Of the papers included in the sample, Zaman paid more attention to the event than the 
others.
6.8.3 selected findings
A large share of the news articles on the event consisted of dry announcements in legal jargon; the 
case and the decision were neither significantly explained, nor contextualized. The very nature of the 
texts prevented any detailed analysis. The texts were analyzed by subjecting them to the following main 
questions:
•  Was HADEP still shown as legitimate? What kind of connection was constructed between the party, 
Turkey’s Kurds, and the Kurdish problem?
•  Were representatives of HADEP used as sources?
•  What labels (if any) were used of Turkey’s Kurds?
•  How was the decision of the Constitutional Court constructed/framed? Was it criticized? By whom?
•  What was missing from the reporting?
1. Still no Kurds, But Only the PKK
The Constitutional Court closed the People’s Democracy Party (HADEP) permanently based on the 
reason that it had become a focal point of actions aimed against the unity of the country and was 
aiding and assisting the terrorist organization PKK.309 (Z0302)
Most of the papers published verbatim the above quotation of the Court’s decision, which gives two 
interrelated reasons for the closure of the party. The first part, “actions aimed against the unity of the 
country,” refers to explicitly voicing Kurdish demands. Yet, as the word Kurdish was still very much 
avoided in the official parlance and also by the media vis-à-vis political demands, HADEP was not 
constructed as a Kurdish or pro-Kurdish party by the papers or in the quotes of HADEP spokespersons 
included in the articles. Only two of the articles explicitly connected HADEP and DEHAP to either 
309 Anayasa Mahkemesi, Halkın Demokrasi Partisi’ni (HADEP) terror örgütü PKK’ya yardım ve destek sağlayarak ülke 
bütünlüğüne ayıkırı fiillerin odağı haline geldiği gerekçesiyle temelli kapattı.
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Kurds or the Kurdish issue. Besides these two, Zaman referred to the party as “acting on ethnic basis” 
(Z0302, Z0304). Once again there were no individuals labeled as Kurdish, and the word Kürt was used 
only four times (Z0303, Z0311, Z0312, S0301) with the word Kürdistan appearing once (M0301). 
Besides the lack of ethnic labeling, there was also a noticeable lack of general background information on 
the party and the reasons for its closure (except in Zaman). Mention of support to the PKK seemed to be 
explanation enough.
The relationship between the legal pro-Kurdish parties and the PKK has been a source of concern 
and contention in Turkey. As was indicated in the previous case, many commentators in Turkey have 
seen the series of pro-Kurdish political parties as a simple extension of the PKK. Symbolic acts of 
support for either the PKK or its leader Abdullah Öcalan by party members (see below) have become 
interpreted as sufficient proof of this and have been seen as “acts of support,” i.e. something more than 
the kinds of mere speeches that can be accommodated in a democratic setting. One reason for this 
conviction has been the stubborn refusal of the pro-Kurdish parties to publicly denounce the PKK and 
its violent tactics.
Nicole F. Watts has argued that 
… although pro-Kurdish parties emerged distinct from the PKK and were not formally subservient 
to it, some of their administrators and elected officials were close to the PKK, and most of their 
rank-and-file constituents were sympathetic to it. In addition, the PKK imposed constraints on party 
activities in the southeast. Becoming too close to the governing establishment, making too many 
concessions, becoming too moderate, or publicly criticizing the PKK would have jeopardized the 
ability of the parties to function and to maintain the support of pro-PKK constituents. (Watts 2010, 
163).
According to Murat Somer, the pro-Kurdish parties became increasingly sympathetic to the PKK during 
the 1990s, when it was hard to be a moderate. In the 1990s Kurdish actors who openly rejected violence 
also risked persecution by the PKK. Yet, the more peaceful period from 1999 to 2004 did not lead to 
moderation either. Somer also questions the extent the Kurdish moderate actors have had autonomy 
from the PKK, as they draw their support from those segments of the population that sympathize with 
the PKK’s cause. (Somer 2008, 226.) Addressing a later period, Watts agrees with Somer. According to 
her, the pro-Kurdish politicians have sought to maintain a delicate balancing act whereby they seem 
sympathetic to the PKK and its fighters because their legitimacy among some Kurdish voters has relied in 
part on their perceived support of the PKK. Yet they have avoided directly taking up the demands of the 
PKK (Watts 2010, 119).
2. Criticism of the Decision
The dissolution of HADEP may not have received much attention and was not contextualized, but it was 
not condoned by the press. The decision was explicitly or implicitly criticized in half of the articles. The 
explicit criticism of the decision was voiced by either HADEP/DEHAP representatives or by EU sources. 
So, once again representatives of HADEP or DEHAP had a voice in the national media (at least in 
Cumhuriyet, Zaman and Yeni Şafak), and in their comments they positioned themselves as spokesmen for 
the people and defenders of democracy. HADEP’s reaction was given visibility, perhaps even credibility 
in the headlines: “HADEP: The decision is a political massacre” (Z0306) and “We did not deserve 
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to be closed” (Z0310). The opposing sides in the news reporting were the Turkish state/judiciary and 
HADEP as an organized political entity. In Zaman, which had the best coverage on the issue, an image-
problematic HADEP was also positioned against a suspicious public opinion. So, the HADEP/DEHAP 
had a voice; they were asked about their opinions and their speech was not systematically opposed by 
textual means.
The EU and the ECHR were constantly present in the articles. Various EU commentators criticized 
the decision, interpreted as a deviation from the process of reforms towards achieving EU-membership 
(in 5 articles). The European Court of Human Rights also loomed large in the background (in 10 
articles). In my opinion, the quiet influence of the slow working and non-partisan ECHR might actually 
be greater than that of the EU. The EU is often seen as hostile to Turkey, with a plethora of politicians 
and officials that hasten to condemn any non-democratic practices on the spot. 
It is worthwhile to note that the religious press did not connect the closure of the Islamist parties 
to the closure of HADEP, which was connected only to the previous pro-Kurdish political parties. 
It was obvious the papers did not wish to highlight the common denominators of the closure cases 
of the religious parties and the pro-Kurdish parties. Also, unlike with the closure of Fazilet, there 
was no uproar from representatives of other political parties in defense of democracy. It is difficult 
to say whether this was because the court’s decision was generally accepted as correct, or because 
politicians did not want to expose themselves to accusations of PKK support. Only two representatives 
of marginal parties came forth to condemn the decision of the Constitutional Court, while the 
mainstream political parties failed to defend democratic rights and freedoms when it came to pro-
Kurdish politicians.310
If the mainstream politicians failed to come out and condemn the decision, the press did it by 
using small details and nuances. The decision was most commonly presented within the frames of 
democracy and international relations (including international agreements), within which closing 
a political party not guilty of violence is not appropriate. Besides this implicit criticism involved in 
framing the decision, almost all sources cited criticized the dissolution. The only exceptions were the 
two Chief Public Prosecutors, the Chairman of the Constitutional Court and one representative of a 
civil society organization (Z0309). Implicit criticism (by the papers) could also be found in headlines 
such as “Resembles a graveyard of parties” (S0305) or “Votes were swept [away] in the east” (subheading 
in YŞ0301), questions over the compatibility of the decision with the previous rulings of the ECHR 
(Z0302), constructing closing of a political party as highly problematic, and the surprise expressed over 
the harshness of the dissolution with 46 bans from politics for individual party members (Milliyet and 
Sabah). 
3. An Active Agent: Who Closed the Party?
Most of the news articles reported the closure with active sentences and with clear causal structures 
and agents. Thus the ban was (mostly) shown as a decision of the Constitutional Court, not as a direct 
result of the convicted party members. For example, in 2001 when Fazilet was banned, the secularist 
newspapers tended to place the responsibility of the closure on a few party members. The Sabah headline 
310 The failure of the mainstream political actors to defend democracy in all situations and for all political actors can be 
compared with the failure of the mainstream press to protect freedom of expression in Turkey as discussed in chapter five. 
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ran: “They came for image, but finished the party” with a picture of two Fazilet members (Sabah 
23.6.2001). This representation simplified the causal chain of events and obscured the agency of the 
Chief Public Prosecutor and the Constitutional Court.
An interesting interpretation of overly zealous public prosecutors in the service of strict Turkish 
nationalism emerges from a careful reading of several of the articles (especially Z0302, but also M0301 
and others). Zaman wrote about the serious discord over the closure cases between the Chief Public 
Prosecutors of Turkey and the heads of the Constitutional Court. Both the previous Chief Prosecutor 
Vural Savaş and the current one, Sabih Kanadoğlu, were said to have tried to hurry the cases to such 
an extent as to be reprimanded by the heads of the Constitutional Court, first by Ahmet Necdet Sezer 
and later by Mustafa Bumin. This information was connected to a highly emotional and nationalist 
quotation from the indictment submitted by Savaş in 1999, which describes the so-called flag incident in 
the 1996 party congress thusly:
...pieces or cloth symbolizing the bloody and treasonous gang and the posters of the ringleader of the 
bandit, Apo were paraded around the room in the [party] congress accompanied by shouts of “Biji 
Serok Apo”311 and continued thus: “While the Turkish flag was dragged on the floor, posters with 
images of the leader of the bandits were held aloft. Furthermore, this incident was applauded by 
those present in the room with signs of victory. Treason was heralded with slogans (Guerrilla hits and 
founds Kurdistan). (Z0302). 
A more level-headed description was offered in another article that same day: 
One of the important reasons why a large share of the society viewed the party with suspicion, besides 
the connection made between HADEP and the PKK, was the flag incident in the HADEP general 
congress on the 23rd of June. One party member threw the Turkish flag onto the floor in the hall and 
put up a poster of Abdullah Öcalan and the so called PKK flag. (Z0303)
For his part, Kanadoğlu was reported to have initiated a closure case against DEHAP for having forged 
documents, a first in Turkey’s political history (S0301). The role of the Constitutional Court as an active 
agent, the existence of discord, the evaluation of the decision as harsh, and the presentation of the public 
prosecutors as over-zealous in performing their duties highlighted that the closure of the party was not 
inevitable, and that there was room for choice.
4. From the Columns
As there were only four columns on the closure, this section on the columns is a short one. All four 
columnists criticized the dissolution and considered it to have negative effects on Turkey, but in three of 
the four columns the criticism was centered either on the negative effects on Turkey’s foreign relations 
or the lamentable state of Turkey’s democracy. Only Milliyet’s Hasan Cemal focused on the pro-Kurdish 
parties as such (CM0301), so I will offer a summary of the analysis of this interesting column here. Cemal 
did not consider the closings of HADEP or DEHAP totally unfounded, as these parties had supported 
311 We love Apo in Kurdish. 
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the terrorist PKK, but argued that any future actors renouncing violence should be accommodated. In 
the areas where they are in the majority, Turkey’s citizens of Kurdish origins have given their votes to this 
series of parties (HEP/DEP/HADEP/DEHAP) and in the name of democracy and to solve the issue, they 
should be accommodated. Cemal argued explicitly against perceiving the issue only within the frames of 
security and economic underdevelopment or poverty. Cemal’s column was the only text in this sample 
that openly acknowledged the existence of politically active Kurds. He referred to Kurds as Turkey’s citizens 
of Kurdish origins, citizens of Turkey, those people, they, our Kurdish brothers in Northern Iraq, Kurdish 
citizens, and all Kurds of the region. Interestingly enough, Cemal argued for cultural identities, human 
rights and democracy in the name of a strong and stable Turkey.312
6.8.4 continued juRidical coeRcion
Based on her analysis of HADEP’s party program and public statements, as well as theories of democracy 
(and ethnic politics), Aylin Güney, whose article on HADEP’s party program was summarized in length 
earlier in this chapter, came to the conclusion that HADEP and its activities did not threaten Turkey’s 
unitary state and democracy. She argued that Kurds constitute a minority, and that there are deep 
cleavages among them. As a result, their vote is split among different political parties and ideologies 
rather than purely along ethnic lines (Güney 2002).313 In 2010, the European Court of Human Rights 
reached a verdict on the closure of HADEP, which it saw as violating the European Convention of 
Human Rights Article11. The European court ruled that members of HADEP “did not incite hatred, 
revenge, recrimination or armed resistance” by referring to the ongoing conflict between the Turkish 
military and the PKK as a “dirty war.” (Hürriyet 14.12.2010)
According to Watts, juridical coercion continued after the closure of HADEP in 2003 and became 
especially onerous from 2006 onwards, with several high-profile cases against Kurdish mayors (Watts 
2010, 114). Watts lists the reasons for this as follows: the emergence of a second wave of pro-Kurdish 
mayors in the local elections of 2004 who demanded more freedom (promised by the legal reforms); the 
resurgence of the violent conflict between the PKK and the Turkish military; the seeming breakdown 
of the EU accession process, a rise of Turkish nationalism, a new anti-terror bill, and the ruling AKP’s 
problems with the military, which it was not willing to challenge on this front (Watts 2010, 114). 
Hundreds of investigations were opened against pro-Kurdish mayors and party administrators each year. 
For example, more than a hundred investigations or inspections, and twenty-eight court cases were filed 
against Diyarbakır metropolitan mayor Osman Baydemir from March 2004 to July 2008 (Watts 2010, 
115). Most investigations and charges were based on three main types of alleged violation: misuse of 
312 I have not done a systematic analysis of subject positions offered for the reader in the articles, but have noted down 
interesting details of pronoun use. In his column, Cemal himself is present as “I” speaking of “us,” i.e. those who wish well 
for Turkey and are open-minded enough to see the solution, addresses those against this as “you” and refers to the Kurds as 
“they”. Thus, even in the column that openly acknowledged Kurds and argued for the need to accommodate their political 
wishes, they were not the target audience or participants in the debate but the object of the debate.
313 According to the survey study Biz Kimiz (2007), around 15.7% of the population is ethnically Kurdish whereas the pro-
Kurdish parties have received between 4,2% and 6.7% in recent elections. This means that the electoral preferences of the 
majority of Kurds have not been formed on the basis of ethnicity. 
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office, violation of political party laws concerning use of Kurdish, and aiding a terrorist organization. 
Investigations could be initiated, for example, if a municipality published a booklet on hygiene in 
Kurdish. Most investigations were dropped, but not all. Most court cases resulted in acquittal, but not 
all. Penalties ranged from symbolic ones to severe (Ibid., 116).
Juridical pressure on the next pro-Kurdish party in the series, the DTP (Demokratik Toplum Partisi, 
Democratic Society Party) was also severe. Many of the important party members, including its chairman 
Ahmet Türk and vice-chairmen Aysel Tuğluk and Sedat Yurtdaş, were sentenced to prison terms, and 
a closure case against the party was initiated in 2007. In December 2009, the Constitutional Court 
decided to close down the DTP for ”becoming focused on terroristic activities.” The court imposed a 
political ban on 37 party members for a duration of five years. Co-chairs Ahmet Türk and Aysel Tuğluk 
were removed from office as MPs. (Bianet 14.12.2009.) Watts (2010) has argued that the comprehensive 
impact of this juridical coercion was to circumscribe the discourse and behavior of the pro-Kurdish 
politicians so as to render them less effective. 
In her book Activists in Office (2010) cited several times in the chapter, Nicole F. Watts asks the 
interesting question of what pro-Kurdish activists could gain by using Turkey’s formal political system. 
When one considers the continuing harassment they faced, why did they continue with legal political 
activism? In a field of conflict structured primarily by violent conflict between the PKK and the Turkish 
Armed Forces, what could they do from within the system that might make a difference? Was it worth 
their trouble? She continues to answer that
Creating political parties and winning elected office provided new material, legal, access, role-
related, and legitimacy resources that were largely unavailable to armed contenders or other actors 
working outside formal politics. These resources included tangible assets such as state funding 
for political parties, municipal budgets, use of buildings as “safe spaces”, control over the hiring 
and use of thousands of employees, legal protection, and votes. They also included less tangible 
resources such as access to high-level decision makers and the role resources of administration and 
governance. All of these could be used to further a pro-Kurdish agenda in various ways. (Watts 
2010, 162)
6.9 case 4: theRe is a kuRdish issue in tuRkey!
In August 2005 AKP’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan publicly stated that there is a Kurdish 
issue or a Kurdish question (Kürt sorunu) in Turkey. He did this in two speeches, the first of which was 
in a closed meeting in Ankara and the second when addressing the public in Diyarbakır, the main city 
of the Kurdish area. He was the first prime minister to publicly acknowledge a Kurdish issue in Turkey. 
As was discussed in relation to the first case, previous prime ministers and presidents had made both 
direct and indirect references to the existence of Kurds in Turkey, but had stopped short of indicating 
that existence of Kurdish ethnicity might constitute an issue to be tackled. On the official level there 
had previously only been recognition of a problem of separatist terrorism fueled by regional economic 
underdevelopment and poverty. Erdoğan’s use of the term “Kurdish issue,” which hints at ethnic and 
cultural aspects, was thus an obvious departure from this earlier official line. Also, just a few months 
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previously Erdoğan himself had explicitly denied the existence of such an issue.314 His speeches received 
much publicity and were considered a hallmark event both by the press and also by many researchers 
(Somer 2008). They were even hailed as a culmination of “the reformulation of Turkish state policies 
regarding the Kurds” (Grigoriadis 2006, 449).
In the previous cases I looked at how the pro-Kurdish cultural and political activities, actors and 
demands for wider cultural rights were presented in the mainstream newspapers. Now the focus is 
different as the gaze is turned towards the establishment and the beginning of an explicit discussion in 
the press on ethno-cultural diversity in Turkey. I look at both what Erdoğan actually said, and how it was 
interpreted and received by the press. Before the analysis itself, I will say a few words about the AKP’s 
stance towards Kurds and Kurdish nationalism, illuminate the immediate political and geopolitical 
context of the speeches, and list some of the most significant EU-induced reforms that had widened the 
scope of (minority) cultural rights since 2003.
6.9.1 backgRound: the akp and kuRds
There was more than one reason why the assumption of power of the AKP in the 2002 elections was 
highly relevant for Turkey’s Kurdish issue. First of all, the previous Islamist parties and political actors, 
as well as their conservative or post-Islamist offshoot, the AKP, have presented themselves as better able 
to resolve the Kurdish issue than the strictly secularist parties. They have generally been considered 
somewhat less nationalist than their secularist counterparts, with a vested interest in breaking the power 
of the old state-centric military and civilian elites. It has been at least partially due to this that the series 
of Islamist/conservative parties have received significant support in the Kurdish-populated provinces: 
in the national elections of 1995, the Islamist party of the time, Refah, received 27.2 percent of their 
votes from the Kurdish communities (Kirişçi & Winrow 1997, ch 5), and the AKP has also attracted the 
support of a significant segment of Turkey’s Kurdish-speaking population. DEHAP may have been the 
most popular party in most of the heavily Kurdish-populated provinces in the November 2002 elections, 
but the AKP also garnered a substantial level of support among Kurdish voters. As DEHAP did not pass 
the 10% threshold, the AKP won the majority of the seats in the southeastern provinces. As a gesture 
to its Kurdish constituency, Erdoğan appointed a Kurdish AKP member, Dengir Mir Mehmet Fırat, to 
serve as a deputy leader of the party (Bahceli & Noel 2011, 105-6). It should be noted, however, that 
nationalism is also an indispensable component of the AKP political identity (Coşar 2011, 182) and it 
frequently resorts to nationalist discourse.
In hindsight, it is possible to see that the AKP had a historic opportunity to resolve the Kurdish 
issue during its first years in power. First of all, it had received 34.3 percent of the total vote with a 
314 Yet, already in 1991, as a Refah mayor of Istanbul, Erdoğan had ordered a report on the southeast issue. The report 
proposes the label “Kurdish issue” instead of “southeast problem,” notes that the Kurdish-populated regions have historically 
been labeled as Kurdistan, and that Kurds speak a language named Kurdish that is not related to the Turkish language. The 
report also states that most Kurds do not want a separate state, but rather recognition of a Kurdish national identity. The 
report also calls for improvements in human rights and democracy, as well as economic conditions. (Akçura 2008, 243-4.) It 
took almost 14 years for Erdoğan to follow some of the recommendations given in this report. This report is also taken up in 
one of the columns in the sample (CS0503).
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democratizing pro-EU platform and thus had wide popular support for its democratizing reform 
program. Thanks to the 10% national threshold, the party got 365/550 seats in the parliament and was 
able to form a strong single party majority government. Besides the domestic support for the reforms, 
the party had the backing of the EU, which was impressed by its reformist drive.
At the same time, the PKK was in disarray. Its leader Öcalan was imprisoned in a Turkish jail for 
life; the organization had leveled down its demands with Öcalan calling for democracy within a unitary 
state; it had unilaterally ceased military activities, and withdrawn the majority of its guerrilla forces from 
Turkey into Northern Iraq. The armed wing of the organization was in serious organizational crisis. 
(Akkaya & Jondgerden 2011.) In addition to, or perhaps partly because of the domestic and EU support 
for reform and the relative calm in the Kurdish provinces, Turkey’s powerful military was also willing to 
show restraint or even a measure of support for AKP’s reform program under the moderate, pro-EU and 
pro-democracy leadership of the Chief of General Staff of the period, General Hilmi Özkök (Bahceli & 
Noel 2011, 108).
During the first two years of AKP’s single-party government, it continued and expanded the modest 
reforms begun under the previous government. The arena of freedom was expanded and human rights 
improved in Turkey, and many of the reforms benefited the Kurds: Kurdish language broadcasts were 
finally begun, the state of emergency (OHAL) was ended in the last provinces, and support was offered 
for internally displaced persons to return to their home villages (Bahceli & Noel 2011, 106). The AKP 
portrayed their reforms as advancing Turkey’s human rights and democratization as demanded by the 
EU, rather than as addressing the Kurdish issue as such.
The reforms were well received by Kurds. It seemed as if the state was at last beginning to right 
past wrongs in its dealings with them. The degree of change that had taken place in Turkey over the 
years was made apparent when the DEP ex-parliamentarian Leyla Zana was freed from prison in the 
summer of 2004 after serving ten years of her 15-year sentence. When she had spoken in Kurdish in the 
oath taking ceremony in the Parliament in 1991, it had been noted down as “an unknown language” 
in the session records. Now, thirteen years later she was released the same week the state began Kurdish 
language broadcasts. The daily Milliyet proclaimed sarcastically: “We figured out ‘the unknown language’ 
in 13 years” (Milliyet front page, 11.6.2004). 
Besides a general approval of the AKP reforms, there was also much skepticism, and the legislative 
provisions fell short of what Kurds had expected. Writing in 2011, Bahceli and Noel conclude that 
From the viewpoint of Kurdish nationalists, the AKP response appeared piecemeal and half-hearted, 
and more importantly, fell short of their perennial demands for cultural recognition and some form 
of territorial government. These demands were supported by virtually all shades of opinion among 
Kurds. But every Turkish government had found them enormously problematical, however defined, 
and in practice impossible to meet. The AKP government was no exception. It had continued to 
build on the policies of its predecessor in removing restrictions on Kurdish cultural expression, but… 
had declined requests for state-funded Kurdish education. (Bahceli & Noel 2011, 107.)
The lifting of restrictions on cultural expression was also slow and piecemeal. The Kurdish-language 
broadcasts by the state television channels were lauded as a sign of tolerance and multiculturalism in 
Turkey, but were in fact strictly limited. Initially there was a limit of maximum of half an hour per day 
with no programs of language teaching or children’s programs allowed. The Kurdish-language programs 
were also immediately criticized for their boring/and or outdated content. Kurdish language education 
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was only allowed for adults in private training centers. 
It is also possible that the relative peace and calm allowed the AKP to coast when it came to providing 
reforms benefiting the Kurds. The issue appeared to have been resolved and the conflict was ending. By 
the summer of 2005 and the speeches given by Erdoğan, most auspicious period for resolving the issue 
had already passed. The PKK restarted its armed struggle in the summer of 2004, thus ending the period 
of relative calm in the area. Once again the public was forced to witness burial ceremonies of young 
conscripts killed by the PKK, and the violent clashes put increasing pressure on the AKP to act decisively.
The widening of cultural (minority) rights and the increasing visibility of both pro-Kurdish actors 
and Kurdish culture in the mainstream public space also catalyzed an angry nationalist backlash. This is 
well exemplified by the public outcry over a flag burning incident in Mersin. In the Newroz-celebrations 
(Kurdish New Year, Nevruz in Turkish)315 in March 2005 organized by DEHAP, the pro-Kurdish party 
of the time, two Kurdish youngsters were videoed while dragging the Turkish flag on the ground and 
burning it. As any visitor to Turkey knows, the Turkish flag is displayed prominently everywhere as the 
most important symbol of the country and the nation. This widely publicized flag burning incident 
incited a nationalist reaction, sparked anti-Kurdish sentiment among the public at large, and led to mass 
demonstrations and lynch mobs.316 The Turkish General Staff issued a statement that referred to the 
youngsters as “so-called citizens” (sözde vatandaş) and described the attempt as “treasonous behavior” 
(haince bir davranış). Well-known researcher Mesut Yeğen has argued that this incident marked the 
emergence of a new approach on the official level towards Turkey’s Kurds, within which they were no 
longer perceived as “future Turks,” as almost-Turks, but rather as pseudo-citizens (Yeğen 2009). Soon 
a sarcastic counter-part was coined for sözde vatandaş (so called citizens), i.e. özde vatandaş meaning 
“true citizens.” It was in this context that Prime Minister Erdoğan gave his speeches acknowledging the 
existence of a Kurdish issue in the country.
6.9.2 the sample
This time reporting was intensive and thus the sample covers only the period from 10th of August 
until 13th/14th of August 2005.317 On the 10th of that month the Prime Minister met with a number of 
intellectuals representing a group called the citizens’ initiative that had called for peace and for the PKK 
to lay down its arms. In this closed meeting the Prime Minister of Turkey acknowledged the existence 
of a Kurdish issue in Turkey for the first time. Some of the papers immediately published online articles 
of the news. As expected, Erdoğan repeated his statement two days later in a speech he gave in front of 
an audience in Diyarbakır, the biggest city of the Kurdish provinces. All the papers covered the event in 
great detail with long excerpts from the speeches and numerous side-stories. In addition, a number of 
columnists hurried to comment upon it or to discuss the Kurdish issue in more general terms. Thus, even 
though period looked is short, it produced a relatively high number of texts to be analyzed.
315 For details of the symbolic importance of the Newroz for Kurdish nationalists, see Aydın 2014.
316 In relation to the Ergenekon conspiracy investigation, it was claimed that the whole flag burning incident had actually 
been a provocation by radical Turkish nationalists (Bianet 30.1.2009).
317 Two columns from Cumhuriyet from 14th of August are included.
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Table 6.6. Number of articles
news columns
Milliyet 5 6
Zaman 6 3
Yeni Şafak 3318 2
Cumhuriyet 14 7
Sabah 7 3
35 21
318
This fourth case differs from the previous ones as the focus is on a statement made by a leading political 
figure and the reactions to it. Thus, the presentation of the analysis differs from the previous cases in 
some respects. It is began with a clarification, based on the news reporting, of what the Prime Minister 
actually said in his speech, and then continues with an evaluation of its reception.319 
6.9.3 an oveRvieW
As was noted, especially by writers in Cumhuriyet, Erdoğan had postponed his visit to Diyarbakır several 
times, and thus it had gained perhaps undue importance and was made amidst much pomp and media 
hubbub (for example CC505). Cumhuriyet interpreted the meeting with the group of intellectuals and 
the acknowledgement of the Kurdish issue as having been carefully timed to ensure Erdoğan a highly 
publicized, successful first visit as a Prime Minister to the capital of the Kurdish-populated region 
(CC0505). A meeting with an association of family members of soldiers who had been killed by the 
PKK that took place between the Ankara meeting and the Diyarbakır speech can be seen as a part of 
the process: even those who had lost most because of the PKK were reported to be supporting Erdoğan’s 
initiative (Z0504, YŞ0501).
After all this preparation, what did the Prime Minister actually say in Diyarbakır? The different 
newspapers and writers emphasized different aspects of the speech. For example Milliyet wondered about 
the heavy emphasis on national unity expressed with statements such as “one state, one nation, one 
flag” (M0504 & M0505), whereas Yeni Şafak paid a great deal of attention to issues of economy and 
development (YŞ0503), and two columnists highlighted Erdoğan’s call for open dialogue for resolving 
the Kurdish issue as the most important message of his speeches (CS0503, CC0502). According to the 
various newspapers and numerous quotes of the speech, the most central statements for the topic at hand 
can be summarized as following: First of all, Erdoğan stated that there is a Kurdish issue in Turkey. This is 
important for a problem has to be recognized as such before possible solutions can be sought. The causes 
318 In this case the number of news articles does not correspond exactly with how much the paper in question paid attention 
to the event. Some of the articles in Yeni Şafak, for example, are very long with several subheadings, whereas in Cumhuriyet 
they would be considered separate articles.
319 This is actually a problematic way to proceed: the same media texts are used both as a source for describing the events 
and then analyzed for partial representations of these same events. While admittedly problematic, it also serves to remind how 
dependent researchers tend to be of the often partial media on following events.
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for this problem were posited to be in the error-laden, past policies and governance, leading Erdoğan to 
argue that great states are bound to come to terms with their pasts. This positioning of the causes of the 
problem in the past rather than in the still continuing repressive practices of the state and lack of cultural 
or minority rights were not contested by the press. Erdoğan went on to present the AKP as the actor that 
is prepared to deal with all of Turkey’s various problems. His proposed solution for the issue was more 
democracy and welfare within the constitutional framework, citizenship legislation within a unitary 
state, and a unified nation.320 Erdoğan explicitly stated that the AKP is opposed to ethnic nationalism, 
regional nationalism and religious nationalism, and offered citizenship of Turkey as the unifying bond 
for the whole country: “There are many ethnic elements in our country; we do not differentiate between 
these. Each of these is a sub-identity. There is a bond connecting us to each other. This bond is the bond 
of citizenship of the Republic of Turkey.”321 (Z0505)
As several of Turkish columnists were quick to point out, there was actually quite a lot of emphasis 
on unity in the Diyarbakir speech (for example CM0504). The problem was defined to be not a problem 
for a part of the nation but for all of Turkey, and there were repetitions of some nationalist catch phrases, 
even if in their more moderate formulations.322 And, as was also immediately noted by several columnists, 
Erdoğan stopped short of making any promises of concrete reforms (for example CS0503). Thus, his 
speech was very much a symbolic act and as important as it was, it is an over-interpretation to see it in 
itself as an indication of new government policy.
6.9.4 selected findings
1. There Are Kurds
Before moving on to investigate the reactions of the press and others quoted by the press, I will once 
again return to the issue of labeling practices, i.e. how the word Kurd(ish) was being used at this time. 
First of all, there had been an obvious relaxation in the use of the word by 2005. A majority of the writers 
and articles referred to a “Kurdish issue” quite comfortably, thus indicating that the press was much more 
progressive in this than were the politicians. There was also frequent mention of “citizens of Kurdish 
origins” (Kürt kökenli vatandaşlar/yurttaşlar), “our Kurdish brothers” (Kürt kardeşlerimiz), and in few 
cases even just “Kurds” (one of these three in 22/56 texts). However, even in 2005, the word Kurd as an 
ethnonym, as a label for an identity remained a difficult one to use in relation to real persons or groups 
320 Analysis of the subject positions offered to the reader in the articles is a complicated issue and not discussed here in any 
detail, but in his speech Erdoğan invited the audience to own the Turkish state despite past problems by using himself and 
his prison term as an example. Yet, the audiences was also expected to be willing to own the heroic security forces and the 
martyred soldiers, and to see the PKK violence as purely evil and devoid of grounds to exist. This was a lot to expect from the 
local audience, who had lived through the heavy-handed state repression of the OHAL years.
321 “Ülkemizde birçok etnik unsur var, bunlar arasında ayrım yapamayız. Bunların hepsi birer alt kimliktir. Bizi birbirimize 
bağlayan bir bağ vardır. Bu bağ, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşlığı bağıdır.” 
322 Such as “one state, one nation, one flag” (tek devlet, tek millet, tek bayrak) but notably the list did not continue with “one 
language” (tek dil). Also the formulation of the unity as “birlik ve beraberlik” (=unity and togetherness) rather than “birlik ve 
bütünlük” is noteworthy. The word birlik means unity or union, bütünlük comes from the word “whole” and beraberlik from 
the word “together”. Thus birlik ve beraberlik can be understood to refer to a union of different kinds of actors or elements 
rather than organic unity of a single being.
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of people, let alone named individuals. It was used to refer to unnamed but real person(s) in only two 
articles (M0505 & C059B). The sole exception vis-à-vis named individuals was a column by Erdal Şafak 
in Sabah, which listed eight Kurdish intellectuals by name (CS0503)! In line with the findings of the 
previous cases, those who welcomed Erdoğan to Diyarbakır with a banner in Kurdish were not labeled 
as Kurds (Z0505), and even the ardent defenders of the Kurdish cause such as the ex-parliamentarians of 
DEP or DEHAP’s local representatives were not categorized as Kurdish. Neither was Erdoğan’s audience. 
Roundabout labels such as bölge (i.e. region to refer also to the people of the region) or Diyarbakırlılar 
(the Diyarbakır residents) were still very much in use.
To test whether this continued reluctance to categorize individuals as Kurds (Kürt) was unique for 
my sample, I once again resorted to a test search in the www-archive of the daily Milliyet. For 2002, the 
search in the sections on politics, economy, and daily agenda yielded 88 hits, most of which were part of 
the term Kurdish issue (=Kürt sorunu). For 2005, the search gave a total of 303 results, out of which 106 
hits were for the first six months of the year. Of these 106, only four referred to a named person, and one 
to a specific organization. Thus my sample can be considered fairly typical.
The increased visibility of Kurds as Kurds seemed to necessitate certain clarifications. Several 
columnists and other commentators made a discursive separation into “normal,” “ordinary” Kurds (or 
our citizens of Kurdish origins) and those who support the terrorist PKK (for example C0504, CS0502, 
CS0503, Z0502), or alternatively Kurds with common sense versus the PKK (CM0502, YŞ0503). So, 
there were the sensible (our) Kurds and the others, who were not, who were excluded from the “us” of 
the commentators, and presumably from the “us” of the nation.
2. Support for and Criticism of Erdoğan
The press reception of Erdoğan’s initiative was mainly positive; giving the problem a label and calling 
for dialogue to resolve it was seen as something necessary, as something that needed to be done, as 
something for which Erdoğan should be applauded. A total of 34 of the news articles and columns could 
be interpreted as positive or somewhat positive; 14 either opposed the initiative or severely criticized 
some aspect of Erdoğan’s message and AKP’s policies; and 8 were unclear, making it impossible to say one 
way or the other.323 The supporters included pro-Kurdish actors who expressed cautious optimism, AKP 
politicians, civil society actors, and several columnists. In general, there was a hopeful if vague expectation 
that things might now change for the better. One commentator went so far as to proclaim a beginning 
of a new era (CYŞ0501). In addition to expressing approval, many actors actually criticized Erdoğan for 
not going far enough and argued that democratization alone is not enough. Especially DEHAP and DEP 
actors and representatives of local interest groups called for concrete steps (for example M0503, M0505, 
C0511). The promising speeches by previous prime ministers and politicians such as Demirel, İnönü 
and Yılmaz over the years (see chapter four and the first case), as well as the subsequent disappointments, 
were brought up again and again in these articles.
Diametrically opposite to these expressions of support and expectations for more concrete steps 
to follow were the nationalist and security-oriented condemnations of the Prime Minister’s initiative. 
Representatives of virtually all opposition parties criticized Erdoğan for endangering the principle of the 
323 This numeric information gives some indication of support and opposition but should not be taken too seriously as it is 
not really so clear-cut: many of the articles were multi-voiced and included both criticism and support.
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indivisible unity of the Republic of Turkey with its land and nation (S0501), for undermining “the fight 
against terrorism,” and for thus contributing to the cause of the PKK (M0502). Acknowledgement of the 
existence of a Kurdish issue in Turkey was seen as contrary to committed armed struggle against the PKK. 
More than half of the articles either highly critical of, or diametrically opposed to, Erdoğan’s message 
were published in Cumhuriyet, the daily with Kemalist-nationalist, state-centric, and radically secularist 
bent. Cumhuriyet gave more room for opposition politicians than the other papers in the sample, and its 
columnists took a more critical stance vis-à-vis Erdoğan.
A good look at the various sources of criticism can be found in a single news article in Cumhuriyet, 
where the Chairman of the center-right ANAP (Anavatan Partisi, Motherland Party) Erkan Mumcu 
states that the attitude of the government makes it look like the PKK had reached some of its aims; 
Secretary General of the center-left DSP (Demokratik Sol Parti, Democratic Left Party) Tayfun İçli 
argues that acknowledgement of the issue serves the aims of certain countries and elements that want 
to create324 ethnic minorities in Turkey; Deputy Chairman of the nationalist MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi, The Nationalist Movement Party) Oktay Vural accuses Erdoğan of sharing the same perspectives 
as Öcalan, who has also suggested a democratic solution; Deputy Chairman of the center-right DYP 
(Doğru Yol Partisi, True Path Party) Celal Adnan points out that Erdoğan gives the impression he is 
addressing Öcalan and that is an insult to the homeland (vatan); the chairman of the small Hürparti 
(Freedom Party) considers Erdoğan to have insulted the residentss of Diyarbakır (for lack of economic 
initiative); and Chairman of the radical socialist-nationalist İP (İşçi Partisi, Workers’ Party) Doğu 
Perinçek blames the prime minister for not giving enough power for the Turkish Armed Forces and 
giving instead tools for the PKK to use (C0510). Within the frameworks of nationalism and/or security 
of the homeland, the problem is understood as that of separatist terrorism encouraged by hostile powers 
outside of Turkey and aggravated by the extreme poverty in the region. Thus, it is impossible to resolve 
it by democratization (for example CC0501). Typically, speakers with this sort of stance refrained from 
talking about a Kurdish issue, let alone Kurds. According to the most extreme nationalist stance, in the 
sample expressed by MHP’s Deputy Chairman Mehmet Şandır, collective political or cultural rights 
equal separatism (C0507B). 
In an interesting counter-attack, Sabah columnist Mehmet Altan turns the tables around for the 
nationalist argument. According to him, there is an old elite embedded into the state that is working to 
prevent Turkey’s democratization and EU-membership and is thus against Turkey’s best interests. The 
restart of PKK hostilities is a stroke of good luck for them as they reject any solution other than a military 
one. Altan’s suggestion for resolving the problem is the provision of individual rights corresponding to 
the Copenhagen criteria combined with socio-economic development (CS0502).
3. Who Can Speak for Kurds?
As was described above, Erdoğan traveled to Diyarbakır with a large entourage of AKP politicians and 
journalists, and his statements received much publicity, both before and after the Diyarbakır visit, 
and elicited the warm approval of a majority of the commentators. Yet, it was not a great success as 
a public event, and only was able to draw a modest audience of some hundreds of persons, leading 
the journalists and columnists to question why the locals had not been more enthusiastic. The lack of 
324 Note the idea of other than Turkish ethnicies as artificial constructions created in order to harm Turkey.
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audience was attributed alternatively to the distant location, the heavy security measures, the heat wave, 
the past disappointments suffered by Kurds, and finally to the lack of cooperation by DEHAP. This last 
explanation leads directly to the question of the role the legal pro-Kurdish actors were envisioned to play 
in the dialogue that was called for to resolve the problem.
In the 2002 national elections the pro-Kurdish DEHAP had increased its share of the vote to 
6.2 percent (i.e. 1.9 million votes), and in the local elections of 2004 it had improved its performance 
from the winning of 37 municipalities in 1999 to the winning of 56 municipalities in 2002. It had 
garnered the highest levels of support in Batman, Diyarbakır, Hakkâri, and Şırnak, where the party’s 
share was between 45 and 56 percent of the vote in 2002. Speaking of election results between 1995 
and 2009, Nicole F. Watts has pointed out that the electoral maps show a clear distinction between voter 
preferences in the Kurdish-majority regions of the country and elsewhere. The election results clearly 
provided evidence of support for the parties and their agenda, and the pro-Kurdish parties gained certain 
legitimacy from this strong local support. (Watts 2010, 167.) 
It was possible to find some signs of this legitimacy or justification for its existence due to the 
number of votes and local popular support in the articles of my sample (for example CZ0502).325 First of 
all, once again the various pro-Kurdish or Kurdish nationalist actors were used as a source by the national 
mainstream media.326 The press release issued by former DEP parliamentarians received press notice, as 
did comments of DEHAP Diyarbakır Greater Municipality Mayor Osman Baydemir. In addition to 
this, DEHAP was presented as the mover and shaker of Diyarbakır: only a few hundred people came 
to listen to the Prime Minister because DEHAP did not will more (CYŞ0502). This indicates the AKP 
could not attract a crowd on its own.
Despite the voice, popularity, and apparent local influence, the legal pro-Kurdish political party 
was generally not seen as a participant in the dialogue called for by the Prime Minister. Erdoğan himself 
snubbed DEHAP by not including a visit to Mayor Baydemir into his official program. The discussion 
of the Kurdish issue was mostly conducted over DEHAP, rather than with them. A few exceptions 
notwithstanding, the legal pro-Kurdish actors were not seen as having a part to play in the resolution 
of the problem. Even Erdal Şafak, who warmly supported the opening and emphasized the importance 
of dialogue in reaching a resolution, explicitly stated that DEHAP, Leyla Zana, Osman Baydemir, 
etc. should not participate in this dialogue as they are under the tutelage of İmralı (CS0503).327 The 
legal actors were thus simply dismissed as pawns of the PKK, and only those Kurds willing to publicly 
condemn the PKK were seen as legitimate dialogue participants. 
The Turkish state and politicians still adamantly refused the possibility of negotiations with “the 
terrorists.” In the dichotomy constructed between “ordinary citizens of Kurdish origins” or “Kurds with 
common sense” and the PKK and supporters of “terrorism,” DEHAP clearly fell within the PKK-group. 
325 As has been noted before in this work, Turkish news articles tend to contain very little background information on the 
events covered. I presume one reason for this to be the reliance on individual columnists for contextualizing. This lack of 
concerted effort seems to result in repetition of certain things and omission of others. For example, the previous speeches 
by Demirel, İnönü and Yılmaz came up again and again in the columns but not one of the articles in the sample had any 
information on the actual support of DEHAP in Diyarbakır and its surroundings, or the balance of power and political 
rivalry between the AKP and DEHAP.
326 Interpreting an actor as being considered legitimate on the basis of a voice in public is problematic at best and needs to 
be combined with other signs of legitimacy. For example, Abdullah Öcalan’s views have been discussed in the Turkish press at 
length, and he is in general not seen as a legitimate actor, far from it.
327 I.e. Öcalan as he is imprisoned on the island of İmralı.
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Despite the often-voiced claims that the PKK does not, and cannot, represent Turkey’s Kurdish 
population in any way, once again a connection was constructed between these two, or at least that is 
one likely interpretation for the demand of unconditional surrender of the PKK as a precondition for 
resolving the issue with further democratization (C0507B).
In an article from 2008, Murat Somer uses Erdoğan’s public address and the lack of Kurdish audience 
as an example of the difficulties involved in moderate to moderate cooperation in resolving the problem: 
…Erdoğan went to Diyarbakır, a stronghold of Kurdish nationalism, where he made an unusually 
conciliatory speech. He admitted that the state had made mistakes in the past vis-á-vis the Kurdish 
question. These were words that would please Kurdish moderates, and Erdoğan took significant 
political risks on behalf of his Turkish-majority constituency by making this overture. However, the 
event turned out to be embarrassment for the prime minister because very few people turned up. 
(Somer 2008, 233.) 
In my sample, Milliyet columnist Fikret Bila was the only one to explicitly voice the difficult question of: 
What does Erdoğan understand with the “Kurdish issue” he has just acknowledged if he argues that it 
should be solved within one nation? Is that one nation not exactly what the Kurdish movement opposes? 
(CM0504). The solution Erdoğan was willing to offer at the time was envisioned within the concept 
of individual rights rather than collective ones and obviously tried to bypass the Kurdish nationalists 
from the process. In the national elections of 2002, AKP had come second after DEHAP in Batman, 
Diyarbakır, and Şırnak making it the most serious competitor for the Kurdish nationalist movement, 
and perhaps Erdoğan aimed even higher. His expectations for stronger Kurdish support were also not 
unfounded: in the national elections of 2007, the AKP outperformed the next reincarnation of the pro-
Kurdish party DTP in the thirteen provinces with Kurdish majority, winning 44 percent of the total vote 
versus DTP’s 38 percent (Watts 2010, 170). In conclusion: DEHAP was not invited to participate in 
trying to resolve the conflict, but actually shut out from participating. Taking this into account, it was 
probably too much to expect it to support the AKP, its strongest rival in the region.
4. If We Only Were Unified…
Before finishing with this fourth case, and moving on to the next chapter and the final case analyzing 
explicit citizenship debates, I want to make a preliminary remark on the calls for unity reoccurring in 
the discourse of various politicians (for example Z0504, Z0505) and also in the writings of the various 
columnists. As was noted in relation to the Kurdish language campaigns of 2002, there was an intra-elite 
disagreement over how to best handle the Kurdish demands, accompanied by accusations of undercutting 
the unity of the nation. Yet, the various actors and commentators continuously presented the issue as 
solvable if everyone only would work together. A unified nation was called for to resolve the problem of 
demands for recognition of diversity. This is a fairly typical nationalist mode of speaking, and something 
that I will return to in length in the next chapter.
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6.9.5 the afteRmath
The PKK showed its approval of Erdoğan’s initiative and declared a one month unilateral ceasefire a week 
after Erdoğan’s visit to Diyarbakır (Balta-Paker 31.8.2005). This was not really beneficial for the AKP, 
who could not afford to seem as if it was willing to negotiate with the PKK. Erdoğan had to explain 
his doings to the National Security Council (Ibid.), and the Armed Forces also expressed a worry that 
using the term Kurdish problem would lead to negative consequences. Thus, while many in the press 
criticized him for not going far enough, according to the military he had already gone too far. At this 
stage the AKP was not yet able or willing to go against the still powerful military, and nothing concrete 
or permanent followed from the speeches. Yet, Erdoğan and the AKP were not willing to just let go, and 
Erdoğan took up the issue of citizenship as the main source of unity and solidarity for everyone in Turkey 
only a few months later, in November 2005. The debate sparked by his next address on the issue will be 
the starting point of the analysis in the next chapter. 
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ChaPter 7: Debating CitizenshiP anD iDentity  
in 2005 anD 2009
7.1 intRoduction
As the title of this seventh chapter indicates, the final case study focuses on explicit debates in the print 
press over national identity and citizenship in connection to the Kurdish issue. The final case with its two 
separate samples is presented in a separate chapter because it differs considerably from the previous ones, 
which investigated how Kurds and their demands for public recognition as Kurds, and for wider cultural 
and linguistic rights were constructed in the press. Now the focus is shifted to explicit and normative 
debates over the relationship between national identity and citizenship and whether the nation should be 
retained as the source of social solidarity on which the state is based. 
The interest is on both the kind of reality constructed i.e. how things are (re)presented, as well as 
on normative arguments over how things ought to be. While I look at the contributions of all those 
partaking in the debate, politicians, specialists, scholars and others, this time columns and interviews 
rather than news are at the center of attention. Columns are prioritized because news articles (quite 
naturally) tended to have less to say about how things should be than columns and the columnists, who 
clearly took on the role of explaining to the interested reader the possible alternative ways to understand 
Turkish nation and citizenship.
The debates are investigated through two instances with almost four years in between: the first one 
is from late 2005 and the aftermath of the Şemdinli bombing incident, when Prime Minister Erdoğan 
proposed citizenship as the source of social solidarity during his visit to the predominantly Kurdish 
Hakkâri province. The second instance is from 2009, when the AKP government initiated the so-called 
Kurdish opening, which could be seen, and was interpreted at the time, as the first serious attempt to 
resolve the Kurdish issue. Both of these were important moments in the process of accommodating 
diversity in Turkey. Both of them also sparked intensive debates in the press on the topics investigated in 
this work.
The normative aspect of the debates differentiates this case from the previous ones as another layer is 
added to the presentation; in addition to contextualization of the news events, description of the sample 
and main findings of the textual analysis, the Turkish debates are evaluated vis-à-vis some international 
political-philosophical and normative scholarly debates over how to cope with diversity in the supposedly 
homogeneous modern nation-states. As has been previously noted, Turkey has not been alone in its 
struggles with claims for recognition for various ethnic and cultural collective identities, ethnically 
or nationally motivated violence and rising nationalist right-wing currents. The 1990s can with good 
reasons be labeled an era of both nationalism and identity politics in the global arena. There was an 
emergence of new nation-states from the ex-Soviet bloc, ethnically and nationally motivated violence 
in the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Africa, a backlash against immigrants and a new popularity of right-
wing nationalist parties in Western Europe as well as an ongoing threat of secession within some of the 
established Western democracies (such as Catalonia or Scotland). For most of the 20th century, ethnicity 
had been viewed by political theorists as a marginal phenomenon that would gradually disappear with 
modernization (Kymlicka 2000, 184), but this was obviously not the case.
From the 1980s onwards, various theorists claimed a move from modernity to a post-modern era, 
and it was also argued that the nation-state belongs to the modern age and is being superseded in the 
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postmodern globalized world (for a critical summary see: Billig 1995, 132-134). The argument goes 
along the lines that the idea of a sovereign, independent, bounded, internally homogeneous nation-
state has been eroded from above by economic and cultural globalization, transnational information 
networks and cross-border flows (immigration), and from below by claims for recognition and demands 
for cultural and political rights by sub-national groups (Billig 1995, CH6; Calhoun 1997). Habermas 
speaks of differentiation of society along multicultural lines and the processes of globalization as 
challenges that overburden the nation-state’s capacity for action and undermine both the internal and the 
external sovereignty of the existing nation-states (Habermas 1998b, 399, 407-413). Growing domestic 
heterogeneity and identity politics reduce the nation-states from within so that they are less able to 
manage collective affairs. In short, the struggle of various sub-national collective identities for recognition 
can be interpreted to reflect, or partially cause, a (postmodern) crisis of the modern nation-state and 
liberal democracy, which has sparked lively theoretic debates on nationalism, the modern nation-state, 
liberal democracy, citizenship and individualistic vs. communal theories of rights.328
An important question in this debate since the early 1990s has been directed at how to govern 
increasingly multi-cultural societies in a democratic and fair way. In this debate, both theorists and 
policy-makers have debated the various ways to manage and accommodate cultural, linguistic, religious 
and ethnic diversity within contemporary democratic nation-states. Questions of equality and group-
differentiated rights, and the need for recognition and the accommodation of cultural diversity within 
liberal democracy with its individualistically defined theory of rights have been topics of long-lasting 
and openly normative debates among political theorists (see for example Miller 1995, Kymlicka 1995a, 
1995b, 2004, 2010, Kymlicka & Norman 1994, Turner 2006, Habermas 1998a; Parekh 1997, 1999b). 
The various positions in the debate that concern us here can be classified as liberal, nationalist and 
multiculturalist (Shafir 1998). Yet, with the possible exception of conservative nationalism (see Parekh 
1999a, 298-9), all participants in the debate can, with good reasons, be considered as liberal. Thus one 
might also speak of various positions within liberal discourse of citizenship.
At the center of the debates on Turkey is the question of how Turkey with its increasingly obvious 
cultural, linguistic and ethnic diversity could be governed, if not in a democratic and fair way exactly, 
then at least in a way that could achieve peace? By 2005 there was an increasing necessity to address the 
Kurdish issue due both to the increasing visibility of Kurds and the perception that ethnic, political, 
cultural and social issues constituted a part of the Kurdish issue. The restarting and escalation of violence 
in the Kurdish-inhabited provinces in 2004 and 2005 also emphasized the need to address the Kurdish 
demands. 
Besides the international theoretic and comparative debates on the issue, the different lines 
of argumentation in the debates (in 2005 and then in 2009) are presented and discussed vis-à-vis 
interpretations offered by scholars of Turkey (Kadıoğlu 2005, 2007, 2008; Kadıoğlu & Keyman 2011, 
Keyman & İçduygu 2005; İçduygu & al. 1999, İnce 2012, Yeğen 2004, 2009). It will be argued that 
the statements by spokespersons of the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) and MHP (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi) and several of the columnists in 2005 bear close resemblance to the ideals of conservative 
nationalist thinking (á la Roger Scruton), according to which the basis of shared ideals and values and 
328 The theorizing on nationalism and ethnicity most relevant for this work was summarized in chapters two and three, and 
the normative political-philosophical debaters on the relationship between the nation and citizenship most relevant for the 
case will be touched upon below.
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social solidarity within a given state is and should be the nation. The state (and thus citizenship of 
the state) is too formal and abstract to provide the source for collective solidarity. This conservative 
nationalist (also labeled hardliner nationalist or defensive nationalist by Murat Somer 2005b) position 
was the dominant one in 2005, but many of the arguments in Erdoğan’s support can be interpreted to fall 
into the category of liberal nationalist. For a liberal nationalist theorist, the nation, the bond of national 
identity remains the essential unifying factor, the basis of trust and good will between citizens (Miller 
1995, 140), with the main differences between conservative nationalism and liberal nationalism being 
the latter’s emphasis on individual rights and higher tolerance of diversity. Arguments going beyond 
liberal nationalism were rare in 2005.
Many of the arguments in 2009 can also be classified as falling into the categories of conservative or 
liberal nationalism. The debates at this later date are further evaluated vis-à-vis multiculturalism (of Will 
Kymlicka 1995) and constitutional citizenship (modeled by Jürgen Habermas 1998a). Multiculturalism 
emphasizes individual’s need for culture and consequently promotes group rights, whereas constitutional 
citizenship proposes that issues of equality and difference can be resolved within the concept of individual 
rights rather than group rights and puts forth the project of constitutional democracy as the source of 
social solidarity.
7.2 citizenship as the supRa-identity and tuRkishness as a 
sub-identity?
7.2.1 the immediate context in 2005: the Şemdinli bombing
After a period of relative peace that had held since 1999 and improvements in the security and human 
rights situation in South-East Turkey, the overall situation in the Kurdish provinces entered a process 
of rapid deterioration in 2005. The PKK had restarted its armed activities the previous year, and there 
was a resurgence of violence in the area. Besides the increased violent activities of the PKK, the Turkish 
security forces used unwarranted force during demonstrations and there were wide-spread allegations of 
state complicity in some of the bomb attacks that had occurred in the Hakkâri region (BHRC & KHRP 
2006, 14-7).
The overall situation was becoming increasingly strained when on November the 9th a bomb went 
off in the Umut Kitapevi (Hope Bookstore) in the Şemdinli district of Hakkâri. The explosion killed one 
man, Mehmet Korkmaz, and wounded several others. Three men were apprehended at the scene by local 
passersby, who witnessed their attempt to escape.329 Two of suspects, Ali Kaya and Özcan İldeniz, turned 
out to be non-commissioned military officers who were reported to be serving as intelligence officers in 
the region. It was also claimed that Kaya and İldeniz were part of a “deep state” organization known as 
JİTEM (Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele, Gendarme Intelligence Gathering and Anti Terror) 
or JİT (Jandarma İstihbarat Teşkilatı, Gendarme Intelligence Organization), leading the government to 
deny the very existence of such organizations. The third participant, Veysel Ateş, was alleged to be a 
329 A very good description of the bombing incident, its immediate aftermath and the trial can be found in the report of the 
UK-based Bar Human Rights Committee (BHRC), and Project Kurdish Human Rights (PKHR) from 2006, pages 19 to 20.
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former PKK member turned state informant. (BHRC & KHRP 2006, 19-21.) The Umut bookstore 
was owned by one Seferi Yılmaz, who had been convicted for his involvement in a PKK bombing in 
Şemdinli in 1984, for which he had been sentenced to 15 years imprisonment. Upon his release from 
prison, he had returned to Şemdinli and opened the bookstore.
The existence of a “deep state” had been brought to the public attention with the so-called Susurluk 
incident back in 1995.330 The Şemdinli bombing clearly indicated that Kurdish militants were not solely 
responsible for the deteriorating security situation but that there had been provocation by the state, or to 
be more precise, by factions within the state. The incident and especially the personalities of the bombers 
caused an uproar among local Kurds, leading the AKP Prime Minister Erdoğan to travel to Şemdinli in a 
show for support for the locals and as an attempt to pacify the explosive situation. While in Şemdinli, he 
proposed citizenship of Turkey as the connecting bond between the people(s) of Turkey.
7.2.2 sample and analysis
The incident, the following unrest, the Prime Minister’s visit, and the speeches he gave in Şemdinli 
and later in Ankara returned the Kurdish issue to the limelight, and provoked a flurry of writing on 
related topics in the press. Due to the intensity of the debate and the high number of articles, only 
three newspapers were looked at this time. Milliyet was selected as the main paper, and it was compared 
and contrasted with Cumhuriyet and Zaman.331 The period of scrutiny for Milliyet was longer than 
for the other two: from the 22nd of November to the 2nd of December 2005. The numerous articles 
included descriptive news reports, interviews, columns, and comments from both politicians and other 
commentators. The topics covered included the bombing incident in Şemdinli with its aftermath, the 
strained atmosphere in the Hakkâri region, the Kurdish issue in general from various perspectives, 
Erdoğan’s visit and the speech he made in Şemdinli, the criticism and interpretation of the speech by 
various other actors and commentators, the definition of the Turkish nation, and also the stipulations 
concerning minorities in the Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923.
Milliyet published a total of 62 articles on related topics from November the 22nd to December the 
2nd. After reading through all of the reporting and debates carefully, a portion of the articles, i.e. six news 
articles and eleven columns, were selected for more detailed analysis, with short summaries and partial 
analysis of the main points of interest from one more news article and six columns.332 Those articles that 
explicitly addressed the issue of identity in relation to citizenship were especially selected for analysis, and 
these tended to be columns. The selection of individual columns for analysis was based on both content 
and author. For the other two papers, the period initially looked at was one week of reporting from the 
23rd of November until the 29th of November, which resulted in a total of 31 articles in both papers. As 
there were some highly interesting columns in both papers during the period from November the 30th 
330 See chapter four.
331 I first searched the electronic archives of the newspapers, but was not fully satisfied with the results and thus once 
again resorted to the traditional method of going through and photographing the relevant articles in the paper copies of the 
newspapers in the excellent newspaper archives of Atatürk Kitaplığı in Istanbul. I am aware that the results of the analysis 
would have been somewhat different if I had selected different papers, for example the more progressive daily Radikal.
332 A full listing of all relevant articles is found in appendix 7/1.
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to December 2nd, a few were included in the analysis, bringing the number of articles included to 34 for 
Zaman and 33 for Cumhuriyet. From Cumhuriyet eight news articles,333 four columns, and one editorial 
were selected for analysis with a partial summary of three more news articles and two columns. From 
Zaman four news articles and four columns were analyzed with a partial analysis of one more column 
and an opinion article by a well-known Turkish scholar.
I did a critical, contextual close reading of the text, where I analyzed how certain key words and 
concepts were used, most notably: nation, citizen, Kurd(ish). I also looked at naming practices of events, 
actors and processes, sources cited, and how various stances were legitimized. Since I considered it 
necessary to analyze a fairly high number of texts, the level of detail of the questions asked to the texts 
was scaled accordingly.334
7.2.3 an oveRvieW of neWs RepoRting and debates in columns
Before presenting the findings of the analysis, it is in order to give a relatively lengthy descriptive overview 
of the news reporting and the columns. Reportedly, Erdoğan had stated the following in Şemdinli: 
Turkish, Kurdish, Circassian, Laz, what comes to your mind, we will all be one and come together 
under the supra-identity of citizenship of the Republic of Turkey. We will respect sub-identities. 
However, we all have a supra-identity. What is it? We are citizens of the Republic of Turkey. Nobody 
will feel uneasy because of this.335 (there are small variations in the quotes, this one is from 
C05B04). 
This may not seem like a radical statement, especially as Erdoğan had made a similar suggestion in 
his Diyarbakır speech, a couple of months before, in August.336 Initially the statement was also not 
interpreted as a radical departure by Milliyet and Zaman. Rather Milliyet described the speech as a call for 
unity and brotherhood (M05B02). But many in Turkey were rendered uneasy by this statement, most 
notably Deniz Baykal, the chairman of the main opposition party, the Kemalist CHP, who immediately 
stepped forth to criticize Erdoğan: 
Somebody explain this to Erdoğan. Citizenship of the Republic of Turkey is a legal identity. The 
Turkish nation cannot be replaced by the citizenship of the Republic of Turkey. You will absorb the 
concept of Turkish nation. You will not be afraid, ashamed, or embarrassed to say Turkish nation. 
You will know that the Turkish nation is not a violation of anybody’s ethnic identity. When you 
333 Many of the news articles in Cumhuriyet are quite short as topics are often divided into separate articles rather than under 
subheadings of a single news article, hence the relatively high number of texts analyzed.
334 For the set of questions, see appendix 7/2.
335 “Türk, Kürt, Çerkez, Laz, aklınıza ne gelirse hepsi Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşlığı üst kimliği altında bir ve beraber 
olacağız. Alt kimliklere saygı duyacağız. Ancak hepimizin bir üst kimliği var. Nedir o? Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşıyız. 
Bundan da kimse rahatsız olmayacak”
336 See case 4 in chapter 6.
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went to Diyarbakır you said, all guilty-like ‘one nation, one state.’ What is this nation, open the 
constitution and look at it. Look at history and see what nation it is.337 (M05B08)
More moderately voiced critique was voiced by Erkan Mumcu, the chairman of the center-right 
opposition party ANAP, who expressed a hope that it had been merely a slip of tongue on Erdoğan’s 
part (M05B08). Erdoğan countered the criticism by emphasizing the unifying power of citizenship and 
the possibility of cultural richness offered by the mosaic [of cultures] in Turkey. This in turn angered 
Devlet Bahçeli, the chairman of the nationalist MHP, whose contribution to the debate was to state that 
“if Turkey were a mosaic, its name should be ‘mosaicistan’”338 (M05B13). Judging by press reports, the 
debate among politicians never went much further than this. Despite a heated and polarized debate, 
there was no actual discussion on how, and in what aspects, the understanding of Turkish citizenship 
should or could be changed. The PM’s suggestion was not supported at large in the comments that made 
it to the papers, and only a very few Turkish politicians, mainly from his own AKP, stepped forth to 
defend him, or perhaps more did, but were not given press coverage.
There were clear differences between the news reporting on this “identity debate” in the different 
papers looked at. Milliyet, the main paper analyzed, allotted more space for Erdoğan’s comments than 
those of his opponents, Erdoğan’s comments were not opposed textually, and when he was criticized by 
other politicians, his counter-criticism was also given ample room in the same articles. The supporting 
comments of Erdoğan’s close collaborator Abdullah Gül, minister for foreign affairs at the time and later 
president, were given much prominence, whereas the admittedly crude comments of Devlet Bahçeli were 
given for curiosity value only. The support was not unanimous as a majority of the columnists argued 
against the Prime Minister’s proposal, while several also criticized Deniz Baykal’s nationalist retort.
It probably comes as no big surprise for anyone following Turkish politics and media that the overall 
approach in the daily Cumhuriyet towards Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement was negative. Cumhuriyet 
has been the voice of the staunchly secularist Kemalists and thus diametrically opposed to the religious 
AKP and most of its initiatives. In the news Erdoğan’s message was not opposed by textual means as 
much as by the sheer weight of the opposing voices. Those condemning the Prime Minister simply 
got bigger headlines and photos than he and his supporters; and most columnists argued against the 
proposed citizenship-identity. Yet, even in Cumhuriyet the confrontationist approach of Deniz Baykal 
received its share of criticism as well.
Also, not surprisingly, Zaman, the Fetullah-affiliated pro-religious daily, was quite supportive of 
Erdoğan and the AKP government, which were applauded for their actions and resolution in handling 
the Şemdinli case. In addition, the paper gave a positive assessment of AKP policies and the PM’s 
actions, and presented optimistic and supportive evaluations of Turkey’s prospects and the government’s 
performance from sources outside of Turkey, such as the Financial Times and the EU. What is interesting 
is that the paper was not very interested in identity issues, but centered on the immediate problem 
created by the Şemdinli bombing and the resulting parliamentary and legal processes, and emphasized 
337 “Biri bunu Erdoğan’a anlatsın. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşlığı hukuki kimliktir. Türkiye Cumhuriyeti vatandaşlığı, 
Türk milleti yerine ikame edilmez. Türk milleti kavramını içine sindireceksin. Türk milleti demekten korkmayacaksın, 
utanmayacaksın, mahcup olmayacaksın. Türk milletinin, kimsenin etnik kimliğine tecavüz olmadığını bileceksin. 
Diyarbakır’a gittiğinde suçlu suçlu ‘tek millet, tek devlet’ dedin. Neymiş bu millet, aç anayasaya, bak. Aç tarihe bak, gör ne 
milleti olduğunu.”
338 “Türkiye mozaik ise, Türkiye’nin adının ‘mozaikistan’ olması lazım” 
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the need to continue the democratizing reforms despite increasing levels of violence.
Because of the lack of in-depth debate among the politicians, the contribution of the columnists to 
the debate emerges as important. For example, Milliyet columnists Fikret Bila, Melih Aşık, Hasan Pulur, 
Taha Akyol and Hasan Cemal, Zaman columnists A. Turan Alkan and Şahin Alpay, and Cumhuriyet 
columnists such as Oktay Ekinci, Mümtaz Soysal, Toktamış Ateş and Şükran Soner debated the issue at 
length in their columns. In addition, Semih İdiz (Milliyet) did an in-depth interview with emphasis on 
minority issues with the representative of the EU to Turkey, and Derya Sazak (Milliyet) did an in-depth 
interview with the leaders of the DTP, the pro-Kurdish party of the time. The journalists and columnists 
clearly assuumed the role of explaining to the interested reader the possible alternative ways to understand 
Turkish nation and citizenship, how Erdoğan’s and Baykal’s short statements could be understood, the 
significance of the various conceptualizations, and the historical background of the issue as well as the 
expected consequences. All in all, in November 2005 there existed a highly publicized debate in the press 
on the definition of the Turkish nation and the content of the citizenship of Turkey.
In the previous chapter, in relation to the findings of the first case analyzed I discussed the limitations 
of the public acceptance of “a Kurdish reality” in Turkey at the end of the 1990s. As was noted in relation 
to the fourth case study, by 2005 the situation was markedly different. The existence of Kurds or cultural 
and linguistic differences in Turkey was not denied, and the category “Kurd(ish)” was relatively freely 
used in the press.339 The Kurds were no longer expected to hide their Kurdishness and to highlight only 
a national Turkish identity in public settings. Rather, now an important part of the debate was over how 
to situate the category of Kurdish vis-à-vis the category of Turkish. On a certain surface level the debate 
aimed to be a general one, i.e. not only about how to accommodate Kurdish ethnic identity, but as some 
of the commentators pointed out, those not content to remain Turks tended to be Kurds (for example 
CM05B15).
Erdoğan’s proposal of citizenship as the source of loyalty that unifies all residents of Turkey offered 
one possible way to accommodate cultural diversity and/or various ethnic identifications. This approach 
implicitly acknowledges an ethnic Turkish component within the Turkish national identity, or it can 
be interpreted to place Turkish ethnicity on par with other ethnicities. Accordingly, Kurds were not 
expected to claim membership of the Turkish nation. Yet, as was stated above, Erdoğan’s statement was 
not supported at large and it was very much opposed by the opposition parties. Their opposition was 
couched in nationalist argumentation, according to which Turkish nation should be retained as THE 
source of loyalty and unity, and it was not enough to replace it with citizenship identity.
After this descriptive summary of the debate, I will next look at the arguments put forth in 2005 vis-
à-vis two normative positions on sources of socials solidarity, namely conservative and liberal nationalism, 
presented together with the relevant examples from the sample. It will be argued that the nationalist 
position, either in its conservative or in some cases its liberal (represented below by David Miller) variant 
remained the main approach to the issue in Turkey in 2005. After this more theoretic interlude, I will 
return to highlight some interesting features of the debates.340 
339 For the continued restrictions and sensibilities, see case 4 in chapter 6.
340 Please note that the following discussion of the findings of the analysis does not aim to be an exhaustive summary of the 
whole debate with all its nuances and arguments, but an analytic summary of the features of the debate most salient for the 
topic at hand.
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7.2.4 conseRvative nationalist aRgumentation
The presentation is begun with a critical description of the position of conservative nationalism, 
represented here by Roger Scruton (from Miller 1995 and Parekh 1999a),341 because it will be argued 
that views that can be classified under the heading of conservative nationalism342 were the dominant way 
to view the relationship between the nation, citizenship, and state in the debates in the press in 2005.
1. Importance of the Nation
For conservative nationalist political thinkers the nation is the ultimate ontological unit of political life. 
Individuals are constituted and nurtured by their nation. They have a specific identity that is derived 
from and inextricably links them to other members of the national community. This is also true of 
the state, which is an organic expression of the relevant nation. The state has a specific identity that is 
derived from the pre-political nation, and it retains its stability and unity only so long as it remains true 
to the latter. All individuals are first members of their nation and only derivatively of the state. Their 
nationality precedes and gives meaning and moral energy to their citizenship. (Parekh 1999a, 296 on 
Roger Scruton).
Like other conservative nationalists, Scruton argues that nations are spiritual and moral communities. 
They lift their members above their petty individual lives, link them up with something bigger and more 
enduring, give them a sense of meaning and significance, and help them cope with the contingency and 
tragedies of life. They also provide them with a sense of rootedness and historical continuity, and stabilize 
their inherently fluid lives. They create a climate of trust and dependability, provide their members 
with ideals and values as well as the motives for living up to these in the form of shared sentiments of 
affection, loyalty, and solidarity, and nurture a rich and relaxed moral life. As indispensable sources 
of meaning, morality, and identity, nations are sacred and deserve highest allegiance and the greatest 
sacrifices. Since the nation defines the bounds of loyalty, conservative nationalists insist either that we 
have no obligations to mankind in general or that these are considerably weaker than those to our 
fellow nationals. (Parekh 1999a, 298, summarizing Scruton)
For conservative nationalists, the unity of the state is grounded in the unity of the nation because by itself 
the state is too formal and abstract an institution to engage the hearts and evoke the deepest emotions of 
citizens. Education is used as a primary means of cultural engineering. The main purpose of education 
is to instill national values, a sense of pride in the nation’s past, the spirit of piety and reverence to its 
institutions, and the sentiment of collective solidarity. When future citizens are thus suffused with the 
spirit of the nation, they can be trusted to express its true will and interests in their un-coerced acts of 
consent. (Parekh 1999a, 299.) 
341 Unfortunately I could not consult Scruton’s provocative essay “In Defense of the Nation” published in his The Philosopher 
on Dover Beach. New York: St. Martin’s Press. (1990)
342 A multitude of ideas and ideals combining nationalism and conservatism from the 19th century onwards can be classified 
under the label “conservative nationalism,” and what is provided here is only one articulation. Also, in the Turkish context the 
term “conservative nationalism” often refers to ideas and ideals that emerged with the Turkish-Islamic Synthesis in the 1970s 
(see for example Uzer 2011).
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The integrity of the nation must be preserved at all costs and thus the nation’s myths and values 
should not be too closely scrutinized and subjected to “corrosive criticism.” Its culture and way of life 
should also be similarly protected. Obviously all this involves restrictions on free speech, on individual 
choices, and even on disinterested academic inquiries. According to Parekh, Scruton and other 
conservative nationalists see nothing wrong in this (Parekh 1999a, 299) and are willing to submit cultural 
minorities and immigrants to a vigorous program of nationalist assimilation (Parekh 1999a, 304).
The official Turkish nationalism instituted after 1980 under the September the 12th regime exhibits 
obvious similarities with Scruton’s conservative nationalism with its vision of an organic nation, 
investment in the nationalist education of the citizen,343 and restrictions on freedom of expression.344 
On the other hand, prioritizing the interests of the state, the deep-rooted state-centrism of Turkish 
nationalism also differentiates it from the ideals of conservative nationalism. According to official 
formulations (by the MGK), the nation is defined as “one of the constituent elements of the state” (Bora 
2003a, 437). Besides the official nationalism of the state, Pan-Turanist/Turkist nationalism of the MHP 
can clearly be classified as conservative nationalism.345 In my opinion, the DSP (of Bülent Ecevit) and the 
CHP have also often resorted to rhetoric reminiscent of conservative nationalism.
Murat Somer has labeled the dominant position in Turkey as defensive-nationalist perspective, the 
main gist of which he describes thus: 
From the defensive-nationalist perspective, actual and enforced cultural-linguistic homogeneity 
(and to a lesser extent, religious homogeneity in a cultural, identity-related sense) is the insurance 
for state-survival and for social cohesion and political-territorial unity. To differing degrees in 
different periods, this perspective has been the dominant Turkish-nationalist perspective and has 
predominantly shaped both the mainstream-societal and the official discourse and ideology. (Somer 
2005b, 76)
It is easy to see that many contributions to the November 2005 debate considered the Turkish nation 
as the ultimate ontological unit of political life; Turkishness was seen as an essential national identity 
shared by all citizens of Turkey, referred to as Turks.346 Individuals were understood to have a specific 
national identity that is derived from and inextricably links them to other members of the national 
community (CM05B09B, CM05B10, CM05B14, CZ05B07, CC05B06). This national identity 
had also great instrumental value for the state as social solidarity based on membership of the Turkish 
nation was seen as essential for the territorial integrity and continuing survival of the state (for example 
CM05B09B, CM05B14). Citizenship of Turkey as the basis for this commonality was simply not up to 
the task, and would lead to either disintegration in the manner envisioned in the Treaty of Sèvres (for 
343 See chapter four for Turkish education in service of nationalism.
344 See chapter five for restrictions on freedom of expression in the 1980s.
345 According to Bora, who has classified Turkish nationalism into different types, the Turkist nationalism of the MHP 
is a perverted, extreme branch of official nationalism which has pursued the idea of the racist-ethnicist vein of Atatürk’s 
nationalism to its extreme. It conceives an organic and authoritarian society and is culturally essentialist. (Bora 2003b, 445).
346 On the surface the definition of nationhood on the basis of citizenship seems inclusive (and civic if you will), but 
when one looks deeper, it is based on the denial of the ethnic aspect inherent in the conceptualization of the Turkish nation 
combined with assimilationist ideals. See the next section for further details.
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example CM05B09B),347 or in the manner of Yugoslavia or Iraq; or towards a federative state structure 
(for example CM05B15).
The necessity of a Turkish nation could be legitimated with several sources of authority. The most 
generally used ones were the Constitution of 1982 and especially its Article 66, according to which: 
“Everyone bound to the Turkish state through the bond of citizenship is a Turk”348 (CC05B06, CM05B14, 
CM05B15, CM05B19); the absolute necessity of shared Turkish national identity for retaining a unitary 
state and avoiding either Balkanization, the fate of Iraq (CC05B02 CC05B10), or transition to a federal 
state structure (CM05B15); more general security considerations; and finally Atatürk’s understanding of 
the Turkish nation (CM05B15, CC05B06, CC05B08, CC05B11).
2. The Relationship between Nation and Ethnicity
The liberal-nationalist thinker David Miller has asked about the kinds of attitudes nationalism should 
adopt towards sub-national group identities. He considers ethnic identities especially problematic as they 
may be at odds with the national identity itself (Miller 1995, 119, 121). Ethnic identities tend to be 
pervasive and to influence the way the individual may be treated by others. Very often ethnic identities 
give rise to demands for political recognition, such as demands for language rights (Ibid., 122). One 
suggested solution within conservative nationalism has been to treat ethnic identities as private identities, 
so that demands for their recognition are ignored and not regarded as justified. 
It is easy to see the official Turkish nationalism, and by 2005 the approaches taken by the CHP 
and MHP easily fall within Miller’s description of this aspect of conservative nationalism: throughout 
republican history all Turkish citizens have been expected to adopt the national Turkish identity in the 
public sphere, regardless of other, possibly competing sources of identification. So, as has been previously 
discussed, the issue in Turkey has mainly not been about assigning second-class citizen status for 
individuals of non-Turkish ethnic origins, but the claim that they are or should see themselves as Turks. 
Most citizens of Turkey with other than Turkish ethnic identity, especially the Muslim emigrants from 
the lost Ottoman areas, have been willing to prioritize a common Turkish identity in the public sphere.349 
Yet, as Miller argues, the problem is that national identities invariably contain some ethnic ingredients as 
nations tend to have been formed around real or imagined common roots (Miller 1995, 123). Thus, the 
ethnic ingredient in national identity makes the relationship between ethnicity and nationality inherently 
problematic as some “members” of the nation might speak the “wrong language,” in this case Kurdish.
This problematic inherent in conservative nationalism vis-a-vis the relationships between Turkish 
national identity, Turkish ethnicity, and other ethnicities was quite evident in the debates of 2005. 
Milliyet columnists such as Melih Aşık and Dogan Heper, and Zaman columnist A. Turan Alkan explicitly 
argued that Turkishness should not be understood in ethnic terms, but as a national identity devoid of 
any ethnic connotations. Hand-in-hand with the denial of the ethnic connotation of Turkish national 
identity goes the idea of ethnic identities as somehow inferior to national ones and thus opposition 
347 In the treaty of Sèvres (1920) the victorious Entente states envisioned the partition of the remaining Ottoman areas into 
several independent states. The fear of outside powers working against Turkey with the ultimate aim of dividing Turkey has 
been labeled “the Sèvres syndrome”.
348 Türk Devleti’ne vatandaşlık bağı ile bağlı olan herkes Türk’tür. 
349 For more details, see Aydın 2005.
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to the attempt to “reduce” Turkishness into a mere ethnic identity. In a column in which he discusses 
what it means to be a Turk in Turkey, Alkan argues that even though the name of the country and state 
are derived from “Turk,” this Turkishness should not be considered an ethnicity as it lacks depth and 
history, rather it means a lack of other ethnic identity such as Arab, Circassian, or Kurdish (CZ05B07). 
This evaluation of Turkishness as non-ethnic by Turkish columnists is fairly typical from a comparative 
perspective, and as Isthla Singh has stated, those in the majority often do not see themselves as “ethnic” 
at all, as ethnic has come to denote anything perceived as culturally distinct from the mainstream such as 
ethnic food or ethnic music (Singh 2004, 95). Some other authors, such as Hasan Pulur (Milliyet) or O. 
Doğu Silâhçıoğlu (Cumhuriyet), seemed to accept that there was an ethnic aspect of Turkishness, but still 
promoted it as a shared national identity (CM05B19, CC05B11).
Another way to promote the desirability of a national identification rather than an ethnic one was 
used by Şükran Soner in Cumhuriyet. It was he who first constructed a qualitative difference between 
nations and ethnicities, and then argued in the light of post-Cold War experiences that emphasis on 
ethnic and/or religious identities is disruptive and leads to discrimination and violence (CC05B11). The 
Cumhuriyet columnist Mümtaz Soysal argued along the lines of 20th century theorizing on ethnicity, 
according to which ethnic and religious identities were presented as backward and counter-progressive, 
and were expected to disappear with modernity: 
In the geographical region called Turkey and in a Republic with historically defined borders, it is 
not progressive to direct people who have come to live among each other to backstep and accept 
such vague concepts as ”ethnic or religious identity.” Progressivism means rushing together to the 
future by adding strength to strength in the collectivity of the concept of the nation and the unifying 
atmosphere of mutual respect. (CC05B07)
 
The same author also used the theoretic discussions on the lack of enduring and coherent identities 
of individuals in the service of nationalist argumentation: the identity-debate becomes obsolete and 
unnecessary when permanent; fixed identities do not exist (CC05B07). 
All in all, the papers provided different reasons why it was not acceptable for a citizen of Turkey 
to claim ONLY Kurdish identity, as one was still expected to be Turkish as well. In line with the stance 
adopted by the opposition parties, many of the columnists argued against the suggestion of Turkishness 
and Kurdishness as equal, as two ethnic identities among others in Turkey under the rubric of citizenship 
of Turkey. DEHAP’s Hakkâri mayor Metin Tekçe was criticized in the papers analyzed for stating in an 
interview in the daily Radikal (not included in the sample) that he does not consider himself a Turk, 
but rather as a Kurd who is proud to be from Turkey (Türkiyeli) (for example CM05B19). This clearly 
indicates that Kurdishness had become accepted as an ethno-cultural identity subordinate to Turkish 
national identity, tolerated as long as Kurds were willing to also claim the shared national identity. Or 
as CHP’s Kemal Anadol put it: Nobody disregards the sub-identities. But the supra-identity is the Turkish 
nation.350 (news article C05B10). Taking into account how sensitive the issue had been in Turkey until 
recently, Milliyet’s columnist Hasan Cemal was right to point out the progress that had been achieved 
by 2005: Tekçe was very much criticized, but he was no longer likely to be indicted for his words 
(CM05B24).
350 Alt kimlikler kimse yok saymıyor. Ama üst kimlik Türk milletidir
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3. Equality and Kurdish Language Rights
Many of the columns advocating Turkish national identity repeated in a mantra-like fashion how 
this non-ethnic Turkish national identity does not discard or threaten anyone’s other (ethno-cultural) 
identifications. Hand-in-hand with this idea of the easy compatibility of Turkish national identity with 
various ethnic sub-identities went a total disregard for the pro-Kurdish demands for language rights. 
Most commentators did not address the issue of language rights at all, while those who did tended to 
consider the existing rights and freedoms as adequate. To give a few examples, Cumhuriyet’s İlhan Selçuk 
stated he could not understand what the whole issue was about, as anyone anywhere in Turkey can 
speak any language one wishes and it is not forbidden to be a Kurd, a Laz, Armenian, Greek, Arab etc. 
(CC05B12). Another Cumhuriyet writer, Professor Toktamış Ateş stated that 
There are Turks of Armenian origins, Turks of Kurdish origins, Turks of Laz origins, Turks of 
Georgian origins, Turks from other ethnic origins. Nobody from these people of different ethnic 
origins is above any of the others. Everyone is a first class citizen within unconditional equality. 
(CC05B08) 
In Milliyet Fikret Bila quotes a decision of the Constitutional Court in which the Turkish-nationalist idea 
of equality is expressed in clear terms:
 …between citizens of different origins within the Turkish nation… in topics such as benefiting from 
and contributing to Turkish language and culture… within the concept of full equality there is no 
discrimination.351 (CM05B23, emphasis mine). 
The main problem with this claim of full equality among citizens is that it overlooks the reasons behind 
Kurdish discontent, and thus fails to produce non-military proposals towards resolving the Kurdish issue. 
If Turkishness is not a threat to other identities, what is the problem with Kurds? Why did a significant 
part of Turkey’s Kurds vote for DEHAP and cheer for Öcalan? Most columns did not address these 
questions at all; in others, some indication for the reasons behind Kurdish discontent was given. In 
an interesting column the Zaman writer A. Turan Alkan accuses “the people of the region” for having 
adopted a position of victims of state oppression, who blame the state for everything rather than take 
the responsibility for their own actions. They feel oppressed and act as if they are perpetually victimized 
and have the right to make demands for the state (CZ05B01). This explanation reduces the pro-
Kurdish demands into a psychological mold, a mere adoption of a victimized position, complicated by 
involvement of outside powers into the issue.
The writer goes on to point out that the general public opinion feels anger over the developments 
in the South-East and worries over the eventual outcome. This neatly divides the population of Turkey 
into two distinct groups, which division is in some form or another visible in a number of other columns 
as well (for example CM05B09B). There are those Turks and Kurds who are proper, upright citizens, 
proud of belonging to the Turkish nation, and then there are the “others,” category that is described to 
include Kurdish nationalists and others who want to divide Turkey (CM05B10, CM05B19). In effect, 
351 ”…Türk Milleti içinde yer alan farklı kökenden vatandaşlar arasında… Türk dil ve kültüründen faydalanma ve katkıda 
bulunma gibi konularda tam eşitlik anlayışı içinde hiçbir ayırım gözetilmemektedir.”
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once again support for wider linguistic and cultural rights seemed to be reason enough to be included in 
the latter group. 
There was still a notable tendency to reduce the Kurdish problem to separatism with the aim of 
weakening Turkey and supported by hostile outside powers. What is deeply troubling in this stance 
is the implicit question left unanswered: what was supposed to be done within a democracy about 
those persons or groups who did not fall within the category of a true element of the state, a proper 
Turkish citizen? Only one columnist, Milliyet’s Hasan Cemal (more on his views below) addressed this 
question: 
Ask for yourselves: what are you going to do to one that says “Brother, I am a Kurd not a Turk”? 
What can you do? He’s a Kurd; He’s a citizen of the Republic of Turkey and as an equal citizen of the 
state he benefits from individual rights stemming from democracy... (CM05B24)
All in all, the conservative nationalist arguments either totally ignored the pro-Kurdish demands for 
wider linguistic rights or posited the Kurds as already equal, which perception fits well the explanation 
of the Kurdish issue to be caused by mistaken policies of the past (see case four in chapter six). Now the 
past is past and everyone is already equal. This position overlooked the fact that use of Kurdish language 
in both education and broadcasts was still strictly limited, and use of Kurdish in official settings was 
not even considered. It may be particular to my sample, but there was very little comparative discussion 
on minority rights elsewhere than Turkey, despite the fast-growing body of both popular and academic 
debates on issues and problems of ethnicity, minorities, and multiculturalism in various parts of the 
world. Bulgarian Turks were mentioned as a positive example (C05012), and the treatment of minorities 
in Greece in a negative context (CM05B11); in addition, the Turkish nation and nation-building project 
was compared with other cases, such as France or Italy (CM05B06).
In conclusion, within conservative nationalist position, meaningful discussion on further rights for 
minorities becomes redundant as everyone is already equal and nobody is discriminated against. 
4. Protecting the Nation
Before moving on to look at the liberal-nationalist voices in the Turkish debate in 2005, there is a need to 
say a few words about the relationship between conservative nationalism and citizens’ rights and freedom 
of expression. David Miller, who defines himself as a liberal nationalist, finds fault with conservative 
nationalism in this regard: the problem is that the need to preserve a common national identity (to protect 
the stability of the state) overrides the basic rights of individuals. The beliefs and practices that compose 
the nation need to be protected against criticism, and the state should ensure that national myths are 
preserved. The result—and aim—is a closely tied national community based on relations of authority 
and tradition, closed, bounded, intolerant, and vigilant against outsiders. (Miller 1995, 125.) Nicole 
F. Watts refers to this inherent contradiction between conservative nationalism and individual rights 
when she talks about “the nationalist imperative” in Turkey (in the 1990s) that was hard to reconcile 
with the demands of democracy. According to her, “…no mainstream consensus existed about exactly 
where the rights of the state ended and the rights of the citizens to change that state began.” (Watts 1999, 
648.) There was a contradiction between Turkish nationalism as traditionally implemented by the state 
and the state’s espoused commitment to democratization. The contradiction Watts talks about was also 
visible in the texts in more than one of my cases, and especially so in the 2002 debates over the question 
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as to whether the citizens had the right to petition the state for something that is in opposition to the 
stipulations of the constitution, and in this current case, where the proposed changes to the definition 
of nationality vis-à-vis citizenship were countered with the existing definitions in the (military drafted, 
undemocratic) Constitution of 1982.
The need to protect the national myths against corrosive criticism and so restrict open discussion was 
visible in many of the comments in the sample. For example the CHP member and constitutional expert 
Oya Araslı, referred to “faulty concepts” that open the way for “faulty thinking” and may lead to dangerous 
consequences by confusing minds (news article C05B07). The idea of “faulty thinking” implies a state-
centric mind-set, within which the state should be protected against active citizens and their demands. In 
a few of the columns a public debate over identity issues was also presented as unnecessary, harmful, or 
outright dangerous (for example CC05B11). Then again, one should be careful to differentiate between 
the different reasons for criticizing the debate: some of the worry over the debate’s harmfulness was 
over increasing nationalism and polarization. Among others, Milliyet columnists Taha Akyol and Hasan 
Cemal pointed out the inconsistency of CHP’s stance and expressed worry over the increasing emphasis 
on nationalism of this social-democratic-Kemalist party. They pointed out that the party had previously 
referred to a Kurdish issue and had had no problem with a shared citizenship identity as the source 
of social solidarity. Both columnists blamed Baykal for using identity issues and fomenting nationalist 
fervor for narrow political gains (CM05B09, CM05B12). Even Cumhuriyet’s Toktamış Ateş reproached 
the CHP for opposing the AKP in the name of merely engaging in opposition politics: such a heated 
debate on such a sensitive topic as identity was argued to be unnecessary (CC05B08).
7.2.5 libeRal nationalist aRgumentation
Erdoğan never supplied much detail for his proposed citizenship identity in 2005, so it is difficult to classify 
whether he actually proposed constitutional citizenship of the type suggested by Habermas (more on this 
below) or merely liberalization of the strict official nationalism. At this stage I would tentatively classify his 
suggestion as falling within the parameters of liberal nationalism rather than constitutional citizenship or 
multiculturalism.352 In any case, many of the arguments in his support can be interpreted to fall into the 
category of liberal nationalist. The arguments I have classified as conservative nationalist may have been in 
the majority in 2005, be they the cool and analytic ones of Fikret Bila or the angry ones of Melih Aşık, but 
there were also other lines of argumentation. The most vocal supporters of Edoğan’s proposal of citizenship 
as the common bond (within the sample) were Abdullah Gül (both in interviews and via a column by Fikret 
Bila), the liberal Milliyet columnist Hasan Cemal (several columns), and Zaman’s Şahın Alpay (one column).
Theorists classified as liberal nationalist, such as David Miller (1995) and Yael Tamir (1993), have 
argued for the continued need for social solidarity provided by nations and nationalism and propose 
a liberal reconstitution of nationalist thinking in a form more tolerant to difference. Yet, even for a 
liberal nationalist theorist, the nation, the bond of national identity, remains the essential unifying factor, 
352 According to Bora’s account of (neo-)liberal nationalism in Turkey, its proponents support terms such as ”constitutional 
citizenship” and claim that Turkish nationalism has nothing to do with ethnicism and essentialisim. At the same time the 
discourse is fully compatible with the causes and taboos of official nationalism and utilizes its themes (Bora 2003b, 444). For 
an evaluation on AKP as liberal nationalist, see Coşar 2011, 180-184.
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the basis of trust and good will between citizens (Miller 1995, 140), even if the demand that all other 
identities besides the national one be privatized is not seen as justified.
According to Miller, the principle of nationalism is consistent with liberal political ideas (Miller 
1995, 130). For him, liberal nationalism means common membership in a nation where the meaning of 
membership changes with time, ideally in a collective conversation in which many voices can join (Ibid., 
127). Liberal freedom becomes important for such an identity: without freedom of consciousness and 
expression, one cannot explore different interpretations of national identity in political forums and civil 
society environment. (Ibid., 128). This national identity should be as independent as possible of group-
specific cultural values (Ibid., 137), and it should be made more hospitable to the minorities. One way of 
doing this is to recognize cultural groups by granting them special rights within the nation-state or to institute 
multicultural citizenship (Ibid., 146). In short, the main differences between conservative nationalism and 
liberal nationalism are the latter’s emphasis on individual rights and higher tolerance of diversity.
According to Murat Somer, there appears to have always also been a liberal-nationalist perspective in 
Turkey, according to which “the state’s allowing, or even institutionalizing, more freedom of expression 
for ethnic-linguistic particularities may be a better way to strengthen national unity.” (Somer 2005b, 77.) 
Such a response would encourage marginalized groups to associate themselves voluntarily with the national 
polity and/or identity. Thus, it may be better insurance for state survival. Somer argues that this more 
liberal attitude towards diversity has gained ground since the 1990s (Ibid.). As a concrete example of this 
liberal-nationalist position one can cite the attitude of Erdal İnönü (leader of the center-left SHP) in 1991, 
when he defended expressions of Kurdish identity with support for the integrity of the country. For him, 
suppression of democracy constituted a bigger threat than Kurdish particularism (Watts 1999, 645).
A good example within the sample of liberal argumentation in support of the AKP-led program 
of democratization was a column by the Zaman writer Şahin Alpay (CZ05B08). First of all, Alpay sees 
the debate on identity issues as beneficial and useful(!), a point made also by Milliyet’s Hasan Cemal 
(CM05B24); and Alpay works to make a synthesis by concluding that the AKP and CHP agree on 
the source of solidarity as citizenship of Turkey, which is referred with the words “Turk” and “Turkish 
nation.” This Turkishness is a legal identity and does not denote ethnic identification. Then he goes 
on to outline the history of the way Turkishness has been defined since the early Republic. He argues 
that the assimilationist policies (tekkültürcü politikalar) reached their aims to a large extent as most 
citizens of non-Turkish origins assimilated, even an important share of Kurds. Yet, he sees the Kurdish 
uprisings as a reaction against these assimilationist policies. He goes on to argue that the 1990s and the 
EU-membership process has forced the opening of the door to multiculturalism. The problems that have 
plagued the Republic can be resolved by defining Turkishness as citizenship, allowing free expression of 
ethnic identities and cultures and free use of languages. He concludes with the argument that Turkey 
needs multiculturalism that is compatible with individual rights. In short, Alpay proposes to keep the 
term “Turkish nation” but to modify its content to a liberal format tolerant of diversity. This line of 
argumentation clearly falls within the liberal nationalist parameters.353 
353 In general, Turkish liberalism has been closely linked to the nation-state. According to a rough generalization by Simten 
Çoşar, Turkish liberalism tolerates the much celebrated rational individual only in the market environment. In the sphere of 
politics it looks for a citizen who is state-centric, loyal to that state and possesses Turkish cultural identity (Çoşar 2002, 729). 
Also other writers have emphasized the role of the economic sphere rather than the political one in Turkish liberal nationalism 
(from the DP and AP to ANAP) (Bora 2003a, Akyol 2002). For more on the relationship of liberalism and nationalism and 
liberal nationalism in Turkey, see Çoşar 2011.
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Critics of nationalism such as Bhikhu Parekh (1999a) and Judith Lichtenberg (1999) have pointed 
out several incoherencies and problems involved in the nationalist position, be it conservative or liberal. 
Besides the critique of the ontological and existential position given in nationalist thinking to the 
distinctly modern phenomena such as nations and nation-states, the main problem is the multicultural 
state of affairs in any given nation-state: Just like Turkey, every national territory, however small, includes 
among its inhabitants members of other nations. There are no nation-states with a homogeneous nation:
Conservative and liberal nationalists talk of the nation as if it were an incontrovertible political 
reality. As a matter of fact, very few states fit their description of nationhood, and those that do are 
increasingly ceasing to be so under the impact of globalization, multiculturalism, and cultural self-
assertion by such marginalized groups as women, immigrants, national minorities, and indigenous 
peoples. Very few of them possess the required degree of solidarity, cohesion, cultural homogeneity, and 
fellow feeling. None is free from the often very deep class, religious, gender, generational, and other 
divisions, or the diversity of moral values, lifestyles, tastes and sensibilities.… Their cultural life is 
inescapably eclectic and plural, and the aspiration for the kind of moral and cultural coherence that 
nationhood presupposes becomes increasingly unrealistic. The content and boundary of the nation 
as they have been hitherto defined are challenged by marginalized groups, who seek to open up the 
officially defined nation not only to make spaces for themselves but also to reconstitute it along new 
lines. The unity of the state cannot be grounded in the unity of the nation as the nationalists maintain, 
for the simple reason that the “nation” today is too fragmented, plural, and fiercely contested to possess 
the kind of degree of unity necessary to sustain the state. (Parekh 1999a, 318-319.)
As was mentioned in chapter two of this work, the majority of the contemporary western states are 
nation-states, and the “liberal position” has often been “the liberal-nationalist position” in reality 
everywhere, not just in Turkey. In some older accounts nationalism is classified as a separate ideology 
comparable with and separate from liberalism and communism (for example Kedourie 1971/quoted in 
Akyol 2002). In practice, liberalism has generally been realized within the boundaries of a nation-state 
and nationalism has been easy to attach to liberalism. Democracy has been seen to depend on strong 
notions of who “the people” behind the phrases “we the people” might be. Often “the people” have been 
equated with the nation. The universalism of the liberalists tends to extend only to the borders of nation-
states. (Calhoun 2004.) 
While the liberal nationalist position is a common one, and may be more hospitable for cultural 
rights for minorities than the conservative nationalist one, the question in Turkey that begs to be asked 
is: what will be the position of Kurds vis-à-vis the non-ethnically defined Turkish nation to be retained as 
the source of solidarity? Part of the problem has been that many Kurds do not want to be Turks. Due to 
the negative connotations of the term “minority,” neither nationalist Turks nor Kurds seem to prefer to 
see the Kurds as a national minority with certain minority rights either. 
7.2.6 beyond libeRal nationalism: hasan cemal
Changing the contemporary policies of citizenship has often been seen as the precondition for correcting 
the defects of western liberal democracy, solving the current problems of multicultural, multi-ethnic and 
229
multi-religious societies (see for example: Kymlicka & Norman 1994), and an answer for the demands 
of recognition. In line with the international debate, several Turkish researchers have questioned the 
way Turkish citizenship has been conceptualized, and have investigated the need and the possibilities 
of a redefining this citizenship (among others Keyman & içduygu 2005). The evaluations and policy 
suggestions for the Turkish case are presented together with the relevant strands of liberal theory, i.e. 
the multiculturalist position of Will Kymlicka (1995) that emphasizes the need to protect and foster 
minority cultures, and the constitutional citizenship of Jürgen Habermas (1998a), both of which will be 
discussed below with examples from the debates in 2009. 
The arguments put forth by the Milliyet columnist Hasan Cemal in 2005, who published several 
columns on nationalism and identity issues within the period under scrutiny, fall under the headings 
of multiculturalism or constitutional citizenship rather than conservative or liberal nationalism as 
described above. Among the columnists within my sample Cemal was the single most vocal supporter 
of citizenship-identity as a source of social solidarity for the peoples in Turkey. He argued explicitly 
and emphatically against Turkish national identity as the shared identity and warmheartedly supported 
citizenship-identity as the replacement for it. He normalized and defended the attachment felt for non-
Turkish identifications and the demands for linguistic rights. He also obviously knew he was in the 
minority and worked hard to both convince his readers, as well as to counter the accusations he expected 
the readers to make against his stance. (CM05B24.) 
7.2.7 continued constRaints and the Role played by the pRess
Before moving on to the debates in 2009, I want to point out some of the continued constraints in 
2005, and to explicitly discuss the role the mainstream press played in the process of discursive change 
and increasing acknowledgement of minority issues in Turkey. When one looks at the way the Kurdish 
issue was debated vis-à-vis Turkishness and citizenship in the analyzed three dailies in November 2005, 
it is obvious that significant developments had taken place during the previous few years. First of all, 
important in itself is the fact that the Prime Minister was willing to, despite much criticism, repeatedly 
take up the Kurdish issue and connect its resolution to the process of democratization and the ways 
the Turkish nation and citizenship were understood. Also, the mere existence of such highly publicized 
heated debate on a topic that had only a few years before been referred to in roundabout ways was also 
an important step forward. Yet, it was also obvious that many constrictions, sensibilities, and limitations 
remained in the way the issue could be discussed.
1. Terminological Constraints
The term minority (azınlık) with its historical problematic and negative connotations was still very much 
avoided for Muslims in Turkey. This resulted in the awkward terminology of “supra-identity” (üst kimlik) 
and “sub-identity” (alt kimlik). The negative understanding of the term minority is exemplified within 
the sample by the following statement of Ahmet Türk, the co-chair of the pro-Kurdish party of the time, 
the DTP: “Kurds are not a minority, but cannot use even the rights granted to minorities by [the Treaty 
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of ] Lausanne.”354 Thus, Turkey’s Kurds do not claim a status of minority with minority rights but aspire 
to be recognized as a nation, a founding element of the Republic of Turkey on par with the Turkish 
nation (M05B26). This same desire is also visible among other non-Turkish Muslims. According to Suavi 
Aydın, who conducted a series of interviews on the topic of the relationship between the citizen and 
the state, informants from immigrant community backgrounds, such as Circassian or Georgian, wanted 
to be seen as a part of the majority, as part of the founding nation of the state, and definitely not as 
belonging to a minority. They were thus hesitant to demand any language rights for themselves as such 
demands were connected with separatism. (Aydın 2005, 31-34.)
By 2005 the content and definition of the term azınlık had become a topic of occasional polarized 
debates, which must have loomed large in the minds of the authors looked at in the current sample. 
The so-called Minority Report, i.e. The Report on Minority Rights and Cultural Rights (Oran 2004) 
commissioned by the Prime Minister’s office as a part of wider review of human rights had been published 
amidst great controversy in the fall of 2004. The sub-committee responsible for preparing the report 
was headed by Professor Baskın Oran from the University of Ankara (thus the report is attributed to 
him). Presenting the report to the Prime Minister’s office and later to the press caused highly publicized 
scandals, as in both cases a member of the committee stepped forth to publicly oppose the report. In the 
first event, the member in question threatened to take the issue to court and in the second the member 
tore the report into pieces in front of the cameras. The report was also debated in the Parliament in late 
2004. Court cases against both Baskın Oran and the head of the wider commission, Professor İbrahim 
Kaboğlu were begun in mid November 2005, i.e. just prior to the period analyzed here. (Leinonen & al. 
2007, 243-244.) 
Within the period looked at here, there was also some debate over the term. Hansjörg Kretschmer, 
EU’s representative to Turkey proposed that Turkey could adopt wider interpretation of the stipulations 
concerning minorities in the Treaty of Lausanne. With the exception of Semih İdiz355 (Milliyet), the 
suggestion was passionately refused. A good example of this was Milliyet’s Taha Akyol, who accused 
Kretschmer of overstepping his mandate and pointed out that according to Ottoman tradition, Turkish 
culture, and law, “There are no Muslim minorities in Turkey, minorities are defined by religion!”356 
(emphasis in original, CM05B11). All in all, by 2005 there was a general willingness to acknowledge a 
degree of cultural differences within the country (for example CC05B06), yet the existence of cultural 
variation was not seen to indicate existence of minorities, which were seen as something Turkey did not 
have, and that the EU and other outside actors were either attempting to force on Turkey, or perhaps 
to create in Turkey (CM05B09B). This was then either interpreted as unfair, as counter to Turkey’s best 
interests or as outright dangerous.
This compares well with Mine Gencel-Bek’s (2001) findings on media’s reporting on Turkey’s 
EU-candidacy a few years earlier. The media considered others as threats, viewed the pressure to 
democratize Turkey as a concession to the EU, and promoted official definition of Turkish identity 
instead of multiple identities. In exchange for political concessions (i.e. democratization) made by 
354 He refers to the non-Muslim minorities defined in the Treaty of Lausanne.
355 İdiz points out the inconsistency in talking about a Turkish minority in Greece instead of a Muslim minority as defined 
in the Treaty of Lausanne. In addition he argues that Turkey breaks against the stipulations of the treaty by restricting use of 
other languages than Turkish as mother tongues in Turkey. (CM05B16)
356 “Türkiye’de Müslüman azınlık yoktur, azınlık dine göre tarif edilir!”
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Turkey, economic gains were expected from the EU (Ibid.).
The idea of outside powers exploiting (and encouraging) ethnic or other divisions within Turkey 
to divide or weaken the country has been labeled as the Sèvres syndrome and can be traced to the 
Ottoman experiences of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The continued power of this idea was evident 
in my sample and gives further proof of xenophobic and paranoid strands within Turkish nationalism. 
A distinct feature within this line of argumentation was evident in several comments in Cumhuriyet, 
according to which the AKP was a pawn of the US in its game for hegemony in the Middle East and 
control over oil resources. The aim of the US was said to be that of installing a moderate Islamist state in 
Turkey (for example CC05B10).
2. Lack of Concrete Policy Proposals  
The second limitation or problematic feature in the debates at this stage concerned the lack of concrete 
policy proposals. Once again debate ensued over a symbolic speech act. In a way the debate as a whole 
was gratifying for a researcher interested in how entities of social reality are (re)constructed through the 
use of language because much of the debate actually concerned the use and definition of the very terms 
and labels I had set out to analyze. What should the common bond between the people(s) of Turkey be 
called? Would membership in the Turkish nation be the best way to ensure social solidarity? How should 
it be defined? If citizenship is adopted instead, how is it different from membership in the nation? In 
other words, commentators taking part in this heated debate obviously believed these labels to be of the 
greatest importance. Words with their explicit and implicit meanings were seen as highly relevant.
The concentration on terminology and the inherent state-centrism of the debate was also criticized 
in the press. The well-known scholar of late Ottoman history M. Şükrü Hanioğlu drew on the Ottoman 
historical experiences to comment on the ongoing identity-debate in a lengthy article. He criticized the 
state-centric and mechanistic views of identities as something that the state can order and create. Can 
identity clashes really be resolved by changing what the shared upper-identity is called?357 He went on 
to argue that the experience with Ottoman identity problems has proven that just because an identity is 
open for all, inclusive, does not mean it will be accepted and internalized by all. The inclusive Ottoman 
identity was not adopted by the population at large and did not succeed in integrating the population of 
the empire in the 19th century.
Hanioğlu goes on to argue that a possible resolution of the identity issue (i.e. Kurdish issue) has to 
go beyond a debate over terminology and also create new kinds of policies. However, coming up with 
these policies would require the questioning and reformulating of the core characteristics, values, and 
ideology of the Republican regime, which would be a difficult process. Also, even after taking these steps 
and making democratizing reforms, the new supra-identity would need to compete with the resisting 
nationalist identities. Kurdish nationalism has created its own history with myths, and an identity 
centered on these. It is very difficult to change, to step back from these, and there will still be demands 
for public recognition. (CZ05B09.)
357 Another example of state-centric view is the worry that multicultural policies create minority identities. 
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3. Political Polarization
One more problematic feature was the political polarization between the AKP and the secularist parties, 
which has been a serious impediment for attempts at resolving the Kurdish issue during the AKP period. 
The various opposition parties, especially the CHP, have been willing to play the powerful “nationalism 
card” to oppose the AKP, and the nationalist reaction of the opposition politicians seemed to have been 
based more on who proposed than what was proposed. The deep mistrust between the secularists and 
the AKP with its Islamist roots was exemplified by Cumhuriyet, where Erdoğan’s proposal was interpreted 
as a step on the path to replace the Turkish nation as a source of solidarity with Islam and Umma (for 
example, the editorial CC05B10). The connections between political polarization, AKP hegemony and 
the CHP’s attempt to move the debate outside the sphere of politics into safeguarding the polity will be 
taken up in more detail in relation to the sample from 2009, where it was even more pronounced.
4. The Role of the Mainstream Press in Widening the Limits of Discussion
Despite the continued power of the state-centric defensive-nationalist perspective vis-à-vis minorities 
described above, it would be wrong to conclude that other kinds of opinions and arguments were not 
be expressed in Turkey at the time. (Also within the sample, Hasan Cemal exemplified an alternative 
approach.) By 2005, a number or researchers had published scholarly works on the Kurds as well as the 
Kurdish issue, including criticism of the official stance and proposals for alternative solutions within a 
framework of democracy and citizens’ rights.358 Many of these scholars were also not content to remain 
in their academic towers of ivory, but chose to actively participate in media debates. Despite this, their 
thoughts were mostly published in only a few progressive dailies such as Radikal (for example Kadıoğlu, 
Keyman, İnsel), the limited readership of which consisted mostly of highly educated urbanites. 
As an example of an explicitly multiculturalist stance in another venue than the print press in 2005, 
I will summarize an interesting book by the Turkish researcher Savaş Çoban titled Küreselleşme, Ulus-
Devlet, Azınlıklar ve Dil (Globalization, nation-state, minorities and language), which makes a powerful 
argument for a multicultural and multilingual Turkey. The main focus of the book is on language 
education: teaching of Turkish as a mother tongue, teaching of Turkish as a foreign language, and the 
importance of mother tongue teaching of other languages besides Turkish. Çoban begins his discussion 
of minorities in Turkey with a definition of azınlık (minority) in the official dictionary of the Turkish 
Language Association TDK,359 according to which azınlık is defined as those who differ in some aspect 
from the majority, are perhaps from a different origin, and are fewer in numbers (Çoban 2005, 106). 
Based on this simple numeric majority-minority distinction, Çoban includes various Muslim groups to 
his list of minorities in Turkey (Ibid 107-111), and argues that they should have the right to both receive 
teaching in their own mother tongue languages, as well as be taught Turkish as a second language rather 
than as the mother tongue (Ibid., 130-131). 
Çoban bases this demand on the provisions of international agreements concerning minority rights 
(Ibid. 111-116), the demands set in EU’s Copenhagen criteria, and finally the importance of mother 
tongue education on one’s intellectual development. He contextualizes the demand with references to 
358 See chapter six.
359 Türk Dil Kurumu is the official regulatory body of the Turkish language. Founded in 1932 it publishes an “official 
Turkish dictionary” also available online: http://tdkterim.gov.tr/.
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some relevant theoretic debates on globalization, the nation-state and multiculturalism, as well as sets the 
Turkish case in comparative international perspective. As I have pointed out above, most of these points 
have all too seldom been taken up in the public discussion in Turkey, where comparisons of existing, 
successful multilingual educational policies in different countries have been very limited. Çoban’s book 
argues in explicit and clear terms and with citations to relevant studies that students whose mother 
tongue is not Turkish are in a disadvantaged position when forced to start their education in Turkish. 
(Çoban 2005.)
The continued difficulty and sensibility of the topic of minorities and minority languages are quite 
obvious in Çoban’s work as well. The book is argumentative and works to convince the reader. The 
comparative context is used to establish as a fact that all countries are multinational and multicultural, 
and that Turkey is no exception. Besides the necessity, the merits and benefits of multicultural policies 
are very much emphasized and the existence of cultural pluralism celebrated. Another indication of 
the continued sensibilities on the topic can be found in the summaries of the two empiric case studies 
given at the end of the book. The topic of the school performance of Kurdish (and other non-Turkish-
speaking) children in the Turkish-language only school system is such a sensitive one that neither study 
explicates the school in question and the author of one of the studies has asked to remain anonymous. 
(Ibid., 135-141.)
As rare as this kind of argumentation centered on linguistic rights in education presented by Çoban 
was in Turkey, it is important to emphasize that he was not alone in his defense of improvements for 
minority linguistic rights. Çoban had a body of work (in Turkish) to draw on when writing his book. 
Also, to cite another example, Professor Baskın Oran continued to argue for Kurdish linguistic rights 
on the basis of the Lausanne Peace Treaty after the publication of the minority report in 2004 (see for 
example Oran 2007). The existence of these “alternative” publications and voices emphasizes that there 
was an element of choice in the way the Turkish-language mainstream press presented the debates and the 
stances the columnists took, in the sense that it was not impossible to voice other kinds of opinions. Yet, 
it should also be considered that one could, and often did, face charges for voicing such arguments even 
in the 2000s. As mentioned above, Baskın Oran was charged for his contributions to the government 
commissioned report published in 2004. Another example is Gülçiçek Günel Tekin, who was prosecuted 
for her 2002 book titled Dilimiz Varlığımız, Dilimiz Kimliğimizdir (Our language is our existence, our 
language is our identity), which argues strongly and explicitly for full Kurdish language rights, especially 
in education. Much of her argumentation is very similar to Çoban’s summarized above (Tekin 2013).360
In conclusion, the mere existence of this heated and public debate over identity was important 
in itself. The various columnists took on the crucial role of explaining to the interested reader what 
the politicians referred to with their not so clear statements and what consequences the various 
conceptualization would or could have. Thus, the role the mainstream press played was important, but 
when one compared with other, alternative venues of debate in Turkey, the high circulation mainstream 
dailies analyzed here tended to give voice to state-centric, conservative approaches. So, in a way the 
heated debate was about small nuances and variations of nationalist stances. Radically different opinions 
were rare.
360 Tekin was first sentenced to a 1 year 8 months prison sentence in 2003 on the basis of TCK 312/2 (Mazlumder 2003) 
but the sentence was annulled in 2007 (DTF 2007). The 2013 edition of her book is used in this work.
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7.2.8 the afteRmath of the Şemdinli bombing
The Şemdinli bombing and its aftermath demonstrated once again the continued strength of the 
so-called Deep State (Derin Devlet) in Turkey. The Chief of General Staff of the time, Yaşar Büyükanıt, 
issued a statement defending one of the perpetrators, and when the Van Public Prosecutor Ferhat 
Sarıkaya attempted to broaden the investigation to include General Büyükanıt’s role in organizing 
illegal undercover operations in the South East, he himself was sacked and prosecuted. Also removed 
was the intelligence officer whose findings supported the prosecutor. The parliamentary commission 
investigating the affair found no evidence for the accusations of military (Gendarme) involvement. 
(Gunter 2011 [/2008], 122-126.) The perpetrators were sentenced to long prison sentences in 2006, 
but the prison terms were overturned on procedural basis and they were freed in 2007.361 As the “Deep 
State” of Turkey has been closely connected with the Turkish Armed Forces and other institutions of 
the sizable security apparatus of Turkey (see Gunter 2011 ch 6), the inability to bring light to this 
shadowy network despite this almost historic opportunity shows the limited power of the official state 
at this stage and the limited room for maneuver the AKP still had vis-à-vis the military prior to the 
elections of 2007. 
7.3 the Rapidly changing context fRom 2005 to 2009
Several significant and partially contradictory developments took place during the almost four years 
spanning the debates analyzed above and those analyzed next. These include escalation of violence 
in the Kurdish regions, reorganization and electoral success of the pro-Kurdish political movement, 
expansion of (Kurdish) linguistic rights despite Turkey’s stagnating EU-membership negotiations, and 
the increasing institutionalization of the autonomous Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq. 
Another important development was the consolidation of AKP’s political power vis-à-vis its political 
competitors and the military in the 2007 elections (and the events leading to the elections).
The period from 2005 to 2009 witnessed intensive fighting between the PKK and the Turkish 
Armed Forces (TSK). The PKK had ended its unilateral ceasefire in 2004, and the TSK intensified its 
counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency measures, and as a consequence the situation deteriorated 
further in 2005 and 2006 with a series of bomb explosions claiming tens of victims and constant 
clashes between the PKK and the TSK in the South-East. Yet, the situation differed essentially from 
that of the 1990s: the PKK no longer had the kind of manpower and resources it had in the 1990s, 
and thus engaged in hit and run tactics, rather than aiming to control the region. According to 
Brendan O’Leary, Constitutional Advisor to the Kurdish Regional Government (Northern Iraq) from 
2003 to 2009, “…the PKK’s latest spasm of political violence is executed to achieve better terms of 
amnesty, rather than the independent Kurdistan that Abdullah Öcalan once espoused. It is clear that 
this damages wider Kurdish interests far more than it can advance them.” (O’Leary 2010, ix.) In 2007 
the security situation deteriorated even further with a series of PKK attacks and counter-attacks over 
the Iraqi border by the TSK in pursuit of PKK militants. As a result Turkey passed a law that allowed 
361 They were retried and re-sentenced to long prison terms only in 2012.
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for operations on Iraqi territory, and in early 2008 launched a major attack against PKK bases in 
Northern Iraq. In the spring of 2009 Abdullah Öcalan renewed his call for peace and declared another 
ceasefire. 
Another important development was the reorganization of the legal pro-Kurdish political movement 
in 2005 and its success in the 2007 parliamentary and 2009 local elections. Leyla Zana, who had been 
released from prison in 2004, and other former HEP/DEP politicians had founded their own pro-
Kurdish political movement, the Democratic Society Movement (Demokratik Toplum Harekati, DTH). 
In 2005 this movement merged with DEHAP to form the Democratic Society Party (Demokratik 
Toplum Partisi, DTP). The DTP program, like its predecessors, emphasized democratization of state 
and society. It called for equality and constitutional reform to replace the homogenized and delimited 
conception of citizenship and national identity with an inclusive common national identity (Türkiyelilik, 
i.e. from/of Turkey) based on a civic pluralist model of citizenship that respected and recognized various 
ethnic, cultural and religious differences (Gunes 2012, 169). It called for a constitution that would 
guarantee: “the Kurds’ and other cultural identities‘ right, within the unity of the country, to freely 
express their identities, to develop their culture, to speak in their mother tongue, to develop it and to use 
it in education and in visual and auditory media” (from the DTP party program quoted in Gunes 2012, 
169). The DTP also called for decentralization of political power and stronger regional bodies (Ibid., 
171). 
The DTP successfully participated in the 2007 parliamentary elections with its candidates running 
as independents so as to bypass the 10% national threshold demanded of parties and managed to get 
33% of the vote in the major Kurdish populated provinces (down from the 40% in 2002). This result 
gave them 22 MPs (one from Istanbul and the rest from the Kurdish provinces), enough to form a 
parliamentary group. After 13 years of absence, the pro-Kurdish political opinion was once again 
represented in the parliament. In the local elections held in March 2009, the DTP did even better and 
increased the number of DTP-ruled municipalities in the South-East from 56 (in 2005) to 99. In these 
elections the DTP gained more than 50% of the vote in many towns. 
Nicole F. Watts points out how extraordinary this consistent level of support has been. The pro-
Kurdish movement had received from 4.2 to 6.2% in every local and national election from 1995 to 
2009. The overwhelming majority of voters supporting pro-Kurdish candidates came from thirteen 
provinces: Ağrı, Bingöl, Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Hakkari, Mardin, Muş, Siirt, Tunceli, Van, Batman, Şırnak, 
and Iğdır. In all these provinces the population has been at least 50% Kurdish and support for the parties 
at least 20%. (Watts 2010, 166-7.)362
The strong regional base and presence in national politics provided the movement with institutional 
basis, connections, and resources. Gunes has argued that this has contributed to intensification of the 
campaign for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey. The institutionalized pro-Kurdish 
political movement now has opportunities to legitimately raise Kurdish political demands and claims 
through democratic channels. The expression of political demands and claims by democratically elected 
representatives, as opposed to a prohibited organization, i.e. the PKK, has been enhancing the authority 
and legitimacy of the pro-Kurdish political parties and makes their acceptance in Turkey as legitimate 
political actor more likely (Gunes 2012, 175): 
362 The support-base of the pro-Kurdish movement differs somewhat from that of the PKK: it is more urban than rural.
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…having parliamentary representation allowed the DTP to disseminate its discourse nationally 
through the national press to the whole population of Turkey. In numerous interviews that the DTP 
MPs had with the Turkish media, they stressed the urgency of the political solution to the Kurdish 
question and provided their alternative representation by uncoupling it from violence and from 
being seen as a security issue. In this alternative representation, as argued by Aysel Tuğluk, the MP 
for Diyarbakır, not resolving the Kurdish question creates security problems and conflict. (Gunes 
2012, 170-171.)
Also, as was shown by my analysis of the previous cases, the pro-Kurdish voice was given space in the 
media, when a formal organization was involved. Although at least during that earlier period (i.e. period 
when the pro-Kurdish parties did not have parliamentary representation), it had not been easy for them 
to voice explicitly pro-Kurdish demands in the mainstream media.
The electoral success of the pro-Kurdish parties also caused some friction between them and the 
ruling AKP. In the national elections of 2007, of which more below, the AKP received over 50% of 
Kurdish votes, and with its 75 Kurdish parliamentarians the AKP could boast that it was THE party that 
represented Kurds. There were several probable reasons for such a strong support in the predominantly 
Kurdish provinces. The most important was undoubtedly the improved economic conditions of the 
South-East under the AKP rule. Also, the appeal of other parties apart from the DTP (with its 33% 
of the vote) was either weak or non-existent in the Kurdish-populated provinces. As was shown above, 
Deniz Baykal’s Kemalist CHP had taken a hard line against the reforms benefiting the Kurds, as had the 
nationalist MHP. Thus it is perhaps not surprising that neither CHP nor MHP succeeded in getting a 
single member elected from the region. The result can be interpreted as support for the AKP-led reforms 
as well as reflecting its position as an anti-establishment or anti-military party in the region where the 
TSK is far from popular. In addition, support for the AKP can also be interpreted as opposition to the 
PKK, which had resumed its armed campaign (Bahceli & Noel 2011, 112-113).363 Many conservative 
Kurds were not in any case likely to support the PKK with its Marxist-Leninist background, nationalist 
program and violent campaign, nor were they willing to vote for the series of legal leftist-nationalist pro-
Kurdish parties. 
The relations between the AKP and the DTP also remained problematic because the AKP demanded 
that the DTP publicly denounce the PKK as a terrorist organization before any cooperation on resolution 
of the Kurdish issue could take place. The DTP would not, or perhaps could not, do this. The political 
demands of the DTP were very similar to those of the PKK, and the AKP used this similarity to discredit 
the party, and to show it as a political wing of the PKK, characterizing it as representing solely Kurdish 
interests and as being the proponent of “ethnic” Kurdish nationalism (Gunes 2012, 172). As was already 
noted in relation to the analysis of case four, the AKP was not willing to engage the pro-Kurdish political 
actors in political dialogue. 
Despite the re-escalation of the armed conflict and tense relations between the political parties, 
there had been marked improvements in cultural-linguistic rights during this period. Some of the legal 
restrictions of publishing and broadcasting in Kurdish and teaching of Kurdish had been lifted already in 
2002 and Kurdish language teaching and broadcasts were begun within a restrictive framework in 2004. 
363 The AKP also postponed the inevitable operations against PKK camps in Iraq until after the elections and refrained from 
belligerent rhetoric.
237
However, the early reforms were estimated to have been largely cosmetic and ineffective (Scalbert-Yücel 
2010, 124). Writing in 2007, O’Neil argued that many of the reforms undertaken by the government so 
far were passed as a direct result of the pressure applied by the EU. In her estimation these (in themselves 
substantial) changes did not represent any kind of real change in attitude on the part of the state or the 
people towards the Kurds. Resistance against the Kurdish movement and the Kurdish language remained 
strong (O’Neil 2007, 84). Then again, the limited EU-induced reforms may have started a snowball 
effect as Kurdish cultural and political actors gained increasing confidence from the full support of the 
EU: local politicians started to use Kurdish more in public speeches, for example. Yet, one could never 
be sure how far the tolerance of multicultural rights extended: the mayor and 17 members of the Sur city 
council (in Diyarbakır region) were dismissed after they decided to enforce multilingualism and provide 
multilingual municipality services in 2006 (Scalbert-Yücel 2010, 127).
More substantial steps to widen multi-linguistic rights were taken in 2008 and 2009. Finally 
a state channel to broadcast in Kurdish, TRT Şeş, was decided upon in early 2008 and launched in 
January 2009. The context of the decision was one of renewed Turkish military operations against the 
PKK in northern Iraq, and the channel was a means to support and legitimize the military forces in 
Iraq. Most of the news, films, talk shows, game & entertainment programs, children’s programs etc. 
are in Kurmanci, with some Zaza as well. (Scalbert-Yücel 2010, 123.) In the fall of 2009, the historic 
decision to allow Kurdish language courses at universities was taken. But now I am moving too far 
ahead as this was still in the future at the time the debates analyzed here took place in the summer of 
2009. 
The steps taken in 2008–2009 to improve linguistic rights are all the more significant as their 
main motivation can no longer be considered to have been EU-conditionality. The EU continued to 
monitor Turkey’s democratization process, and one of the areas it showed interest in was Diyarbakır, 
which gave pro-Kurdish mayors access to European officials and oversight procedures and put pressure 
on Turkish authorities (Watts 2010, 89). However, the EU’s emphasis on expansion of individual rather 
than collective rights for the Kurds and other minority groups (Bahceli & Noel 2011, 111) as well as 
the stand-still in Turkey’s EU accession process (caused mainly by Cyprus, increasing anti-Turkish voices 
within the EU, the ECHR headscarf ruling, and the AKP’s lack of will to proceed with democratizing 
reforms) made the EU a less effective motivator for improving Kurdish rights.
Competition for the Kurdish electorate could help push policy reform, as governing parties tried 
to win voters away from the DTP. The high performance of pro-Kurdish parties at the ballot box put 
pressure on other parties to make concessions to Kurdish national demands (Watts 2010, 171-2). Bahceli 
and Noel conclude that, “The AKP government’s performance may be found wanting in certain respects, 
particularly on the pace and thoroughness of implementation. But it is fair to say that no previous 
government has ever made as much progress on Kurdish rights.” (Bahceli & Noel 2011, 115). 
As this work focuses on the way the Kurds and their demands for rights has been discussed in 
Turkey, developments related to the Kurdish issue on the international arena have mostly been ignored. 
Yet, the Kurdish issue is a trans-national one (with more than purely regional significance), so we need 
to point out the importance of the consolidation of the autonomous position and institutions of the 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq that took place between 2003 and 2008 (for more details 
see Stansfield 2010), and which made its existence and autonomy a fact impossible to ignore in Turkey. 
This in turn gave impetus for the demands of Turkey’s Kurds. After initial hesitation, Turkey came to 
terms with the existence of a semi-independent Kurdish state at its South-Eastern flank and moved on 
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to improve relations with the leaders of the KRG in line with Ahmet Davutoğlu’s364 stated policy of “zero 
problems with neighbors.” A bustling trade over the border developed, with several hundred companies 
operating in the region and Turkish exports to Iraq increasing from 3 billion dollars in 2006 to 12 billion 
in 2013 (Gunter 2010, Hacaoglu 2014).
One more development important for understanding both the Kurdish opening and the subsequent 
debates was the resounding election victory of the AKP in the summer of 2007. The AKP had ruled in 
single party governments with its 363 parliamentary seats since the 2002 elections. In the spring of 2007, 
the AKP announced Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül as its candidate for the next president of 
Turkey.365 The secular opposition parties opposed Gül366 for president and, supported by the judiciary 
and the military, managed to prevent his election. The AKP promptly announced new national elections, 
in which they proved their continued support by gaining 46.7 percent of the vote. The CHP gained 20.9 
percent and the nationalist MHP 14.3 percent. While this time three parties had managed to overcome 
the 10 percent threshold, leaving the AKP with only 341 seats, it still continued to rule as a majority 
single party government and proceeded to have Abdullah Gül elected as the president of the Republic.
The inability of the Turkish Armed Forces to continue to interfere in politics was evident from the 
events of 2007, and its political power was further broken by the series of highly publicized court cases 
over coup plans; the first court case over the so-called Ergenekon coup plot was initiated in 2008. Also, 
the AKP (narrowly) managed to avoid closure by the constitutional court in 2008 over the scarf issue. 
Thus, by 2009 the AKP was in a strong enough position to attempt to resolve the Kurdish issue, and the 
military’s political power to prevent or hinder this was relatively weak. 
7.4 an attempt at a Resolution: “the kuRdish opening” of 2009
It is in the above described context that the AKP government launched an approach that aimed to 
resolve Turkey’s Kurdish problem. A vital part of the initiative known as “the Kurdish Opening” or “the 
Democratic Initiative” was argued to be the less ethnically based redefinition of Turkish citizenship. While 
the initiative was applauded by the majority of the Turkish intelligentsia as the most serious attempt to 
resolve the Kurdish issue to date, it was also resisted by both political opponents and ordinary citizens 
for, among other things, challenging the notion of “Turkishness.” The public-political debates were 
accompanied by instances of violent inter-ethnic clashes and lynch mobs in different locations, which 
had been relatively unusual in Turkey. In this study, I analyze part of the initial discussions immediately 
following the initiative announcement.
364 Ahmet Davutoğlu was Turkey’s Foreign minister 2009-2014, the chief foreign policy advisor to the Prime Minister 
before that, and the Prime Minister from 2014 until 2016. His foreign policy doctrine Zero Problems with Neighbours policy 
underlined Turkey’s role as an active regional power.
365 The president was to be elected by the parliament.
366 Due to his Islamist background and wife with a head scarf.
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7.4.1 sample and analysis
I began the analysis by looking at the Milliyet, Cumhuriyet and Zaman writings published during a 16 
day period from July the 30th to August 14th after the debates on the so-called Kurdish initiative had 
begun. I located a total of 384 articles for the three papers.367 A rough quantitative analysis based on 
the headings and ingresses was made of these to estimate the level of support and opposition expressed 
towards the initiative and to gain a general understanding of the speakers, sources, and actors present 
in the texts. The second stage consisted of carefully reading through and making brief notes of all the 
articles for a shorter period, i.e. for 8–13 August.368
Once again the main paper in the analysis was Milliyet (moderate, secular, mainstream, owned by 
the largest media corporation, the Doğan Holding and having a circulation at this time of approximately 
230,000). The reporting of Milliyet was contrasted with that of the daily Zaman (moderate religious, 
connected to the religious Fetullahçılar network, highest circulation in the country with approximately 
800,000) and Cumhuriyet (Kemalist-nationalist-state-centric, small readership). In addition, a separate 
analysis was made from a 10 part series that appeared in 3–12 August in Milliyet comprised of 30 
interviews with politicians from different parties, representatives of civil society organizations, scholars, 
and high ranking ex-officers of various branches of the security apparatus. The stated aim of this highly 
interesting series of interviews was to look for a model to: A) end the violence, and B) resolve the Kurdish 
issue.369 This series was included in the analysis in its entirety as it addressed explicitly many of the 
questions looked at in this study, and also represented a multitude of stances by different political, social 
and military actors.370
7.4.2 an oveRvieW of the debates
There were both significant similarities and important differences between the debates in 2005 and in 
2009. I will begin by listing the similarities and continuations. Once again the AKP came out with a (at 
this stage) highly symbolic opening of public debate on the Kurdish issue, and once again it elicited the 
ardent disapproval if the two main opposition parties: the CHP and the MHP, as well as a number of 
other political actors. 
This time the aim of the AKP was to produce concrete proposals within a process of negotiation, 
367 For this longer period I resorted to the www-archives of the newspapers, i.e. not the paper copies. It should be taken 
into account that there are significant differences between the printed dailies and the www-pages of the newspapers. The 
differences between Zaman’s paper and online versions were the greatest.
368 This time I used the paper copies as the main material. If I refer to an article found only in the online version that will be 
noted upon. The total number of articles in the paper copies for this shorter period was 114 news articles and 51 columns, of 
which 12 news articles were analyzed in detail with a partial analysis of 5 more news articles, and 14 columns were analyzed in 
detail with partial analysis/notes of features significant to the study of 16 more. For the list of articles see appendix 7/3 and for 
the list of questions asked to the texts, see appendix 7/2.
369 These two were separated into two different even if related sets of problems. The significance of this division will be 
discussed below.
370 As was noted before, the top military or ex-military personnel have been an important source on the Kurdish issue for the 
Turkish mainstream media (see also Erdem 2014).
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but during the period of analysis, this was yet to take place. Once again the AKP proposed citizenship as 
the source of shared identity, and once again propagated with heavy emphasis on unity. For example, the 
AKP Minister of Interior, Bülent Arınç, talked about historical unity and the friendship and brotherhood 
of the past (M0932); and President Gül defended the idea of unity in diversity with a statement: “We 
are one nation. Within great nations the differences are also great. It is not a tribe or a clan… Especially 
if you are the heir of an empire.”(M0910).371 Erdoğan emphasized the shared bond of Islam, the feelings 
created by shared cultural references and shared history, and appealed to the opposition: “… we say don’t 
cast a shadow, don’t hamper this project of brotherhood, this project of peace and integration, don’t close 
your doors to this project of national unity and integration”372 (M0922). Elise Massicard’s work on Alevi 
claims for difference can shed light on the reasons for AKP’s strong emphasis on unity. She has argued 
that state institutions did not abandon the dogma of the Unity of the Nation in the face of the increasing 
identity and recognition discourses and claims from the 1980s onwards, on the contrary, it was strongly 
reaffirmed (Massicard 2006). Thus, in order to legitimate measures to accommodate difference, the AKP 
actors had to express themselves in the name of unity to distance themselves from enemies of that unity. 
Another noticeable feature of the AKP discourse this time was the connection built between the 
opening and demands imposed by modernity and civilization (M0910), traditionally the catch words of 
the Kemalists. Erdoğan asked the public to imagine what Turkey would be like, how its democracy and 
economy would have flourished, if it could have used elsewhere the resources squandered to the violent 
struggle (M0934).
Once again the leaders of the CHP and the MHP raised their voices against the AKP. The ultra-
nationalist MHP simply rejected the whole initiative. Resistance by the CHP was also adamant and the 
leader of the party, Deniz Baykal, refused to meet AKP representatives to discuss the opening, but unlike 
the MHP, it had to justify its refusal to participate in the process. Baykal demanded concrete proposals to 
be submitted before a meeting and defined what the party was not willing to even consider. He demanded 
that the notion of Turkish nation be retained as the source of solidarity for the inhabitants of Turkey 
(while respecting everyone’s ethnic identity within this national solidarity), and a Turkish-language only 
educational system (M0911, M0918). A more detailed evaluation of the MHP’s and CHP’s discourses 
and positions as well as the underlying reasons will be provided below.
Other than those of the MHP and the CHP, this time there were only a very few other voices raised 
against the opening. Not surprisingly, once again Cumhuriyet remained the least inclined to support the 
AKP’s efforts and did so with relatively neutral or balanced news reporting and overwhelmingly critical 
columnists.373 Zaman was again at the opposite end of the spectrum, with almost total support for both 
the AKP government and the initiative. Milliyet represented the middle ground and allotted somewhat 
more space for voices and views supportive of the AKP government’s new initiative than those criticizing 
371 Biz bir milletiz. Büyük milletlerin içinde farklılıklar da büyük olur. Aşiret, klan değil ki... Hele de bir imparatorluk 
mirasçısı iseniz.”
372 “… diyoruz ki gölge etmeyin, engel olmayın, bu kardeşlik projesine, bu barış ve bütünleşme projesine, bu milli birlik 
ve bütünlük projesine kapılarınızı kapatmayın.” This time he used the formulation of “birlik ve bütünlük,” which can be 
understood to refer to organic unity of a single being rather than the other alternative, i.e.“birlik ve beraberlik” (=unity and 
togetherness).
373 Despite the obvious ideological bias, the quality of the journalistic news work in Cumhuriyet was higher than in the other 
two papers. Even the short articles gave the details of the events, where the statements were made, the quotations were long 
but had less rhetoric and there was more contextualization on the important ones.
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it. In the news articles of the sample, in addition to the CHP and MHP, only some organizations of family 
members of soldiers lost in the war and the small communist Worker’s Party (İşçi Partisi, İP)374 stepped 
forth to condemn the initiative. In addition, virtually all Cumhuriyet columnists and three columnists in 
Milliyet (Bila, Heper and Aşık) argued against the opening. In the series of 30 interviews in Milliyet, only 
three interviewees argued explicitly and clearly against the initiative, with six more persons expressing 
various levels of skepticism. The rest agreed at least on that something needed to be done.375
All in all, most commentators either supported the opening or if not this opening per se, at least 
thought that something should be done. Organizations of families of soldiers and PKK militants killed in 
the war as well as a group of intellectuals stepped forth to support either the initiative or more generally 
change, as did most columnists of Milliyet and Zaman.
Table 7.1. Support and opposition (in the headings and ingresses in the larger sample)
Paper Milliyet Cumhuriyet Zaman Total
Positive/supportive 52 33 92 177
Neutral/cannot tell/both 39 31 36 106
Negative/against 30 54 17 101
Total 121 118 145 384
Table 7.2. support/opposition within the smaller sample news
  Milliyet Cumhuriyet Zaman Total
Positive/supportive 18 11 28 57
neutral/cannot tell/both 8 7 4 19
Negative/against 13 12 3 28
Total 39 30 35 104
Table 7.3. support/opposition within the smaller sample columns
  Milliyet Cumhuriyet Zaman Total
Positive/supportive 10 1 10 21
neutral/cannot tell/both 4 3 3 10
Negative/against 7 11 1 19
Total 21 15 14 50
When one looks at the speakers and actors (table 7.4), it is possible to see that the debate was multi-
voiced. Different kinds of approaches were proposed and debated both by the different columnists and 
especially by the various experts interviewed by Devrim Sevimay in Milliyet.
374 The ideology of the İP led by the legendary character Doğu Perinçek is a peculiar combination of socialism or maoism 
with kemalism and nationalism.
375 Support for the attempt to finally do something to resolve the Kurdish issue did not necessarily imply support for the 
AKP or firm belief in its ability to resolve the problem. 
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Table 7.4. Speakers and actors in headings and ingresses, the larger sample
Paper Milliyet Cumhuriyet Zaman Total
Representatives of AKP 16 18 43 77
Representatives of CHP 14 10 13376 37
Representatives of MHP 9 14 15 38
Representatives of DTP 10 5 10 25
Other parties 5 4 5 14
Civil society actors 10 2 13 25
Outside of Turkey 4 2 4 10377
Other 7 2 20 29
Total for each paper 75 57 123 255
7.4.3 featuRes of the debates376377
1. CHP and MHP: Defending the Unitary Republic of Turkey
In 2010 Fuat Keyman estimated that as the international situation had seemed promising in 2009, the 
AKP sincerely expected to succeed in its attempt to find a way to end the violence and to gain the 
support of the other parties for its attempt at resolution. Instead, the opposition parties opposed it on the 
basis of worry over increasing risk of an ethnic-based disintegration. (Keyman 2010, 92-3.)
The reaction of the MHP was angry and aggressive (for example in M0914). The stance is best 
exemplified by two quotes from MHP’s Oktay Vural: Also today there are those, who say there is a Kurdish 
problem in Turkey, those who want to divide this political geography and nation among ethnic identities and 
to estrange this nation from its national identity with ethnicist/racist approaches.378 He blamed the AKP for 
accommodating Kurdish nationalism and asked: Did they not see those who shot at the soldiers, police, teachers 
and engineers of this nation? Do they not realize the political aims of those who want to divide Turkey? Do they not 
know the danger Turkey is facing? Are they not aware of the scenario to divide this nation along ethnic identities? 
(M0914).379 In addition, representatives of the party stood up to criticize every small attempt for softening the 
atmosphere, such as President Gül using an old Kurdish place name Norşin during his visit there (M0912). 
The MHP had previously cooperated with the AKP on a number of issues important also for 
its conservative and religious voters, but it was obviously not going to tolerate any move away from 
conservative nationalist conceptualization of the nation or from practices associated with it. For the 
MHP, based on a rather radical variant of Turkish nationalism (see below and Bora 2003b, 2011), the 
democratic opening simply meant “sleeping with the enemy” and was an indicator of AKP’s weakness in 
dealing with the problem of terrorism in the country. In addition, any verbal reference to ethnic groups 
or minorities in Turkey was interpreted as a potential impetus for discrimination and exclusion (Celep 
2010, 138), as an “insult to the homeland” (M0923).
376 Most of the comments by representatives of CHP, MHP and the family organizations of martyrs in Zaman were actually 
used to support the opening and to criticize the CHP’s and MHP’s strict opposition to the initiative.
377 The EU did not have much of the role in the debates this time.
378 Bugün de Türkiye’de Kürt sorunu vardır denilerek, bu siyasal coğrafyayı ve milleti etnik kimliklere göre ayırmak, ırkçı 
yaklaşımlarla bu milleti milli kimlikten uzaklaştırmak isteyenler vardır.
379 Bu milletin askerine, polisine, öğretmenine, mühendisine kurşun sıkanları görmediler mi? Türkiye’yi bölmek isteyenlerin 
siyasal amaçlarının farkında değiller mi? Türkiye’nin hangi tehlikeyle karşı karşıya olduğunu bilmiyorlar mı? Bu milleti etnik 
kimliklere göre bölme senaryosunun farkında değiller mi? (this article only appeared in the internet publication)
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The reasons behind the state-centric and security-oriented reaction of Deniz Baykal and his kemalist 
CHP, with its social-democratic leanings demand some more effort to explain. As was (once again) 
pointed out also by the press, the CHP had already made similar initiatives in the 1990s (CM0903). 
Why had the CHP changed its position from supporting a democratic non-military solution? The 
confrontational approach of the MHP and the CHP was heavily criticized by representatives of the 
AKP, other commentators, and several columnists (CM0903, CM0904, CM0911, CM0912, CM0920 
CZ0901, CZ0909, CZ0910), many of whom accused CHP and Baykal of once again using identity 
issues and fomenting nationalist fervor for narrow, short term political gains. On the surface, that indeed 
seemed to be the case.
Fuat Keyman has argued that the explanation is not that simple, and has connected CHP’s stance 
with the simultaneous process of consolidation of Turkey’s democracy and the continued electoral 
hegemony of the AKP (Keyman 2010). Keyman explains the concept of electoral hegemony as referring 
to a situation “in which the dominance of one party in the electoral process becomes so strong that not 
only can the parties not have a claim to win the elections, but also, and more importantly, the supporters 
of these parties lose faith in their own parties’ electoral success.” (Keyman 2010, 101-2). These social 
segments become increasingly frustrated and insecure, which generate social and political polarizations 
and result in a crisis prone Turkey. Keyman continues: 
…the CHP has chosen to focus its political strategy on the growing fears and insecurities of the secular 
segments and middle classes for the future of the secular modernity in which they have been the 
dominant class since the inception of Turkey as a modern nation-state… [It has linked] its historical 
identity of being the bearer and the implementer of the Republican modernity with its recent role of 
defending the political substance of the modern Turkey, that is, the secular and homogeneous political 
community. Thus, as opposed to the electoral hegemony of the AK Party stemming from its consecutive 
electoral successes, the CHP’s political strategy has been to shift the focus of political competition from 
politics (where competition takes place among political parties) to polity (that is, the constitutional and 
institutional norms, values and decision-making procedures that frame the competition among political 
parties), and thus to present itself as the defender of the existing polity. (Keyman 2010, 102)
The unresolved Kurdish issue has been an obstacle to consolidation of Turkish democracy as security 
concerns have been prioritized over democracy. In its resort to the defense of polity over engagement 
in politics, non-securitation and democratization have not been in the interests of the CHP. Thus, both 
the CHP and the Kemalist Cumhuriyet daily reiterated a state-centric Kemalist nationalism, with its 
emphasis on cultural homogeneity and either encouraged or forced assimilation.
Discussing a slightly earlier period (up to 2008), Murat Somer (2011) has argued that the Kurdish 
conflict cannot be resolved peacefully until two “security” dilemmas are resolved. The first one arises 
because the Kurds form a trans-state and transnational minority, which creates the possibility of pan-
Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish secession. The second dilemma arises because political elites in Turkey 
need to resolve their separate conflict over secularism in order to build a consensus over “a modernization 
path more amenable to ethnic-national diversity and Kurdish difference” (Somer 2011, 253-4). From 
the debates and events in 2009, we can see that the increasing polarization over question of secularism 
seriously hindered attempts at resolving the Kurdish conflict.
It is easy to see the attraction of using nationalist discourse(s) in a situation of political polarization 
in Turkey, where, as Tanil Bora notes, the 
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broad and disorganized lexicon created by the plurality of nationalist discourses gives rise to a great 
swarm of words, becoming a nationalistic hubbub. Nationalism’s tyrannizing discourse dominates 
politics and every-day life. Furthermore, its monopolizing logic expands to the utmost, generating 
fervor and violence, turning all the political opposition into enemies, insisting on national unity as a 
dogma, and turning the “shared good” into something otherwordly. (Bora 2011, 79.) 
The plurality of nationalist discourses Bora refers to is his by-now classic division or classification of 
the nationalism of the 1990s into four or five different “languages”: The root-language of Turkish 
nationalism is the official nationalism of the nation-state, i.e. Atatürk nationalism. The second variant is 
the “left-wing” Kemalist nationalism ulusçluk. The third is pro-Western neo-liberal nationalism, and the 
fourth is the racist-ethnicist (radical) nationalism with neo-pan-Turkist elements. Then there is also the 
nationalism in Turkish Islamism. (Bora 2003b and 2011.) Official nationalism has focused on building 
and perpetuating the nation-state. It pretends to be “civic” but can also be essentialist. It is pervaded by 
a perception of constant threat and a state of vigilance and leans ultimately on the army as its guardian. 
According to Bora, the official nationalism has been too rigid, cold, and stereotyped to raise emotions. 
It has tried to compensate this in public life by frenzied consumption of symbols of the nation-state: the 
national anthem, the flag, Atatürk, the Star & Cresent (Bora 2011, 64 and 2003b, 437-8; Özkırımlı 
2011, 92). Kemalist nationalism is a derivative of official nationalism with a leftist coloring. It is anti-
imperialist (later anti-Western) and staunchly secularist (Bora 2003b, 439-40; Özkırımlı 2011, 92). 
Neoliberal nationalism in Bora’s analysis is an offshoot of the modernist-Westernist aspect of official 
nationalism. National identity is defined in terms of its ability to attain the level of the developed 
countries of the world with emphasis on economic and material success (Boral 2003, 440-45; Özkırımlı 
2011, 92-3). Also gaining new currency in the 1990s after the collapse of the Soviet Union was the kind 
of earlier Turkist radical nationalism that defines the Turkish homeland as the entire Turkic-inhabited 
world g. This notion was now cleansed of its racist elements and transformed into a cocktail of cultural-
historical essentialism with Islamic accretions. While doing so, it moved more to the center and managed 
to widen its appeal. Yet, it did not succeed in closing the rift between its traditional rural and new urban 
constituencies. (Bora 2003b, 445-8; Özkırımlı 2011, 93.) The combination of Islamism and nationalism 
is anti-Westernist, xenophobic, and even anti-Semitic, but also progressive-developmentalist just like 
Kemalism (Özkırımlı 2011, 93 on Bora). These competing nationalist discourses formed the “nationalist 
hubbub,” within which they crossbred and fused (2003, 440-50). 
Another well-known researcher of Turkish nationalism, Umut Özkırımlı, has suggested that the 
various currents have survived to the 2000s, but that the cross-breeding has intensified to the extent 
that we can now talk about a synthesis between official nationalism and some of its rivals, i.e. the 
Kemalist-leftist ulusçuluk and neo-liberal nationalism. This synthesis, ulusalcılık, is at once polyphonic 
and multi-centered (Özkırımlı 2011, 93-5). Bora has also noted that in early 2000s nationalism was on 
the rise again. In his opinion the main triggering factor was Turkey’s EU membership candidacy and the 
resulting anti-Western reaction (Bora 2011, 60, see also Keyman 2011, 29). Whatever the reason, in a 
Ph.D. seminar on nationalism I attended at the Bilgi University in the fall of 2007, most of the students 
considered the resurgence of nationalism a fact, and had gloomy perceptions of the situation as being 
“lost.” While my analysis did not utilize this division of Turkish nationalism into five different variants, 
the continued strength of the nationalist discourses, the “nationalist hubbub” was evident. Conservative, 
defensive nationalism was an easily available powerful tool for the CHP to utilize in their struggle against 
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the AKP over secularism.
Education ranks as one of the fields in which CHP’s Baykal insisted on continued cultural 
homogeneity: 
There is an absolute need to keep the concept of ethnicity and ethnic measures outside of national 
education policies. If ethnicity enters into national education, it ceases to be national. National 
education is the basis of the process of nationalization of Turkey… Let’s not sever from Turkey our 
children, who live in the region by separating their language of education.380 (M0918) 
There are obviously several points of interest in this quotation. First of all, it reflects the idea of Turkish-
language only education as ethnically impartial and neutral, as non-ethnic. Second, by referring to 
national education as an instrument of the process of nationalization, Baykal both acknowledges the 
ongoing process of assimilation of the Kurdish population and expresses support for the conservative 
nationalist ideal of nurturing the nation via compulsory education. Third, he implicitly refuses the idea 
of mother-tongue education as a basic right, and finally, by referring to Kurdish speaking students as “our 
children who live in the region” he shows continued sensitivity vis-à-vis the term Kurdish. MHP’s Oktay 
Vural’s warning of “… there are those… who want to separate this political geography and nation along 
ethnic identities, to estrange this nation from its national identity” (M0914) quoted already above can 
be interpreted along similar lines: the nation needs to be constantly protected and nurtured, as there is a 
danger of it losing its identity.
At this point, it also in order to note the very harsh tone used in Turkish political rhetoric; the 
leaders of the parties used the second person singular imperative, when addressing each other, such as 
Baykal addressing Erdoğan: “Sen de… dinle ve ona göre davran… (=You listen… and act accordingly…) 
(C0924). Use of second person singular pronoun and imperative form instead of second person plural is 
in this public context simply rude. 
As was already stated above, the news reporting of the Cumhuriyet daily did not differ all that much 
from Milliyet, but there was a great difference between the columns. Most (but not all) Cumhuriyet 
columnists interpreted the problem as one that has been created by external actors, mostly the U.S. 
(editorial CC0902, CC0903, CC0907 CC0912, CC0913, CC0915). Several Cumhuriyet writers 
argued against the existence of a specifically Kurdish problem. The columnist Akgüç wrote that ordinary 
citizens cannot understand what the problem is about because such a problem does not exist. It is an 
artificial problem created by outside powers to gain control over Middle-Eastern oil, assisted by internal 
collaborators (i.e. the AKP). There is no discrimination between Turks and Kurds; the only separation in 
Turkey is between those who are for the republic and those who are against it (CC0901). These kinds of 
arguments carry the issue outside of normal democratic decision-making into an issue of external security 
and defense of the country. As was described in chapter four, a process of securitization of politics had 
taken place in Turkey under the military Junta 1980–1983. Since the early 1990s, this process had been 
slowly reversed, and increasing numbers of issues had been moved back to the field of political decision-
making. However, as can been seen from the arguments of the MHP and the CHP, and has been pointed 
380 Etnisite kavramı ve etnik ölçülerin milli eğitim politikaları dışında tutulmasına mutlak ihtiyaç vardır. Etnisite milli 
eğitime girerse, o eğitim milli olmaktan çıkar. Türkiye’nin uluslaşma sürecinin temel dayanağı milli eğitimdir…. Bölgede 
yaşayan çocuklarımızın eğitim dilini ayrıştırarak onları Türkiye’den koparmayalım.
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out by researchers working with other materials such as school primers (for example Altınay 2004), 
ensuring the security of the homeland (with unity of the nation) still continued as a powerful argument 
that could be utilized when needed. 
The overall stance of Zaman was warmly supportive of the initiative of the AKP government, 
and various speakers (both in interviews and in columns) explicitly argued against the arguments put 
forth by the CHP and the MHP. I will cite here two examples. In a full-page interview, Hüseyin Çelik, 
an ex-minister of education, an AKP MP of Van and a scholar of some renown argues explicitly that 
democratization and freedom do not lead to separatism (Z0901). He also points out that Turkey would 
not be making any sort of “concessions” to Kurds, as the issue is about basic rights that Kurds should have 
in any case. He makes a powerful argument legitimized with the demands of democracy, rationality, the 
EU, freedom and basic rights. He appears as the voice of moderation and sensibility; he quotes Atatürk 
and refers to Ottoman history in addition to pointing out the high costs of the armed conflict. It is also 
easy to see the reasons behind CHP’s opposition in Çelik’s rhetoric: according to him the main source 
of solidarity in Turkey is Islam.381 Thus the DTP and PKK also do not represent Kurds; the AKP does. 
(Z0901.) In the other example, the well-known scholar İhsan Dağı questions why Kurds would want 
to separate from a democratic, free, and prosperous Turkey, which is a member of the EU, has accepted 
diversity as richness, and where they have full citizenship rights. He criticizes the kind of outdated model 
in which the supposedly strong state forces people into a certain mold. Instead, he envisions a truly 
strong future Turkey that has surpassed the ideal of homogeneous centralized nation-state and lives in a 
pluralistic democracy (CZ0906).382
2. “The Terrorists in the Parliament”
Even though Prime Minister Erdogan acknowledged the existence of a Kurdish issue in Turkey in 2005, 
he was not willing to extend a hand to the pro-Kurdish party of the time. This time the DTP was 
included in the proceedings, despite the fact that its support for the opening was less than enthusiastic 
(for example M0907). The party representatives applauded the AKP, but hastily continued to add that 
they expected to see some concrete proposals before committing themselves. This lukewarm attitude 
was probably much less than that expected by the AKP, especially after a personal visit from the Prime 
Minister to the party, a visit he had vowed not to make unless the DTP first condemned the PKK, which 
it had still declined to do.
In 2009, the representatives of the pro-Kurdish party once again had a voice in the Turkish 
mainstream press. This time, however, the press did not present the party as a legitimate or even semi-
legitimate representative of Kurdish interests, but rather, as an entity directly connected to the PKK. The 
discourse of many of the commentators was based around the assumption that the DTP was a part of the 
PKK, and its MPs were, literally, the terrorists in the parliament (for example CM0901, CM0903). In 
others, the connection was less direct and involved the DTP’s refusal to condemn the PKK and classify 
it as a terrorist organization. The fact that he was engaging in a dialogue with the DTP also made Prime 
Minister Erdoğan a target of criticism by the opposition(CM0901).
381 The idea of Islam as the source of social solidarity was visible also in the quotes of the Prime Minister (for example in 
Z0921) and a number of other articles in Zaman.
382 This stance has obvious similarities that of Erdal İnönü in 1991 (see section 7.2.5 in the current chapter).  
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In the analysis of the previous cases, it was found out that while the pro-Kurdish politicians had a 
voice in the national press, it was at the expense of being able to voice explicitly pro-Kurdish views. By 
2009 this had changed (see also Gunes 2012, 170-171). A good example of this change is the reporting 
on a public meeting of the DTP. The speakers of the meeting were Emine Ayna, a deputy chairman of 
the party and a Mardin MP, and Hatip Dicle, the chairman of the older DEP. Milliyet’s internet-version 
included a long and detailed account of the meeting, but even the shorter one in the printed version gave 
room for nationalist Kurdish discourse, which clearly runs counter to Turkish nationalist expressions. 
Dicle referred to PKK fighters as “martyrs of the war of Freedom,” and Ayna explained the emergence of 
the PKK with the following: 
People did not take to the mountains for nothing. Nobody takes up arms for nothing. People are 
forced by circumstances. The Kurdish people preferred the mountains because they were left with no 
other options. 383 (M0937)
The same news article also reported that the audience had carried posters of Öcalan and shouted 
slogans in his support. The refusal to condemn the PKK and insistence of the pro-Kurdish actors on 
Öcalan’s inclusion into a peace process have been a source of continuing friction between the DTP 
and the mainstream public, which still seems to hold Öcalan personally responsible for the violence 
and deaths, even if he was no longer routinely referred to as “the baby killer” (with the exception of 
Vural/MHP, C0909). Derya Erdem has noted that the mainstream media continually emphasized the 
links between the DTP and terrorism, and insisted that the DTP denounce the PKK. It also tended to 
emphasize slogans for Öcalan’s support and portraits of him in demonstrations instead of reporting what 
the demonstration was about (Erdem 2014, 51-2).
Within the context of the re-escalation of the violent struggle, the narrow boundaries of strict 
Turkish nationalism, the inability of the legal pro-Kurdish political movement to distance itself from the 
PKK, and the voicing of even moderate demands for minority rights (moderate from the comparative 
international perspective) such as mother-tongue primary school education or constitutional guarantee 
for cultural rights have been interpreted as radical minority nationalism.384 Thus, the legal pro-Kurdish 
parties have not really been seen as legitimate disseminators of demands for cultural rights. This has 
made them less able to influence the public opinion outside of their own constituency. Virtually all 
Turkish mainstream politicians talked about the casualties of the violence in highly emotional terms. It 
was held that the failure of the DTP to condemn “the guilty party” must mean they condoned the killing 
of innocent, patriotic Turkish youth.
There has also been a wide gap between what the nationalist Kurds demand, i.e. Öcalan’s inclusion, 
full linguistic rights including mother-tongue education and regional autonomy or at least strong local 
governance with wide-reaching powers, and what the moderate Turkish actors have previously been 
willing to consider.
383 İnsanlar boşuna dağa çıkmadı. Kimse eline boşuna silah almaz. Koşullar zorlar insanları. Başka şans bırakılmadığı için 
Kürt halkı dağı tercih etti
384 Stronger demands also voiced by the Kurdish nationalists, such as regional autonomy (for example CC0914), would 
constitute a difficult issue in many other countries as well.
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3. Is Everything Finally All Out and in the Open?
Cumhuriyet accused the AKP for not introducing concrete legislative packages; instead it again and again 
initiated debates on the issue, thus preparing the ground for gradual piecemeal changes (C0916).385 If this 
has been indeed the tactic of the AKP, one has to say it has worked to a large extent. When one compares 
the debates of 2009 with those of 1999 and even 2002, it is obvious that many previously difficult, 
almost taboo topics had by 2009 become topics of passionate and highly publicized debates. The series 
of interviews by Devrim Sevimay (from 3rd to 12th August) provide ample proof of the degree of change. 
The issue was discussed under two separate headings: How to end the violence and how to resolve the 
Kurdish issue, i.e. these two were framed as two separate even if interrelated problems requiring different 
measures. The proposals for ending the violence included: full amnesty, programs for reintegration of 
ex-PKK members into society, negotiations with the PKK with Barzani as a mediator, the inclusion of 
Öcalan into the process of peace for purely pragmatic reasons (i.e. to prevent the PKK from splintering 
during the process of disarmament), etc. Proposals for resolving the Kurdish issue, discussed under a 
separate set of questions, included: an ethnically blind constitution, social solidarity based on citizenship, 
extension of cultural rights, mother-tongue education in the Kurdish provinces, (economic) affirmative 
action in the Kurdish areas that have suffered from the fighting, stronger local administrations, regional 
autonomy, and even referendum to define whether Kurds really wanted secession.386 Quite expectedly, 
there was no consensus and most of these proposals also faced resistance, while demands were also made 
for the unconditional surrender of the PKK, the inclusion of Öcalan in any capacity was flatly refused, 
and the existence of an ethnicity-based problem in Turkey was denied.
The scope of topics that could be discussed in the mainstream public had obviously become much 
wider, and cultural rights had become an issue that could be both debated and often supported. For 
example, in stark contrast to the events surrounding the Kurdish language petition campaign in 2001–
2002, this time it was the university rectors, supported by the president of the republic himself, who 
applied for permission to open Kurdish-language departments (M0902). Nobody was arrested. True, 
there was still quite much resistance, but Baykal’s CHP seemed to be on the defensive with his insistence 
on NOT introducing Kurdish language into Turkish schools. Then again, one should be careful not to 
over-interpret the texts. “Cultural rights” as a concept had obviously acquired enough positive weight 
that it was difficult to oppose directly, but one could, for example, support “full cultural rights that do 
not lead towards secession” (CC0913), i.e. one opposed Kurdish language education.
Also the language used in the debates had undergone positive changes. One can understand 
President Gül’s enthusiasm over the change of terminology: 
First of all, nobody should underrate the rising standards of Turkey. Instead of counting one by one, 
look at the changing understanding. The jargon has changed in Turkey, words, concepts, perceptions 
have changed. The talk is about respect, love, sympathy. This is more important than what has been 
done and will be done one by one (M0910).
385 Besides this current debate and the debates in 2005, a debate on a new constitution took place in 2007 and another one 
on extending the Kurdish-language broadcasts in 2008. Unfortunately, I could not include them into this study.
386 This last proposal was not voiced by any pro-Kurdish actor, but by a Turkish ex-diplomat.
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The awkward terms of supra-identity and sub-identity, the exact content of which had been the 
topic of intensive debates in 2005, had by now been mostly abandoned. The terms used now included 
citizenship (identity), national identity and ethnic identity. Even the security-oriented Kemalists or the 
hard-core MHP nationalists (or most of them) no longer worked to ignore the existence of ethnic Kurds 
in Turkey, but now spoke about Turks and Kurds (albeit still in rather an abstract way).387 They merely 
failed to see a problem in the current arrangement. The argument for not using the label “Kurdish issue” 
was certainly not centered on any denial of Kurdish ethnicity but implied rejection of the idea that 
a clash of identities or clash of nationalisms lies at the root of the PKK and the violent struggle. For 
example a Cumhuriyet editorial described a tendency of “nationalization”388 among the Kurds, classified 
it as late-comer nationalism with no realistic possibility of founding its own state, and concluded that 
Turks and Kurds continue to live together without troubles (CC0902). In addition, many of the texts 
reflected an implicit understanding of Turkishness as one ethnicity among others (for example CM0901) 
on par with Kurdishness (CM0918). The well-known professor Levent Köker389 also explicitly expressed 
satisfaction over the use of the term “Kurdish issue,” the use of which nationalists had long managed to 
prevent. According to him, it is impossible to resolve an issue that is inaccurately defined (CZ0910).
Counter to 2005, this time many writers expressed satisfaction with the emergence of such an open 
debate on how to resolve the problems (both violence and identity-related) that had plagued the country 
since at least the 1980s (for example CM0903, CC0906). All in all, in 2009 the debate was much more 
multi-voiced and open than in any of the cases before, and probably more open than ever before during 
the republican history, even if one would not go as far as AKP deputy chairman Abdülkadir Aksu who 
describes it as: A problem upon which no word under the sun has been left unsaid…390(11.8. Milliyet) as 
there were still some problematic features in the discussion, as well as some empty spaces (at least in these 
particular dailies). 
Besides the strong nationalist reaction led by but not limited to the MHP and CHP, which managed 
to block the opening later, just as it had in 2005, I was especially troubled by the lack of references to 
international agreements, norms or scholarly debates on human rights, citizenship, or linguistic minority 
rights. Neither were there any positive examples of successful multilingual societies. The few references 
made to debates and contexts outside of Turkey were negative: human rights and minorities were seen 
as tools of imperialism, Iraq was splintering, Greece or France did not acknowledge minorities etc. Also, 
some of the comparative information was purpose-oriented and, in a few cases, simply not true. For 
example, Ali Sirmen (CC0906) explained in all seriousness that not even democracies with no intentions 
of suppressing ethnic identities have educational systems where some citizens would be educated with 
one language and others with another one, as that would fracture the unity of national education and 
pave the way towards federation!391
As a side-note, it was interesting to note the positive meaning attributed to the term “brotherhood” 
(kardeşlik) across the spectrum in Turkey (for example the speakers in Z0929). This has been one of 
the ways the pro-Kurdish actors have wanted to define the relationship between Turks and Kurds: two 
387 There was still a marked reluctance to label concrete public persons as Kurds. 
388 ulusallaşma
389 He was cited several times in chapter two.
390 Güneş altında söylenmedik hiçbir sözün kalmadığı bir sorunu…
391 I personally am a citizen of Finland, which has a fully bi-lingual education system, and which is not a federation. 
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nations that live together in brotherhood. As was mentioned earlier, Elise Massicard has argued that 
the only way for the Alevis to gain legitimacy for identity claims was within the framework of Turkish 
nationalism by emphasizing national unity (Massicard 2006, 80). This is considerably more difficult 
for pro-Kurdish actors than the Alevis. Perhaps using the concept of “brotherhood” was an attempt 
to legitimize pro-Kurdish demands with emphasis on unity, without having to resort to the Kemalist-
Turkish-Nationalist catchwords of birlik (unity) and bütünlük (unity/totality). In this case AKP used 
the term kardeşlik to support the opening, and the CHP, the Cumhuriyet, and the family members of 
lost soldiers (martyrs) used it to oppose it. 392 They must have all used the word with different meanings 
or nuances for they all argued that Turks and Kurds live as brothers. Also “modernity” and “civilization” 
are such powerfully positive terms that actors across the whole spectrum used these expressions to justify 
their own particular stances (for example President Gül in M0910).
As another side note I wish to point out some interesting continued terminological particularities 
that convey small nuances self-evident for a Turkish reader. For example, the aim of the Zaman headline 
“Şirnak, the province of Turkey that has given most martyrs” (Z0917) might be somewhat difficult for 
an outsider to gauge. But, when one considers that the term “martyr” (şehit) is used for soldiers who have 
died during military service (presumably action) and that Şirnak is a predominantly Kurdish province, 
the meaning becomes clear: Zaman wants to emphasize that the war has not taken place between Turks 
and Kurds, but between the Turkish military, which includes many Kurdish youth in its ranks, and the 
PKK. To give another example, for a Turkish reader it is obvious that the “Mesopotamia Association for 
Assistance, Solidarity, and Culture with Families that have Lost Members” is an organization of families 
of dead PKK fighters. This can be understood from the word Mesopotamia, a 1980s and 1990s code 
word for Kurdish, used at least in names of organizations (such as Mesopotamia Cultural Center in 
Istanbul in the 1990s), as well as the term “lost” rather than “martyr” (Z0903).393
After this rather lengthy descriptive-analytic account of the 2009 debates in the newspapers, it is 
time to once again to take a step back from the texts and consider what conclusions can be made on 
various models for managing diversity and ensuring social solidarity as the basis for the state in Turkey. 
I will first look at the multicultural model of Will Kymlicka with group rights. Multicultural policies or 
minority rights have not received much support in Turkey, but they provide a good point of comparison 
between the debates and practices of managing diversity in Turkey and in Western nation-states. After 
multiculturalism, (individualistically defined) constitutional citizenship as proposed by Jürgen Habermas 
will be introduced and discussed as a more likely solution for Turkey’s identity-based troubles.
392 In Zaman, the communal understanding of responsibility in general was very strong. The family members and especially 
mothers of dead soldiers were seen as central figures in a process of reconciliation. (For example Z0903, Z0908, CZ0905)
393 This raises interesting questions: do the families not consider the dead PKK soldiers as martyrs or would it have been 
impossible to have the organization registered with that in the title? Also the conventions regarding the way the martyrs are 
referred to seem to be very strong, for example, usually the rank, full name and place and time of death of the soldier in 
question are given, when a family member’s citation is given (for example Z0909). This can be interpreted as a sign of respect. 
Interestingly enough, the reference by Hatip Dicle to PKK fighters as “martyrs of the war of freedom” also made it to the 
pages of Milliyet (M0937).
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7.4.4 multicultuRalism and minoRity Rights in management of 
diveRsity?
Most societies today are culturally diverse. It is only in a very few countries that the citizens share the same 
language, or belong to the same ethnonational group (Kymlicka 1995, 1). Contemporary multiculturality 
differs in several respects from that of the premodern societies (such as the Ottoman Empire) in which 
different communities led autonomous lives alongside each other with only minimal contact, in 
which diversity of cultures was accepted as a fact of life, and in which marginalized groups accepted 
their subordinate status and led their distinct ways of life on the periphery of society. Contemporary 
multiculturalism in the West has evolved within a tradition of the homogenizing nation-state with its 
expectations of a broad moral and cultural consensus. Also, most political theorizing until the 1990s, 
from Hobbes and Locke to Rawls has been based on the assumption of cultural homogeneity. (Parekh 
1997, 54-55). Currently the range and depth of diversity are greater than before, and the democratic 
ideals of respect for individual autonomy and rights have encouraged demands for public recognition 
and cultural rights by minority groups. (Parekh 1997, 54.) 
1. Multiculturalism in political philosophy
The most famous spokesperson for multiculturalism and group rights has been the Canadian political 
philosopher Will Kymlicka. In his Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (1995) 
Kymlicka aims to create a liberal framework for the just treatment of minority groups. In his view 
individualism, autonomy, critical self-reflection, and choice are central to liberalism. According to 
Kymlicka, freedom in liberalism means the freedom to decide what is “the good life,” to pursue it, and 
also the freedom to question one’s beliefs, to change one’s mind about the good life (freedom of religion, 
freedom to proselytize, freedom of apostasy, freedom of heresy) (Ibid., 80-82). Although Kymlicka is 
known as a proponent of group rights, for him individuals are the basic moral units of society (not 
minority communities) and are the sole bearers of rights and obligations. Societies and culture have no 
moral status of their own, but cultures are important because they offer individuals the context for these 
decisions for choosing “the good life” (Ibid., 84-85). Kymlicka defines cultures, “societal cultures” in his 
terminology, as entities that provide their members with meaningful ways of life across the full range of 
human activities, including social, educational, religious, recreational, and economic life, encompassing 
both public and private life (Ibid., 76). They tend to be territorially concentrated and based on a shared 
language, thus typically associated with national groups. Such ‘societal cultures’ came into being as a 
part of the process of modernization, and reflect the need for a high level of solidarity within modern 
democratic states (Ibid., 76-77). Yet, most countries have more than one such societal culture, even if 
there is a dominant majority culture. Kymlicka associates societal cultures with national minorities, i.e. 
not immigrants (Ibid., 77-80). According to this categorization, Turkey’s Kurds would be considered 
a national minority. So, according to Kymlicka, our (national) culture gives us a meaningful variety 
of options (for the good life) and the tools with which to judge these options. For Kymlicka, cultural 
membership, that is, membership in a stable and historically continuous cultural community, is essential 
to human freedom and autonomy, and hence is a primary good. 
If people’s capacity to make meaningful choices depends on access to a cultural structure, why do 
the members of a national minority need access to their own culture? Why not the majority culture? 
Kymlicka questions the ease of changing cultures, the ease of cosmopolitanism. Changing ones culture 
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is a difficult and costly process. Why should one have to do it? Also, most people do not want to. 
Kurds could be used as an example for this reluctance. People want their own culture, and in Kymlicka’s 
opinion, should have the right to expect to have it. The ties to one’s culture are normally too strong 
to give up, and this is not to be regretted. We cannot be required to make such a sacrifice. In general, 
cultural membership is valued despite the liberalization and modernization of national cultures that has 
resulted in thin forms of identity with more internal differences and less external differences, pluralism 
and tolerance. (Ibid. 84-91)
Kymlicka also points out that national identity does not rest on shared values, which makes it 
appropriate basis for liberal politics (Kymlicka 1995, 92). 
The national culture provides a meaningful context of choice for people, without limiting their 
ability to question and revise particular values or beliefs…. the liberal ideal is a society of free and 
equal individuals. But what is the relevant ‘society’? For most people it seems to be their nation. The 
sort of freedom and equality they most value, and can make most use of, is freedom and equality 
within their own societal culture… (Kymlicka 1995, 92-93)
In short, liberal theorists have generally, if implicitly, accepted that cultures or nations are basic 
units of liberal political theory. (Ibid., 93) 
Kymlicka does not consider group rights for national minorities as violating the liberal theory of rights, 
where the individual is the bearer of them, but argues for supplementing traditional human rights with 
minority rights (Kymlicka 1995, 6). Unlike the majority community whose culture is embodied in 
the major institutions of society and enjoys considerable power and dignity, the national minority is 
often disadvantaged by factors beyond its control and needs protection of its rights to equalize it with 
the majority community. However, the right to culture does not belong to all minorities equally, as 
for Kymlicka the right to full cultural membership belongs only to the national minority because it is 
territorially concentrated, and has a more or less complete cultural structure. For other minorities such as 
refugees or immigrants more limited rights are offered. (Ibid.)
2. Internationalization of Minority Rights and the Turkish Case in Comparison
Minority nationalism is a universal phenomenon: in all parts of the world national minorities are 
challenging the state over issues such as political representation, language rights, and self-government. 
While the challenge is universal, the states’ responses to it vary tremendously. (Kymlicka 2004, 127.) I 
will summarize here the main lines of minority policies in Europe based on the works of Will Kymlicka 
(2004, 2005) and Antony Alcock (2000). 
During the 19th century, the protection of minorities in Europe centered on religious minorities. In 
the 19th century language and culture also became politicized in the context of the rise of nationalism, 
and thus also linguistic or cultural minorities became viewed with suspicion and hostility. However, 
until the interwar period, measures of protection concentrated on religious groups. (Alcock 2000, 1-2.) 
The European attempts at the protection of minorities in the Ottoman Empire and the early republican 
period were briefly touched upon in chapters two and three. It was especially the emphasis on the rights 
of minorities in the peace treaties of Sévres (1920) and Lausanne (1923), which were part of the (limited 
and inefficient) international interwar attempt to protect minorities, that caused resentment in Turkey. 
All in all, the internationalization of minority issues was based on the premise of minorities as political 
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threats to states, and the aim of protective measures was political: to ensure peace and to avoid conflict 
between states over minority issues.
Between the aftermath of the First World War and the collapse of communism in Europe in 1989, 
the concept of minority rights was not emphasized on the international agenda. In the aftermath of the 
Second World War the focus shifted to individually defined human rights for all, rather than special 
rights for some, as evidenced by the UN adoption of the (non-binding) Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948 (Alcock 2000, 96-97). The assumption was that firm protection of individual 
rights would make further rights for the members of specific minorities unnecessary. The idea was that 
ethnic identity, like religion in a secular state, is something that people should be free to express in 
their private life, but which is not the concern of the state. (Kymlicka 1995, 3.) If there were special 
positive rights to be provided it was up to the host state to provide them. At this stage, the treatment 
of minorities was not seen as an international problem but a domestic affair or a state (Alcock 2000, 
96-97).394 In 1950 the Council of Europe adopted the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR), binding on its signatories, listing certain rights, and providing a machinery, including a 
petitions system, to ensure the enforcement of individual rights (Ibid., 117-118). In the 1960s efforts 
were made to explicitly guarantee the rights of minorities as a part of the ECHR, but these failed, 
and the ECHR provided mainly for non-discrimination for individuals. It is obvious from some UN 
documents (1950) and the Council of Europe documents (1960s and early 1970s) that creation of 
international standards for minority rights was hindered by the continued perception of minorities as 
political threats to states (Ibid., 102, 121).
The 1966 UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Article 1 stated 
that all “peoples” have a right to “self-determination” by which they can “freely determine their 
political status,”which has traditionally been interpreted to include the right to form one’s own state. 
In international law its application has been limited to peoples subject to colonization from overseas. In 
addition, there have been separate provisions for autonomy for indigenous peoples. (Kymlicka 2005.) 
If a minority was not considered as ”peoples” under Article 1, the only other option was to appeal to 
Article 27 of the ICCPR, which guarantees the right to ”enjoy their own culture... in community with 
other members of their group.” This has generally been understood to include only negative rights of 
non-interference, rather than positive rights to assistance, funding, autonomy or official language status. 
In effect, it simply reaffirms that members of national minorities must be free to exercise their standard 
rights (of freedom of speech, association, assembly, and conscience). (Kymlicka 2005.)
According to Antony Alcock, positive developments for regional minorities in Western Europe 
were made from the 1970s onwards in individual states. European integration brought about recognized 
frontiers, which made granting minority rights or regional autonomy much easier for the host states. 
It also meant the adherence of western European states to the vast corpus of human, political, cultural 
and welfare rights stipulated by Council of Europe conventions and EU regulations, which have helped 
the economic and social integration of minorities in the host countries, while enabling them to keep 
their cultures alive. A significant conceptual development had to with the doctrine of self-determination 
(guaranteed in the UN ICCPR in 1966), which was now interpreted as two possible variants: external 
394 There were attempts to get protection of minorities inserted into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, but they 
were rejected. Also, there was an attempt to include cultural genocide included in the Genocide Convention adopted at the 
same time, but that was rejected as well. (Alcock 2000, 100-101.)
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self-determination and internal self-determination, i.e. autonomy. This created a framework within 
which minorities could make legitimate demands without the specter of separation as the final goal. 
Steps towards greater autonomy for regional minorities were also made easier by the rise of regionalism in 
Europe. (Alcock 2000, 134-135.)
According to Kymlicka, in the course of the 20th century, internal self-determination (i.e. territorial 
autonomy) became the norm for sizable, territorially-concentrated national minorities with nationalist 
aspirations within the liberal democracies of the West.395 This model for accommodating sizable and 
concentrated minorities seems to have been successful, and no Western democracy that has adopted 
territorial autonomy and official bilingualism has reversed this decision. In short, argues Kymlicka, “if 
there is such a thing as a “European standard” for dealing with mobilized national minorities, some 
form of internal autonomy would appear to be it.” (Kymlicka 2005, 199) Yet, until early 1990s the 
treatment of minorities was an internal matter of each state, and was not much regulated or enforced on 
international arenas.
The collapse of communism in Europe engendered a number of violent ethnic conflicts. In the 
end, the violence was primarily confined to the Caucuses and the Balkans, but this wasn’t clear at 
the time. To prevent ethnic tensions from turning into violent conflicts the Western democracies in 
the early 1990s felt they had to do something, and they decided, in effect, to ”internationalize” the 
treatment of national minorities in post-communist Europe. Thus the status and treatment of national 
minorities became matters of international concern. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (OSCE), the Council of Europe, the European Union and NATO have been actively involved 
in decision-making about state-minority relations since 1989 (Kymlicka 2005, 191) as is evidenced 
by the series of important European agreements from the 1990s: the OSCE Copenhagen Document 
(1990), the European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages (1992), the Central European 
Initiative Instrument for the Protection of Minorities (1994), and the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (1995). All four agreements include the right to education in one’s 
mother tongue and guarantee the minorities’ right to establish institutions, including schools. (O’Neil 
2007, 82-83.) 
Yet, despite the internationalization of minority rights issues since early 1990s, there are no 
uncontested international or even European norms regarding the extent of the rights national minorities 
should be granted, and the western democracies have not been pushing for any such model.396 However, 
even though there are still disagreements over the content of minority rights and room for negotiation, 
there is a general view over minority rights as a standard of “Europeanness”; granting minority rights 
has become seen as proof that a country has abandoned its ”ancient ethnic hatreds” and ”tribal 
nationalisms,”and is able to join a modern, liberal and cosmopolitan Europe. (Kymlicka 2005.)
In opposition to the liberal states of the West, in most post-communist Eastern and Central 
European (ECE) countries the idea of federalism or other forms of territorial autonomy has faced stern 
resistance. One important reason for this has been that, unlike in the West where demands for minority 
395 All groups over 250,000 that have demonstrated a desire for territorial autonomy now have it in the West, as well as many 
smaller groups. As examples Kymlicka cites Swedish-speaking Åland Islands in Finland, South Tyrol in Italy, Puerto Rico in 
the US, Catalonia and the Basque Country in Spain; Flanders in Belgium, and Scotland and Wales in Britain (Kymlicka 2004 
and 2005).
396   In addition, there are also western countries such as France and Greece that have not recognized national minorities, 
even though France has granted constitutional recognition to regional minority languages.
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rights have lately become addressed as issues of justice, in Eastern Europe (and most other parts of the 
world) they have been evaluated in terms of security. Within a framework of security, the main goal is 
to ensure that minorities are unable to threaten the existence or territorial integrity of the state, a threat 
that most ECE states believe that self-government for minorities poses. (Kymlicka 2004.) When one 
looks at Turkey’s attitude towards its minorities and multicultural policies, it is obvious it bears some 
resemblance to two western countries, i.e. France and Greece, in the sense that it has been reluctant to 
admit there are minorities within the nation (other than those defined in the Treaty of Lausanne). With 
the increasing visibility of Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish ethnicity/national identity as being separate 
from the Turkish, demands for minority rights have become discussed within a framework of security, 
similar to that of the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe.397
All in all, the Turkish case accords well with Kymlicka’s (2004) comments on securitizing minority 
rights elsewhere. The comments of representatives of both MHP and CHP reflect the idea of minority 
rights as an existential threat to the state, and the interpretation of minority rights as in issue of social 
justice is almost absent. As was already pointed out, this can then be used to advance the interests of the 
parties as it can be used to trump both normal democratic processes of debate and negotiation. Naturally 
the existence of secessionist violence and its extent in Turkey has made it easier to frame all claims for 
Kurdish rights as an issue of security.
Furthermore, when comparing the Turkish case with Western European practices and those of the 
post-communist countries, it is seen that tolerance for minority demands has been lower in Turkey than 
in the Eastern European countries. Kymlicka (2004) has listed typical minority demands in descending 
order of strength: 
1. secessionist violence/terrorism 
2. democratic secessionist mobilization
3. territorial autonomy
4. minority-language higher education
5. veto rights
6. collective rights
7. official language status
8. minority-language elementary schools
9. minority-language street signs.
According to him, in effect everything else except violence can be tolerated in the established Western 
democracies. In Turkey, by contrast, where part of the problem has been secessionist violence, even such 
weak demands as mother tongue primary education and local place names (8-9), usually tolerated in 
Eastern European countries, have not been accommodated until very recently. In line with this, Turkey 
is not a party to the European agreements on minority rights drafted in the 1990s, as these outline 
significant language rights for individuals (O’Neil 2007, 82-83).
To complicate the picture of Kymlicka’s neat division of Western European standards vs. ECE 
standards of state policies on multicultural issues and minority rights, Stephen Shulman has determined 
397 I discuss in here only those parts of Kymlicka’s views of eastern European post-communist countries that have direct 
relevance for understanding the Turkish case.
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that public support for minority rights was actually higher in Eastern European countries than in Western 
countries. According to a survey conducted in 1995-1996, the number of respondents from majority 
ethnic groups in Eastern European countries that agreed with the statement, “Ethnic minorities should 
be given government assistance to preserve their customs and traditions.” was noticeably higher than that 
in such Western countries as Canada, the US, or Sweden. (Shulman 2002, 577). 
3. Different Meanings of Multiculturalism
Since the late 1990s, multiculturalism has also become increasingly a target of criticism in public discourse. 
Kymlicka’s proposals for minority rights within multicultural citizenship were mainly concerned with 
national minorities rather than immigrant communities. However, in the public discourse the term 
multiculturalism is mainly used to refer policies vis-à-vis migrant communities. Much of the critique 
has been nationalist and opposed to (especially Muslim) immigration to Western countries, but by the 
2000s, multiculturalist policies have increasingly become a target of criticism by other political actors 
and political theorists as well. In a review article titled Citizenship and the crisis of multiculturalism, Brian 
S. Turner states that multiculturalism is in retreat because these policies have failed to deliver an equal 
share in social resources; they have failed to produce justice and equality. More importantly, they appear 
often to have divided rather than united societies (Turner 2006, 611). 
Kymlicka himself refutes the narrative of the “rise and fall of multiculturalism” (Kymlicka 2010). 
First of all, multiculturalism is often misrepresented as a static celebration of cultural difference rather 
than a set of policies to correct economic and political inequality. Also, reports of multiculturalism’s 
death are very much exaggerated and refer mainly to immigration and immigrant groups. There has been 
no retreat from the commitment to new models of multicultural citizenship for indigenous peoples and 
national minorities. On the contrary, the trend towards enhanced language rights and regional autonomy 
for sub-state national groups remains fully in place in western democracies (Kymlicka 2010).
Bryan S. Turner (2006) has also pointed out several different meanings of multiculturalism, which 
help understand what the debate over multiculturalism has been about. There is a need to distinguish 
between multiculturalism as a policy, as a moral position and as the description of a state of affairs. 
Multiculturalism as a state of affairs means the existence within the same society of a diversity of different 
cultures and communities. This should not be opposed in a democratic society. While liberal philosophers 
and social scientists may be hesitant about the merits of multiculturalism as a policy (at least vis-à-
vis immigrant communities), it does not follow from this withdrawal that diversity has ceased to be a 
value. Also, it is far from evident that Western democracies have actually retreated from multiculturalist 
policies. According to the summary scores in the Multiculturalism Policy Index of Queens University, 
there have actually been significant improvements in recent decades (http://queensu.ca/mcp/).
Much of the political theory on accommodating ethno-cultural diversity within liberal democratic 
states, and debates on multicultural policies, are based on the Western European or North-American 
experience to such a degree that it is only partially relevant in such other contexts as Turkey. In Turkey 
the problems of diversity do not stem from recent mass immigration, lack of integration, cultural 
clashes, or xenophobia. In Turkey the most vocal demands have been made by the national minorities398 
398 In Kymlicka’s use of the term. In Turkey the term national minority is used to refer to the minorities defined in the Treaty 
of Lausanne, i.e. Greek Orthodox Christians, Armenians and Jews.
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such as Kurds and Alevis, whereas the immigrant communities399 have been quite willing to adopt the 
Turkish national identity on the public level (for more details, see Aydın 2005).400 Yet, the debates on 
multiculturalism and individual versus group rights are useful as they provide a comparative framework 
for accommodating diversity, and the experiences of other countries can be used to evaluate the usability 
and effectiveness of various policies of multiculturalism. In addition, comparisons with post-communist 
Eastern and Central European cases can be useful for understanding the situation in Turkey, and lessons 
can be learned from the historical development of multiculturalist policies in Western Europe.
When one looks at the debates in the press as well as other developments in Turkey, it is quite obvious 
that multiculturalism as a state of affairs became increasingly accepted in the public sphere between 1999 
and 2009. The findings of my analysis give further proof of the process of “denationalization” which has 
been taking place in Turkey in the sense that difference and diversity have become more visible. As Ayşe 
Kadıoğlu pointed out already in 2007, the process of forgetting, which accompanied the formation of the 
Turkish national identity (see chapter 2), has been turned back (Kadıoğlu 2007), and acknowledgement 
of difference is a precondition for granting rights pertaining to difference. One clear indicator of the 
wider acceptance of diverse cultural identities in the public sphere is the gradual normalization of the 
word Kurd/Kurdish. It has been a difficult word, banned from public use for a decade, and after that 
gained ground only slowly. Even in 2009 it continued to be still somewhat sensitive and it was rare to 
refer to politically active individuals as Kurds in the press, even Kurdish nationalist actors. So, difference 
has become more visible and accepted, but what about rights pertaining to difference? Has Turkey 
progressed towards multicultural policies?
4. Are Multiculturalist Policies Necessary in Turkey?
Despite increasing acceptance of multiculturalism as an existing social reality, multiculturalism as a 
policy has been, and continued (in 2009) to be, very much opposed. The fear of multiculturalism as 
divisive rather than as something that could unite societies was deeply felt. It was feared that if Turkey 
changes its strategy of coping with cultural diversity from assimilation to multiculturalist policies, this 
may not lead to the intended goal, integrative pluralism (the ideal) but to fragmented pluralism, where 
the society is divided into several separate communities, a plural society. This fear has been aggravated 
by the historical experiences of the Late Ottoman period, and in this historical framework Western 
demands for improvements of minority rights tended to be still viewed with great suspicion. In addition, 
the internationalization of minority issues described by Kymlicka (2005) has not been fully understood 
in Turkey. Multiculturalism and demands by Western actors for Turkey to improve its minority rights 
were thus often associated with imperialism and Western power play rather than with human rights and 
democracy (in the sample, see CC0915). The insistence on Kurds as already equal went hand-in-hand 
with the association of multiculturalism with imperial designs.
Unlike in the press, the issue of management of cultural, linguistic, and ethnic diversity in 
Turkey has been a focus of lively scholarly investigation and debate since early 1990s. In one article, 
399 The majority of which are Muslims who immigrated to Anatolia during the gradual shrinking of the Ottoman Empire 
during the 19th and early 20th century.
400 This situation is bound to change with the recent large-scale migration of Syrian refugees to Turkey since 2012. Initially 
Syrians fleeing the war were welcomed with the expectation that their stay would be of limited duration. As the war in Syria 
has continued and intensified, the temporary guests have turned into long-term residents. 
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the Turkish researcher Betigül Ercan Argun (1999) attempts to answer the question as to whether the 
Kurdish question can be satisfactorily settled within the parameters of universal (liberal) citizenship or 
ifs it calls for the introduction of group-specific rights as an integral part of its peaceful settlement. She 
comes to the conclusion that resolving the Kurdish issue in Turkey does not necessarily demand group 
specific rights but can be resolved within the paradigm of universal human rights and liberal ideal of 
citizenship. She argues that the problem in Turkey does not stem from “too much modernity,” a claim 
that the so-called republican-communitarian camp has made for Western countries, but from too little 
modernity. Commitment to, and exhaustion of, liberal principles of citizenship and equality have not yet 
been fully realized in Turkey. The Kurdish issue is a part of a larger problem, the problem of inconclusive 
liberal democracy. “This larger problem is compounded by the republican ethos of top-down imposition 
of the common good and the fear of territorial loss entrenched in the Turkish political culture.” (Argun 
1999, 86.)
While it is easy to agree with Argun’s general conclusions of inconclusive liberal democracy, her 
straightforward rejection of group rights and affirmative action in the case of Turkey’s Kurds is more 
open to controversy. She opposes group rights on principle as well as in practice. She rejects group rights 
by pointing out one of the main weaknesses of multiculturalism, namely taking for granted the human 
need for culture, primordialist attitude towards cultural groups as given, and the lack of attention to 
conflict of interests within groups. (Argun 1999.) In practical terms this critique would translate into 
the simple questions of why the state should prioritize “culture” over other sources of identity such as 
class, gender, profession or sexual orientation, and how the limits of the groups bearing group-specific 
rights are defined. In the Turkish case, if there were affirmative policies offered for Kurds, who would be 
defined as Kurdish? What would the criteria be? Who would decide if one is a Kurd or not?
This critique ignores the fact that usually gender, sexual, class or professional identities are not 
incompatible with national identities. The situation is pronouncedly different with ethnic identities as 
there often is an ethnic component in national identity (see for example Miller 1995). Her uncertainty 
on how to define who is Kurdish resonates with the comments encountered in the Turkish press. In a 
way this emphasis on the problems of defining “who is a Kurd” reflects the notion of a stable, singular 
(ethnic) identity. As was discussed earlier in this work (see chapter 3), there is no unanimity of answers, 
no clear objective criteria of definition. Also, the “groupness” of minority groups can and should be 
questioned (Brubaker 2004), as often there are conflicting interests as well as deep cleavages within these 
groups. In the case of Turkey this can be exemplified by the position of the “sub-groups” such as Zaza 
and Alevi vis-à-vis Kurdishness. An individual can at the same time feel attachment to one’s identity as 
a Zaza, an Alevi, and a Kurd, or prioritize only one or two of these. Yet, as usually an important part of 
affirmative action for minorities takes the form for funding for minority-language schools, universities 
and media, there are many instances where the issue of defining Kurdishness of individuals would not 
constitute a problem for instituting affirmative action. A more problematic issue would be the questions 
of regional autonomy and or political quotas for minority members. Regional autonomy has been on the 
list of demands voiced by the nationalist Kurds, whereas the latter issue is not under discussion in Turkey, 
as ethnic Kurds have been estimated to have been well-represented in political decision-making, with the 
main problem being the 10% national threshold.
Even if one might disagree with some of Argun’s arguments, her conclusion that liberal citizenship 
is enough to provide the necessary solution is comforting in the sense that there seemed to be little 
support for group-rights in Turkey. Within all the media texts analyzed for this work, only Abdullah 
Öcalan’s lawyer Ömer Güneş explicitly argued for group rights (Milliyet 12.8.2009). Of course, on the 
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basis of the sample it is impossible to estimate how many others who proposed cultural rights, truly 
understood them within the framework of collective rights. Yet, some additional indication of lack of 
general or at least official approval of multiculturalism can be gleaned from the fact that the Turkish word 
çokkültürlülük (multiculturalism) or its different variants was absent from the “official” online Turkish 
dictionary of TDK, though Google search produced about 130,000 hits (both accessed in June 2013).
In addition to group rights, Argun explicitly opposes the practice of affirmative action, central for 
the ideals of multiculturalism401 on the basis that it is difficult to test 
…whether or not inequality of opportunity with respect to Kurds has an obvious ethnic basis that 
warrants group-specific cultural rights for compensatory purposes. The fact that in Turkey inequality 
of opportunity cuts across ethnicity confounds any empirical test in this regard. There are many ethnic 
non-Kurds who, in the process of rapid modernization, are being deprived of status and resources as 
well. There are insufficient studies that link Kurds’ inequality and poverty to their Kurdishness in a 
causal fashion. (Argun 1999, 94)
A large-scale survey research made more than a decade after Argun wrote her article shows clearly the 
inequality between different ethnicities, even if it cannot build a causal relation as to the reasons for 
the inequality (Konda 2011). Such a study would probably have been impossible at the time Argun 
wrote her article. According to its findings, the educational levels of those identifying themselves as 
Kurds are lower than those of Turks: more than 17 percent of Kurds were illiterate (4% of Turks), the 
average years of education was 6 (8 for Turks) and only 7.3 percent had university level education (13.3 
for Turks) (Konda 2011, 93). The level of unemployment was higher for Kurds, 18 percent (11.8% for 
Turks) and the household incomes were considerably lower with 48 percent earning less than 700 TL per 
month (31.6% for Turks). Plus that, they had poorer social security benefits than Turks with only 40.8 
percent being covered by the work-based SGK (72.9% of Turks) and 36.6 being covered by the so-called 
green card health insurance granted to those households whose per person income falls below 1/3 of the 
minimum wage. A total of 22 percent of Kurds had no social security, with 19 percent of Turks being 
in the same situation. All in all, when individual income levels are looked at, it can be estimated that 23 
percent of Kurds live under the hunger line and another 29 under the poverty line (as defined by Turkish 
Statistical Institute). The poverty and inequality have been deepened by the economic losses caused by 
the fighting, which had affected 29.9 percent of the Kurds interviewed. One in five Kurds had either lost 
a family member or had one injured in the fighting, and 17 percent had been forced to migrate because 
of it (Konda 2011, 94-6). 
The study might have been impossible in the 1990s, but arguments similar to Argun’s were made 
by several Cumhuriyet writers in 2009. Many of them claimed Kurds are not discriminated against in 
Turkey as they have the same legal rights as all citizens (inheritance rights were given as an example (!) 
in CC0910), their horizontal social mobility has not been hindered, and they have equal opportunity of 
vertical social mobility (CC0913). However, this total rejection of de-facto inequality was not the typical 
attitude in the sample. More than half (16) of the interviewees in Milliyet’s series of interviews approved 
of affirmative measures when defined as economic measures within geographically specified area.
401 According to Kymlicka, affirmative action usually refers to temporary measures supplementing human rights and aiming 
to alleviate historical injustices. It is different from permanent minority rights. (Kymlicka 1995, 4). 
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All in all, analysis of the debates in the press in 2009 indicated that attempts to resolve Turkey’s 
identity-based problems within the framework of multiculturalist minority or group rights would not 
be the easiest path. Considerably more support was given to proposals for cultural rights within the 
framework (of liberal and individualistically defined system) of constitutional citizenship. 
7.4.5 constitutional citizenship and individual Rights in 
management of diveRsity?
Constitutional citizenship (or constitutional patriotism) aims to offer one possible solution for respecting 
human diversity and at the same time providing solutions to concerns of social integration. It aims for a 
racially or ethnically inclusive models of citizenship reconciled with unity and cohesion in the political 
community. German philosopher Jürben Habermas (1998a) has offered to save the format of the nation-
state, argues for reconstitution of true liberalism, and envisions constitutional citizenship. Habermas 
has pointed out that the liberal theory of rights behind modern constitutional state is individualist 
theory of rights (Habermas 1998a, 203) and asks whether a theory of rights that is so individualistically 
constructed can deal adequately with struggles for recognition by collective identities. Habermas’ answer 
to this is yes. He demands the consistent actualization of the system of rights, and politics of recognition 
that protects the integrity of individual in the life contexts in which her identity is formed (Ibid. 206-
208). The aim and meaning of cultural rights is that an individual has the right to her culture. It is not 
the right of the culture to be protected to survive, i.e. the aim is not the preservation of cultures as such! 
Therefore the right to culture can be seen as the realization of individual rights rather than communal 
rights, as the right for cultural membership that needs to be guaranteed because individual’s identity 
is interwoven with collective identities and can be stabilized only in cultural network. Also, failure of 
cultural recognition is often connected with gross social discrimination (Ibid.)
In multicultural societies, the coexistence of forms of life with equal rights means ensuring every 
citizen the opportunity to grow up within the world of cultural heritage and to have his or her 
children grow up in it without suffering discrimination. It means the opportunity to confront this 
(and every other) culture and to perpetuate it in its conventional form or to transform it, as well as 
the opportunity to turn away from its commands with indifference or break with it self-critically 
and then live spurred on by having made a conscious break with tradition, or even with a divided 
identity. (Habermas 1998a, 223) 
In short, Habermas has argued for constitutional citizenship with individualistically defined liberal 
theory of rights which can accommodate the protection of differences. As Argun also reminds, 
…at a philosophical level there is nothing in the very logic of liberalism that excludes the recognition 
of multiplicities of cultures within a multinational or polyethnic state. The liberal language of rights 
does in fact provide us with valuable tools to be responsive to identity politics. Cultural survival of 
groups is in principle possible without making groups rather than individuals the bearer of rights. It 
is true that culture can only be nurtured collectively rather than individually. But this is a different 
claim than arguing that the group rather than the individual, differences rather than common traits 
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should be the bases of a state’s theory of rights and that the state should take action to protect and 
nurture some cultures more than others. I argue for a consolidated liberal democratic framework, 
a properly civic understanding of nationality and citizenship, and legal reforms in the direction of 
non-interference by the state in the sustenance and development of culture and identity, rather than 
for positive steps in the form of legislating group rights and thereby entrenching differences. (Argun 
1999, 98-99.)
The idea of constitutional citizenship or constitutional patriotism has raised considerable interest in 
Turkey since the 1990s. One of the most vocal supporters of it has been the well-known Turkish scholar 
Ahmet İçduygu. Following the ideas put forth by Jürgen Habermas, three Turkish scholars, Ahmet 
İçduygu, Yılmaz Çolak and Nalan Soyarık, have suggested adoption of constitutional citizenship in 
Turkey (İçduygu & al. 1999). According to İçduygu & al. constitutional citizenship is based on the idea 
that democratic citizenship in contemporary states does not need to be rooted in the national identity of 
a people. The notion of constitutional citizenship works to answer the question of belonging and social 
solidarity by emphasis on socialization of the citizens into a common political culture, without divorcing 
themselves from their diversity of different cultural forms of life. The common identity would be created 
around the historical project of the constitutional state (over generations). By recognizing and including 
the diversity and otherness in one common identity, constitutional identity would contribute to the 
integrative function of citizenship. It is also believed that the demand for both representational rights 
and multicultural rights coming from various identities is a demand for inclusion, not for exclusion 
(İçduygu & al. 1999, 192).
Writing in 1999, İçduygu & al. refer to a public debate on constitutional citizenship that had taken 
place in Turkey. According to them, the debates up to that time could be summarized into four basic 
points: 1) The struggle of the ethnic and religious identities for recognition as distinct groups has had a 
very significant impact on the notion of nation-state in Turkey. 2) There is a need to recognize the reality 
and implications of that identity-based diversity. 3) There is greater awareness about the need for a series 
of policy initiatives, which will help the state better manage the consequences of identity-based diversity 
in the interests of the state, citizens and society as a whole. 4) There is recognition of the importance of 
the citizenship institution in solving the identity-based conflicts (Ibid., 202). It is difficult to estimate 
the scope of this public debate during the second half of the 1990s they refer to, as they give only a few 
citations referring to the debate, but based on my sample more than a decade later, I would estimate that 
the four points summarized by İçduygu & al. were more or less valid for the debate on cultural diversity 
in 2009. Unfortunately, the public debate seemed not to have evolved much further than that.
For the proponents of constitutional citizenship, citizenship represents something more than a 
formal legal status of membership. It is relevant in securing the loyalty of distinct identity groups in the 
country. The opponents see it as a danger to the nation and argue that recognition of ethnic and religious 
identities will not bring a sense of unity to the nation. These identities will always have certain difficulties 
in meeting the basic measure of becoming a member of the nation, bounded by a sense of solidarity, a 
common culture and a national consciousness. In the opinion of the three authors, Turkey can be more 
stable and prosperous only on the condition that it is able to deal with its multicultural society. Thus 
İçduygu & al. propose constitutional citizenship as a practical solution for managing diversity (1999.) I 
would interpret most of the calls for pluralist and democratic order in Turkey (çoğulcu bir demokratik 
nizam by İhsan Dağı CZ0906), where Kurds would be equal citizens (eşit yurttaşlar, CZ0906) in the 
sample in 2009 to fall within the broad category of support for constitutional citizenship. 
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Ahmet İçduygu, this time together with Fuat E. Keyman, took up the topic again in 2005 in a 
book titled Citizenship in a Global World, European Questions and Turkish Experiences. In the 
introduction to the collection of articles, they pack together Turkey’s economic problems at the turn of 
the millennia, governing crisis, and identity-based conflict. They argue that, “The strong-state tradition, 
national developmentalism, an organic vision of society and the republican model of citizenship together 
established the foundational basis for the state-centric mode of operation of Turkish modernity.” (Keyman 
& İçduygu 2005: 7). Turkish modernity (for the use of modernization/modernity see Keyman 2000) 
was successful in the creation of the Turkish nation-state, economic development, industrialization, 
urbanization, education and social welfare. Yet, the material success of Turkish modernity did not bring 
real democratization, the development of the language of rights and freedoms, or the promotion of 
individual autonomy or the recognition of cultural differences (Ibid.).
They argue that since the 1980s Turkish modernity has been in crisis. The politics of national 
developmentalism ended in early 1980s, and since then Turkey has witnessed both the collapse of the 
organic vision of society and the emergence of the so-called politics of identity with the resurgence of 
Islam, the Kurdish question, and the emergence of civil society, all of which have in their own ways 
challenged the organic vision of society (Ibid., 8). According to the interpretation of Keyman and 
İçduygu, the crisis of Turkish modernity was also a crisis of the republican duty-based model of Turkish 
citizenship on which it has initiated its state-centric operation. Thus, to overcome its various problems, 
Turkey needs to radically alter its state-society relations in a democratic and liberal form (Ibid.). 
Keyman & İçduygu then call for a democratic reconstruction of Turkish modernity and propose 
a multicultural, differentiated, and constitutional reconstruction of Turkish citizenship based on the 
language of rights rather than duties (Ibid., 3). In their intervention, Keyman and İçduygu do not discuss 
in any detail the particular model of citizenship to be followed, but merely argue for the general need for 
democratic and liberal reconsideration of Turkish citizenship so that identity claims can be articulated 
to citizenship rights. Keyman continues with the theme in an article in the same book, where he argues 
that citizenship in Turkey should be post-national, differential, and constitutional, and continues to 
define these as follows: post-nationalist in the sense that citizenship is not reduced to legal and political 
membership of the nation-state, differential in the sense that it should recognize both individual and 
group rights, and constitutional in the sense that it should function as a ground for the constitutional 
guarantee of both individual and group rights (Keyman 2005, 285).
In another article in the same book Soyarik-Sentürk acknowledges the important steps taken in the 
beginning of the 2000s, that “hold out some hopes for a more rights-oriented and liberal understanding 
of citizenship,” but argues that a new constitution is needed, so that “Then we might see the possibility 
of democratic state-society relations in Turkey, which would be based on a new constitution, recognizing 
the importance of the language of rights of individuals as citizen-subjects.” (Soyarik-Sentürk 2005, 139).
In this last sample the need for a new constitution was voiced by different commentators from 
a variety of backgrounds, and there was an increasing awareness of the need to institute new kind of 
citizenship not based on narrowly interpreted homogenizing Turkish nationalism and membership of the 
nation to resolve Turkey’s identity-based conflict (for example by the researchers Ümit Kardaş (CZ0913), 
Levent Köker (CZ0910) and İhsan Dağı (CZ0906) in Zaman). In line with this, Turkey’s Kurds, as well 
as other language groups, could be granted wider cultural rights, but conceptualized within individual or 
human rights rather than group rights or any communitarian model of recognition. This would require a 
new ethnically blind constitution, a new social contract with a new vision of the basis of social solidarity 
(also Çelik in Z0901). Or, as Ümit Kardaş put it in simple terms:
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There is no need to have a definition of citizenship in the new constitution. However, if there must 
be a definition, my proposal is this: “Everyone who is connected to the Republic of Turkey by the 
connection of citizenship are citizens of Turkey, despite religious, sectarian, racial (ethnic) or cultural 
differences402 (CZ0913)
In addition to individualistically defined cultural rights and constitutional citizenship, there was 
some support expressed by supplementary affirmative action in the form of support for the economic 
development of those provinces that have suffered from the war. A measure of decentralization of power 
as a part of a wider process of democratization could take place, but any sort of regional autonomy is 
unlikely to gather enough support.
Another researcher to argue for the institution of constitutional citizenship in Turkey is Başak İnce: 
“The demands coming from different identities in Turkey can be met through constitutional citizenship.” 
(İnce 2012, 193.) According to her, political attachment centered on the norms, values, and the 
procedures of liberal-democractic constitution, a concept of citizenship which is purely formal, legal and 
concerned with the relation of the citizen to the state can secure the loyalty of distinct identity groups in 
a way that citizenship based on membership of the nation cannot (Ibid.). Like Keyman, she also goes on 
further to argue for group rights within constitutional patriotism: 
The concept of constitutional citizenship as founded on the articulation of identity claims with 
citizenship rights could provide an effective basis for the solution of problems that Turkey faces. We 
should articulate identity claims within the context of constitutional citizenship which operates not 
only as a legal and political membership but also as an articulating principle for the recognition of 
group rights. The solution should not be sought in identity, but in an attempt to articulate identity 
claims to citizenship rights within the context of a democratic and pluralist vision of Turkish 
modernity. Only such a kind of citizenship can create substantial equality in addition to legal 
equality in Turkey. (İnce 2012, 193). 
For her, constitutional citizenship within the liberal and individualistically defined theory of rights need 
not be in opposition to group rights. 
İnce notes the positive, albeit cautious, steps that have been taken towards the recognition of 
minority cultural rights, sees a new constitution as essential, and calls for political dialogue as a part of 
the solution. The Turkish government needs to gain the trust and support of its citizens. Kurds demand 
to be recognized as real citizens, as partners on equal footing with the Turks. They expect the state to be 
their friend, to embrace them as citizens entitled to equal treatment with Turks and to take affirmative 
measures to alleviate the legacy of Turkification policies. Nevertheless, having constitutional citizenship 
in a diverse society is not easy. As İnce also points out, Turkey has been working on a new constitution 
for years, and all in all, despite the noteworthy improvements in the state’s approach towards minority 
citizens, it is too early to talk about constitutional citizenship in Turkey in 2012 (İnce 2012, 195-6).
Despite its less than spotless record in freedom of expression and often intolerant attitude towards 
the media, the AKP governments have managed to open the discussion on the Kurdish issue. The public 
402 Compare this formulation with the definition in the 1924 Constitution: “The people of Turkey regardless of their religion 
and race would, in terms of citizenship, be considered Turkish” discussed in chapter two.
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debates have progressed from round-about expressions, virtually a code-language to an open debate on 
conceptual (and at times also practical) matters. Within these debates, even quite radical proposals for 
solution have been presented, considered, and debated. The existence of these debates is promising, even 
if the immediate results have fallen far behind expectations.
Yet, even if institutionalization of democracy and citizens’ rights including full linguistic rights are 
seen to have significant support, it is a different matter when and how they can be realized in the face 
of the ardent nationalist opposition working to raise public opinion against any “concessions.” There are 
deep divisions in the Turkish society between Turks and Kurds, secularists and religious people, the rich 
elite and the poorer masses, the urbanites and the rural population, etc., which are not made any easier 
by the deep political polarization and mistrust between the two largest parties: the AKP and the CHP. 
This makes it almost imperative for Turkish politicians to constantly emphasize unity (and brotherhood), 
and unity of the nation has remained as one of the catch-phrases in the political parlance. Also the 
political rhetoric of the AKP is colored by nationalist ways of thinking and speaking. The 2009 sample 
was striking in just how many commentators worried over possible public reaction against proposed 
steps for solving the Kurdish problem. It is also questionable whether those changes that can be made 
acceptable for this Turkish public opinion would also be enough to satisfy Turkey’s Kurdish population. 
As Ahmet Akkaya stated in 2010, so far the reforms had been too little, too shy, and too late!403 
7.4.6 epilogue: the failuRe of the opening
Within a few months it became obvious that the 2009 initiative had also failed as it did not manage to 
bring about significant, concrete reforms. Its failure was due to a combination of factors and unforeseen 
events. First of all, it was stubbornly opposed by the CHP and the MHP and like-minded actors, and 
failed to receive the firm support of the pro-Kurdish DTP as well. The probably well-meant involvement 
of imprisoned Abdullah Öcalan with the submitting of his “Road Map” to peace in August 2009 probably 
did nothing to help the process either. In 2009 it would have still been unthinkable for a large share of 
the Turkish public to include him in the negotiations for peace. When the pro-PKK Kurdish nationalists 
gathered to celebrate the return from the mountains of a group of 34 PKK militants in October 2009, it 
also caused a nationalist backlash and public outcry: it appeared as if the PKK was returning to Turkey 
victorious! This co-called Habur incident has become seen as signaling or even causing the end for the 
Kurdish opening. By the end of the year, the pro-Kurdish DTP was closed down by the Constitutional 
court, and great number of its members arrested. In 2010 the PKK ended its unilateral ceasefire and 
restarted armed activities. Once again the fighting was underway, and a peaceful solution and democracy 
were no closer than it had been in the past.
403 A statement made at the World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies in Barcelona in 2010.
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ChaPter 8: ConClUsions anD ComParisons
In this study I have investigated some of the reasons behind Turkey’s inability to resolve its Kurdish issue 
despite the enormous human, political, and economic costs of the conflict between the state and the 
PKK. Why had there been no serious attempts at non-military solutions prior to 2009 and why did the 
initiative in 2009 fail? Why was the progress from 2009 onwards slow and problematic? In this work 
the answer has been explored by examining the shortcomings of the (non-state) public discourse on the 
Kurdish issue, colored by nationalism, which has rendered public demands of sub-national groups for 
cultural and political rights illegitimate, and open public debates on the issue difficult. 
The work began by tracing in chapters two and three the ways the citizenship of Turkey, Turkish 
citizenship, and membership in the Turkish nation were formulated during the early republican period 
and how these formulations and related minority policies (vis-à-vis Kurdish speaking population) changed 
from the 1940s to late 1970s. Chapter four investigated how Turkish nationalism was reformulated in 
the aftermath of the 1980 military coup d’etat, and how the imagined and enforced homogeneity of the 
nation was challenged by claims for ethnic, religious, and sectarian identities in the 1990s. Chapter five 
presented the history of the Turkish-language press. 
As the most important aim of the work has been to contribute to the research on Turkish nationalism 
and citizenship by a systematic analysis of some relatively recent every-day manifestations of nationalism 
in an important sector of the public discourse, this concluding chapter concentrates on summarizing the 
findings of the analysis in the empiric chapters six and seven, where I analyzed through five case studies: 1) 
how Kurds and Kurdish demands for cultural and political rights were portrayed in the Turkish-language 
mainstream press (1999–2005) and; 2) what kinds of roles the media assume in the debates over proposals 
to change the way the citizenship of Turkey was conceptualized as a part of a resolution to Turkey’s Kurdish 
issue (in 2005 and 2009). In this chapter I attempt to explicitly evaluate the role of the print media in 
the process of discursive transformation, within which the Kurdish minority in Turkey has become more 
visible. What kind of role has the print media in Turkey played in the (re)production of the nation and 
representation of Kurds, Kurdish demands for cultural and political rights, and the Kurdish issue? What 
was the role of the print media in the process of discursive transformation? How has the discourse changed, 
and in what ways has the media’s reporting on the demands for Kurdish rights and recognition of Kurdish 
ethnicity or nation—as distinct from the Turkish identity within Turkey—promoted or hindered the 
creation of a multicultural Turkey and the constitutional reconstitution of Turkish citizenships in a form 
tolerant of cultural diversity? What should the relationship between national identity and citizenship be, 
and should the nation be retained as the source of the social solidarity on which the state is based?
In addition to summarizing my findings, I also compare my findings with those of other studies 
on the media, as well as studies on the content of educational materials and survey studies on attitudes, 
which address relevant issues of identity.
8.1 conclusions (i): kuRds emeRge and make “unReasonable” demands
The sixth chapter of this study analyzes through five snapshots how pro-Kurdish activism and demands 
for Kurdish cultural, linguistic, and political rights—as well as recognition of a separate Kurdish 
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identity—were (re)presented in the Turkish mainstream press (1999–2005), and what this tells us about 
the kind of Turkishness constructed by the press. Here I summarize the main findings and compare 
them with those of Sezgin & Wall from 2005 (previously mentioned in chapter six), who looked at the 
coverage of Kurds in the daily Hürriyet (from 1998 to 2002) and those of Derya Erdem from almost a 
decade later, analyzing also for approximately one year—from the end of 2008 to the end of 2009—the 
coverage of Hürriyet newspaper and two popular (or populist, not known for their high-quality news 
reporting) TV channels, Show TV and Star TV (Erdem 2014).
Case 1: The main findings of my analysis on the reporting in Milliyet, Cumhuriyet, Zaman, Sabah and Yeni 
Şafak on HADEP in the 1999 elections were as follows: 1) the pro-Kurdish HADEP’s failure to overcome 
the 10% threshold in the national elections and its spectacular success of winning 37 municipalities in 
the local elections were not considered important news by the mainstream national dailies. 2) There were 
no persons labeled as Kurds in the news. 3) The limits of the “politically correct” way of discussing pro-
Kurdish politics were still very narrow. HADEP was presented as a legitimate, or at least semi-legitimate, 
political actor and its representatives had a voice in the national media, which differs from the findings of 
Sezgin and Wall (2005), who argued that Kurds were not used as sources. HADEP was also not explicitly 
connected with the PKK and terrorism in the news on the 1999 elections, which is different from 
Erdem’s findings for 2008–2009 and the DTP. However, HADEP was also NOT presented as Kurdish, 
and this avoidance of the label Kurdish resulted in a curious representation, a sort of code language, 
understanding of which required prior background information. There was no information on issues 
such as: Why exactly was HADEP being harassed and in most cases also by whom? How exactly does 
“the region” differ from the rest of the country? Why wouldn’t the central state officials or the nationalist 
MHP work together with the new democratically elected HADEP mayors? Why would terrorists attack 
the elections? Why did the PKK want to become a political entity, and why would that be bad? Similar 
absences were noted by Sezgin & Wall (2005, 790, 794) in their study.
Case 2: Unlike the official sources such as state officials or legislation, the media were quite comfortable 
with the existence of Kurdish language by 2002, when the official sources still used euphemisms such as 
“the different languages and dialects used traditionally by Turkish citizens in their daily lives” or “other 
than the official language.” Despite this, the visibility of the Kurdish language was not combined with 
the existence of explicitly Kurdish actors in the news articles on Kurdish language education petition 
campaigns: individuals and groups petitioning for Kurdish language rights were not labeled as Kurds but 
as persons, students teachers, mothers, guardians, women, children, etc. The petitioners/demonstrators had 
no voice in the media. They were neither interviewed, nor presented with names as individuals, but were 
merely a faceless group; they were the causes for a debate that was conducted over their heads.
This should be seen as typical. Sezgin and Wall (2005) also noted how Kurds were kept silent in 
media coverage; discussions were about them, not with them; they were associated with terrorism and 
were portrayed as divisive and putting forth unreasonable demands. According to Derya Erdem’s study of 
the pro-Kurdish party DTP in the Turkish mainstream media: “…journalists systematically focus on the 
violence itself, and only extremely rarely actually give space to the views and grievances of the protestors. 
The reporting is often from ‘above’ and from a ‘distance’ and always biased, emotional, judgmental, and 
rendered with a dose of nationalist rhetoric.” (Erdem 2014, 56). According to her, the causes for the 
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protests are either not discussed or are dismissed as “excuses”; protestors are rarely interviewed and there 
is no interest in what brought them to the streets. Any reason expressed by the Kurds is dismissed as an 
excuse, as the real cause is creating chaos and instability. Also, some young protestors are “duped” (Ibid., 
54-5). 
Most of these conclusions were valid for the case of language teaching petitions in 2002 as well. 
The young Kurds were seen as being used by the PKK, which was behind the action, the real reason of 
which was not achieving Kurdish language education as that was impossible, but to take the issue to the 
European Court of Human Rights. However, unlike in Erdem’s sample from 2008–2009, where Kurds 
were presented as the source and instigator of violence in street protests, while the role of the security 
forces and heavy-handed security measures were not touched upon, it seems that in 2002 the security 
apparatus went too far: there was implicit criticism in the descriptions of the extreme security measures 
used to clamp down the campaign. This might make the reader wonder why sharp shooters were needed 
against youth demanding language education rights. There were also some voices calling for moderation 
and condemning the extreme measures. One of these was the former prime minister Mesut Yılmaz, who 
argued that it would be beneficial to act in moderation vis-á-vis the petitioners.
I concluded that the increased visibility of the Kurdish language and tacit acknowledgement in 
the press of the existence of linguistic and cultural diversity in Turkey were not translated into a 
willingness to tolerate political activity or cultural rights based on this diversity. Thus, a campaign 
of petitions by citizens to state institutions to receive educational services was generally constructed 
as a threat to the state and connected with separatist terrorism, despite the awareness that demands 
for minority language education could also be understood and discussed within the framework of 
democracy and human rights. The aims of this inherently political action rendered it illegitimate, and 
thus a good, proper citizen of Turkey would not engage in the campaign. This was also something 
noted upon by Erdem. According to her, the media constantly delegitimized the pro-Kurdish demands 
by connecting them with the PKK and “terrorism” (Erdem 2014, 51). A similar tendency was noted 
also by Sezgin & Wall (2005).
As has been noted by Murat Somer (2005b) for other instances, in 2002 there was also an intra-
elite disagreement on how to respond to Kurdish political activity, but it was not about granting wider 
cultural or linguistic rights, but at this time was still limited to a debate over the legality of demanding 
such wider rights as Kurdish language teaching. Granting cultural and linguistic minority rights was not 
deemed possible by most of the commentators in the mainstream press in January 2002. The framework 
within which the topic was discussed was still quite narrow and considerable terminological constraints 
remained.
Besides news articles, important for (re)producing social reality, I included a number of columns 
into the sample due to the great importance of columnists for public discussion in Turkey: they interpret 
and contextualize the issues presented in the news, which are often quite brief. Despite the relatively low 
circulations of the print press, the columnists are well-known media personalities with their followers, 
invitations to exclusive events, and television appearances. The well-known columnists write with their 
own name, and have much greater freedom to write as they wish than the news reporters. The columns 
differed from the news in several ways. Some of the columnists were more willing to accept political claims 
and citizen activity carried out on the basis of ethno-cultural Kurdish identity, and these columnists 
considered petitioning the state as a basic democratic and/or constitutional right of all citizens. Yet, even 
this debate remained mostly focused on the tactic and legitimacy of demanding, rather than over the 
content of the demand, i.e. the right for mother tongue education for non-Turkish speaking citizens. The 
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most notable exception was the Cumhuriyet columnist Aydın Engin, who used his constitutional right to 
petition the state as a citizen to gain the right to have Kurdish language education.
Case 3: The press did not consider the decision to close the pro-Kurdish HADEP in 2003 a very important 
news item. The basis for the closure, i.e. “actions aimed against the unity of the country” and support to 
the PKK were not questioned. Because the word Kurdish was still very much avoided in both the official 
parlance as well as by the media vis-à-vis political demands, HADEP was generally not constructed as a 
Kurdish or pro-Kurdish party in the news. Besides the lack of ethnic labeling, there was also a noticeable 
lack of general background information on the party and the reasons for its closure (with the exception of 
Zaman). Yet, the closure was not universally condoned: about half of the articles were at least somewhat 
critical of the decision. It was seen as harmful for democracy and Turkey’s international relations, as can 
clearly be seen from the following headlines: “Democracy is harmed” (Cumhuriyet 14.3.2003), “HADEP 
decision is a deviation from reforms” (Milliyet 15.3.2003), “HADEP: the decision is a political massacre” 
(Zaman 14.3.2003), “Like a graveyard of parties” (Sabah 14.3.2003). Also, the role of the Constitutional 
Court as an active agent, the existence of discord over the decision, the evaluation of the decision as harsh, 
and the presentation of the public prosecutors as over-zealous in performing their duties highlighted that 
the closure of the party was not inevitable, but that there was room for choice and that the constitutional 
court as an active agent decided to ban the party.
The results of my analysis differ significantly from those of Erdem on the 2009 closure of a later 
incarnation of the pro-Kurdish party, the DTP. She constructs a direct causal link between media’s way 
or reporting on the DTP and its closure, and argues that the media approved of/supported the legal 
proceedings against the party and normalized the proceedings, while some reporters seemed excited and 
eager over the process (Erdem 2014, 60-61). According to her, the closure decision in 2009 was not 
depicted as a failure of democracy, but instead as a “correct and well-placed decision.” Either the more 
populist media analyzed by Erdem was also more nationalist, which is quite likely, or the stance of the 
media towards the pro-Kurdish political actors had grown more harsh from 2003, when the decision to 
ban HADEP was taken during the relative calm under the unilateral ceasefire of the PKK. Or perhaps 
Erdem herself overinterprets the support of the press; for example, she interprets both the headline “DTP 
is banned” and the treatment of the closure as an everyday occurrence as being supportive of the decision 
(Ibid. 61). My interpretation of the headline would be more cautious, and unfortunately party closures in 
Turkey have not been very rare, so there are also grounds to treat them almost as part of normal politics.
Case 4: The press in general approved of AKP Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s public 
acknowledgement of the existence of a Kurdish issue in Turkey, which he expressed during his 2005 visit 
to Diyarbakır, the capital of the Kurdish-inhabited region. Supporters included pro-Kurdish actors, who 
expressed cautious optimism, other AKP politicians, civil society actors, and several columnists. Despite 
Erdoğan’s carefulness in depicting the reasons for the issue to lay in the past, and the solution to lay in 
democratization and dialogue within a unified nation, he drew criticism from virtually all the opposition 
parties (other than DEHAP, the pro-Kurdish party of the time). This criticism was made within the 
frameworks of nationalism and/or security of the homeland, where the problem is understood as that of 
separatist terrorism encouraged by hostile powers outside of Turkey, aggravated by the extreme poverty 
in the region, and thus, impossible to resolve by democratization. Typically those supportive of Erdoğan’s 
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statement were more relaxed with using the label Kurdish, whereas those opposing him usually refrained 
from talking about a Kurdish issue, let alone Kurds. 
It also deserves to be explicitly noted, that unlike opposition politicians, several columnists and 
other writers warmly supported Erdoğan’s statement and criticized him for not going far enough, not 
being more progressive. This wide public discussion of a Kurdish issue as something other than, or in 
addition to, terrorism was extremely important, as the way the issue is labeled/represented also suggests 
different measures for its resolution. For example, in Sezgin’s & Wall’s study of 1998–2002, Hürriyet still 
presented the Kurdish issue as simply terrorism and linked all Kurdish demands with terror (Sezgin & 
Wall 2005, 792). 
In 2005 the DEHAP representatives had a voice in the press and were shown to be the most 
influential political power in Diyarbakır.404 Yet, despite the voice, popularity, and local influence, the 
legal pro-Kurdish political party was generally not presented as a necessary participant in the dialogue 
the Prime Minister was calling for. A few exceptions notwithstanding, the legal pro-Kurdish actors were 
generally not seen as having a part to play in the resolution of the problem, but were dismissed as being 
PKK pawns. In the dichotomy constructed between “ordinary citizens of Kurdish origins” or “Kurds 
with common sense” and the PKK and “supporters of terrorism,” DEHAP clearly fell within the PKK-
group. Based on her analysis of media reporting of 2008–2009, Erdem argues along the same lines: the 
media present a third of the Kurds (i.e. voters of the pro-Kurdish parties) as not “our proper citizens” but 
a threat, an enemy within (Erdem 2014, 51).
The conclusions of Sezgin & Wall from 2005 and those of Erdem from 2014 do not give a positive 
picture of the Turkish language mainstream press. Sezgin & Wall argued that Kurds were mainly 
covered because of outside pressure, and that otherwise the Kurds would have been virtually ignored. 
In the opinion of the writers, this reflected the government’s reluctance to raise Kurdish issues, and the 
mainstream media’s reproduction and justification of this stand which helped to maintain the unequal 
position of Kurds in Turkish social life. Kurds were kept silent in media coverage; discussion was about 
them, not with them; they were associated with terrorism and portrayed as divisive and putting forth 
unreasonable demands. These researchers found the framework of the coverage to be very nationalistic 
and one that regarded the Kurds as enemy “others,” belittling and discrediting their existence and cultural 
values. The coverage was discriminatory and used degrading tones in discussions of Kurds, Kurdish 
culture, and language. They argued that the news coverage reinforce prejudices and was an indirect tool 
of oppression, rather than an agency of change. (Sezgin & Wall 2005, 795.)
Derya Erdem came to very similar conclusions a decade later: the language of the popular 
mainstream media was not impartial, but rather incited inter-ethnic enmity and polarization; socio-
political dynamics behind the conflict were not looked at, and Kurds were labeled as sources of “threat 
and danger,” sources of violence, thus shifting the agency and blame for the violence away from the 
state. Such coverage is also an obstacle to much needed dialogue, reconciliation, peace, tolerance, and 
democratization. She concluded that the media’s tendency to support the dominant militarist discourse 
renders the finding of a political, non-violent solution for the Kurdish question even more difficult. 
(Erdem 2014, 62). 
Despite a number of differences, the findings of my more detailed and larger study of several 
404 The party had received between 45 and 56% of the vote in Batman, Diyarbakır, Hakkâri, and Şırnak in the 2002 national 
elections.
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newspapers (Milliyet, Sabah, Zaman, Yeni Şafak, Cumhuriyet) support the general lines of the findings 
of the other two studies (on Hürriyet, Star TV and Show TV), even if my evaluation of the role of the 
mainstream media is not quite as negative. Yet, I agree that the role the Turkish language mainstream 
print media has played vis-à-vis accommodating the Kurdish demands for rights and recognition has 
been a problematic one. It did not assume the (idealistic) role of courageous defender of democracy and 
universal human rights, but mostly remained within the barriers of the officially promoted nationalist 
conceptualizations, and hindered rather than promoted transformation towards a multicultural 
Turkey more accommodating of difference, even if this difference became more visible during the time 
investigated. 
On the basis of my analysis, I also want to explicitly question what is understood with claims of a 
recognition of a Kurdish reality that supposedly had taken place in Turkey in the 1990s. When one looks 
closer, what this recognition amounted to is that in the 1990s it became increasingly difficult to deny the 
physical existence of Kurds in Turkey, and some selected comments from leading politicians (mentioned 
for example in: İçduygu & al. 1999; Bahceli & Noel 2011, 101-2; Yanık 2006, 287; Yavuz 2001, 17) 
became celebrated as signs of an almost official recognition of Kurdish identity in Turkey. Thus, it was 
somewhat surprising to note the continued difficulty in the use of the term “Kurdish” in my sample, 
especially in the news articles from 1999, 2002 and 2003: there were no Kurds as Kurds in the news 
articles. My analysis clearly shows that the “recognition” remained on the abstract level only, and Kurds 
as Kurds or the Kurdish identity were not visible in mainstream public, at least on the pages of the papers 
included in my sample in the said context of a routine political process with news events centering on the 
pro-Kurdish demands for cultural and political rights, where one could expect to find Kurds present. It 
is obvious that long until the 2000s, the demands for recognition for Kurdish identity and cultural rights 
were referred to in roundabout ways, with code words in mainstream public space. The readers of the 
dailies, of course, understood the nuances of the officially approved terminology.
In similar lines, Welat Zeydanlıoğlu has also recently noted that the said ‘recognition’ did not come 
about as a result of genuine reform and reconciliation process. Kurds or Kurdish were not granted any official 
status. But it had become impossible to deny their existence any longer. That’s why a grudging acknowledgement 
was forced upon the official discourse. Admissions of the existence of ‘Kurds’ or ‘citizens of Kurdish origins’ 
was sporadic and no serious policy change or legal reforms followed. In legislation, there was no reference to 
Kurds or the Kurdish language. (Zeydanlıoğlu 2014, 168-169.) So, the very partial “recognition” did not 
imply a change in policy and did not bring about the granting of fundamental linguistic rights, but was 
combined with discourses of denial and denigration (Ibid.). To an extent this holds true for the press as 
well: unlike in legislation, the word Kurdish was used, but as was pointed out, this usage remained on an 
abstract level, and this abstract presentation of diversity was not combined with support for rights based 
on difference.
8.2 conclusions (ii): tuRkish national identity, kuRdish ethnicity 
and citizenship
In chapter seven my study moved on to analyze explicit debates in the press in 2005 and 2009 on 
national identity and citizenship in connection to the Kurdish issue. I looked at two instances of explicit 
and normative debates (in Milliyet, Zaman, Cumhuriyet) over the relationships of national identity with 
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citizenship, and whether the nation should be retained as the source of social solidarity on which the 
state is based. The interest was on both the kind of reality constructed; i.e., how things are (re)presented 
as well as on normative arguments.
Turkey’s struggles with diversity and the tentative initiatives to find means for managing it were 
analyzed within the context of wider academic discussions and debates related to various issues raised 
by heterogeneity of populations in the supposedly culturally homogeneous nation-states and the 
implications for citizenship studies by this diversity (for example: Turner 1990 and 2006, Isın & Turner 
2007, Habermas 1998a, Kymlicka 1995). The Turkish case was evaluated vis-à-vis some of the different 
strands in the contemporary international citizenship discourses, namely these are the normative ideals 
of conservative nationalism (represented by Roger Scruton), liberal nationalism (of David Miller), 
multiculturalism (á la Will Kymlicka), and constitutional citizenship (á la Jürgen Habermas).
Case five: I concluded that in the debates in the mainstream press in November 2005 surrounding 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s proposal to change the definition of citizenship, the dominant way to view the 
relationship between the nation, citizenship, and state fell under the heading of conservative nationalism 
(or defensive-nationalism of Murat Somer 2005b). Many of the participants in the November 2005 
debate considered the Turkish nation as the ultimate ontological unit of political life; Turkishness was 
seen as an essential national identity shared by all citizens of Turkey, referred to as Turks. Individuals were 
understood to have a specific national identity that is derived from, and inextricably links them to, other 
members of the national community. This national identity had also great instrumental value, for the 
state as social solidarity based on membership of the Turkish nation was seen as essential for the territorial 
integrity and continuing survival of the state. Citizenship of Turkey as the basis for this commonality was 
not up to the task, and was seen to lead to either disintegration or federative state structure. 
I also argued that the relationship constructed between the nation and ethnicity was a problematic 
one: it was generally not considered acceptable for a citizen of Turkey to claim only a Kurdish identity, but 
one was still expected to also claim Turkish national identity in addition to the Kurdish ethnic one. Many 
columnists explicitly argued against the idea of Turkishness and Kurdishness as equal ethnic identities. 
One of the most important dangers involved in this conceptualization of Turkishness as non-ethnic, 
is that it makes it difficult to understand the pro-Kurdish demands in any other light than separatism. 
The conservative nationalist arguments either overlooked the pro-Kurdish demands for wider linguistic 
rights, or posited the Kurds as already equal. Thus, within conservative nationalist position meaningful 
discussion on further rights for minorities was unnecessary as everyone was already equal and there was 
no discrimination on the basis of ethnicity or mother tongue.
Even if much of the debates still remained within a conservative-nationalist framework, there were 
different voices as well. Erdoğan’s November 2005 proposal of citizenship of Turkey as the connecting 
bond for all inhabitants of Turkey, as well as most comments for his support, were classified as liberal-
nationalist. The main difference between conservative and liberal nationalisms was stated to be the latter’s 
emphasis on individual rights and higher tolerance of diversity. However, in the debates of 2005 the 
liberal-nationalist stance was still in the minority in the sample investigated.
It was concluded that the willingness of the prime minister to repeatedly publicly address the Kurdish 
issue within the frame of democratization and citizenship, and the resulting highly public debates on 
sensitive issues, were important in themselves, even if there still remained many constraints to the way 
the issue could be discussed in public. The constraints I emphasized were the obvious terminological 
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ones, especially vis-à-vis the term “minority,” and the continued lack of concrete policy proposals to 
improve Kurdish cultural or political rights. The political polarization and hostility between the AKP 
and the Kemalist CHP also influenced the tone of the debates in a negative way, and most likely induced 
the CHP to use stricter nationalist rhetoric in its opposition to the AKP. It was also concluded that even 
if the role the mainstream press played was important, when compared with other, alternative venues of 
debate (such as books and academia), the high circulation mainstream dailies analyzed in this work still 
tended to give voice for state-centric and conservative nationalist approaches.
In 2009, the AKP government launched an approach that stated the resolution of Turkey’s Kurdish 
issue as its primary aim. An important part of the initiative was to be the redefinition of Turkish 
citizenship as a less ethnically based understanding of the term. The opening sparked lively debates over 
both the possible ways to resolve the Kurdish issue as well as over the definition of citizenship in Turkey. 
When comparing the debates of 2009 with those of 1999 and even 2002, it was obvious that many 
previously almost taboo topics had by 2009 become topics of passionate debates. The scope of topics 
that could be discussed in mainstream public had become much wider, and especially cultural rights had 
become an often supported topic of debate. The language used in the debates had also undergone positive 
changes: the awkward terms of supra-identity and sub-identity (of 2005) had been mostly abandoned, 
and the terms used now included citizenship (identity), national identity and ethnic identity, though still 
not minority.
The existence of ethnic Kurds in Turkey was no longer denied even by the hard-core nationalists 
who, however, continued to refuse to acknowledge any inequality or discrimination in the current system. 
Most commentators seemed to accept and express the need to address the identity-based Kurdish issue, 
which they now viewed as being separate from the problem of violence (most often labeled terrorism). 
This should be seen as a very positive and promising development. As Murat Somer has emphasized, it 
is extremely important to recognize the difference between the Kurdish question and the Kurdish conflict. 
The Kurdish question emerged as soon as peoples in the Kurdish-inhabited regions developed nationalist 
ideas. The question concerns the status of Kurds first in the Ottoman and Persian empires and then in 
relation to the modern nation-states that replaced the multi-ethnic empires. How could Kurdish ethno-
cultural or national difference be accommodated and their aspirations to self-government be addressed? 
The Kurdish conflict emerged when the Kurdish question was not resolved peacefully and successfully, 
but it was not the only possible outcome of the question (Somer 2011, 254-5). The definition of an issue 
is always crucial as it in itself suggests possible remedies, and the fact that now the commentators in the 
press were discussing both the identity-based Kurdish issue and the violent conflict was promising for 
developing further non-military solutions.  
When one looks at the debates in the press as well as other developments in Turkey, it is quite 
obvious that multiculturalism as a state of affairs became increasingly accepted in the public sphere 
between 1999 and 2009, and difference and diversity became more visible. However, demands for 
minority rights continued to be discussed within a framework of security, very much as it was in the 
post-communist countries of Eastern Europe. The sample that analyzed the comments of representatives 
of both the nationalist MHP and the Kemalist CHP reflected the idea of minority rights as an existential 
threat to the state, and the interpretation of minority rights as an issue of social justice was almost absent 
from the debate. 
There are no uncontested international or European norms regarding the extent of the rights of 
minorities, but in the West the issue has been (mostly) approached from the perspective of social rights 
(and addressing past injustices). In opposition to the liberal states of the West, in most post-communist 
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Eastern and Central European countries demands for minority rights have been evaluated in terms 
of security. Within a framework of security, minorities are seen to threaten the existence or territorial 
integrity of the state, and minority rights are resisted and tend to be more limited. (Kymlicka 2004.) 
Turkey’s attitude towards its minorities and multicultural policies bears some resemblance to two western 
countries, i.e. France and Greece, in the sense that it has been reluctant to admit there are minorities 
within the nation. With the increasing visibility of Kurdish nationalism and Kurdish ethnicity/national 
identity as a separate from the Turkish one, demands for minority rights have become discussed within a 
framework of security, similar to that of the post-communist countries of Eastern Europe.
The debates of 2009 continued to reflect a discernible lack of concerned references to international 
agreements, norms, or scholarly debates on human rights, citizenship, or linguistic minority rights. Absent 
also were references to any positive examples of successful multilingual societies. The few references made 
to debates and contexts outside of Turkey were negative.
At this point I would like to compare my findings with what Elise Massicard’s (2006) arguments 
on nationalism and unity, and the Alevi claims for difference in Turkey. She has pointed out that state 
institutions did not abandon the dogma of the Unity of the Nation (of Atatürk’s nationalism) in the 
face of the increasing identity and recognition discourses and claims from the 1980s onwards, but on 
the contrary it was strongly reaffirmed. Thus, claims for extended rights cannot not be argued for in 
the framework of diversity, as would be the case in a multicultural system accepting diversity, but have 
to be promoted within the framework of the supreme values of the nation, mainly Unity. For example, 
the Alevi have demanded recognition of the cemevi as a place of worship, as Alevis who are loyal Turkish 
citizens, but who have not been able to practice their religion freely. Such a demand implies that they 
are the victims of discrimination, which is then perceived as a threat to national unity. This reaction 
thus suggests that recognition or particularist claims have remained illegitimate per se, even if they have 
become quite common. There is only one way to gain legitimacy for identity claims, and that is within 
the framework of Turkish nationalism (Massicard 2006, 80). In my sample the AKP actors heavily 
emphasized the unity of the nation in their speeches, when they proposed transforming the understanding 
of citizenship. Also, the pro-Kurdish actors commonly refer to a concept of “brotherhood” (kardeşlik), 
which has positive connotations of togetherness, but no clearly defined content. They have demanded 
to be treated as equals, as a Kurdish nation (or people) sharing the country of Turkey as equals with the 
Turkish nation, the relationship envisioned as a form of brotherhood. 
Massicard (2006) also pointed out that every political actor tries to delegitimize his political enemy 
by accusing him of being an enemy of the Unity. Thus, basically, anybody can be accused of being a 
separatist/engaging in separatist activities (Ibid.). Some form of this accusation was used by the MHP and 
the CHP in both the debates of 2005 and 2009. The political polarization, mainly over secularism, was 
one of the reasons that hindered action leading to resolution of the Kurdish issue in the 2000s. Both in 
2005 and in 2009 the CHP successfully countered the AKP’s tentative initiatives to do something about 
the Kurdish issue by relying on conservative, state-centric, and security-oriented nationalist discourse 
with its emphasis on cultural homogeneity as a guarantee of national security. Acting out of self-interest 
and in accordance with political struggles and resorting once again to a conservative nationalist rhetoric, 
the party conveniently overlooked the fact that it had itself tried to institute similar initiatives in the 
1990s. Conservative nationalism was (most likely) not the root cause of CHP’s opposition, but it lent 
itself for use as a powerful instrument in a situation of political polarization caused by the strained 
relations between the largest parties and the majoritarian defects of Turkish democracy. The CHP was 
joined in its criticism by the nationalist MHP, for which the democratic opening simply meant sleeping 
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with the enemy. They argued that the opening was merely an indicator of AKP’s weakness in dealing 
with the country’s problem of terrorism. 
What conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the debates in 2009 in the press of the various 
models for managing diversity and ensuring social solidarity as the basis for the state? The answers 
provided by the MHP and the CHP were still versions of conservative nationalism in 2009. Erdoğan’s 
proposal of citizenship as the connecting bond was tentatively classified as liberal nationalism, and 
the other two possible ones evaluated were: 1) the multicultural model of Will Kymlicka (including 
group rights), which has become a sort of “Western norm” in the treatment of (national) minority 
populations; and 2) constitutional citizenship (as proposed by Jürgen Habermas). It was argued that 
while multiculturalism as a state of affairs, as an existing social reality, i.e. Turkey’s cultural and ethnic 
diversity, became increasingly accepted in the public sphere between 1999 and 2009, multiculturalism 
as a policy continued (in 2009) to be opposed. It was feared that multiculturalist policies would end 
in fragmented pluralism, where the society is divided into several separate communities. Aggravated 
by historical experiences, multiculturalism, and Western demands for improvement of minority rights 
tended to be associated with Western power play rather than with human rights and democracy. It was 
concluded that multiculturalist policies and group-specific rights would be much opposed.
While this makes resolving the Kurdish issue more difficult, it does not necessarily mean that the 
cultural and linguistic rights of Kurds cannot be improved, as long as they are conceptualized within 
the rights of individual citizens, rather than as any form of communal rights. If group-specific rights 
were resisted and particularistic claims for difference based on diversity were framed as illegitimate, 
considerably more support was given to proposals for cultural rights within the framework (of liberal 
and individualistically defined system) of constitutional citizenship. By 2009, the need for a new 
constitution was voiced in the press by different commentators from a variety of backgrounds, and there 
was an increasing awareness of the need to institute a new kind of citizenship, one that was not based 
on narrowly interpreted homogenizing Turkish nationalism and membership of the nation to resolve 
the identity-based conflict. In line with this, I argued that Turkey’s Kurds, as well as other language 
groups, could be granted wider cultural rights, but, conceptualized within a framework of individual 
or human rights, rather than group rights or any communitarian model of recognition. In addition to 
individualistically defined cultural rights and constitutional citizenship, there was some support expressed 
for supplementary affirmative action in the form of support for economic development for the Eastern 
provinces.
After having said that, one should point out that it is very difficult to estimate what the various 
speakers and actors might actually have meant when they spoke about these “individual rights.” For 
example, support for individually conceptualized language rights might not automatically mean 
support for an individual citizen’s right to receive ALL public services, including education, in his or 
her mother tongue. In his concluding chapter of the history of protection of minorities in Europe, 
Alcock interprets the 19th and 20th century developments as struggles between two approaches to the 
problem of minorities: the one based on the individual, and the one focusing on the group. According to 
him, the supporters of the individualist approach today argue that in the fast changing and globalizing 
contemporary world it is unrealistic to think in tribal terms of ethnic purity or the need to maintain 
community solidarity in order to preserve identity. For them it is enough that individual members of a 
minority should enjoy rights equal to members of the majority, and that they should be able to enjoy 
a basic cultural autonomy, i.e. to have such basic linguistic rights as having their own language taught 
at schools, publications in their own languages, and (usually) the right to use it in relation to public 
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authorities. These rights should be granted on an individual rather than a group basis. “The vision is 
one of a fluid, bold, open, progressive, unsegregated, interactive, optimistic society, welcoming change.” 
(Alcock 2000, 214.) In the light of rising Turkish nationalism and the importance placed on national 
and/or ethnic identification, it is somewhat difficult to believe that the support for individually defined 
minority rights instead of group-based ones in today’s Turkey stems from the above described progressive 
and optimistic view of society. For example, expressions of support for full cultural rights that do not 
lead to secession actually referred to “no for mother tongue education” in my sample. Some researchers 
of Turkey seem to interpret the expressions of support for individual rights in the public parlance to refer 
to a very watered-down version of rights, namely the right to receive Kurdish-language education in 
private schools. In practice, it would mean only negative rights of non-interference rather than positive 
rights to assistance, funding, autonomy or official language status. In effect, it would simply reaffirm that 
individual Kurds are free to exercise their standard rights of freedom of speech, association, assembly, and 
conscience (see Kymlicka 2005).
These watered-down rights would certainly not be enough to satisfy Kurdish demands and several 
scholars have thus emphatically argued for communal rights as a must (Bayır 2014, 34, Zeydanlıoğlu 
2014, 175). When one looks at Alcock’s summary of support for the group-based approach, it is easy 
to see why Kurds would demand such. Alcock reminds us that, “Above all, minorities come from the 
defeated and conquered. History has not dealt kindly with them. There is no cause for optimism.” (Ibid. 
2000, 215.) Supporters of the group-based approach argue that the individual flourishes better, and is 
better able to preserve his culture and identity within a group. “Their vision is one of a closed, inward-
looking, pessimistic society, on the defense against a formidable army of destructive forces… either the 
hostility, or the contempt, or the benign neglect of the host state, as well as precisely those features of the 
contemporary world so attractive to the advocates of the first approach, freedom of movement, mixed 
marriages, dominant language brought even into the home by electronic means.” (Alcock 2000, 214-
215.) They see uncertainty in the outside world, a sea of economic and social change, and the decline of 
traditional values, where ethnicity can be an anchor.
However, I want to emphasize that there is nothing in the logic of individualistically defined theory 
of citizens’ rights that prevents realization of full cultural rights; it merely means that individuals rather 
than groups are the bearers of these rights.
8.3 compaRisons (i): nationalist education
An interesting set of questions concerns the causes behind the excessive nationalism of the mainstream 
media discourse. While the effects of the discourse may make tolerance of diversity and thus resolution of 
the identity-side of the Kurdish issue more difficult, I consider it wrong to assign this discursive practice 
active agency and goals as Erdem does: 
…the strategic and political purpose of this framing of the Kurdish question is to limit and silence the 
already restricted public space that the pro-Kurdish movement has, and to legitimize the dismissal 
and rejection of Kurdish cultural, linguistic, and political demands raised democratically by the pro-
Kurdish movement. (Erdem 2014, 48). 
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Rather, the reasons, which were discussed in considerable detail through chapters two to four in this 
work, should be looked for in ingrained patterns of thought and dominant ways of thinking and seeing 
the Turkish society, all of which were engendered by decades of nation-building efforts and nationalist 
state propaganda, as well as the continued dominancy of the combination of a multitude of nationalist 
discourses (which was presented in chapter seven and briefly touched upon above).
To provide a clearer picture of the nationalist discourses at play and the reasons behind their 
continued power, I will further evaluate my findings on media texts vis-à-vis studies of nationalism 
and conceptualizations of citizenship in school primers. In addition to national media and general 
conscription military service, national education can be seen as the most important site for reproducing 
the nation.
8.3.1 atatüRk’s nationalism
Ayşe Gül Altınay’s (2004) excellent work The Myth of the Military-Nation. Militarism, Gender and 
Education in Turkey focuses on military and militarization as “productive” mechanisms, how militarism 
(as an ideology) has become intertwined with nationalism, and how it shapes culture, politics and 
identities in Turkey (Altınay 2004, 3). Altınay investigates a course that was called in the early years 
of the republic “Preparation for Military Service” and later “National Security Knowledge” (Milli 
Güvenlik Bilgisi) (Ibid., 8). This course, with its officer-instructors and military-written textbook, is a 
direct intervention of the military to the educational system. Altınay analyzed the content of the course 
textbooks, participated in classes, and interviewed students on how they perceived the class. 
According to the officer-instructors interviewed in Altınay’s study, the most important topics of the 
course on national security were Atatürk’s principles and contemporary politics (Altınay 2004, 135). 
Accordingly, the longest chapter in the primer in use from 1998 onwards was on “Atatürk’s principles and 
national unity,” which provided a response to the critique of the term “Turk” (Türk), and where the non-
ethnic/nonracial character of Atatürk’s term “Turk” was emphasized. It included a sophisticated discussion 
of “latest scientific theories on nations and nationalism” where objective (race, language, religion) and 
subjective (cultural) definitions were discussed and Turkish nationalism was said to be based on the 
subjective definition: “Atatürkism, accepts as Turks all Turkish citizens who ‘share a common history, 
morals and laws,’ embrace the same shared culture and ideals, and have tied their fate to the Turkish 
nation on their own will.” Thus, racist definitions of Atatürk’s nationalism were refuted and Turkishness 
was explained as not being based on a Turkish race. It was obvious that the term race (ırk) had not been 
differentiated from the term ethnicity, so that race mostly referred to ethnicity. Atatürk’s nationalism 
was said to be opposed to such non-nationalist ideologies as Marxism-Leninism, racist ideologies, and 
ideologies that seek to divide Turkish society along racial lines or along the lines or religion or religious 
sects. Both the Kurdish movement and the ultra-right movement were shown to be based on racial 
differentiation, unlike Atatürk’s nationalism, which was not based on race but was nonracial, i.e. non-
ethnic. (Ibid., 128-131.) The terms race, nation, and culture were used almost interchangeably in the 
textbook, an obvious continuation from Atatürk’s time.405Another study of educational materials is Başak 
405 For more details, see chapter two.
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İnce’s work, Citizenship and Identity in Turkey from Atatürk’s Republic to the Present Day (2012), which 
has already been quoted at length in the previous chapter. This work critically examines the concept of 
citizenship in Turkey from the founding years of the republic up until the present day through analysis 
of civic education materials. In her analysis of the primers for civics education from 1980 onwards, 
Başak İnce discovered that in this course the nation was still defined as a unity of language, religion, 
race, history and culture, with increasing importance placed on Sunni Islam. The books exaggerated the 
virtues of the Turkish nation and also taught that Turkey’s nationalism is based on Atatürk’s nationalism 
that accepts everyone living in Turkey as a Turk (İnce 2012, 182).
Some of the findings of these two studies are quite similar, and bear a close resemblance to my 
findings in the press. As the Milliyet columnist Melih Aşık wrote in 2005: ”However, Article 66 of 
the Constitution [states] exactly this: ”Everyone connected to the Turkish state through the bond of 
citizenship is a Turk... Turkishness is not a name of a race [/ethnicity]; it is the general name of the nation. 
Also, Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution term the ”Turkish nation” as all the people of different origins 
living in Turkey (Milliyet 27.10.2005.) The resemblance between the school primers and the writing 
in the Kemalist daily Cumhuriyet is especially striking. In addition, several of the Milliyet columnists 
subscribed to similar conservative-nationalist ideals.
When the findings of these studies on national media and the content of national educational 
materials are combined, they demonstrate how in the early 2000s the discourse of these traditional 
mechanisms of nation(-state) creation continued to contribute to a narrow understanding of the Turkish 
nation and citizenship along the lines of the conservative-nationalist argumentation. 
8.3.2 a game played oveR tuRkey
In the national security course’s primer, the discussion on race/ethnicity established the background for 
the subsequent discussion on Turkey’s external and internal enemies. It was argued over and over again 
throughout the textbook that those who claim to belong to different race are the “divisive elements” (bölücü 
unsurlar) that promote racial discrimination in society. They are supported by Turkey’s enemies, not by 
the Turkish people. It was also made clear that the Lausanne minorities are the only minorities that exist in 
Turkey. The rest were stated to have shared the same fate for thousands of years and having blended with 
the same culture and goals (implying also that the officially acknowledged minorities had not). (Altınay 
2004, 129.) This move simultaneously denied the coexistence of multiple ethnicities, religions and sects 
under the Ottoman Empire and ethnicized and Islamized Turkishness. The Turkish nation/culture became 
defined in ethnic/racial terms through its “thousands of years” long history. It was obvious that the textbooks 
continued to be influenced by the Turkish History Thesis from the 1930s. (Ibid., 130.)
Games are played over Turkey by its neighbors, who are also its enemies. Turkey needs to be strong 
because it is alone and nobody else wants a strong Turkey. Internal threats were defined as activities that 
seek to divide Turkey along the lines of race, religion, or religious sect—but these “games” that are played 
over Turkey have external origins and the Turkish people are not fooled by them. 
…students in this course are encouraged to view both international and national political issues in 
strategic terms and adopt this thinking as a way of life. They were encouraged to be suspicious of all 
foreigners, particularly people from neighboring countries; fear all differences, remaining blind to 
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the differences among their Muslim friends and treating their non-Muslim friends as categorically 
different (in fact, as non-Turkish); regard all dissent within Turkey as having an “external” origin 
(and thus non-authentic, non-Turkish); and think of international politics as being determined 
by wars and international politics by the military, accepting the inevitability of the use of force. 
(Altınay 2004, 137.)
The emphasis on enemies and threat was also present in the civics textbooks analyzed by İnce. They 
promoted the idea that Turkey is surrounded on all sides by enemies and emphasize dangers posed by 
threats to Turkey’s regime—traitors who want to destroy its unity. Unlike in previous decades, the post 
1980 books warned against internal enemies as well, for their aim is to divide the nation along lines of 
race, class and religious sect. Thus there are both external and internal supporters of anarchy and terror 
who want to divide Turkey. The reasons given were related to Turkey’s geopolitical importance. All in all, 
according to the books Turkey is surrounded by enemies (İnce 2012, 179).
As was pointed out in chapter seven, a very similar stance was also quite evident in many of the 
texts included in my samples, and was especially pronounced in the Cumhuriyet newspaper. The quote 
from the columnist Özten Akgüç exemplifies this well: “As a citizen of Turkey, I have not understood this 
‘Kurdish issue,’ something that is often repeated by those in power and responsibility and for which a 
solution is sought.... ‘Kurdish issue’ is an artificial issue, created and pumped up by imperial powers via 
local collaborationists (Cumhuriyet 9.8.2009) This stance ties nicely together with the idea of Turkish 
nationalism as unifying, non-discriminatory, and non-ethnic: problems are not internal but external. 
Kurds and the Kurdish issue have been used by enemies, and therefore the solution does not lie in 
democratization and minority rights but in military measures and security. However, the theme did not 
play as prominent a place in my sample as in school primers, most likely because I looked at political 
demands and debates over citizenship and more or less excluded reporting on violence. The print press is 
also much more multi-voiced than the school primers, which represent the official discourse.
8.3.3 duty-based citizenship
Another interesting theme in the primers that bears importance to my findings was their conceptualization 
of citizenship. According to İnce’s analysis of citizenship in the civics education primers, citizen’s rights 
were defined by reference to the 1982 Constitution. The limitations set on these rights in the constitution 
or other legislation were presented without criticism. Rather, it was seen as a duty of the state to limit 
the rights of citizens under certain circumstances! (İnce 2012, 177.) Furthermore, the state and national 
interests were always assigned priority over citizenship rights and freedoms and the existing situation was 
presented as perfect. In the press those pundits who oppose any redefinition of citizenship of Turkey in a 
manner less Turkish also referred to the definition in the 1982 Constitution,406 and tended to present the 
existing situation as ideal. As the Cumhuriyet writer, Professor Toktamış Ateş stated: 
406 Article 66- Türk Devletine vatandaşlık bağı ile bağlı olan herkes Türktür (=Eveyrone tied to the Turkish state by the bond 
of citizenship is a Turk).
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There are Turks of Armenian origins, Turks of Kurdish origins, Turks of Laz origins, Turks of 
Georgian origins, Turks from other ethnic origins. Nobody from these people of different ethnic 
origins is above any of the others. Everyone is a first class citizen within unconditional equality. 
(Cumhuriyet 26.11.2005.) 
In the primers duties were still emphasized over rights. As an example İnce (2012) quotes a poem by Ziya 
Gökalp given in one of the textbooks:
The road to righteous conduct is very narrow.
Don’t say, I have the right.
There is no right, there is only duty.
(quoted on page 178.)
İnce criticizes the content of the primers for promoting a duty-based social order and failing to address 
the importance of citizens’ participation in the policy process, thus reducing democracy simply to the 
exercise of voting. Civic education becomes a means of sustaining an obedient society, rather than a way 
to introduce tolerance for diversity. In line with this, there was no promotion of critical thinking, but 
memorization was the preferred method of learning. (İnce 2012, 178.) 
When one combines the theme of a constant threat to the nation and national unity with duty-
based citizenship and social order, the result is that “civic education is used as a tool to develop ‘self-
sacrificing,’ ‘good citizens’ who should always be alert about ‘enemies’ and be ready to protect the unity 
of the nation” (Ibid., 179). These themes also clearly resonate with my findings. First of all, a few of the 
commentators in my sample argued for the need to protect the national myths against criticism and so to 
restrict open discussion. It was argued by several columnists that debates on sensitive issues, such as the 
definition of Turkish citizenship, should be avoided as harmful. Thus even representatives of the media 
were willing to impose limits on the freedom of expression, i.e. practice self-censorship in the name of 
national unity and security.
Another common feature can be found in the approach towards citizens’ activism in the press. 
In line with the reduction of democratic participation and citizenship to voting in elections in school 
education material, the press also presented petition campaigns (which should be considered citizens’ 
activity par excellence) and other demands for mother tongue education as being threats connected with 
terrorism. Such demands were not approached within the frameworks of democracy, human rights, and/
or citizen’s rights, even if there was awareness of these as alternative frameworks. 
I also found a dichotomy constructed by the press between good, “ordinary citizens of Kurdish origins” 
or “Kurds with common sense,” and the PKK and supporters of terrorism, which give grounds for concern. 
Demands for Kurdish language education and more general support for pro-Kurdish political parties were 
generally enough basis to be included to the latter group. This actually fits in quite well both in the light of 
duty-based citizenship model, where the rights of an individual citizen can be limited to protect the nation 
and a citizen is expected to prioritize the needs of the state over his own, and it can be interpreted to refer 
to the idea of an external origins for the pro-Kurdish cultural and political demands. In line with the idea 
of formal party politics and voting as the essential core of democracy, pro-Kurdish actors had a voice and a 
measure legitimacy in the press in the setting of formal party politics (though as was noted, not as Kurds).
The similarities between the representations in school primers and print media attest to the continued 
strength of nationalist discourse (or propaganda) in Turkey. In many ways and many spheres it remains 
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the dominant approach to seeing and thinking about the nation and citizenship, and its continuous 
propagation by both the official and non-official institutions further strengthens it. It is perhaps useful to 
point out the obvious: there were also important differences between the media and educational material. 
Unlike the media, as late as 2008 the textbooks did not contain any references to Kurds living Turkey 
(İnce 2012, 182), let alone include wide-ranging and explicit debates over possibilities of resolution of 
the identity-side of the Kurdish issue, including changing the definition of citizenship of Turkey.
After having argued against nationalist framing as an active strategy at the beginning of the section, 
and after having looked for the causes and backgrounds for the continued dominance of nationalist 
representations, it is in order to reiterate that alternative stances were both possible and publicly voiced 
both in the press and in other venues throughout the period studied. There have also been progressive 
scholars and civil society activists who researched, debated, and published on Kurds, their rights, and the 
Kurdish issue. Thus, there is always a measure of choice: individual politicians and whole political parties 
decide which ideological and discursive stances they publicize, and individual journalists and columnists 
as well as whole newspapers make selections on what issues they make into news and how these are (re)
presented and framed. There were also individual writers in the sample, such as Milliyet’s columnist 
Hasan Cemal, who clearly and explicitly argued against the conservative nationalist interpretations.
8.4 possible causes foR the discuRsive change? 
Despite the continued strength of conservative nationalist stances, there was also undeniable change in 
the way the Kurds and the Kurdish issue were discussed in the press. By 2009, Kurds were more likely 
to be visible as Kurds in the public space in political settings. The terminology used had changed, and 
the existence of a Kurdish issue or question as either an ethno-political, linguistic, cultural or identity-
based one had gained increasing public acknowledgement. There was increasing support for some mode 
of modest cultural rights. Also as argued before, the mere existence of such a wide-spread debate on the 
definition of Turkish citizenship and membership in the nation was significant in itself. An important 
question arises from this manifest change: Why? Why did a measure of change take place and why now 
rather than in the 1990s? 
Murat Somer has argued against researching nationalism as a discourse, as self-propelling actor. In 
his opinion, nationalism as a discourse is not the only or the most important manifestation of nationalism 
and that nationalism as a language is more an effect than cause of changing nationalism. All in all, as a 
researcher Somer is more interested in non-discursive factors and causal reasons behind change. (Somer 
2011: 260-61.) Even if the main part of my work is very much focused on texts and the discursive 
level—nationalism as a language—much of the underlying reasons or at least possibilities for change 
were taken up in chapters six and seven in the sections contextualizing the cases. It is notoriously difficult 
to prove causality, and even a summary for possible reasons for a process investigated for a span of a 
decade is not an easy task, but I will content myself by listing some of the most important developments 
that contributed to the transformation of the discourse.
One of the most important ones was undoubtedly the capture and trial of Öcalan: The Turkish 
establishment had to acknowledge, albeit with severe disappointment, that the capture of Abdullah 
Öcalan in 1999 failed to end the Kurdish issue, which had been reduced into an issue of terrorism. Instead 
of an end to the conflict, the PKK continued to exist and Kurds continued to voice their identity-based 
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demands. The cessation of violence during 1999–2004 gave more space to discuss the issue from other 
perspectives besides that of terrorism, even if this window of opportunity was not well used.
Another factor was Turkey’s EU-membership process and the associated process of democratization 
(2002–2006), which limited the possibilities for repression and forced assimilation. Turkey’s internal 
matters became subject to EU scrutiny and evaluation. And even if the EU did not demand minority 
or group rights as such, it pressured for democratization and respect of human rights. Many of the pro-
Kurdish demands resonated with those voiced by the EU.
Increasing assertiveness and consistent electoral support of the pro-Kurdish parties can be seen as 
one more reason. The strong regional base and presence in national politics provided the movement 
with institutional basis, connections and resources, which contributed to intensification of the campaign 
for a peaceful solution to the Kurdish question in Turkey. The institutionalized pro-Kurdish political 
movement had more opportunities to legitimately raise Kurdish political demands and claims through 
democratic channels (Gunes 2012, 175), and it thus became was more difficult to ignore such demands. 
Competition for the Kurdish electorate could also help push policy reform, as other parties tried to win 
voters away from the pro-Kurdish parties (Watts 2010, 171-2).
Also very important was the consolidation of the autonomous position and institutions of the 
Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) that took place between 2003 and 2008. The impossibility of 
ignoring its existence and autonomy resulted in impetus being given for the demands of Turkey’s Kurds. 
After an initial hesitation, Turkey came to terms with the existence of a semi-independent Kurdish state 
at its border and moved on to improve relations with the leaders of the KRG. 
The ruling party from 2002 onwards, the AKP, also seemed more willing than the other parties 
to accommodate pro-Kurdish demands, even if not the pro-Kurdish parties. The AKP was popular 
among Kurds as it both continued the gradual expansion of cultural rights and catalyzed more progress 
on Kurdish rights than any prior government (Bahceli & Noel 2011, 115). Prime Minister Erdoğan 
repeatedly took up the question of citizenship of Turkey in relation to the Kurdish question. Another 
factor was the consolidation of AKP’s political power vis-à-vis its political competitors and the military 
in 2007—2009. At that point, it became more difficult for the military to effectively intervene in politics 
and to define the limits of public discussion.
8.5 compaRisons (ii): on Reception and attitudes
It is always difficult to estimate how readers of various texts actually interpret them and whether they 
internalize, agree with, or reject and question the representations offered. So, on the basis of analysis of 
texts we cannot estimate how students at school or readers of newspapers perceived citizenship of Turkey 
or the Kurdish issue. One also presumes that there must also have been wide divergence between the 
interpretations of ethnic Turks and others, such as Kurds. 
My study or İnce’s study do not include analysis of reception, but Altınay both participated in the 
classes and interviewed students. In her discussions with the students in Istanbul, the strategic analysis 
came out prominently: 
The students debated whether Greeks were indeed our enemies, where Russia’s interests lay, why so 
many countries had come to support the PKK, so on and so forth. The National Security Knowledge 
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course meant current politics, which meant strategic analysis... most students I interviewed in Istanbul 
agreed on two main assumptions: that Turkey was surrounded by enemies and that our military had 
to remain strong. Even oppositional statements had to take these “facts” into consideration. (Altınay 
2004, 144-145). 
Also the Kurdish issue was analyzed along the lines of the chapter in the text book The Games Played 
over Turkey, which had become a significant aspect of the students discourse on politics (Ibid., 145-
146). Altınay points out that the students in Diyarbakır did not actively participate in the lesson, as an 
engagement with the course necessitates at least minimal identification with the “national self ” whose 
security is being defined from a military perspective. Those who cannot identify with it have to deal with 
their locations of “otherness” and designated positions of “potential threat” on a daily basis (Ibid., 145.)
There are also two relatively large-scale survey studies that can shed light on the perceptions and 
expectations on the Kurdish issue of the population at large. The Public Perception of the Kurdish Question 
in Turkey by SETA and Pollmark (2009) was actually conducted from August 7th to 15th of 2009, 
coinciding nicely with my last case, which was from August 8th to 13th. Konda’s Kürt Meselesinde 
Algı ve Beklentiler (2011) was conducted a year later in June 2010. As the times of the surveys and the 
formulations of the questions differ from each other, the results are given separately topic by topic. As 
I find this numeric information on public opinion on the issue both very interesting as well as highly 
relevant point of comparison to my analysis of media representations, it is given in some detail.
On the Reasons behind the Kurdish Issue
There were important differences between Turkish and Kurdish407 respondents as to what they considered 
to be the reasons behind and solutions to the issue. In the SETA and Pollmark survey, the respondents 
were asked to name only the most important source of the issue. The top four explanations given by Turks 
were: socio-economic reasons 22%, there is no such issue 19.6%, foreign meddling 16.2%, and PKK/
terrorism 14.5%, whereas for Kurds they were: discrimination 28%, socio-economic reasons 27.6%, 
state policies 18.2% and Kurdish nationalism 10.9%. (SETA & Pollmark 2009, 23-24.) 
According to the Konda study made a year later, where respondents could name multiple causes, 
84% of Turks considered the Kurdish issue a consequence of foreign instigation, 82.7% saw it as the fault 
of the PKK, 71.3% as a consequence of the Kurds wanting to establish their own state, 64.8% a result 
of the economic underdevelopment of the region, and 56.3% thought it was caused by some general 
problems shown as concerning only Kurds. Turks did NOT accept the claim that the state’s unequal 
treatment of Kurds was behind the issue. This resonates with the view of everyone as already equal, 
expressed by several columnists analyzed in my work. As the writer of the Konda report also noted, the 
Turkish top three explanations obviously stem from the connection constructed between the Turkish 
ethnicity and the Republican state, within which framework the nation needs to protect the state from 
407 It is interesting to note that the apparent difficulty of defining who should be considered Kurdish of the previous years 
(see chapter four) seem to have been forgotten. The SETA and Pollmark survey divides the respondents to the categories as 
Kurd and Turk, with no information on how this division was made. 
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threats. (Konda 2011, 119-21.) Of Kurdish respondents408, 78.3% also saw economic underdevelopment 
and 53% foreign instigation (!) as the cause, and 53.5% connected it with general problems being shown 
as concerning only Kurds. The fact that 53% of ethnic Kurdish respondents also considered the Kurdish 
issue a consequence of foreign instigation means that the view presented both in school primers and on 
the pages of the mainstream press was also widely shared by the Kurdish population. This was where the 
similarities between the views of the Turkish and Kurdish interviewees ended: Kurds did not see the PKK 
or a desire for separate state as the root-causes of the issue, but 63.3% saw unequal treatment by the state 
and 61.2% see Kurdish identity issues as the causes. (Konda 2011, 119-21.) The majority of Kurds did 
not agree with the claim of everyone as equal.
On Possible Solutions
In the SETA & Pollmark study, only 20.8% of the respondents considered past measures in handling the 
issue, in this instance reduced simply to terrorism, as successful (SETA & Pollmark 2009, 31). Yet, 43.8% 
of Turks still considered the military to be the most effective institution in the process of settlement of 
the Kurdish question, and 21.2% of Kurds agreed. Most however, were of the opinion that “all state 
institutions together” were the key for achieving a resolution. For the main topic at hand, i.e. the role of 
the media, it is interesting to note that only 11.5-11.8% thought of media as the most central institution 
in resolving the issue. (SETA & Pollmark 2009, 31-37)
As most respondents did not think the Kurdish issue had been handled successfully in the past and 
thought all state institutions should cooperate in finding a resolution to it, the time was indeed ripe for 
an attempt to find new ways to resolve the issue as the government attempted with its Kurdish Opening. 
How did the respondents evaluate the AKP government’s Kurdish Initiative, still in its early stages at this 
point? Of all population, 48.1% supported it, 36.4% opposed, and 15.5% had no idea. Of Kurds, 75.7% 
supported it. In line with this rather supportive attitude towards the government’s attempt, the Kemalist-
lefitst CHP’s aggressively confrontationist approach was condemned by 63.5% of the population, 
including 47.4% (!) of CHP’s own constituency. Only 33% of the party’s own supporters endorsed its 
approach. The nationalist MHP’s approach was condemned by 62.3% of the general population, but it 
did better among its own constituency than the CHP with an endorsement of 40.4%. 
So, there seemed to be relatively wide support for the need to do something, but what was that 
something expected to be? The SETA & Pollmark survey results do not offer much suggestions for a 
way ahead as in 2009 there was wide-spread fear that further cultural rights would lead to disintegration 
(42.5%), 45.8% were not willing to lift the remaining restrictions on Kurdish language to settle the 
Kurdish question and 65.2% did not consider constitutional recognition for Kurdish identity acceptable. 
Surprisingly enough 51.1% were positive about the launch of Kurdish language state television channel 
TRT-6, which had taken place in January 2009.
The Konda study has more to say about the opinions of the population on possible solutions. 
When one looks at the solutions proposed by ethnic Turks and ethnic Kurds, there is a widespread 
consensus only on the need to foster economic development supported by 77% of Turks and 94% of 
408 The Konda survey asked the respondents about their self-identification. Those claiming Kurdish or Zaza identity were 
grouped together as Kurds and formed 14.7% of the sample. The other labeled groups were Turkish with 76.7% and other 
with 8.5%. Taking into account demographic statistical data, 18.3% of the population were concluded to be Kurds (including 
Zaza), 73.6% Turks and 8.2% other. (Konda 2011, 83-90.) 
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Kurds. Otherwise Kurds see the keys to solution to consist: 1) of support for Kurdish traditions by the 
state 89%, 2) right for mother tongue publication 87%, 3) right for mother tongue education 82%, 4) 
constitutional recognition for Kurdish identity 74%, 5) lifting of national 10% threshold 59%, 6) strong 
elected parliament 71%. Of ethnic Turks 74% demanded end of terror (as a precondition for solution), 
and they were mainly against constitutional solutions: 72% were against a constitutional recognition for 
Kurdish identity, 59% were against mother tongue education with 56% opposing lifting the election 
threshold. (Konda 2011, 125). The notable gap on the views on the possible solutions for the issue 
between Turkish and Kurdish respondents did not promise to make its resolution an easy task.
Both studies included questions on important identifications as well. When one looks at how the 
respondents identified themselves in the Konda study, we see there is an interesting difference between 
the ethnic Kurds and the rest of the population. For everyone, the three most important identifications 
were: 1) Citizenship of the Republic of Turkey 61.3%, 2) Religious (din/mezhep) 39.3%, 3) Turkish 
citizenship 37.9%, which means that even the most general one, i.e. citizenship of the Republic was not 
prioritized by a large part of the population. The answers by ethnic Kurds were also markedly different 
with, 45.7% prioritizing religious identity, 39.4% ethnic origins, with citizenship coming only in the 
third place (no percentage given)(Konda 2011, 102). The report estimated that both the national identity 
and citizenship have been identified with Turkishness to such a degree that Kurds do not feel they give 
enough room for their specific identity. The writer of the report expresses worry as both ethnicity and 
religion as identifications have high potential for political mobilization and clashes (Ibid.). The relative 
unimportance of shared citizenship as a source of identification also raises concerns as to what might be a 
possible source of social solidarity in the future. Then again, the findings of the SETA & Pollmark study 
differs in important respects on this issue. According to it, when asked explicitly about how important 
citizenship of the republic of Turkey was for the respondents, 92.1% of Turks considered it either very 
important or important, and also 76.5% of Kurds considered it either very important or important.
8.6 consequences: incReased visibility of diveRsity in a context 
of unitaRy nationalism
As has been analyzed in the previous chapters and summarized in this conclusion, a process of increasing 
visibility of cultural, ethnic and linguistic difference, and public acknowledgment of de-facto cultural 
diversity, i.e. the sociological multicultural reality of Turkey took place within a framework of continued 
strength of Turkish-nationalist discourses, which continued to aim for a unified, culturally monolithic 
nation, and view diversity with deep suspicion. This raises an interesting question: where does this 
combination of increasingly visible diversity within the context of continued power of nationalist 
discourses lead? How can the process advance towards state and citizenship, and a society tolerant and 
respectful of diversity? Or is it more likely to lead towards fragmented society with plural communities in 
conflict with each other?
Mesut Yeğen wrote about the changing status of Turkey’s Kurdish population in the 2000s in 
several studies (for example Yeğen 2006 and 2009), and has come to the conclusion that the earlier 
belief that Kurds can be Turkified, the idea of Kurds as future or prospective Turks, was in the process 
of being eroded in the early 2000s. As was detailed in chapters two and three of this work, all Muslims 
were considered to be Turkish citizens and were expected to assimilate to the Turkish nation, or at least 
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prioritize Turkish national identity over other sources of identity in the public sphere. However, Yeğen 
describes how Kurds were labeled in several instances in the 2000s as “pseudo-citizens” (Yeğen 2006, 
47-9; 2009, 608-10). On the level of ideas or discourses, this means that Kurds were moved from within 
the circle of Turkishness to its outskirts, closer to the position traditionally accorded to the non-Muslim 
minorities. As was also detailed in chapters two and three, non-Muslims were excluded from the Turkish 
nation, and were considered citizens of the Republic of Turkey, but not Turkish. According to Yeğen, 
the first signs appeared in the popular media around 2003, where some Kurdish groups were identified 
with Jews and were claimed to be of Jewish origin, or compared with citizens of Greece in their dealings 
with the state of Turkey (Yeğen 2006, 74-78; 2009, 608-8). By 2005, the idea of Kurds as outside of 
Turkishness, as separate from Turks, appeared in more official settings as well. The evidence Yeğen gives 
is anecdotal more than systematic; for example, he describes how the military coined the phrase of “sözde 
vatandaşlar” (so-called citizens) used in relation to the Newroz demonstrations and the flag incident of 
2005.409 This division into “öz vatandaş” (real/core citizen) – “sözde vatandaş” (so-called citizen), or first 
and second class citizens was very much criticized, and the military had to clarify it had actually referred 
to those who do not consider themselves as part of the nation. Yet, the terms were subsequently used 
by other officials as well. (Yeğen 2006, 79-80; 2009, 610-12.) As was discussed above, this division (of 
Kurds) into real citizens and others was also visible in my sample, even if not as openly stated. 
Yeğen asks the important question: Why? Why did the belief in Kurds as potential Turks come 
to an end? Why did it take place in the 2000s rather than in the 1990s and during the violent war? 
In Yeğen’s opinion, it was a matter of disillusionment. In the early years of the 2000s it had become 
clear that a significant portion of the Kurdish population was resisting assimilation into Turkishness. 
As was described in chapters two and three, the Republic had attempted to found the nation-state on a 
homogeneous nation with one culture and one language, but after decades of assimilationist practices it 
had to admit the undeniable existence of another, non-Turkish element (with unity of language and tie 
to a land) in the country. Furthermore, Kurds form a significant part of the country’s population (18.3% 
according to Konda 2011) and are concentrated into a certain area of the country. (Yeğen 2006, 81-83.) 
There were also other dynamics at play in addition to those listed by Yeğen: the EU-process 
complicated the enforcing of forced assimilation policies, while the autonomy of the Iraqi Kurds 
strengthened Kurdish national consciousness in Turkey. I would also add the significant fact of the 
increasing visibility of Kurds as Kurds in the public space, including the media, which did not really 
take place in the 1990s. Also Tanil Bora’s argument of severe disappointment over the failure of 
Abdullah Öcalan’s capture to end the Kurdish issue, which had been reduced into an issue of terrorism, 
can shed light as to the reason for the timing (Bora 2011). Instead of putting an end to the conflict, 
the PKK continued to exist and Kurds continued to voice their identity-based demands, which were 
not accommodated by the state as the issue was perceived as almost solved. With time, anti-Kurdish 
resentment became more widespread and increasingly Kurds (perceived as a homogenous block) became 
perceived as the enemy, rather than only the PKK. “This banal nationalist discourse, which defines the 
Kurds as barbarians while criminalizing them not only politically but also socially and ethically, signifies 
the dangerous replacement of assimilationist optimism with a violent nonassimilation.” (Bora 2011, 58.)
Yet, as Mesut Yeğen has underlined, there were still two simultaneous and contradictory processes 
taking place, those of the assimilation and the alienation of Turkey’s Kurds. Writing in 2009, he argued 
409 See chapter six.
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that the state had not yet fully lost its perception of Kurds as prospective Turks and thus its confidence 
in assimilating the Kurds. The assimilationist system was still firmly in place with Turkish-language only 
education that propagates Turkish-nationalist ideals. General conscription military works for assimilation 
and then there was of course the mainstream media, which contributed to the continued Turkifying of 
the Kurds. Added to these, the early 2000s witnessed a host of civil society initiatives, such as improving 
the educational levels of girls, etc. that were primarily not aimed at assimilation, but also contributed 
to Turkification (Yeğen 2006, 21; 2009, 613-4.) Besides these, the large-scale internal immigration, 
high levels of intermarriage between Turks and Kurds, and continued economic integration continued 
to contribute to both integration and assimilation of Turkey’s Kurds. At the same time, the process of 
alienation and estrangement from the Turkish state (and Turkishness), which started in the 1970s or 
1980s also continued and gained strength. More and more Kurds resorted to Kurdishness: many of the 
local municipalities in the Kurdish-inhabited regions were run by cadres who worked for the Kurdish 
nationalist ideal, and hundreds of thousands of Kurds participated in mass demonstrations. Also the 
disintegration of the social state in Turkey since the 1980s with the concomitant disintegration of health 
care and other social services and growing inequality can be seen to have contributed to a process of 
estrangement from the state. (Yeğen 2006.) The balance of these two processes had clearly turned towards 
increasing resistance to forced assimilation and Turkification.
In a context where the ideal of a unified nation is retained, the increasing visibility of difference 
brought about some negative, even ugly side-effects. These included the negative labeling Yeğen discussed, 
but also increasing tensions between ordinary Kurds and Turks and in some extreme instances even lynch 
mobs (Radikal 8.1.2010). Cenk Saracoglu has coined the concept “exclusive recognition” to describe the 
common aspects of different anti-Kurdish sentiments. He lists the four following features as defining 
exclusive recognition: 1) in contrast to the conventional assimilationist discourse of the state, the recent 
anti-Kurdish discourse recognizes Kurds as a separate group or people; 2) the logic of this recognition 
excludes Kurds as they are perceived in negative light as ignorant, culturally backward and separatist; 
3) the agents of this anti-Kurdish discourse derive their negative stereotypes primarily from superficial 
contacts with Kurdish migrants in the everyday life (“experienced other” rather “than imagined other”) 
in the cities rather than from any outside influence; and that 4) this negative labeling is not necessarily 
extended to other ethnicities in Turkey but is used mainly vis-à-vis Kurds (Saracoglu 2009, 640-3). While 
I disagree with Saracoglu’s main claim, namely that this process with its negative stereotyping of Kurdish 
immigrants has been primarily due to lived experiences in immigrant-receiving cities in Western Turkey 
rather than the logic of Turkish nationalism, I think the term exclusive recognition can still be used to 
summarize the situation that came about in the 2000s. 
Saracoglu basically argues that as the existence of Kurds as a separate group of people was denied in 
the official nationalism, it cannot be the origin of negative stereotypes (Saracoglu 2009). This argument 
seriously underestimates the complexity of the relationships between Turkish nationalism and diversity 
in general and the position of Kurds vis-à-vis Turkishness in particular. It also completely ignores the 
inherent division of those with other than Turkish-ethnic origins into “good citizens,” who are happy 
to claim membership in the Turkish nation and the others, who, for example, demand mother-tongue 
education. The vocal pro-Kurdish demands for rights and the bloody war (1984–1999 and 2004–2013) 
are most likely the main reasons why Kurds rather than other ethnicities have been the targets of exclusion 
and negative stereotyping. It is also no coincidence that the most common negative traits attributed to 
Kurdish immigrants according to Saracoglu were: ignorant (cahil, i.e. not modern) and violent/separatist 
(Ibid. 645-6). The first one is an evil by-product of early Kemalist nationalism and the second of the 
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more recent Atatürkist variant. After having said that, I do not wish to deny the importance of everyday 
life-experiences in bringing these stereotypes to life, merely that these encounters are the primary source 
of them.
In any case, the term exclusive recognition can be used to describe the situation whereby Kurds 
started to be increasingly recognized as Kurdish, but this recognition often entailed their exclusion, be 
it from the Turkish nation, first class citizenship, or the modernity of city-life (as in the opinion of 
Saracoglu’s informants). This exclusion has led to instances of hostility and violence between Turks and 
Kurds, which were previously very rare. To a large degree the official stance of the violence taking place 
between the state and the terrorist organization PKK had managed to prevent the spread of clashes 
between Turks and Kurds.
How has this exclusion been experienced by the people in Turkey? The Konda study can shed light 
on this topic as well. More than half of the respondents to the survey, who identified themselves as 
Kurds, said they have faced identity-related problems, whereas the corresponding figure for Turks was 
10% (Konda 2011: 104). Furthermore, 60% of Kurds estimated in general that various people in Turkey 
face identity-based difficulties. In comparison, 67% of Turks estimated that nobody in Turkey faces 
identity-based problems, i.e. others can live with their identities. It is obvious that Turkish respondents 
reflected their own position to others. (Ibid.) A similar attitude was displayed in the columns in my 
sample: some of the columnists argued that nobody is discriminated against, and that everybody is free 
to live their identity and culture and to speak a language of their choice. They totally ignored the still 
continuing restrictions on languages other than Turkish and by implication denied the importance of 
Kurdish mother tongue education for native Kurdish speakers, to give just one crucial example.
When asked about the desirability of a neighbor, workmate, or daughter-in-law/spouse from an 
ethnicity (i.e. Turkish/Kurdish) other than one’s own, 47.4% of Turks and 22.1% of Kurds did not want 
a neighbor from the other ethnicity, 53.5% of Turks and 24.8% of Kurds did not want a workmate from 
the other ethnicity, and 57.6% of Turks and 26.4% of Kurds did not want a daughter-in-law/spouse 
from the other ethnicity. (Ibid., 106-7).410 It probably comes as no surprise that voters of the nationalist 
MHP were the least tolerant, but what is somewhat surprising in the light of the findings of my analysis 
of the Kemalist Cumhuriyet daily’s harshly nationalist discourse is that voters of the center-left-Kemalist 
CHP were the most tolerant after the voters of the pro-Kurdish party of the time the BDP (Ibid.).
What is also very interesting is that tolerance or lack of it did not depend on gender or age, but 
correlated with education: illiterate and university graduate respondents tended to be more tolerant, 
while those with high school education tended to be less tolerant! When this result is combined with 
the analysis of the school primers summarized above (Altınay 2004 and İnce 2012), it is obvious that 
the nationalist slant in the education had indeed influenced the perceptions of the population, and in a 
manner not conducive for acceptance of diversity. 
The impact of the print press is more difficult to gauge. It should also be kept in mind that 
newspaper circulations in Turkey are very low, with 95 copies per 1,000 inhabitants (Barış 2010), and 
410 Note that the higher tolerance of diversity by the Kurds was limited to Turks. The majority of both Turks and Kurds were 
not willing to accept a non-Muslim or an American in any of the categories mentioned above. Yet, as always, one should take 
the results of survey studies with a grain of salt. The SETA & Pollmark study from 2009 shows much higher acceptance of 
the “other” in respondents’ close circles. For example, 69.9% of Turks and 87.1% of Kurds would not be disturbed to gain 
a relative through marriage ties from the other group, and 75.5% of Turks and 92.3% of Kurds would accept an individual 
from the other group as a close friend. Ethnicity is probably not a deciding factor in forming close relationships in Turkey.
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that they are mainly read by the educated part of the population (see chapter five for more details), 
that the newspapers included in this sample are not the cheap and most popular ones, and neither are 
they considered especially nationalist. Thus, the bulk of their readers most probably belong to the more 
tolerant university-educated category, and the stances ranging mainly from conservative-nationalist 
to liberal-nationalist with some tolerance for diversity and cultural rights with calls for reform can be 
estimated to resonate with their views on the topic and thus reflect the more tolerant end of the spectrum. 
The exclusionary discursive patterns had consequences for the life-experiences of the people: 
according to the Konda survey study, 14.3% of Kurds said they had been treated badly by their fellow 
citizens and 5.6% had faced discrimination by the judiciary or the police (Konda 2011: 96). Thus, 
even if the acknowledgement of Kurds as non-Turkish, or recognition of Kurds as Kurdish is something 
Turkey’s Kurds have demanded, it should not be naively perceived only as a positive step leading towards 
multicultural society, but it took place amid rising antagonistic attitudes towards or discourses on Kurds 
in Turkey. As Yeğen also concludes: 
… the state has continued to pursue the ideal of a homogeneous, monolingual political community 
within its borders and seems determined to reduce the political community to an ethno-cultural 
community. Under such conditions, expecting a ready remedy to the increasing alienation of the 
Kurds is unrealistic, as is expecting the growing doubts of the establishment in Kurdish loyalty to 
fade. (Yeğen 2009, 615.)
Yeğen argues that to resolve this dilemma, the state would need to one day perceive Kurds as respectable 
citizens of the Republic without requiring assimilation (Ibid.), not an easy demand when diversity is 
conceptualized as disruptive for the nation by the media and other nation-building institutions. 
Having discussed the undesirable effects of increasing visibility of diversity, I want to underscore both 
the great symbolic and practical importance of this development. Public acknowledgement of the existence 
of Kurds as Kurds in Turkey and increasing acceptance of the existence of an identity-based, political issue 
besides the violent conflict, or identity issues forming the background for the violent conflict are important 
steps towards successfully accommodating ethnic, cultural and linguistic diversity in Turkey.
I hope I have managed in this work to illuminate an important phase of this discursive and social 
transformation, including its contested nature, the continued difficulties and constraints as well as the 
undeniable progress made. I will cite two positive consequences of this process of opening up. One 
of them is research of Kurds as discussed in chapter six. When I first started this work in 2004, there 
were almost no studies made on Kurds in Turkey, and also very scant hard data on Turkey’s Kurds. For 
example, one had to rely on Servet Mutlu’s (1996) ingenious statistical estimations on the number of 
Kurds in Turkey based on reported mother-tongue in the survey of 1965. The contrast to the current 
situation with studies such as the Konda surveys on identity issues in Turkey (2007 and 2011) is great. 
The other positive outcome is a result of the first one. Some of the studies (such as Konda 2011) have 
explicitly addressed the question of inequality in relation to ethnicity, and the findings clearly show the 
effects of discrimination against Kurds and point out a deep structural inequality. It is exactly this kind of 
research that is needed to counter the claims that no-one is discriminated against in Turkey as claimed by 
Cumhuriyet columnists, or that it is difficult/impossible to establish that such a discrimination is based 
on ethnicity as there are many social groups in Turkey facing poverty and otherwise in disadvantaged 
situations (Argun 1999). To have any hope of being widely accepted, demands for affirmative action and 
positive rights need to be based on sound information of inequality.
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ChaPter 9: an ePilogUe 2009–2015
This short epilogue offers a very brief overview of the main developments from 2009 to 2015 pertaining 
to the Kurdish issue in Turkey.
 
9.1 politics afteR the kuRdish initiative of 2009 
As was mentioned in chapter seven, AKP’s Democratic Opening/Kurdish Initiative in 2009 failed. It 
was much resisted by other parties, did not bring immediate results, and came to a halt with the public 
outcry after the so-called Habur incident, where the 34 returning PKK members received an enthusiastic 
heroes’ welcome to Turkey. 
The process was also hampered by the increased judiciary pressure on legal pro-Kurdish political 
activities. In December 2009 the Constitutional Court of Turkey banned the DTP for having become 
the ”focal point of activities against the indivisible unity of the state, the country and the nation,” i.e. 
having an organic connection with the PKK, and for violation of Articles 68 and 69 of the Constitution 
and the Political Parties Law.411 The party’s co-chairmen Ahmet Türk and Aysel Tuğluk were expelled 
from the Parliament and a total of 37 party members, including Leyla Zana, were banned from joining 
any political party for five years. 
In addition to the closure of the DTP, a series of mass arrests of pro-Kurdish politicians had 
begun already the previous April as a part of the Union of Kurdistan Communities (Koma Civakên 
Kurdistan, KCK) investigations and trials. The KCK was founded in the 2005, and can be considered the 
operationalization of Öcalan’s idea of “democratic confederalism.” Öcalan is its symbolic president and 
the de facto leader of PKK, while Murat Karayılan is the chairman of the executive council. According 
to the indictment, KCK’s main demands were as follows: constitutional recognition of Kurdish identity 
(under Türkiyelilik, i.e. being from/of Turkey); full linguistic minority rights (Kurdish as second official 
language and Kurdish-language education); full rights to association, freedom of thought, expression 
and conscience; eradicating all gender discriminatory legislation and social inequality; the institution 
of a project of reconciliation including release of Öcalan and all political prisoners; abolishment of the 
village guard system and economic assistance to returning villagers; and increasing the power of local 
governance. The PKK on its side would end the violence gradually and join democratic life. (Bayır 2014: 
35-7.) A total of 113 criminal cases were launched as part of the KCK investigation and 2,146 people 
were charged. Derya Bayır has interpreted the trials as a political strategy aiming to marginalize Kurdish 
political activity (and to prevent politicization of the PKK) with less international criticism than party 
closure cases (Ibid.). 
The DTP was succeeded by the Peace and Democracy Party (Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi, BDP 
founded in 2008), which improved on DTP’s 2007 performance in the elections of 2011 and managed 
to get 35 representatives elected as independents. This unprecedented success in working around the 
10% national threshold was achieved with a host of well-known and highly visible candidates, as well as 
411 For more details, see the analysis of media coverage of this party closure by Erdem 2014.
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with a carefully engineered campaign to ensure the optimal distribution of votes.412 In the elections of 
2011, Leyla Zana returned once again to the parliament, twenty years after she was elected for the first 
time.413 
In the 2011 general elections, the ruling AKP received a strong mandate with 50% of the vote. This 
ranks as a victory made all the more specular by the fact that it was the first time in Turkish political 
history that a ruling party managed to increase its share of the vote in third elections in a row. Yet, the 
AKP obviously expected even more. Its aggressive campaign against the nationalist MHP with the aim 
of pushing the party below the 10% national threshold did not succeed, and the pro-Kurdish BDP 
exceeded everyone’s expectations with the 35 (up from the 22 in 2007) seats for its candidates. When 
this was combined with the 5% increase in votes for the Kemalist CHP, the AKP actually ended up 
having 327 seats, fewer than before, which left it short from the minimum number of votes in the 
national assembly needed to make constitutional amendments alone (367 votes are needed to make 
unilateral amendments, and minimum 330 are needed to submit proposed constitutional amendments 
to a national referendum).
As was discussed in the previous chapters, despite numerous amendments, the Constitution of 1982 
strongly reflects the authoritarian and state-centric mind-set of the military, under whose authority it 
was written. There was a widespread consensus that to democratize and to resolve the Kurdish issue and 
other diversity-based problems, Turkey would need a new constitution. Constitutional recognition for 
Kurdish identity has ranked as one of the demands made by the pro-Kurdish parties. The AKP Prime 
Minister Erdoğan had also voiced his wishes for a presidential or semi-presidential system to replace 
the parliamentary one; thus the issue was far from being trivial for the party. Judged by Erdoğan’s 
victory speeches, the AKP seemed to acknowledge the need for collaboration and consensus to achieve 
constitutional changes. 
The “new” CHP under the moderate and soft-spoken Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who hailed from Tunceli 
with an Alevi-Zaza background, did well with 26% of the vote, even if this was much less than the party’s 
enthusiastic supporters expected.414 Kılıçdaroğlu was involved in a difficult balancing act, attempting to 
diversify the views present in the party while still retaining the old support. Cooperation between the 
AKP and the CHP was also thought possible. The nationalist MHP did poorly with only 13% of the 
vote, and was on bad terms with the ruling AKP. 
The Parliament’s Constitutional Reconciliation Commission began its work on a new constitution 
from scratch. All four parties in the Parliament (AKP, CHP, MHP, BDP) were included, and it was 
stipulated that decisions had to be taken unanimously. There were some expectations after the elections 
of possible cooperation between the AKP and the BDP, where the first would get the support it needed to 
amend the constitution and the latter would get concessions vis-à-vis the pro-Kurdish demands. Despite 
extensive negotiations, the Commission managed to reach agreement over only 60 articles, while deeply 
rooted disagreements remained over many of the basic issues (see Kaya 2013). The process was not made 
easier by the AKP’s push for a presidential system instead of a parliamentary one. The other parties 
412 This is done with a cost: political parties in Turkey receive support from the state treasury. In a democratization package 
in 2013 this support was extended to parties with over 3% of the national vote (previously 7%). With candidates running as 
independents, the pro-Kurdish parties are not able to receive any state funding (Yüksekova Haber 3.3.2014).
413 It was possible to be elected as an independent despite the 5-year ban on political party membership.
414 Deniz Baykal had to resign in 2010 after a tape revealing his extra-marital relationship with another CHP MP was leaked.
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feared this, as it would give even more power to Erdoğan and the AKP. The AKP withdrew from the 
commission in late 2013.415 Thus the 10% national threshold also remained in effect. In early 2015, in 
preparation for the 2015 general elections, President Erdoğan once again emphasized the need for a new 
constitution, to be prioritized after the elections.
A source of concern for observers of Turkey from at least 2013 onwards has been the increasingly 
authoritarian behavior of the AKP, and especially President Erdoğan, which contrasts sharply with the 
democratizing reforms of AKP’s first years in power. An ongoing and increasingly harsh suppression of 
journalists, civil society actors, and political opponents has taken place, including this time the previous 
ally, the Gülen movement. At the same time, the increased political control of the bureaucracy and 
security services and legislative reforms have limited judicial oversight. (Among others Eissenstat 2015.)
A deep political polarization has formed between the supporters of the AKP and the others, whose 
opinions the AKP has not felt it needs to heed, as was clearly evidenced by the Gezi protests of 2013. 
Despite his conciliatory speeches after the 2011 elections, Erdoğan has not been willing to make any 
compromises and has used harsh rhetoric against any and all opposition to his rule. Meanwhile, the 
political alternatives to the AKP have remained too weak to challenge its power. The political polarization 
has also been aggravated by the numerous corruption accusations against leading AKP politicians and 
the increasing grandiose spending of President Erdoğan (since 2014). 
The AKP has retained much of its popularity despite several corruption scandals in late 2013 
and early 2014 that implicated several ministers, as well as Erdoğan and some of his family members. 
Erdoğan dismissed the evidence of corruption, including audio recordings, as fabrications by elements 
of a “parallel state” composed of followers of Fethullah Gülen. In the wake of the scandal more than 
2,000 police officers, judges, and prosecutors who had been investigating government corruption were 
dismissed from their jobs or transferred to other assignments. (Freedom House 2015.)
The corruption cases, controversies, polarization, and increasing authoritarianism did not reduce 
the popularity of the ruling AKP, which gained two electoral victories in 2014. It received more than 40 
percent of the vote in the local elections in March and in August Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan 
was elected president in the first direct elections for the post. The main opposition parties remained 
lackluster and weak, while the mainstream Turkish press has been effectively brought to heel. Since 
the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013, the government has greatly expanded its police powers and 
consolidated control over civil society organizations.
A new development in the pro-Kurdish politics was the emergence of the Halkların Demokratik 
Partisi (HDP, People’s Democratic Party), which was founded in 2012. The BDP and the HDP together 
received 6.1 percent of the vote in local elections (secim.haberler.com 2014).416 In the summer of 
2014 the BDP merged together with the HDP. The HDP is a leftist/socialist party that has worked to 
overcome the division between Turkish and Kurdish leftists. It defends and reflects diversity and promises 
to protect the rights of the diverse disadvantaged or oppressed groups in society (Sardag 2015). Initially 
it was questioned as to what extent the party could actually attract votes from non-Kurds as it is closely 
415 I highly recommend the TESEV collection of short articles and evaluations of the constitutional process on http://
turkeyconstitutionwatch.org/.
416 The BDP got 2.059.485 votes and the HDP 901.945. The BDP won a total of 77 municipalities in the Southeast: Ağrı 
51% of the vote, Bitlis 44%, Diyarbakır 55%, Hakkari 69%, Siirt 47%, Tunceli 28%, Van 53%, Batman 52%, Şırnak 71% 
and Iğdır 43%. In addition, Ahmet Türk, who ran as an independent, received 52% of the votes in Mardin. (Habertürk 
2014.)
292
associated with the history of the pro-Kurdish political movement and thus the PKK and Öcalan. The 
success of HDP’s co-chairman Selahattin Demirtaş in the presidential elections of 2014 was promising: 
he received almost 10% of the vote, i.e. significantly more than the pro-Kurdish parties had received in 
earlier elections. Emboldened by this success, the HDP participated in the 2015 national elections as a 
party, rather than as independents, and managed to overcome the 10% national threshold with more 
than 13 percent of the vote and a total of 80 seats in the parliament.
9.2 naRRoWing boundaRies of fReedom of expRession
As was briefly described in chapter five, pressure on the media started to once again increase at least from 
2007 onwards. Once again the media friendly to the government began receiving financial rewards, 
whereas critical media are facing economic pressure and legal charges. Dozens of intellectuals and 
journalists have been jailed. The government harassment of newspapers or of individual journalists has 
once again become common, leading to self-censorship and dismissals.
In her article published in 2014, but largely written in 2012, Bilge Yeşil looks at state power, 
commercial pressures, and the resulting self-censorship (Yesil 2014). She describes how both the 
Ergenekon conspiracy trials and the KCK trials were used to silence journalists and media. The trials 
also targeted a number of critical and/or pro-Kurdish journalists used as evidence tapes from wiretapped 
phones. As a result, both journalists and their sources started to avoid discussing sensitive topics over 
the phone, which made journalists’ work much harder (Ibid.). In addition to fears of wiretapping and 
being publicly stigmatized as a coup plotter or terrorist, excessive economic pressure were brought to 
bear on media companies (such as the tax inspection and fine on Doğan Holding summarized in chapter 
five). As a consequence, the media became more hesitant to criticize the AKP government. A number 
of influential and well-known journalists have been fired or have resigned under pressure, and a number 
of critical TV programs were ended. Yesil gives a number of examples of these: in 2011 Oray Eğin 
from Akşam and Ferai Tınç from Hürriyet resigned; Banu Güven was dismissed from NTV for criticizing 
AKP over the Kurdish issue; the NTV terminated political news shows produced and hosted by Can 
Dündar and Ruşen Çakır, both veteran journalists; in 2012 Ece Temelkuran was fired from Habertürk 
for her columns critical of AKP’s Kurdish policy. Nuray Mert was put on leave from Milliyet due to her 
columns about the Kurdish issue. Nor was the pro-AKP media immune to pressure: Andrew Finkel was 
dismissed from Today’s Zaman in 2011 because of his criticism of the Ergenekon investigation and AKP’s 
undemocratic turn; in 2012 Mehmet Altan, editor-in-chief of Star, lost his position for criticizing the 
government; and Ali Akel from Yeni Şafak was fired for criticizing Prime Minister Erdoğan. (Yesil 2014, 
166-167.) An example from 2013 was the dismissal of Milliyet’s well-known columnist Hasan Cemal, an 
institution in himself.417 His columns were cited in chapter seven as an example of stances going beyond 
liberal nationalism in the media. Apparently hundreds of journalists, many of whom had been working 
on corruption investigations, have quit under pressure or been fired from their posts. The AKP has also 
417 Technically he resigned after the paper refused to publish his new column after a two week forced leave of absence. The 
leave of absence was due to a public rebuke by Prime Minister Erdoğan over the publishing of the minutes of a meeting in 
İmrali with Öcalan and BDP MPs. According to Cemal, the editor-in-chief was ordered to do so by the owner of the daily, 
Mr. Demirören, after Erdoğan had personally called to put pressure on him (Cemal 2014). Erdoğan denied any involvement. 
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an active policy of suing journalists for insulting government officials. 
A special case has been the crack-down on the Gülen movement, including its media outlets, one 
of which is the daily Zaman analyzed in this work. By 2013–2014 it had turned increasingly critical of 
the government, and in December its editor and more than 20 other workers were arrested for allegedly 
establishing a terrorist group to attack another Islamic organization (Freedom House 2015.) All in all, 
more than 30 people linked to Gülen, including newspaper editors and television scriptwriters, have been 
arrested. According to the evaluation of Assistant Professor of Middle East history Howard Eissenstat 
(2015), the Gülenist movement attempted to challenge Erdoğan after the Gezi demonstrations with 
the leaked recordings of phone conversations and the corruption cases, but lost. In March 2016, Zaman 
newspaper was taken under the control of state authorities.
9.3 gRadual expansion of cultuRal Rights
The increasing authoritarianism of the AKP regime did not prevent a gradual expansion of Kurdish 
cultural rights from 2009 to 2014. The Kurdish only state television channel TRT Şeş was launched in 
January 2009 prior to the Democratic Initiative, and the expansion of cultural rights continued despite 
the failure of the opening. In 2009 restrictions on the use of Kurdish by prisoners among themselves and 
with their visitors were lifted, and the Higher Education Executive Board (Yüksek Öğretim Kurumu, 
YÖK) accepted the establishment of a Kurdish section at the Institute of Living Languages at Mardin 
Artuklu University. Finally, in the fall of 2011, almost ten years after the petition campaigns for Kurdish 
language education, the first steps to realize Kurdish language education in Turkey were finally taken as 
courses in Kurmanci were started at the Kurdology institute at Artuklu, an institution that plans both to 
carry out academic research and to train teachers for Kurdish language courses. (Öpengin 2015, 14-15; 
Taştekin 2014.) Later, Artuklu University also established undergraduate-level Kurdish Language and 
Culture studies, and several other universities in the Kurdish region have opened Kurdish language and 
literature departments. Given the scarcity of qualified staff, most of the departments exist only nominally 
with relatively little academic activity (Öpengin 2015: 15). Initially the Artuklu University program was 
very popular with 3000 applications, and in 2013 the first 500 students graduated from Kurdish studies 
from Artuklu. However, there have been continued problems with state officials vis-à-vis enrollment to 
the program (Taştekin 2014.) 
In the summer of 2012 the AKP government announced the decision that Kurmanci and Zaza could 
be taught as elective courses in state schools, two hours per week from fifth to seventh grade. As little 
as two hours per week for three years may be, it was an important step towards fulfilling another one of 
the demands of the petitioners, and the first step towards realizing full linguistic rights in public primary 
education. It is a historic change away from Turkish-only educational system and paves a path for wider 
integration of Kurdish into public education (Öpengin 2015.) When the Kurdish courses were began in 
2013, 18,847 students chose the course in 28 of the 81 provinces (Hürriyet 6.2.2013). According to a 
study summarized in the daily Radikal, both the students taking the course and their parents have been 
very excited about the course. This despite the fact that the teachers had no formal education in teaching 
Kurdish (Radikal 14.9.2014) as the Turkish Ministry of Education has been very reluctant to appoint the 
Kurdish language program graduates from Artuklu as teachers. 
Other positive steps were the Parliament approval in the spring of 2014 of a democratization package 
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that allowed use of other languages besides Turkish in spoken and written election propaganda, and 
the restoration of non-Turkish village names. The Parliament also recognized the right to education in 
languages other than Turkish in private schools (Öpengin 2015). The first private schools teaching only 
in Kurdish were established in the fall of 2014, but were closed as they had no proper permits. A Kurdish-
language children’s television channel Zarok TV was launched in March 2015 (Mynet 25.3.2015).
In conclusion, important steps to expand cultural rights have been taken in recent years, and some 
of these, such as university level education in Kurdology and Kurdish language courses in public school 
system, have been at the core of pro-Kurdish demands and of great symbolic importance. This expansion 
of cultural rights should be considered all the more important as it did not really have the full support 
of the non-Kurdish population as was discussed in the concluding chapter of this work. At the time of 
writing this in late 2015, there is also still quite a way to proceed to full linguistic rights, and as Öpengin 
notes, there are several shortcomings in the achievements so far: The expansion of linguistic rights does 
not equal official, legal recognition of Kurdish as the legislation still resorts to euphemisms such as 
“living languages and dialects” rather than explicitly guaranteeing citizen’s rights to receive education in 
Kurdish, Kurmanci, or Zaza. The government retains full authority in regulating the use of non-Turkish 
languages as granting or withholding permissions to broadcast or run educational activities is subject 
to the decisions of the state ministries. When there is no firm legal protection for the use of Kurdish, it 
renders these rights fragile. Also the implementation of these new policies is often inconsistent: Kurdish 
language teachers are trained, but not appointed by the Ministry of Education, and instead unqualified 
personnel teach the classes. Also, why does the mother tongue teaching start only from the fifth grade? 
Evidently families and students have been discouraged to take Kurdish language as elective course by 
school personnel to show that in reality Kurds are not interested in Kurdish language courses.418 (Öpengin 
2015, 17-19.) Öpengin concludes that as important as this limited expansion of linguistic rights was, 
it should not be interpreted as a reversal of Turkish-assimilationist policies vis-a-vis the Kurds (Ibid.), 
rather it should be seen as a new version of older politics in conformity with the government’s strategy of 
containing Kurdish ethno-cultural activism and pro-Kurdish demands. 
9.4 staRt of negotiations and the peace pRocess 2013–2015
In addition to gradual expansion of cultural rights, until 2015 the AKP worked to end the violent 
conflict. There had been occasional rumors and accusations of negotiations between representatives of 
the state and the PKK for years. The existence of negotiations was finally confirmed in 2011, when a 
tape was leaked to the Turkish media. It was apparent that state officials had met with representatives 
of the PKK to discuss the possibilities for peace on several occasions between 2008 and 2011 in the 
so-called Oslo Talks. While Prime Minister Erdoğan had in 2010 denied these accusations in harsh 
terms, he finally acknowledged them in 2012, when the judiciary opened investigation into these very 
negotiations.419 The talks were apparently discontinued after the incident in Silvan in the summer of 
2011, when a PKK strike killed 13 Turkish soldiers. Even if these negotiations did not bring immediate 
418 The figure published for 2013 was remarkably low and the figures for 2014 were not made public.
419 The investigation was prevented by the AKP government.
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results, their importance should not be underestimated. Previously the state had categorically refused to 
negotiate with “terrorists”.420 The later willingness to negotiate indicates that both sides had come to the 
conclusion that they could not win the armed struggle: the Turkish armed forces had not been able to 
destroy the PKK and the PKK had not managed to gain permanent foothold in Turkey. Despite this, the 
conflict re-escalated once again in 2011-2012 , claiming hundreds of victims. 
One of the difficult issues since 1999 has been the position and role of Abdullah Öcalan in the 
process. The de-facto leader of the PKK has been in solitary confinement on the prison island of İmralı, 
but PKK militants and supporters still regard him as the undisputed leader of the Kurdish nationalist 
movement, a national hero, and cannot see a resolution without him. Thus both the PKK and other 
Kurdish nationalist actors have continued to insist on his inclusion into the process as well as making 
the conditions of his imprisonment lighter and eventually his release (for example the interview with 
Karayılan in 2013, Cemal 2014). This has actually been one of the most difficult demands for the Turkish 
public, as Öcalan has customarily been demonized as the one solely responsible for the tens of thousands 
of deaths. The Kurdish nationalists have countered by claiming that Öcalan is the only individual who 
has the ability to “bring the militants down from the mountains.”
Despite Öcalan’s repeated calls for peace from 1999 onwards, several unilateral ceasefires, and several 
declarations of willingness to participate in resolving the armed conflict, the Turkish state has, at least on 
the official level, continued to refuse to include Öcalan in negotiations until early 2013. In January 2013 
Prime Minister Erdoğan announced that Öcalan would be included in the peace process about to be 
launched. Accordingly, his isolation421 was lifted enough to allow him to meet a number of pro-Kurdish 
politicians of the BDP in February 2013, and to present his plans for achieving peace through the MPs 
to both Ankara and the PKK.422 
Öcalan’s letter was read to the audience at the Kurdish New Year’s festivities, the Newroz on 21st of 
March. Turkish commentators hailed the day as a historical one: the BDP members of the Parliament, 
Pervin Buldan and Sırrı Süreyya Önder read both in Kurdish and Turkish Öcalan’s New Year’s message 
of a new era, an era of resolution whence weapons were to be silenced and ideas would be debated. 
Unlike in 2005 when Erdoğan visited, this time the audience in Diyarbakır numbered in the hundreds of 
thousands. (Cemal 2014: 47.)423 Öcalan’s roadmap included the following: a lasting ceasefire and an end 
to violence, followed by a new constitution that would include a new definition of citizenship, address 
local governance, and allow for education in mother tongue; the issue of imprisoned KCK members, 
the withdrawal of PKK militants from Turkey, general amnesty, and the right of return of PKK fighters 
(Cemal 2014: 25). 
420 As was evidenced by the investigation into the negotiations led by Hakan Fidan in 2012, it was technically illegal for 
organs of the state to engage in negotiations with representatives of the PKK.
421 Previously he had been allowed to meet only with members of his immediate family and his lawyers, who had forwarded 
his communications.
422 The PKK actors have referred to the peace negotiations as taking place between Ankara, İmralı and Kandil, i.e. between 
the government or state, Öcalan and the PKK. 
423 The letter was published by the online sites of several newspapers and tens of columns were written about it. According 
to the leftist sendika.org, the pro-AKP-government publications were highly supportive of the process and emphasized the 
role of the AKP in the peace process; the liberal ones were positively surprised by the process, centered more on Öcalan and 
analyzed his letter in detail; columnists in nationalist newspapers warned of separatism/separation; Cumhuriyet writers used 
objective language and were willing to give the process a chance but saw it as having external roots (Basında Diyarbakır 
Newroz’u ve Öcalan’ın mektubu 22.3.2013). 
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After the auspicious start in 2013, the progress of the peace process was quite slow, the advances 
ad hoc and piecemeal. Yet, there was progress, as the government matched PKK’s ceasefire with serious 
changes in legal framework that was thought to make real progress possible. Even in the absence of clear 
commitments or matching end goals, the process itself was seen as useful for the entire country. The 
PKK’s ceasefire since March 2013 largely held, drastically reducing casualties (International Crisis Group 
2014: i) until 2015. 
After the failure of the peace process, the list of recommendations in the November 2014 report by 
the Crisis Group Europe can be read as a list of its shortcomings. The report urged both sides to do more 
to define common end goals and show real public commitment to difficult compromises. The process 
lacked a comprehensive agenda, an urgent timeframe, good social engagement, and mutually agreed 
ground rules and monitoring criteria. Instead, it consisted of a series of ad hoc initiatives. The process 
also lacked agreement on conditional amnesty, transitional justice, or a truth commission. (International 
Crisis Group 2014: ii) By early 2015 the painfully slow process was finally described as being “stalled” 
(Eissenstat 2015, 2).
9.5 WaR Resumes in 2015
In the summer of 2015, Turkey restarted the war against the PKK. One of the reasons was the 
shortcomings of the dragging and difficult process described above, while other important reasons 
were the regional developments in the Kurdish inhabited regions in Syria, Iraq, and Turkey, as well as 
the domestic political situation with the success of the pro-Kurdish HDP in the 2015 parliamentary 
elections.
The so-called Arab Spring with the spread of the civil war into Syria and the 2012 declaration of 
the autonomous Kurdish region of Rojava in Northern Syria adjacent to the Turkish border raised the 
expectations of Kurdish nationalists, who apparently foresaw a possibility of their own “Kurdish Spring.’ 
The emergence and aggressive expansion of the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) in Northern Syria 
and Western Iraq in the summer and fall of 2014, and especially its attacks to Mosul, the KRG areas, and 
the Kurdish town of Kobani at the Syria-Turkey border dampened these optimistic expectations. Yet, the 
common struggle against the ISIS has served to tighten the bonds between the Kurds in Syria, Turkey 
and Iraq, and to an extent Iran.
Turkey’s response to the civil war in Syria and the extreme violence on the other side of its border 
has been problematic. In 2012 it voiced its expectations that the Assad regime would collapse within 
months, and committed itself to supporting the opposition. Turkey failed to act in 2014 in the face of 
the rapid expansion of ISIS. Many commentators, including Kurds in Turkey and Syria, accused Ankara 
of offering covert aid to ISIS in its efforts to cleanse the Kurdish population of Syria from areas adjacent 
to Turkey’s borders. (Karaveli 2014.) Then, as ISIS laid siege to the Kurdish town of Kobani, which 
was held by a PKK-affiliated Democratic Union Party (PYD), Turkey refused to intervene and faced 
new accusations of complicity, thus damaging Turkey’s standing with the US and NATO allies. Turkey’s 
refusal—or failure—to act also influenced its own political balance by giving the previously side-lined 
military more power. It also brought violent Kurdish demonstrations to the streets of Turkish cities, with 
tens of dead in the demonstrations of October 2014.
Since the summer of 2014, the PKK and its Syrian affiliate, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), 
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have spearheaded the battle against the jihadists in Iraq and Syria, and for the first time, the United States 
began overtly cooperating with the PKK, despite its continued inclusion on list of terrorist organizations 
It was the US-led coalition airstrikes against ISIS targets in and around Kobani that tipped the battle 
decisively in the Kurds’ favor. (Zaman 2015.) The struggle for and subsequent victory in Kobani united 
the Kurds in new ways, even if both PKK and PYD claim that they have no dreams of an independent 
Kurdistan. Turkey has continued to oppose any arrangements in Syria that would lead to Kurdish 
autonomy, but it is far from certain that it can actually prevent such arrangements. Despite the events in 
Kobani and Syria, the peace process between the Turkish state and the PKK continued throughout 2014, 
and at that time it was estimated that neither side could afford to resume the war within Turkey. 
Time will show what follows from the newly found unity of Kurds in Turkey, Syria, and Iraq. 
With Kurdish autonomy and self-rule in the neighboring countries, it would be less likely that Kurdish 
nationalists in Turkey will settle for modest, individually conceptualized cultural rights, equal citizenship 
of Turkey and a limited local autonomy with constitutional recognition, which could be something the 
AKP-governed Turkey might be willing and able to offer. 
Another reason behind the re-start of the war against the PKK has been the popularity of the 
democratic pro-Kurdish legitimate party, the HDP, which is not in the interests of President Erdoğan’s 
AKP or the PKK. The leader of the HDP, Selahattin Demirtaş, stated in the spring of 2015 that the HDP 
opposes Erdoğan’s ambition to transform Turkey into a presidential system, with Erdoğan himself at the 
helm. When the HDP managed to get into the parliament with 13% of the vote, it trumped Erdoğan’s 
possibilities of having the necessary majority for unilateral constitutional change. Erdoğan’s need for the 
support of the Kurds for the constitutional change, and willingness to barter this support for wider rights 
for the Kurds has been estimated to have been an important motivator behind the peace process, and 
now this motivation was removed. Erdoğan may also have calculated that the re-escalation of violence 
would work against the HPD in the re-elections in November 2015.
The PKK’s decision to restart the hostilities has also raised some speculation. It is likely a combination 
of miscalculation based on PKK’s position as a US ally in the fight against ISIS as well as a move against 
the HDP and Selahattin Demirtaş. The PKK would prefer to remain the sole voice of Turkey’s Kurds. In 
any case, the re-escalation of violence has also this time brought along increasingly inter-ethnic clashes 
between Turks and Kurds, and actions against ethnic Kurds in various cities in Turkey. 
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